The Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service (EFIS), also known as the Välisluureamet (VLA) in Estonian, is Tallinn’s external intelligence agency. Tasked with the collection of secrets concerning foreign interests, activities and personnel, it disseminates gathered intel to the head of the Estonian government and their associated departments. First formed in 1992 and organised under the Ministry of Defence, the VLA is integral to the defence of Estonia against foreign malign influences.
Images Sourced From: EFIS, ERR
1 History of the EFIS
The EFIS has a relatively short history. Its predecessor organisation, the Information Agency of the Government Office of the Republic of Estonia, was only formed in 1992. However, EFIS has since been at the forefront of the defence against foreign assets and especially against Russian influence in the Baltic region.
EFIS’s predecessor organisation, the Information Agency of the Government Office of the Republic of Estonia (Eesti Vabariigi Riigikantselei Teabeteenistus), was founded in 1992. This organisation began operations on 1 January 1993 and was transferred to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1994.
Under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Information Service dealt with the foreign intelligence collection and analysis capability of the Republic of Estonia.
In 2001, the Estonian Information Board was established, effectively reforming the previously existing Information Agency, and was subsequently subordinated to the Ministry of Defence. This organisation, the Estonian Information Board, was also united with the signals intelligence unit of the former Government Communications Agency.
On 1 July 2017, the Estonian Information Board was renamed as the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service (EFIS – Välisluureamet – VLA) in order to reaffirm its main task, which was the collection and analysis of intelligence.
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2 Purpose and Tasks of the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service
The Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service has several primary tasks: collecting intelligence, protecting classified information, conducting counterintelligence and also the organisation and control of electronic information security. These may overlap or remain separate depending on the field of responsibility and the data which is to be collected/protected.
2.1 Collection of Intelligence
The collection of intelligence involves the gathering, analysis and delivery of information regarding external security threats that Estonia may face. Information gathered and analysed by EFIS has a significant impact on the Estonian government’s security and the development of its national defence and security policy creation. As such, EFIS is at the frontline of Estonia’s national defence.
The EFIS mission includes:
- Collection and processing of political, military and economic information concerning foreign countries, factors/activities that are necessary for the formation of foreign, economic and national defence policy;
- Providing assistance to the Security Police Board and the Estonian Defence Forces in collecting information electronically;
- Maintaining databases of collected information.
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2.1.1 EFIS Public Reports
One of the publications that EFIS produces is its public reports. Released yearly, these reports detail a variety of areas in which Estonia faces threats from foreign sources. They have published these reports year-on-year since 2016, and they contain chapters concerning a variety of fields as mentioned previously.
EFIS Public Reports sections regarding Russia
Due to the overwhelming threat that Russia poses to Estonia, these reports cover a wide array of areas, including:
- The threat posed by the Russian military
- Russian narratives on foreign events (the Ukraine war)
- Russian domestic politics and economy
- Russian foreign policy
- Russian special services (including psychological and cyber operations)
- Russian influence activities
- Relations between Russia and Belarus
- Russia’s civilian fleet
EFIS Public Reports sections regarding China and East Asia
The EFIS reports also cover China’s growing global role and influence as well as rising tensions in East Asia. This includes:
- Chinese influence through its state-owned companies
- Chinese scientific and technological advancements
- Chinese narratives on foreign events
- Chinese special services activities
- Chinese influence operations
- Chinese-Russian relations during COVID
- China’s global position
- Chinese position on Taiwan
- South and East China Sea
- North Korea
- North Korean Weapons Programme
EFIS Public Reports sections regarding International Terrorism and Migration
International terrorism and migration are also covered in the EFIS public reports. More specifically:
- The threat of terrorism in Europe
- Migration from Afghanistan
- The Syrian conflict
- Libya
- Migration crisis (2016)
- Decline of ISIS (2017)
EFIS Public Reports sections regarding the Protection of Classified Information and EFIS’ mission
- Cyberwarfare experience
- Status of Estonian companies joining classified European programmes
- Mission of EFIS
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2.1.2 Breakdown of EFIS Public Reports
The pie chart below, which contains data from 2016 to 2025, shows that out of 76 chapters of the reports, Russia makes up almost 70% of all the reporting. This indicates that Tallinn views Russia as still posing the greatest threat to Estonian security out of all the potential security issues.
