The Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS) also known as the Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste (FE) is a Danish intelligence agency which is responsible for the foreign intelligence provided to Denmark and also operates as the Danish military intelligence service. Working under the Ministry of Defence it is housed at Kastellet, a preserved citadel in Copenhagen. Responsible for the analysis of and dissemination of intelligence which is important to Denmark’s domestic security and its military activities it works closely with the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (DSIS).
1 Logo and History of the DDIS
1.1 Logo of the DDIS
The logo of the DDIS features an abbreviation for the name of the organisation in Danish, Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste. It also features a crown on top of the logo which is due to Denmark being a monarchy.
1.2 History of the DDIS
The origin of the DDIS can be traced back to 1911 and the pre-WW1 General and Naval Staff Intelligence Sections. However, it has operated continuously since then and has undergone name and organisational changes.
1.2.1 1866-WW1
Between 1866 and 1867, the Danish Ministry of War established a clandestine intelligence service, which was subsequently integrated into the tactical department of the General Staff in 1873.
In 1903, this department underwent a reorganisation, adopting a structure inspired by the French model, resulting in the formation of four distinct bureaus. The intelligence service was assigned to the newly designated “2nd Bureau,” which was renamed Generalstabens Efterretningssektion (GE) or General Staff Intelligence Section in 1911.
Beginning in 1911, General Erik With (1869-1959) assumed leadership of GE, having previously been involved with the intelligence service from 1904 to 1908.
He was affiliated with a faction of officers that held strong pro-French and pro-British sentiments, which led to attempts by his German colleagues and the Danish government to oust him.
In 1918, Captain Niels Frederik Herholdt Sylow (1877-1958) succeeded General With as the head of GE, following a lengthy power struggle with the defense minister that resulted in With’s reassignment to a battalion commander role in Holbæk.
However, evidence from private notes and diaries suggests that With was able to retain influence over GE throughout the war via intermediaries and regular meetings with Sylow.
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1.2.2 Organisation of the General Staff Intelligence Service
Three covert organisations were led by officers: the Foreign Intelligence Service, the Preventive Intelligence Service, and the Domestic Intelligence Service, which were founded in 1866, 1898, and 1900, respectively.
Foreign Intelligence Service
The primary objective of the foreign intelligence service was to deliver alerts regarding the possibility of an invasion, specifically a German offensive against Denmark. It was anticipated that such an assault would involve German ground forces advancing through Jutland alongside the German Navy’s deployment to Køge Bay, where troops would be disembarked near Copenhagen.
Consequently, operatives were recruited in German ports situated along the Baltic Sea, as well as along the Kiel Canal and the railway connecting Hamburg to the then Danish-German frontier. These agents were instructed to observe the gathering of transport vessels, military supplies, and troop movements.
GE maintained a network of approximately fifteen agents within Germany, all of whom were part of the Danish minority. Their encrypted communications were transmitted through letters, telegrams, and even advertisements in local German publications.
However, the efficacy of this communication system waned during the war due to the strict regulations imposed on information exchange.
As a result, GE resorted to utilizing “legal travellers” for intelligence collection abroad—Danish tourists and business individuals who were briefed by GE prior to their journeys and subsequently debriefed upon their return to Denmark. The Danish-German border was relatively easy to traverse, and military activities in Schleswig were also meticulously monitored.
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Preventative Intelligence Service
The Preventive Intelligence Service functioned not as a formal organisation or department like the Foreign and Domestic Intelligence Service departments, but rather as a collective term encompassing all counterintelligence operations.
Investigations into suspected espionage were systematically recorded by GE, resulting in a directory of names that surpassed 1,000 entries by 1918. The intelligence gathered was sourced not only from operatives within the domestic intelligence service but also from postal and telegraphic communications.
Throughout the war, both GE and law enforcement agencies possessed the authority to mandate telephone wiretaps and to intercept letters and telegrams related to espionage investigations.
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Domestic Intelligence Service
The Domestic Intelligence Service aimed to create a network of informants that could be mobilised in the event of a hostile takeover of Denmark, akin to a “stay-behind” network.
By the year 1914, this initiative had evolved into a fully operational counter-espionage agency that, both before and during the war, provided the General Staff (GE) with updates on any suspicious activities potentially linked to French, British, German, or Russian intelligence operations within Denmark.
At the onset of the war, around 1,500 individuals had enlisted and undergone training in specific areas. The organisation was structured hierarchically, comprising group leaders, district heads, and regular agents. These agents were frequently tasked by GE with various investigative and surveillance assignments.
The leaders of German espionage activities in Denmark were diligently monitored by agents to the best of their capabilities. Investigations into suspected spies typically commenced when an agent identified a suspicious situation and maintained surveillance of the suspected spy.
If the GE determined that a case warranted further attention, the collected evidence was forwarded to the police authorities for continued investigation.
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1.2.3 WW2
At the outbreak of WW2 the Danish intelligence community consisted of the Generalstabens Efterretningssektion (Intelligence section of the General Staff) and the Marinestabens Efterretningssektion (Intelligence section of the Naval Staff.
Headed by Col. Mygdal Einer Norderntoft and Capt. Poul Adam Mørch respectively, both organisations did not consist of more than a dozen staff due to a general disinterest from the Danish government in intelligence activities in the interwar period.
In mid-1941 an agreement between the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) and the Special Operations Executive (SOE) stated that the SOE would be responsible for the collection and analysis of information in Denmark. They would also liaise with the local resistance organisations within Denmark.
This agreement meant that the SOE would take over primary intelligence collection duties and MI6 would play little to no role in intelligence collection in Denmark.
However, MI6 did make an attempt to drop an operative named Thomas Sneum and his wireless radio operator Christoffersen near Brofelde. Sneum was a former officer in the Danish army who had fled to England in June 1941 by flying a homemade aircraft.
