Cuba’s Military Counterintelligence Directorate (Dirección de Contra-Inteligencia Militar – CIM) is one of the most effective and enduring counterintelligence agencies in the world. Established in 1962 in response to growing U.S. intelligence operations against the newly formed revolutionary government. The CIM has played a crucial role in safeguarding the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) from infiltration, espionage, and internal subversion. Over the decades, it has evolved from a Soviet-backed institution into a sophisticated intelligence apparatus with close ties to Russia, China, and other strategic allies.
In the post-Cold War era, CIM has adapted to modern threats. Shifting its focus toward economic espionage, cyber intelligence, and covert operations against the United States and other adversaries. High-profile espionage cases, such as Ana Montes, a senior U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) analyst who spied for Cuba for 16 years. Manuel Rocha, a former U.S. ambassador accused of being a Cuban agent for over four decades, highlights Havana’s long-standing ability to penetrate U.S. intelligence agencies.
This article provides a broad overview of CIM, its historical evolution, operational structure, key figures, and its ongoing role in geopolitical espionage.
Images Sourced From: Marco Zanferrari, Fidel, Diplo Denizen,
1 History of CIM
CIM traces its origins to the post-revolution security restructuring. After the 1959 Revolution, the new government faced immediate threats from exiles and the CIA, including armed infiltration and sabotage campaigns. To protect the Revolutionary Armed Forces from penetration, the Military Counterintelligence Directorate was officially established on 07 November 1962. [source]
1.1 Structure of CIM
CIM operates as the military intelligence branch of Cuba’s Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR), focusing exclusively on intelligence related to the Cuban military. Unlike its civilian counterpart, the Cuban Intelligence Directorate (DI), it specialises in military intelligence gathering and is responsible for conducting counterintelligence, signals intelligence (SIGINT), and electronic warfare activities, particularly targeting U.S. military operations at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base. It has an elite troop unit at its disposal: the Special Purpose Unit (UDE). The directorate maintains close ties with Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). A relationship solidified through a military cooperation agreement signed on 14 June 1993.
1.1.1 The Special Purpose Unit (UDE)
This specialised troop is integral to CIM’s operations, focusing on high-priority missions that require advanced training and capabilities. The UDE operates under the auspices of the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR), aligning its objectives with Cuba’s broader military strategies.
However, specific details about the UDE’s operations are scarce due to the covert nature of its assignments. Its existence underscores Cuba’s commitment to maintaining a robust and responsive military intelligence framework. The unit’s collaboration with international intelligence entities like Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) highlights its strategic importance in regional and global contexts. [source]
1.2 Key Figures
1.2.1 Jesús Bermúdez Cutiño: 1972-2000
After joining Fidel Castro’s caravan to Havana after the Cuban Revolution, Jesús Bermúdez Cutiño served in various military roles. Including assistant to an airborne battalion, head of a combat unit, and Chief of Operations in Cuba. Later in his career, he took on more senior roles. Such as the Chief of Staff of a motorised division in Santiago de Cuba, leader of the Holguín Division, and second chief of a major division defending Havana.
In 1972, he served as second-in-command of the CIM and later became the chief of Military Counterintelligence. Overseeing key operational functions in protecting the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) from external espionage threats.
Under his watch, the UDE was developed as the elite arm of the counterintelligence directorate. Bermúdez’s career highlights also include heading the Military Intelligence Directorate (DIM) of the FAR and, notably, being appointed head of the civilian Directorate of Intelligence (DI, formerly DGI) of the Ministry of Interior in 1989.
His appointment to lead the DI came in the wake of the Ochoa affair when a shake-up of the intelligence services saw military counterintelligence experts taking charge. Bermúdez is highly respected by the Cuban leadership – he is regarded as one of the country’s most capable and honoured generals, decorated with dozens of orders and medals
His tenure ensured that the UDE and CIM became integral to safeguarding Cuba’s military from espionage and treachery. Even after retiring from active command in 2000, General Bermúdez continued to contribute to Cuba’s defence intelligence as president of the Center for Defense Information Studies (CEID). [source, source]
1.2.2 Julio César Gandarilla Bermejo 2000-2016
Vice Admiral Julio César Gandarilla Bermejo was born in Matanzas in 1943. He played a crucial role in Cuba’s military and intelligence sectors. A founding member of the National Revolutionary Militias after the Cuban Revolution in 1959, he was actively involved in the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. For more than 16 years, from approximately 1999 to 2015, he served as the head of CIM, reinforcing the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces against espionage and internal threats.