2.2 Protection of Classified Information
The protection of classified information is also one of EFIS’ main tasks. This includes the following:
- Protection of classified information of foreign states and international organisations.
- Security of classified communication and information systems/information assurance
- Protection of classified information in Estonian embassies and representations abroad.
- Organising and controlling special communications.
- Performing security checks on persons applying for service or employment in EFIS and persons who are currently employed by EFIS (except for the Director and Deputy Director).
2.3 Counterintelligence & Electronic Information Security
Another set of tasks that EFIS undertakes is counterintelligence and also the security of electronic information. This includes:
- Carrying out counterintelligence for the protection of Estonian foreign missions and Estonian Defence Force units outside of Estonia.
- Carrying out counterintelligence for the protection of its employees and officials, including personnel who are cooperating with foreign intelligence agencies.
- Cooperating with the Security Police Board to prevent crimes against the state.
- Organising and controlling compliance with requirements as set out in the law for electronic information security.
- Issuing and/or revoking certificates for state secret processing systems and controlling their operation, including the construction, use, repair and maintenance of connections to communication networks.
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3 Structure and Hierarchy of Reporting of the EFIS
The Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service (EFIS) operates under the Estonian Ministry of Defence and, unlike intelligence agencies in other countries, it does not oversee any subordinate divisions. Instead, EFIS maintains close operational coordination with national agencies, including the Estonian Internal Security Service, Estonian Defence Forces, Police Security Board and other local government agencies.
EFIS also cooperates and coordinates intelligence collection with foreign intelligence and security services. This includes international organisations such as other nations intelligence agencies, particularly in matters regarding external intelligence and counterintelligence.
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3.1 Current Leader of EFIS
The current head director of the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service is Colonel Kaupo Rosin, a former Estonian intelligence officer and military officer. He has held this post since November 2022, when he was appointed to the position by the Estonian Defence Minister Hanno Pevkur. This was due to his “nearly 20 years of experience in intelligence, the last four of which were served in a high position at NATO headquarters.”
3.2 Oversight of EFIS
On 4 April 2015, the Special Committee for the Supervision of Security Agencies (Julgeolekuasutuste järelevalve erikomisjon) of the Estonian Parliament, the Riigikogu, was formed. This was done to verify the lawfulness of the activities of EFIS and the Internal Security Service.
This committee is responsible for several things, including:
- Verifying compliance with the Code of Criminal Procedure
- The procedure for the ‘Registration and Disclosure of Persons who have served in or cooperated with security organisations or intelligence/counterintelligence of the Armed Forces who Have Occupied Estonia Act’
- ‘State Secrets and Classified Information of Foreign States Act’
- Verifies the compliance of the activities of the Police and Border Guard Board, the Prisons Department of the Ministry of Justice and the Investigation Department of the Tax and Customs Board with the Code of Criminal Procedure.
- Discussion of a draft budget of the security authorities at the same time as the draft state budget is being debated in the Riigikogu
- Submission of an overview of its activities to the Riigikogu once a year.
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3.2.1 Current Members of the Oversight Committee
The current members of the oversight committee are:
- Maris Lauri – Chairman
- Aivar Kokk – Deputy Chairman
- Raimond Kaljulaid
- Ando Kiviberg
- Rene Kokk
- Lauri Laats
- Juku-Kalle Raid
- Mart Võrklaev
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4 Activities of the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service
EFIS has several known activities that are publicly known. These include:
- September 2014: Data leaks from a database operated by Gamma Group, a producer of high-tech surveillance software systems, revealed that the software, FinFisher, was being used in Estonia. This software was most likely being used by the then-Estonian Information Board. [source]
- April 2015: Due to a phone call between former Foreign Minister Urmas Paet and the former European Union Foreign Affairs and Security Policy High Representative Catherine Ashton being uploaded onto YouTube, the Information Board proposed and passed legislation which gave government ministers encrypted phones. These phones were only to be used for communicating information which is “not to be disclosed.” [source]
- February 2022: The 2022 EFIS Public Report contained a chapter regarding ‘China’s Politicised Vaccine Diplomacy’ and how the Chinese government was using vaccines as a pressure tool in its foreign policy goals. In response to this, the Chinese Embassy in Tallinn accused EFIS of “spreading false information.” [source, source]
- February 2022: On 16 February 2022, the then Director General of EFIS, Mikki Marran, stated that the presence of Russian soldiers in Belarus would “reduce preparation time for an attack against the Baltic’s.” He also went on to state that Estonian intelligence services were aware of 10 battle groups of Russian troops moving towards the Ukrainian border. The Russian Invasion of Ukraine broke out 6 days later. [source]
5 The Future of EFIS and Potential Avenues
Due to increasing threats from Russia in the cyber, military and social spheres, as well as a rising China, the relevance of the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service has increased. Their reporting and analysis of threat actors is high-quality, and they consistently release reports detailing threats to Estonia. [See 2.1.1 EFIS Public Reports section for more details]
Their relevance and importance within the wider European Intelligence Community also continue to grow despite their small stature, and there are several avenues that EFIS may undertake due to the aforementioned threats to Estonia.
