Aman, the oldest intelligence agency established following the founding of the State of Israel, plays a central role in the country’s national security architecture. Its primary mandate is to collect, analyse, and deliver intelligence to both the Israeli government and the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), supporting decision-making in both peacetime and during military operations. Operating at the intersection of strategic and tactical intelligence, Aman monitors conventional military threats and terrorist activities through a combination of human intelligence (HUMINT) and advanced technological capabilities. Additionally, it holds responsibility for cross-border reconnaissance missions, reinforcing its role as both an intelligence provider and an operational enabler in high-risk environments.
1 Historical Background
1.1 The Birth of Aman and Its Early Influences
Israel’s Military Intelligence Directorate, known as Aman (Hebrew: “Agaf HaModi’in”), has origins tied to Israel’s early statehood. After independence in 1948, the IDF recognised a need for a dedicated intelligence capability. In 1950, it formally established Aman. Many early personnel came from the Haganah’s* pre-state intelligence operations, providing valuable institutional knowledge and experience.
Aman was from the outset set up as an independent service on equal footing with the Army, Navy, and Air Force, not buried within the military hierarchy. This special status reflects how central intelligence has always been to Israel’s security thinking.
Aman’s British influence was initially strong (owing largely to the Mandate* period), but by 1951, Israel reorganised the directorate along more American lines. Aman continued handling military intelligence under Defence, while the now-famous Mossad took on foreign operations, reporting directly to the Prime Minister. Despite this division, Aman remained the primary analytical centre for military and strategic intelligence, providing crucial information to both government and military leadership. [source, source]
1.2 Early Operational Success and Strategic Value
Through the 1950s and 60s, Aman grew in sophistication. It absorbed hard lessons from early conflicts, like the 1948 War of Independence and the 1956 Sinai Campaign. By the Six-Day War in 1967, their capabilities were well established. Their spy networks ran deep, with figures like Wolfgang Lotz in Egypt and Eli Cohen in Syria infiltrating high-level Arab military circles and delivering secrets that proved decisive in 1967. These early successes established Aman as an essential cornerstone of Israel’s national security structure. [source, source, source]
*The Haganah conducted pre-state intelligence operations by actively gathering information on British authorities, Arab forces, and regional threats to support the Zionist movement and defend the Jewish community before Israel’s independence. [source, source]
*The Mandate period refers to the time between 1920 and 1948 when Britain governed Palestine under a League of Nations mandate following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I. During this time, British military, administrative, and intelligence practices heavily influenced local institutions, including those later adopted by the emerging Israeli defence establishment [source]
2 Organisational Units and Structure
Aman consists of three main operational components–Unit 8200, Unit 9900, and Unit 504–and two departments (research and information security).
2.1 Unit 8200
2.1.1 Capabilities and Structure
Aman’s largest component, Unit 8200, specialises in signals intelligence (SIGINT) and code decryption, and is widely regarded as one of the most advanced technical intelligence agencies globally. According to Peter Roberts of the Royal United Services Institute, Unit 8200 rivals the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) in capability, distinguished by its focused targeting and exceptional operational intensity. [source]
Unit 8200 intercepts communications, monitors electronic signals, and develops advanced tools for cyber espionage. It is the main information-gathering unit of Israeli intelligence, deploying its personnel in the field alongside combat units to provide real-time intelligence in war. It is the largest intelligence unit in the Israel Defence Forces (IDF), composed primarily of 18 to 21-year-old conscripts selected for their ability to rapidly learn and adapt within the limited timeframe of their compulsory military service. Recruitment is highly selective, often beginning in the IDF’s screening process after high school, but also drawing from elite after-school programs that teach computer coding and hacking to gifted 16 to 18-year-olds and serve as feeder programs for the unit.
A brigadier general leads the unit (recently revealed to be Yossi Sariel), supported by a colonel as deputy commander and a dedicated officer overseeing Data Science and Artificial Intelligence. Former Unit 8200 members have gone on to prominent careers in international technology companies and start-ups, particularly in Silicon Valley in the United States, making the unit a powerful incubator of Israel’s cyber and high-tech ecosystem. [source, source]
2.2 Intelligence Failure and the 2023 Hamas Attack
In the wake of the 2023 Hamas attack on Israel, Unit 8200 faced significant criticism for failing to anticipate the assault. Reports revealed that the unit had allegedly stopped monitoring Hamas’s handheld radio communications in 2022, deeming them unimportant, a decision that may have undermined an early warning mechanism for the attack.
