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    Egypt and Israel’s Dirty Little Secret

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    Just days into 2019, it was reported that Egyptian President Abdul Fattah al-Sisi had been subject to an interview by the CBS television show 60 Minutes, an interview Egypt’s envoy to the US requested not to be broadcast shortly after it was conducted. The background for the request is quite simple: Firstly, al-Sisi answered sensitive questions about his regime’s methods in countering opposition. Secondly, al-Sisi confirmed an unprecedented level of cooperation between Egypt and Israel, which can both make or break Egypt’s security and al-Sisi’s regime.

    The Beginning of a Partnership

    The Egyptian Revolution of 2011 spawned Ansar Bait al-Maqdis, a jihadist extremist group. They exploited the power vacuum and initiated an ongoing insurgency in the Sinai Peninsula. The group launched attacks on Israeli targets from the Egyptian side of the border, as well as sabotaging the Arab Gas Pipeline, which crosses half the peninsula, before entering Jordan. In 2013, the army, led by al-Sisi, removed Mohammed Morsi from power in a coup d’etat, a move that led the Sinai insurgency to target Egyptian security forces increasingly. Following this, Egyptian security forces increased efforts against the insurgency, with minimal results. Immediately after the coup, Israel urged the US and its allies to recognise al-Sisi as the legitimate leader of Egypt, mainly because of Morsi’s ties with the Muslim Brotherhood.

    Israel’s recognition of al-Sisi was the beginning of the cooperation between the two, and it took only weeks before the first report of unidentified explosions came in August 2013, which killed five insurgents near the Israeli border. It was claimed that the explosions were caused by Israeli drone strikes with Egyptian approval, to which Egypt responded that such a claim was ‘lacking truth and goes against sense and logic.’ In 2014, the group pledged allegiance to IS and formed the Sinai Province branch of the group. After the merger, the insurgent’s ambitions grew and in July 2015, they captured the city of Sheikh Zuweid. Just months after, the Russian commercial airliner leaving Sharm el-Sheikh was shot down in Northern Sinai on its way to St Petersburg, killing 224 people, most of whom were tourists. These events led to a shared understanding – stabilization required increased efforts.

    Egypt and Israel

    Increased Cooperation

    It’s reported that in the following two years, up until the beginning of 2018, Israel conducted more than 100 airstrikes in Sinai. In comparison, the Israeli Air Force only reached that number of strikes inside Syria in five years. The delivery vehicles, drones, helicopters, and jets were all unmarked when conducting the strikes, sometimes flying circuits to deceive possible observers into believing they originated from within Egypt. At the same time, the area itself has been declared a closed military zone to reduce the risk of discovery. Israel was reportedly unsatisfied with Egypt’s ability to secure territory with ground troops following their air strikes in the period 2015-2017, which led to the formation of another alliance. In 2017, Egypt mobilized four Bedouin tribes – the Tarabin, Sawarka, Tiyaha, and Rumaylat – to take arms against terrorists in the Peninsula.

    The alliance announced their objective was to eliminate terrorism in the area in coordination with the Egyptian army. This move has helped the security situation in the Peninsula as the alliance has contributed with intelligence, closing local smuggling routes, and fighting. Government forces increasingly gained a foothold in the area and saw attacks starting to diminish after the addition of the Bedouin to the already existing Egyptian-Israeli alliance.

    The Leviathan Field

    Counter-terrorism efforts continued in 2018, and the prospect of a stable and secure Sinai has become more viable. In late 2018, Israel announced a $15 billion deal allowing gas export from Israel to Egypt. Israel discovered the Leviathan gas field in 2010 and will begin production in 2019. The export to Egypt will go through a part of the Arab Gas Pipeline. A part of it connects Ashkelon in Israel to El Arish in North Sinai.

    The Leviathan field incentivises further cooperation as Egypt invested in natural gas infrastructure in the 1990s, while Israel lacks such infrastructure. Egypt has two liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals that could export LNG once the natural gas supply is in place. With increased cooperation, Israel could increase its production and use Egypt’s existing infrastructure to tap into other large markets. In contrast, with increased regional stability, Egypt could start production in the Zohr field and export its natural gas.

    Egypt and Israel

    High Risk, High Reward?

    Currently, Egypt and Israel have common enemies in the Sinai Peninsula and Syria. They also have common interests in securing and stabilizing Sinai, a necessary condition for Egyptian-Israeli natural gas cooperation. Such a future could decrease unemployment and increase investment in Egypt, reinforcing its security and stability. On the flip side, following al-Sisi’s comments on 60 Minutes, the people could start turning on his regime. Despite the cooperation, state-owned media has continued to denounce Israel publicly. The cooperation has been going on covertly, which many would perceive as hypocritical.

    In society, Israel is still primarily understood as being the enemy. The increased normalisation of relations and approval of Israeli military action within Egypt could cause domestic opposition. If such opposition were to rise, they would likely accuse the regime of being hypocritical and sneakily normalising Israeli relations. Then, the security situation in Sinai could once again become unstable with four Bedouin tribes armed and trained to fight. Egyptian forces would then be placed in demilitarized zones in Sinai based on Israeli approval. The success of the cooperation has so far been dependent on the covert nature of it. Bringing its extent to light might be a huge risk

    Fredrik Hellem
    Fredrik Hellem
    Served in the Norwegian Military Intelligence Batallion. Former student at Aberystwyth University and St Petersburg State University, currently studying MA Intelligence and Security Studies at Brunel University London.

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