1.0 Introduction
Intelligence Failure can be defined as when an actor does not collect and analyse information adequately, formulate sound policy based on intelligence (and other considerations), or respond effectively. This implies that Intelligence Failure can happen at multiple levels at multiple stages during the entire Intelligence Cycle.
Intelligence Failure is quick to make national headline news due to the devastating impact it can have. The public and media alike are keen to hold the Intelligence community and policymakers accountable when Intelligence does not function as anticipated. Conversely, Intelligence Successes often go unpublicised, which is a symptom of their success.
Defining ‘Intelligence Failure’ is more challenging than perhaps initially evident. Modern media frequently uses the term across a wide range of events. The phrase immediately evokes images of the 11th September 2001 attacks, or the 2017 London Bridge attacks, as incredibly famous examples of a lack of warning of significant events. However, Intelligence Failure can occur in more than one way. [source]
2.0 So What?
As intelligence Analysts our job is to facilitate informed decision-making by collecting and analysing vast quantities of information to tease out valuable insights. As good decision-making relies on timely and accurate intelligence, any failings during the intelligence process can result in misinformed policy decisions. Intelligence failures can therefore have serious negative strategic consequences.
In February 2022, for example, Vladimir Putin was informed by senior FSB officials that a Russian invasion of Ukraine would invite minimal Ukrainian resistance. On 24 February, Putin launched Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on the assumption that Kyiv could be encircled in under three days and Russian forces would be greeted with open arms. Over two years into Putin’s three-day “special military operation”, Russia has suffered over 500,000 and is yet to capture Kyiv. [source]
Deconstructing intelligence failures is crucial to preventing future failures. This process typically involves highlighting conscious or unconscious behaviours that disrupt the intelligence process and developing means to mitigate them. By seeking to improve the intelligence process, the intelligence community and decision makers can increase the likelihood of strategic successes and mitigate the potential threat of surprises.
Belarussian President Alexander Lukashenko detailing Russia’s intended plan for Ukraine in March 2022. [source]
3.0 When Does Intelligence Failure Happen?
3.1 The Intelligence Cycle
Intelligence failure can originate from failings at any point during the intelligence process. The intelligence process, which is in essence the relationship between the intelligence consumer and producer, is typically depicted as an intelligence cycle. How the intelligence cycle should be expressed as a diagram is widely debated by Intelligence practitioners and scholars.
While scholar debate how the intelligence cycle should be expressed in diagram form, it is widely accepted that the process consists of five main stages:
- Direction – A question is set by the consumer
- Collection – The gathering of information and data
- Processing – Validating collection and sorting useful information
- Analysis – Identifying the implications of collated information
- Dissemination – Expressing intelligence product to decision-makers
The Core Functions of Intelligence according to JDP 2-00 3rd Edition. [source]
3.1.1 Direction
Intelligence failures at the direction stage are usually the manifestation of a communication breakdown between Decision-maker and Analyst. When setting an intelligence question, decision-makers must take into account the limitations of the intelligence community.
Intelligence collection is not all-seeing and intelligence Analysts are certainly not all-knowing. Therefore, the decision-maker and Analyst must work together to clearly define the scope of the intelligence question so that appropriate collection sources can be utilised and the final intelligence product provides maximum insight.
Decision-makers are generally looking for up-to-date information regarding their current issues and strategic priorities. Therefore, as part of the direction, consumers may be requesting short-term Intelligence products which lack significant strategic value and are only relevant for a short time. [source]
While short-term intelligence products do provide policymakers with rapid strategic insights, the concise analytical format often fails to communicate nuance or strategic trends. In the decade following the end of the Cold War, within the CIA there was a push towards short-term intelligence reports. The CIA’s intention was to provide US lawmakers with direct policy support.
In the lead up to the Iraq War, the new format encouraged US policymakers to ask increasingly narrower questions which ignored Saddam Hussiens broader strategic concerns. The US intelligence community was hit by a flurry of questions regarding “Saddam’s WMD arsenal” and “Saddam’s links to al-Qaeda”. Consequently, US intelligence constructed narrow intelligence reports which failed to explain broader uncertainties about Iraq’s capabilities and the potential unreliability of some US sources. [source]
Intelligence Failure can occur at any stage of the intelligence process. [source]
3.1.2 Collection and Processing
Intelligence failures during the collection phase typically arise as a result of poor collection strategies. Once tasked with an intelligence question, Analysts evaluate which collection sources are most likely to efficiently and reliably provide relevant information on the subject matter. All intelligence collection sources, from imagery through to signals, have inherent strengths and weaknesses that increase and decrease the quality of information Analysts can extract. A sound collection strategy encompasses multiple sources of intelligence collection in order to mitigate the drawbacks of the different methods.