His tenure in CIM shaped his rise within Cuba’s security apparatus. This led to his appointment as First Deputy Minister of the Interior before being promoted in 2017 to Minister of the Interior, under Raúl Castro’s administration. Gandarilla also participated in military operations in Angola (1975-1991) and carried out special missions in other countries.
As Interior Minister, he expanded security cooperation with Russia. He signed a memorandum of understanding with the Russian Security Council in 2019. However, his role in internal repression led to U.S. sanctions imposed by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in November 2019, accusing him of human rights violations in Venezuela. The sanctions also stated that Bermejo was responsible for arbitrarily arresting and detaining thousands of Cuban citizens, as well as unlawfully incarcerating over 100 political prisoners in Cuba.
Bermejo remained Minister of the Interior until his death in 2020. Marking the end of a long and influential career in Cuban military and counterintelligence leadership. [source, source, source, source]
2 Cuban counterintelligence in Angola
Cuba’s intervention in the Angolan Civil War (1975-1991) was a massive military operation and a major counterintelligence effort. Cuban forces deployed to Angola around 370,000 troops and 50,000 civilians to support the MPLA government against CIA-backed UNITA rebels and apartheid South Africa. While the primary focus was military, Cuba also deployed intelligence operatives and counterintelligence specialists to safeguard its mission.
Given the Cold War tensions, Cuba faced espionage threats from the CIA, South African intelligence (BOSS), and Western-aligned forces seeking to disrupt Cuban operations. Cuba’s CIM likely played a crucial role in securing Cuban forces. Identifying foreign spies, and preventing defections or leaks within the ranks. Cuban intelligence had already established a presence in Angola through Che Guevara’s earlier missions in the 1960s. By 1975, Havana’s intelligence services had refined their ability to counter enemy surveillance and sabotage. Additionally, Soviet and East German (Stasi) intelligence services worked closely with Cuban operatives, enhancing counterintelligence coordination. Additionally, CIM may have monitored local MPLA allies to detect possible infiltrators or Western-backed informants. The long-term Cuban presence in Angola until 1991 suggests that counterintelligence remained a critical component of Cuba’s broader military strategy. Ensuring that their forces remained resilient against external intelligence threats.
Even after the war ended, Cuban-trained intelligence operatives continued to influence Angola’s security sector, shaping its counterintelligence capabilities and state structures. This enduring legacy highlights the long-term impact of Cuba’s intelligence operations on Angola’s post-war governance and security framework. [source, source, source, source]
3 Cold War & Post Cold War era
For years, U.S. officials underestimated Cuban intelligence, viewing it as amateurish. Major Florentino Aspillaga’s 1987 defection to the United States changed that perception, revealing that Cuba had a highly trained, KGB-backed network capable of running numerous double agents and collecting valuable U.S. secrets.
His revelations dealt a significant blow to Cuban espionage, particularly by uncovering the extensive use of double agents and the level of Soviet training within Cuba’s intelligence apparatus. Aspillaga revealed that nearly every CIA recruit in Cuba since the 1960s was a double agent. Feeding false information to the U.S., was a deception that had severely compromised American intelligence efforts. He also disclosed that Cuba’s General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI) had expanded significantly after the U.S. invasion of Grenada. Enhancing its ability to track, infiltrate, and counter U.S. intelligence operations. Additionally, he claimed to know the identities of 350 Cuban agents operating abroad. Information that U.S. officials expected to cripple Cuba’s foreign intelligence for years. His defection forced Cuban counterintelligence to scramble, prompting the regime to publicly expose numerous CIA operatives in Havana in an effort to preempt further leaks.
