grey dynamics

African Security Organisations Part III: MOWCA

August 2, 2020

Jesutimilehin Akamo

  Key Judgements   MOWCA’s implementation and evaluation mechanism is ineffective. Therefore, West and Central African states need to strengthen maritime security. MOWCA/ICGN and ECOWAS/ECCAS's tasks overlap. This is highly likely responsible for the delayed implementation. Lack of productive cooperation, and lack of implementation and harmonisation of national laws to support MOWCA’s ICGN shows weakness of member states towards the ICGN. Maritime crime will likely increase between 2020 and 2022. Hence the need to mobilise more resources for maritime security.…

African Security Organisations Part II: EASF

July 31, 2020

Eren Ersozoglu

  This Grey Dynamics African Intelligence report analyses the East Africa Standby Force (EASF), why it is important, what are the weaknesses, and how it could contribute to ongoing and future security issues.     Key Judgments KJ-1. The EASF claims full operational capacity but has yet to be tried and tested in an actual operation. Scarcity of funding and training in reality likely limits the capacity of the organisation to operate at an effective level of capacity.   KJ-2.…

African Security Organisations Part I: ECOWAS & G-5 Sahel

July 30, 2020

Ana-Maria Baloi

  This report delivers a comparison between the modus operandi of the two most influential organisations in West Africa - The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and G-5 Sahel. The document informs the reader about the latest developments in terms of counterterrorism efforts in the Sahel region while generating future scenarios. For collection and processing, the author used OSINT, therefore the report is safe to be further distributed.     Key Judgements   KJ-1. G-5 Sahel is a…

AFRICOM Part IV: AFRICOM in North Africa

July 16, 2020

Louis Tayler

Key Judgements   AFRICOM’s mission in North Africa is limiting the effects of instability resulting in the 2nd Libyan Civil War. This mission has almost certainly had limited success. AFRICOM, and by extension, the United States has a de-facto neutrality policy on the 2nd Libyan Civil War; the US is highly unlikely to pick a side or get involved beyond hunting IS and AQ affiliates, and other extremists, in light of Trump’s “America First” withdrawal. Despite denial by Tunisian authorities and strategic…

AFRICOM Part III: With or Without AFRICOM – Central Africa

July 15, 2020

Jesutimilehin Akamo

  Key Judgements   It is almost certain that the majority of the Central Africa region is unstable. While Sao Tome and Principe remained peaceful within the last decade, others are either at the brink of a conflict or have active conflicts. Oil as a national security issue was the primary reasons for AFRICOM’s establishment. Therefore, even if AFRICOM reduces engagement in Africa, AFRICOM is highly likely to maintain its presence and relationship in Central Africa. African countries will highly…

AFRICOM Part II: AFRICOM’s Strategy in West Africa

July 14, 2020

Ana-Maria Baloi

  This report examines the strategic concepts of AFRICOM applied in West Africa, based on the US interests in the region, military doctrine and past experiences in other parts of the world. For collection and processing the author used OSINT, therefore the report is safe to be further distributed.     Key Judgements   KJ-1. US’s military strategy in West Africa is to contain the terrorist threat by helping the local forces to develop their own capacities and tactics. AFRICOM…