One thing I want to share with you outside of report contents is about our readership.
Of course, we are trying to deliver our reports and articles as much as we can to professionals in industry, just like you and me.
But data analytics shows that most of our current readers are business developers, marketing & research experts, security contractors and real bystanders who don’t even aware of the fact that there are ongoing wars all around the globe haha.
So, as you can see, it is likely for us to assume that our intel consumers don’t have deep enough understanding in geopolitical or military issues. Therefore, in our writings, we have to be kinder for those consumers, so they can correctly consume your works.
I know you have good skills to correlate info and come up with creative judgements, but the way you illustrate is more suitable for scholars and senior level analysts, not suitable for people who do not have ‘foundational understanding’, which you and me might think that as a ‘common sense’.
I’m 100% sure that this issue is more common issue in government or military working environment. The most of high-ranking decision makers, especially the politicians and government officials, that I met in Korea, US and UK usually do not have same basic information or understanding that you and me have. One time, group of MPs in Korea ordered me to analyse potential threat for newly opening Korean Embassy in country X, where AQ affiliates were extremely active at that time. I worked so hard for that. After couple of weeks, I finished my dissemination of my report in front of them and the first question what they ask to me was, surprisingly, “So, what is AQ?” – this makes me to rewrite entire report again, starting from super basic information.
Also, this is why making consumer to “consume” report properly is also an analyst’s task. I know it’s fucking annoying, but it is also a painful truth that you will face in your future workspace.
So, for the next time, imagine that the consumers of your report are high school students or stupid douchebags in internet who try to be a smart ass so-called ‘professional’. This mindset will definitely helps you to come up with easy consumable report.
This report seeks to offer a current assessment on the tactical situation in North-Western Libya, with a focus on the newer factors affecting the 2nd Libyan Civil War.
This report contains the following Key Judgements:
- Turkish involvement is proving to be crucial. It includes widespread drone warfare, use of its navy, and material and personnel support.
- Coronavirus is not yet a major factor for either side in the conflict. It is, however, the subject of rival media narratives by the LNA and GNA. Within 2-4 months it will begin to have a negative impact on the fighting power of both the GNA and LNA.
- Supply is highly likely to be an issue for the LNA. Routes are difficult, and Turkish drones are hitting exposed LNA supply vehicles. This will almost certainly continue, and the GNA’s tactics clearly reflect awareness of this weakness.
Libya is suffering from a second civil war, between two powers. On the one side, the UN-approved Government of National Accord (GNA), based in Tripoli, is supported directly by Turkey, but also by Italy and Qatar. The Libyan National Army (LNA), commanded by strong-man Field Marshal Haftar, supports a Tobruk-based alternative government. The LNA has mostly surrounded the GNA in Tripoli and Misrata, where fierce clashes, drone-based warfare and artillery shelling dominate the conflict. See figure 1 for a current map overview of the areas of control in Western Libya.
Figure 1: Extracted from Liveuamap.com 08.04.2020. Approx. front-lines. GNA in Blue, LNA in red.
(9). Turkish Involvement: In the past six months, Turkey has dramatically increased assistance to the GNA, which now includes naval forces, drone/air contributions, and contributions of manpower and equipment.
(a). On 01 April 2020, a G class frigate fired a Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM;RIM-66E) at an LNA target (likely a drone), but missed. The presence of this frigate next to the important oil refineries of al-Zawiya, (currently held by the GNA) will protect oil exports from the refinery. See figure 2 for images of the Turkish frigate next to Sabrata. The Turkish Navy’s entry to this war as an active participant is a major tactical development, as it redefines the areas in which LNA aircraft and drones can operate freely. Furthermore, its presence outside the GNA-controlled port of Al-Zawiyah indicates Turkish deployments are in the area to protect important oil infrastructure. The LNA is highly unlikely to be able to counter or attack Turkish frigates, with a lack of capabilities to do so.[SK1]
Figure 2: Extracted from Twitter. Photo of G Class Frigate off the Libyan coast, near Sabrata.
