The South China Sea is home to a number of territorial claims from China. These include Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, and Malaysia. Over the years, some of the claimant countries have used fishing and natural resource extraction operations to advance their claims. China has even constructed artificial islands to support their rights in the sea. As a result of the competing claims and the variety of economic and political developments in the South China Sea, the Chinese Communist Party will continue agressive policies in a number of overt and covert ways.
Key Judgment-1: China will continue to be aggressive towards regional powers in the South China Sea but will not initiate conflict in the next 12 months.
Key Judgment-2: Regional powers, particularly the Philippines and Vietnam, will create stronger partnerships with the United States to counter China in the next 12 months.
Key Judgment-3: China will work to strengthen relations with Malaysia in order to ensure extended maritime access through the Malacca Strait in the next 12 months.
Sources of Geospatial Analysis
- Maxar
- Airbus
- Google Earth (Maxar, Airbus)
- Esri
- Sentinel-2 L2A
Key Judgment 1: China will continue to be aggressive towards regional powers in the South China Sea but will not initiate conflict in the next 12 months.
a) In February 2021, China’s Communist Party passed a new Coast Guard Law which authorizes the Chinese Coast Guard to fire on foreign ships that enter China’s claimed waters [source].
b) China’s policy will continue to be assertive in order to firmly lay claim over territory in the South China Sea [source].
c) Under the leadership of Xi Jinping, China progressed towards achieving Xi’s “China Dream.” A major component of this vision is China reclaiming what is believed to be territory of historical Chinese control [source].
d) After consolidating control, Xi demonstrated the ability and the will to use aggressive means in pursuit of this dream [source].
e) For a number of years, the CCP used civilian Chinese fishing vessels as cover for a maritime militia. The militia can be used to intimidate other countries with territorial claims in the South China Sea [source].
f) These vessels allow China to extend their aggression under the cover of gray zone warfare tactics [source].
g) China expanded it’s airfields on Hainan Island to accommodate additional maritime surveillance aircraft and UAV’s as well additional residential areas for staff and pilots [see Fig. 1, 2 and 3].
Name: Sanya Air Base
Location:18°17’7.41″N, 109°27’46.06″E
Description: A moderately sized air base currently undergoing significant expansion with the addition of new recreational and residential facilities. Several hangars appear dedicated to house reconnaissance UAVs whereas others appear to be housing maritime patrol and ASW helicopters.
Name: Sanya Air Base
Location: 18°17’7.41″N, 109°27’46.06″E
Description: An animated series of grabs showing the development of Sanya over the course of several years.
Name: Lingshui Air Base
Location:
Description: A large air base located to the east of Sanya Air Base and capable of accommodating far larger aircraft. The aircraft present at Lingshui appear to be maritime patrol and surveillance aircraft as well as AWACS and ASW aircraft. Of particular note is the presence of Shaanxi KJ-500 AWACS aircraft. This aircraft could greatly enhance the ability of the PLAN to engage targets at a distance.
Key Judgment-2: Regional powers, particularly the Philippines and Vietnam, will create stronger partnerships with the United States to counter China in the next 12 months.
a) As regional powers have faced aggression from Chinese ships, they have turned to the United States for assistance. In China’s view, this growing partnership is the primary reason for heightened tensions and risk of conflict [source].
b) Former Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, indicated that the United States only recently took a position against China’s territorial claims and that this is causing instability and threatening peace. This has forced China to step up their show of force to counter the U.S. interest and influence [source].
c) Since the early 2010s, Chinese citizens have developed a strong nationalist sentiment. This has resulted in harsh views towards the Philippines, Vietnam, and by proxy the United States [source].
d) This in turn has encouraged greater degree of aggression from Beijing [source].
e) The US Secretary of Defense hosted President Marcos at the Pentagon. Both agreed to mutually develop defence cooperation [source].
f) US Secretary of Defence Austin also visited Manila in January and finalized a deal which would allow the US increased naval access to the Philippines [source].
Key Judgment-3: China will work to strengthen relations with Malaysia in order to ensure extended maritime access through the Malacca Strait in the next 12 months.
a) China’s leadership has, since the early 2000s, been concerned with their reliance on the Malacca Strait for a large share of economic activity [source].
b) Concern over the United States ability to control this strait and create a blockade in the event of conflict is encouraging China to cooperate more closely with Malaysia [source].
c) According to estimates, the Malacca Strait provides transit for 60% of China’s trade flows and is even more critical to China’s economy as productivity and population stagnation provide new challenges for the CCP [source].
d) The Malacca Strait is critically the passageway of 80% of China’s oil imports. Should conflict arise, China’s opponents will likely work to cut this passageway off and pose a detrimental energy supply risk to China [source].
e) The Yulin and Longpo Naval Bases on Hainan Island are strategically located to deny US Naval assets free movement in the Malacca chokepoint area with SSBN’s and at least one carrier, the Shandong [see Fig. 4].
f) The Shandong itself was deployed in the South China Sea and around Taiwan [source].
g) The Yulin Naval Base is undergoing extensive renovations and expanding its capacity by adding to additional piers [see Fig. 4].
h) Sentinel-2 imagery from May shows work ongoing on the 2 new piers to the west of the facility [see Fig. 5].
Name: Yulin Naval Base – West
Location: 18°12’7.83″N, 109°33’5.24″E
Description: A large naval base with dry dock and repair facilities, berthing for an aircraft carrier and multiple berths for conventional and nuclear submarines. A large radar and air defense installation sits on the southwestern most outcropping across from the carrier berth and dry dock. New piers are under construction and are visibly being developed in an active manner.
Name: Yulin Naval Base – Sentinel 2 Imagery
Location: 18°12’7.83″N, 109°33’5.24″E
Description: A large naval base with dry dock and repair facilities, berthing for an aircraft carrier and multiple berths for conventional and nuclear submarines. A large radar and air defense installation sits on the southwestern most outcropping across from the carrier berth and dry dock. New piers are under construction and are visibly being developed in an active manner.
Analytical Summary
We are confident in the assessment that China will continue to increase its aggression in the South China Sea. The sources used to create this assessment are of a wide variety and viewpoint. Official Chinese Communist Party documents and laws were consulted in order to track China’s stance on the issue over the years and project that into what it will evolve into over the next 12 months.
Independent researchers were also consulted in order to counter analytical biases associated with such a highly contentious political issue. The quality of these sources have given us a high degree of confidence in the conclusions of the assessment. In alternative scenarios, China may deem the issue as too important to their identity and national pride that they would decide to engage in conflict in the region.
By utilizing geospatial tools to establish tactical capabilities of the PLAN, we are also confident in our assessment that the PLAN is investing additional capital and resources into developing maritime capabilities in the South China Sea.