A Unit 8200 veteran analyst reportedly raised alarms in July 2023 about Hamas’s plans for a cross-border incursion, but senior military officials dismissed the warnings as “totally imaginative.” (Similarly, female IDF surveillance operators known as tatzpitaniyot — responsible for monitoring the Gaza border — claimed they observed Hamas training for such an attack and issued warnings that were ignored by higher command. The operators emphasised their deep familiarity with the terrain and border activity, voicing frustration that decision-makers ignored their warnings despite clear signs of militant preparations. Tragically, only two of the tatzpitaniyot on duty survived or escaped abduction during the attack.) [source, source, source]
2.3 Unit 9900
This is Aman’s visual intelligence (VISINT) and mapping unit, which handles geospatial and satellite reconnaissance. Unit 9900 analyses aerial and satellite imagery, producing maps and visual data critical for operations. From high-resolution satellite photos of enemy bases to interpretation of drone feeds, this unit provides the imagery intelligence (IMINT) needed to track enemy movements and develop target data. Notably, Unit 9900 has even pioneered the use of soldiers with special cognitive skills to spot minute details in imagery, illustrating Aman’s innovative approach to staffing.
Unit 990 developed a highly classified mapping software designed to enhance battlefield awareness using real-time, fused intelligence. According to Forbes, the Android-based software operates on tablets or smartphones and leverages 3D imaging to display up-to-date information on enemy positions, even in GPS-denied environments. It integrates data from multiple intelligence sources — including signals intelligence (SIGINT), HUMINT, and satellite imagery — and uses artificial intelligence to detect behavioural patterns, predict enemy movements, and identify vulnerable points on the battlefield.
The system translates this complex, multi-source data into actionable insights for soldiers on the ground. It can be displayed directly on handheld devices or weapon sights. It appears to be closely tied to Rafael’s Fire Weaver system, which enhances situational awareness by creating a real-time “operational internet” linking naval, air, and ground forces and allowing them to share live feeds and coordinate actions more efficiently. [source, source]
2.3.1 The “Roim Rachok” (RR) Program
Roim Rachok is a unique and elite team within Israel’s Unit 9900. It is composed entirely of soldiers on the autism spectrum. These individuals possess exceptional visual and analytical abilities, making them particularly skilled at interpreting satellite imagery and maps, which are crucial for defending Israel’s borders. Despite being eligible for exemption from military service, all members of the RR Program volunteer to serve, driven by a strong desire to contribute to their country and integrate into society. Many choose to extend their service beyond the initial one-year term. The program not only showcases the operational value of neurodiversity within military intelligence but also reflects the soldiers’ deep sense of duty and inclusion. [source, source, source]
2.4 Unit 504
Unit 504 is a military intelligence unit of the IDF founded in 1948, shortly after Israel’s independence. Originally called “Modi’in 10,” it underwent several name changes before receiving its current designation following the Yom Kippur War. The unit specialises in clandestine operations, counterintelligence, HUMINT, and intelligence assessment, and operates beyond Israeli borders, similar to Mossad. Unit 504 is responsible for interrogating prisoners of war and unlawful combatants. The unit took part in all of Israel’s major conflicts, including assassinating Palestinian Islamic Jihad leader Baha Abu al-Ata in 2019 and interrogating hundreds of Palestinians during the 2023 Gaza war.[source, source]
2.5 Other
Aman’s organisational structure extends beyond operational units to include a Research Department where analysts integrate intelligence from multiple sources into comprehensive assessments. It also maintains an Information Security Department that encompasses military censorship functions for controlling sensitive information dissemination. Additionally, Aman operates liaison units dedicated to maintaining relationships with foreign intelligence services.
3 Key Figures
3.1 Major General Aharon Haliva
Major General Aharon Haliva was born on 12 October 1967. He is a retired senior IDF officer who served as the head of Aman from October 2021 until his resignation in April 2024. With a military career spanning nearly four decades, Haliva held a series of high-profile command and staff positions, shaping both the operational and strategic dimensions of Israeli military intelligence.
Haliva was born and raised in Haifa to parents of Moroccan descent. He joined the IDF in 1985 and began serving as a paratrooper in the elite Paratroopers Brigade. In 2016, he became a Major General (Aluf) and led the Technological and Logistics Directorate. Two years later, he took over as head of the IDF Operations Directorate. During this time, he tackled key internal challenges. These included widespread weapons thefts from IDF bases and planning for conflicts like Operation Guardian of the Walls (2021).