(b). Turkish drones have had a great effect on the conflict by conducting strikes on logistical vehicles throughout the conflict zone, but in particular, in the area in and around Bani Walid (see figure 4). Bani Walid is a small town to the South of Tripoli, and South-West of Misrata, the two last-remaining major urban strongholds of the GNA. In the past 8 days, the GNA has struck multiple targets, claiming to have destroyed several LNA trucks carrying important artillery munitions to the front lines. See figure 3 for photograph and corresponding claim from Libya Observer. Though air attacks are not necessarily all attributed to Turkish drones, a spate of destroyed vehicles with precision munitions, and the systematic targeting of logistical vehicles in the LNA’s rear is consistent with Turkish drone tactics. Further evidence supporting this theory is the claim that the LNA downed a drone near Bani Walid on 09/04/2020. The pattern of attacks suggest that the GNA knows that it is a crossroads which supplies for the LNA must pass through. It is highly likely that such attacks will continue, and that missing supplies will interrupt and delay LNA attacks and artillery bombardments.
(c). Aside from targeting the LNA’s logistic chain, the drones serve a tactical function – see figure 5. They target combat vehicles on the front-line near Tripoli with precision munitions. There are few reports of Turkish drones being destroyed while in the air; a Jane’s report from December 2019 suggests that most drones were destroyed while on the ground. The LNA does have some anti-drone capability however – it has conventional surface to air missiles which can target air assets. Some electronic warfare drone-disrupting equipment has been spotted in service with the LNA, however, it is only effective against targets up to 1000m, and Turkey’s main offensive combat drone, the Bayraktar TB2 has an operational altitude of 7300m. GNA air superiority over the LNA is highly likely to be demoralising to LNA troops, with little means to return fire[SK2] [LT3] [SK4] [LT5] . There are now also fewer reports of drones being destroyed on the ground, as there were in 2019. This suggests that the GNA and Turkish military have learnt from their mistakes and changed their tactics accordingly. Turkish drone attacks are highly likely to target LNA troop concentrations ahead of major attacks, discovering and disrupting them, especially in areas of high-intensity, important fighting near Tripoli.
Figure 3: Extracted from Libya Observer Destroyed LNA truck carrying artillery munitions. N.B. Claim/photo may be exaggerated/misleading, as Libya Observer is pro-GNA media source.
Figure 4: Extracted from https://libya.liveuamap.com/en, see airstrikes around Bani Walid, and Bani Walid’s important logistical position on roads leading to Tripoli and Misrata.
Figure 5: Extracted from Twitter, LNA truck-mounted ZSU destroyed by Turkish drone strike, on the front-line near Tripoli.
(d). Turkish materiel and manpower contributions[LT6] [SK7] [LT8] : Turkish manpower contribution to the war is likely to be a significant factor in the GNA’s ability to defend territory. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, as of late March 2020, approximately 4750 Syrian fighters have been trained and sent to fight for the GNA in Libya, with a further 1,900 training in Turkey. However, with casualties rising, and their salaries not being paid, morale is reportedly low. Turkish materiel contributions consist of whatever can be brought in by plane, and by ship. As documented by BBC News Africa, three cargo ships, the Amazon, Bana and the Ana have sent weapons munitions and vehicles to Libya. The Amazon brought small arms, missiles, and 40 Kipri armoured vehicles. The Bana and Ana docked in Libya in January and February respectively; the Bana dropped off an unknown number of ACV-15 vehicles, GDF Anti-Aircraft guns, T-155 Self-Propelled Guns, and KORKUT Self-Propelled Anti-Aircraft Guns, while the contents of the Ana is unknown. Outside of contributing with drones, and naval power, the Turkish contribution can be measured in terms of manpower and materiel – vehicles, munitions and weapons. Syrian fighters are highly likely to be encountered in the areas around Tripoli, though their quality as fighting units may be questionable, due to rising casualties, and low morale due to unpaid salaries. Turkish armoured vehicles and weapons are highly likely to be encountered on the battlefield, though it is almost certain that inexperienced crews will not use the more complex weapon systems to their full potential.
(10). Coronavirus: Coronavirus has not put a stop to the conflict yet. Instead, it is becoming a factor which both sides will need to consider, not from a medical, but a media perspective (see figure 5,6,7). Coronavirus cases were estimated to double every 7.4 days in the early stages of the epidemic in Wuhan (before restrictions came in). Though some restrictions are in place across Libya[SK9] [LT10] , they are reasonably mild, and the doubling rate for Libya is still highly likely to remain relatively high. Though there are relatively few documented cases of coronavirus in Libya, this is likely due to lack of testing capability. The immediate impact to tactical units on both sides from “social distancing” and other preventative measures will be the reduced ability to rely on civilian activity to fulfil needs, logistical and otherwise. The disease’s impact upon units will be light, as most fighting age males will not suffer overly from ill effects. Effects from the disease itself are unlikely to be severe for another 2-4 months.