Aspillaga’s disclosures revealed the sophistication of Cuba’s counterintelligence strategy. Demonstrating how Havana manipulated U.S. intelligence for decades while positioning itself as a formidable player in global espionage.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Cuba’s intelligence priorities shifted from countering U.S. espionage to economic intelligence gathering. No longer solely focused on thwarting CIA operations, Cuban intelligence adapted by engaging in economic espionage, technology theft, and cyber operations to sustain the regime. Havana has leveraged digital networks, malware, and surveillance technologies to infiltrate foreign corporations, monitor communications, and bypass encryption regulations. Reports suggest that Cuba has even explored quantum computing to evade cybersecurity measures. Additionally, its intelligence services have been implicated in illegal activities. Such as drug and arms trafficking, to generate revenue and exert geopolitical influence. As part of its post-Cold War strategy, Cuba has strengthened alliances with nations like Russia and China. Securing intelligence-sharing agreements and permitting Moscow and Beijing to operate SIGINT facilities on the island.
Beyond state actors, Cuba has also collaborated with non-state groups, exchanging intelligence with rebel organisations and criminal networks in Latin America to maintain its strategic foothold. [source, source, source]
4 Recent Cuban Intelligence Operations Against the United States
While the Cuban Military Counterintelligence Directorate (CIM) primarily focuses on protecting Cuba’s armed forces from foreign espionage and internal threats, the broader Cuban intelligence community—particularly the Cuban Intelligence Directorate (DI)—has also successfully conducted long-term infiltration of U.S. institutions. Two of the most significant cases of Cuban espionage against the United States involved Manuel Rocha and Ana Montes. Both of whom operated under the DI’s jurisdiction rather than CIM’s. These cases illustrate the overall effectiveness of Cuban intelligence operations. They rely on deep-cover, ideological agents rather than financial motivations.
4.1 Ambassador Manuel Rocha
A case that shocked U.S. intelligence circles, the December 2023 arrest of former U.S. ambassador Manuel Rocha on charges of spying for Cuba revealed a high-level, long-term infiltration of the American government. Allegedly operating as a Cuban agent for over 40 years (beginning in the early 1980s). Rocha’s actions were described as one of the most significant espionage scandals involving the communist-run island. Evidence suggests Rocha privately criticized the U.S. while maintaining a conservative, pro-American image in public. This strategy allowed him to rise through the ranks of the U.S. diplomatic service undetected.
Former CIA counterintelligence chief James Olson emphasized the sophistication of Cuban intelligence. More often calling it more disciplined and effective than even the KGB at times. Rocha’s case reinforced the view that Cuba, motivated by ideology rather than financial gain, has relied on deeply embedded, long-term agents to gather intelligence and counter U.S. policies from within American institutions. His arrest marked one of the most damaging Cuban espionage operations exposed in recent years. [source, source]
4.2 DIA Analyst Ana Montes
Ana Belen Montes, a senior Defense Intelligence Agency analyst, was arrested shortly after 9/11 for spying for Cuba. Recruited in the 1980s due to her critical stance on U.S. foreign policy, she passed classified information to Cuban intelligence for years without taking payment. She did not physically remove classified documents but instead memorized sensitive military data during the day at the DIA and, at night, transcribed the information from memory, encrypted it on disks, and passed the disks to Cuban intelligence. She communicated with her handlers using payphones, and pagers and coded shortwave radio transmissions. Also, occasionally meeting Cuban agents in Washington, D.C. restaurants and even travelling to Cuba for direct debriefings.
Suspicion arose in 1996, leading to an FBI investigation that confirmed her espionage. She was arrested to prevent her access to plans for the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. Montes later pleaded guilty. Admitting That she revealed the identities of four undercover U.S. operatives and was sentenced to 25 years in prison. [source, source, source, source, source]
5 Conclusion
Cuba’s counterintelligence operations have proven to be highly effective. Evolving from Soviet-backed Cold War tactics to a modern, adaptable intelligence apparatus. Defectors like Florentino Aspillaga have exposed Cuba’s deep penetration into U.S. institutions. High-profile espionage cases, such as Ana Montes and Manuel Rocha, confirm this reach. These cases show how Havana relies on long-term ideological spies rather than financial incentives. This strategy has helped Cuban operatives evade detection for decades. Cuba has also shifted toward economic espionage and cyber operations. Intelligence-sharing with global allies remains a key part of its strategy. Despite economic and political challenges, Cuba aims to maintain its strategic relevance. Its counterintelligence efforts persist in infiltrating U.S. agencies and global networks. Havana’s spycraft continues to adapt to new threats and opportunities in the evolving intelligence landscape.