On 5 October 2021, Haliva assumed leadership of Aman as military intelligence chief; he linked national security to regional stability. He argued that the Abraham Accords reflected deep socioeconomic needs in the Middle East. To support regional stability, he backed efforts to raise living standards in nearby states like Lebanon and pushed to stabilise the Palestinian Authority as a way to reduce terrorism and strengthen Israeli security. Haliva also promoted surgical precision in military operations, urging the IDF to clearly distinguish between enemy combatants and uninvolved civilians.[source]
3.1.1 Haliva and the October 7 Intelligence Failure
Haliva’s tenure came under intense scrutiny following the 7 October 2023 Hamas attack, which resulted in the deaths of approximately 1,400 Israeli civilians and soldiers. Although alerted the night before about unusual Hamas activity, Haliva dismissed it as a training exercise and decided to postpone any response. In the aftermath, he publicly accepted responsibility, calling it “a failure in our most important mission” and referring to the day as a “Black Day” for Israeli intelligence. His leadership during this period became emblematic of the broader intelligence lapse, and on 22 April 22 2024, Haliva resigned from his position as Aman’s chief, becoming the first senior Israeli official to step down over the failure. [source, source]
4 Aman’s most significant failed operation
The failure of Aman to predict and prevent the 7 October 2023 Hamas attack represents one of the most significant intelligence breakdowns in Israeli history. Despite possessing detailed knowledge of Hamas’ military buildup, invasion plans, and training exercises, Aman adhered to a flawed conception. It is believed the group was deterred from war and more interested in economic stability and governance. This assumption came from a Western-centric analytical framework. It projected rational, state-like behaviour onto a non-state Islamist group driven by ideology.
The construction of a high-tech border barrier further reinforced the belief that Hamas could not infiltrate Israeli territory, leading to reduced intelligence collection on its ground forces and tactical capabilities. There were early warning signs, such as drills resembling the eventual attack, internal alerts from soldiers, and external warnings (e.g., from Egypt). However, these were often dismissed as “aspirational” or beyond Hamas’ capability, exemplifying the “warning paradox” where accurate warnings may be ignored due to disbelief. The attack not only exposed Aman’s intelligence failure but also revealed a deeper, systemic flaw in Israel’s national strategy toward Hamas—an overreliance on a conception of deterrence through economic incentives and limited engagement. This belief, shared across the IDF and political leadership, created a dangerous comfort zone in which Hamas was viewed as rational and restrained. This way allowed Israel to divert focus to other threats like Iran and Hezbollah.
The intelligence failure was not due to one mistake, but a series of issues across leadership, collection, analysis, and communication. [source, source, source]
5 Joint Operations
Aman maintains robust collaborative networks with global intelligence partners, spanning agencies across the United States, European nations, and beyond. These strategic alliances facilitate critical information exchange and enable coordinated responses to transnational security challenges. A notable example of such cooperation occurred during the 1990s, when Aman worked in close coordination with U.S intelligence services to develop comprehensive assessments of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs. These partnerships continue to enhance Aman’s operational reach and analytical capabilities beyond what would be possible through unilateral efforts alone. [source]
6 Conclusion
Aman stands as a cornerstone of Israel’s national security architecture. With its sophisticated intelligence capabilities, which were developed over decades of conflict and adaptation. The organisation’s structure—combining signals intelligence (Unit 8200), visual intelligence (Unit 9900), and human intelligence (Unit 504)—reflects Israel’s comprehensive approach to intelligence gathering and analysis. These specialised units, each with unique capabilities, work together to provide military and political leadership with critical information for decision-making.
However, the catastrophic intelligence failure of 7 October 2023 has exposed significant vulnerabilities within this system. Despite its advanced technology and vast resources, Aman misjudged Hamas by applying a Western lens that assumed rational, state-like behaviour. This failure shows that even top-tier intelligence systems can falter when rigid thinking takes hold and warning signs are ignored.
Major General Aharon Haliva’s resignation signals institutional responsibility, but deeper issues will require major reforms in Aman’s intelligence practices.
Moving forward, Aman faces a major challenge. Aman faces the challenge of balancing its technological strengths with a renewed focus on traditional intelligence methods. These methods are vital for gaining deeper cultural insight into non-state adversaries. This recalibration will be essential. Israel continues to navigate an increasingly complex security environment where conventional and asymmetric threats converge.