This could include:
5.1 China
Indications of China-based direct threats to Estonia could force EFIS to pivot towards this strategic threat. Specific points of interest could include:
- The potential for China to destabilise the Estonian economy through the saturation of the market with cheaper goods, which could undercut Estonian industry. This has been a rising threat to Europe, with, for example, China undercutting the European steel industry with a cheaper supply of steel. [source]
- Chinese ships ‘allegedly’ cut undersea cables in the Baltic region. This fits into a wider pattern of Chinese ships that have ‘accidentally’ severed critical cables by dragging their anchors along the sea bed. [source]
- Chinese espionage activities in Estonia, including the arrest of a woman who was found guilty of spying for China in Estonia, as well as the arrest of an Estonian national who was working at a NATO research institute focused on maritime and submarine research. [source, source]
5.2 Russia
The continuous threat of Russia looms over Estonia, and its escalating activities in the cyber, military, espionage and economic realm also play a large part in EFIS’s overall mission to defend Estonia against foreign threats. Continuous analysis of threats which Russia poses to Estonia could include:
- Detailed analysis of the threat which Russia poses in the military space. This includes the threat of an actual invasion, even if it is unlikely due to Estonia being a member of NATO.
- The threat that is posed by the presence of a large number of Russian speakers who could be utilised. Much like in Eastern Ukraine, to ‘justify’ another Russian ‘Special Military Operation’. Additionally, this Russian-speaking minority, of which 83,000 hold Russian citizenship, has been consistently targeted by Russian disinformation networks in order to shape public opinion and incite anti-NATO and pro-Russian sentiments. [source, source]
- In 2024, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs attributed the 2020 cyberattacks against Estonia to members of Unit 29155 of the Russian military intelligence (GRU). This is a rising and continuous threat to not only Estonia but also the rest of Europe. [source]
- Russian espionage in Estonia, including the recruitment of academics and other individuals suspected of acting on behalf of Russian ‘special services’ is a rising threat to Estonian sovereignty and state stability and will require EFIS to escalate its monitoring of suspected Russia-aligned individuals and groups who seek to destabilise Estonia. [source, source]
5.3 Other Threats
Although China and Russia pose the greatest foreign threats to Estonian stability, there are other areas that EFIS will need to monitor to ensure security:
- The threat posed by individuals who fought in Syria and the wider MENA region is also faced by Estonia and requires special attention by EFIS to prevent potentially deadly terrorist attacks, as seen in other European states. Other Estonian intelligence and law-enforcement agencies have also undertaken efforts to address this issue, including the rejection of e-residency permits of 26 individuals in 2023 who had links to groups such as al-Qaeda, ISIS, Hezbollah and the Taliban, amongst others. [source, source]
- Russia and Estonia may escalate their usage of hybrid-warfare tactics, including the weaponisation of migration, in order to destabilise Estonia. EFIS could add onto already published plans to establish a guard force on Estonia’s eastern border by intensifying intelligence efforts to analyse where and when these migrants are being used by these states. [source, source]
6 Conclusion
The Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service (EFIS) is at the forefront of several areas. This includes the detection of and countering of foreign threats and the protection of classified information in Estonia. With their primary tasks including the collection and dissemination of intelligence to the highest levels of the Estonian state, their mission is more important than ever.
Rising threats from Russia, which is acting increasingly belligerent and undertaking more and more actions against Estonia every year, and an increasing awareness of Chinese activities in Estonia and Europe more widely have put EFIS at the forefront of the detection and countering of these threats.