Figure 5: Extracted from Twitter, Pro-LNA account links Syrian mercenaries to Corona virus.
Figure 6: Extracted from Twitter, pro-LNA media source claims Turkish drone bombed a plane carrying medical supplies and corona virus medication.
Figure 7: Extracted from Twitter, pro-GNA media source claims that the LNA is shelling Al Khadra Hospital, which is a hospital serving Coronavirus cases.
(11). Media reports from 01 April 2020 show strong evidence that a military cargo plane landed in Benina airport, Benghazi, carrying supplies for the LNA. This is far from the front-lines around Tripoli, and LNA supplies must then travel by road or air closer to the frontlines. A road journey from Benina Airport to Sirte is approximately 560km, and depending on the route, munitions travelling by LNA controlled roads could travel as far as 1450km until they reach the frontlines near Tripoli. In contrast, Turkish supplies landing in Tripoli or elsewhere by sea or air have a far shorter distance to go before reaching GNA-aligned forces – sometimes fewer than 30km. Adding to the logistical difficulty for the LNA is the intermittent Turkish drone strikes targeting its vehicles, as discussed in paragraph 9b. The GNA has relatively short supply lines and is better able to immediately exploit assistance from external powers. For the GNA’s tactical commanders, this means that Turkish equipment and support will reach them quickly and responsively, once in Libya. In contrast, the LNA must transport equipment and supplies for hundreds of kilometers, occasionally in contested conditions. It is highly likely that this logistical burden is negatively affecting the LNA, and it is a major strategic weakness. The GNA is targeting this strategic weakness, and will highly likely seek to continue attacking and disrupting the LNA’s supply lines in coming months.
[SK1]Please merge all “Assessment” sections in your report into linked main context area. I know this is good way and easy way for both analyst and readers to understand, but flowing narrative is also very important, especially as a web content.
[SK2]I saw some pic in Twitter which Libyan militia using Tavor-21 style anti-drone weapon. Can you find that out?
[LT3]I found it, but it’s a bit a weird one. It only targets VERY low flying small drones, and it’s used for stadiums and the like. Wouldn’t destroy/down the bigger drones. Proper anti-TB2 weapons are conventional SAMs, or complex electronic warfare equipment, which I doubt the LNA has, and if they did, could they use it effectively?
[SK4]I 100% agree with this. Can you add this comment into context in more formal analytic description format?
[LT5]Added
[LT6]I want to know if this news story is true: https://almarsad.co/en/2020/03/28/french-navy-intercepts-ship-with-turkish-weapons-heading-for-libya/
It makes sense given the geopolitical situation, but no-one is reporting it, and it would impact my assessment by saying that Turkey is going to be less able to bring weapons and vehicles into Libya at the moment. Any idea how I can verify it?
[SK7]Love this. Considering the source itself, it seems reliable info. Anyway, 2 tips for info validation issue:
1. Find the echo!
Finding directly related information is the best of course. But, as you mentioned, if it is not available, find circumstantial evidence or indirect information. For example, assessing GNA offensive / defensive activities before and after the interception can lead you if this true or not (Of course, you have to analyse how Turkish equipment support was crucial first as a yardstick for comparison). If you have enough time to do so, this will be the best way to validate but it is not suitable in our timeframe. I think at least it will gonna take 2 weeks, considering current ammo / equipment stock of GNA.
2. Coming up with “What if” analysis at the end
This is easier way for analyst to conduct analysis based on the very weak information or source. If you show this info as an evidence of future inefficiency in Turkish intervention, unless you don’t mention this info in main body, this can be very good evidence for alternative scenario or prediction. Of course, in this case, you should notice the reliability and credibility of info / source, so make consumers understand why this info didn’t used in main body.
[LT8]I have decided not to include it because after another few days have passed, no other news source other than Marsad has reported this story, and the few other media sources just quote the Marsad claims – there is no evidence that I can see.
[SK9]Are these restrictions being effective enough as China?
[LT10]I’ve added that they’re fairly mild restrictions -which seems to be the case. Ultimately I suspect it will vary hugely from place to place in Libya, depending on local government and priorities of the war.