At the dawn of the 21st century, the United States possessed the world’s most sophisticated intelligence collection platforms. Once tasked, US systems were capable of capturing high resolution images almost anywhere on earth. Technology does not always paint the full picture however and in 2003, Iraq demonstrated why traditional forms of collection are still vital in the modern world. [source]
Between 1998 and 2003, the US had exactly zero human intelligence sources on the ground in Iraq. Previously, US intelligence had relied on UNSCOM’s WMD inspectors that had periodically toured Iraq since 1991. Therefore from 1998 onwards, US intelligence became reliant on overhead collection and lacked any sources on the ground to verify imagery analysis. [source]
The Kerr Report which followed the Iraq War claimed that US satellite and other forms of overhead imagery had failed to “acknowledge the political/cultural context” of Saddam’s actions in Iraq. Furthermore, not only was the US collection strategy formulated around the false premise that Saddam certainly possessed WMDs but it also failed to account for limitations and lack of certain collection methods. A comprehensive all-source approach to intelligence collection is therefore imperative to avoid intelligence failures at the collection stage. [source]
3.1.4 Analysis
The greatest risk of intelligence failure is arguably at the analysis stage. Intelligence analysis is fundamentally a cognitive task where in the Analyst extracts insights from information based on their experience and best judgement. However, when confronted with vast quantities of data, the human mind is poorly equipped to process the complexity of reality, especially in the face of great uncertainty and ambiguity. Our minds therefore create “heuristics” which simplify the world into models and patterns we can more easily understand. [source]
Patterns and models can be an Analyst’s best friend but also an Analyst’s worst enemy. By simplifying reality, patterns and models smooth the analytical process and make trends more easy to identify. On the flip side, patterns and models can oversimplify the world around us, leading Analysts to make forecasts that are detached from reality. The existence of models further implies that all world events occur according to organised frameworks with pre-described motivations and drivers. Regardless, heuristics are an inescapable element of human cognition. [source]
Bias
What is important is that analysts are aware of the shortcoming in their mental wiring. Analysts usually refer to the innate narrowness of our thinking as “biases”. Here are some examples all Analysts should be aware of:
Confirmation Bias – The tendency to listen to information that confirms existing beliefs.
Hindsight Bias – The tendency to perceive past events as more predictable than they were.
Recency Bias – The tendency to place undue importance on the most recent event.
Proportionality Bias – The tendency to assume big events will have big consequences.
Group Think – The tendency to minimise conflict in groups which causes groups to reach irrational consensuses.
These are only five of the most common biases during analysis, there are in fact hundreds of recognised mental models we form that inhibit our ability to perceive the world. And while analysts are trained on how to mitigate the effects, unconscious biases remain a leading cause of intelligence failure. [source]
3.1.5 Dissemination and other errors
Some Intelligence professionals have placed Intelligence Failure on the shoulders of those consuming Intelligence. That is to say that Intelligence Failure can occur when policymakers refuse to accept accurate Intelligence. [source]
This type of Intelligence Failure can occur for multiple reasons; biases of policymakers or wanting to proceed with the predetermined course of action despite any Intelligence produced can be considered an Intelligence Failure.
Finally, Intelligence Failures can occur outside of these stages and during the Intelligence process more generally. For example, competition between Intelligence agencies can lead to a lack of interagency cooperation, resulting in less comprehensive Intelligence products, thus painting an incomplete picture. Some agencies may have overly bureaucratic structures that do not allow timely reporting or face issues with corruption. These systemic issues can cause further Intelligence Failure. [source]
Finally, another major issue that can occur is the leaking of sensitive information. Espionage efforts to steal classified information and negligence of Intelligence professionals or policymakers that result in a breach of sensitive information can be described as significant Intelligence Failures. [source]
4.0 Conclusion
Intelligence Failure is not necessarily as easily rectified as it seems at face value. The intricate nature of Intelligence communities provides room for error at many levels. Be those at an individual level or more prominent systemic issues. Scholars and Intelligence professionals alike have long sought to avoid failures in the Intelligence cycle wherever possible. However, it seems that failure remains inevitable to some degree.