After being vetted by MI5, Thomas Sneum was convinced to return to Denmark by Euan Rabagliati, an MI6 officer. Here he conducted several operations before escaping to Sweden following suspicion by the local police force.
1.2.4 Ebbe Munck
The reluctance by MI6 to collect information was due to the quality of information provided by the SOE and their Danish agents. The information gathered by the SOE Danish Section largely came from Ebbe Munck. He was an explorer and agent of the Danish military intelligence service who operated undercover as a journalist for a daily newspaper known as Berlinske Tidende.
Munck worked in Stockholm and maintained close contact with an SOE representative, known as Ronald Turnbull. Munck claimed to be linked to a fully equipped and prepared resistance movement known as “the Princes”.
Turnbull and Munck had an agreement which MI6 had endorsed on the grounds that intelligence would be traded for a ban on sabotage. This was feared to bring severe reprisals without damaging the German war machine to any large degree.
However, SOE began to suspect that “the Princes” had exaggerated their strength. In August 1942 they were proven correct when the Danish puppet government fell and the Germans imposed their own administration.
During this replacement of administration, one of the leaders of the “Princes” was arrested, and two escaped to Sweden. The fourth surrendered and was freed allowing him to travel to Copenhagen and reestablish contact with SOE.
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1.2.5 Cold War
Throughout the Cold War, military intelligence and the police’s intelligence division closely monitored and documented the activities of the Danish left, which included communists and also pacifists.
This surveillance extended to various organizations and individuals associated with the Danish branch of the War Resisters’ International, the Danish Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons, and the Conscientious Objectors’ Union.
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2 Organisation of the DDIS
2.1 Organisation Structure of the DDIS
The DDIS is composed of several divisions which include an Operational and a Supporting Division. These are then further divided into other supporting components within these divisions such as regional desks and also technology support divisions
2.1.1 Operational Divisions
Intelligence Division
The Intelligence Division consolidates most of the intelligence functions within the DDIS and is responsible for three primary objectives:
- Knowledge enhancement
- Threat detection
- Countermeasures.
Leveraging its diverse capabilities, the division gathers data and information, which are then analyzed and transformed into actionable intelligence. A significant portion of this intelligence forms the basis for the alerts regularly communicated to DDIS partners.
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The Center for Cyber Security (CFCS)
A primary objective of the Centre for Cyber Security (CFCS) within the DDIS is to strengthen the cybersecurity framework of critical infrastructure sectors.
To achieve this goal, the CFCS provides advisory support to Danish public institutions and private enterprises, whilst also overseeing their network communication systems to mitigate the risk of advanced cyber threats.
Additionally, the CFCS serves as Denmark’s national authority for IT security and acts as the telecom response authority.
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Defence Division
The primary objective of the Defence Division is to support the Danish Defence and NATO. Its responsibilities include:
- managing military security under the jurisdiction of the Danish Ministry of Defence
- Providing intelligence support for military missions
- Facilitating both offensive and defensive cyber operations related to military activities.
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2.1.2 Supporting Divisions
Legal & Executive Support Division
The Legal & Executive Support Division is responsible for managing the DDIS’s legal matters. It also supports the Board of Directors, coordinates activities with the Ministry of Defence, and oversees media communications as well as relationships with DDIS’s international partners.
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Development, Resources and Internal Security Division
Organisational support for the entire DDIS is the responsibility of the Development, Resources, and Internal Security Division. Key staff tasks such as financial management, strategic planning and development, and human resources are also managed by this section. It is also responsible for maintaining the DDIS’s internal security.
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Data, IT & Advanced Technologies Division
The DDIS’s data and technology infrastructure, as well as its signal intelligence capabilities, are developed and maintained by the Data, IT & Advanced Technologies Division. The division also oversees internal IT security protocols and oversees the management and improvement of IT systems and applications.
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3 Facilities operated by the DDIS
The DDIS is known to operate one facility which aids in its mission of intelligence surveillance and collection. It is as follows:
3.1 Sandargargardan Station
The DDIS operates the Sandargargardan station located close to Copenhagen, where it conducts monitoring of data-driven communication. This facility assesses various forms of communication, including that which occurs through submarine cables.
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4 Controversies Linked to the DDIS
4.1 Lars Finden
Lars Findsen, a Danish jurist and former civil servant who served as chief of the Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS) from 2015 to 2020, was placed on temporary leave in August 2020 when it was discovered that the spy agency had broken the law and misled its oversight body.
Between 2014 and 2020, the agency had monitored Danish citizens. Whistleblowers who supplied vital information prompted an investigation into this incident.
The agency was accused of failing to look into espionage in the armed services and of gathering and sharing data about Danish nationals. It is also charged with concealing violations and neglecting to report them to the intelligence monitoring body.
Findsen and three other people were detained and accused of leaking confidential material in December 2021. However, five days after his arrest, a commission which was tasked with investigating the allegations cleared the intelligence agency and the arrested employees of any wrongdoing.
4.2 NSA Collaboration
In May 2021, reports emerged that the DDIS had collaborated with the US National Security Agency (NSA) to wiretap and monitor other EU members and states including several politicians such as Angela Merkel.
This lead to widespread backlash from the other EU members and there were also demands for an explanation from the Danish and American governments.
5 Conclusion
The Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS) also known as the Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste (FE) is the intelligence agency which is responsible for the protection of and provision of foreign intelligence used in Denmark’s defence. It also operates as the Danish military intelligence service. As a component part of the Ministry of Defence, and bound within a preserved citadel in Copenhagen, it is responsible for the analysis of and dissemination of intelligence which is important to Denmark’s domestic security and its military activities. With escalating espionage activities all across Europe, the DDIS is poised to take a greater part in the defence of Denmark.
