1.0 Introduction
Kosovo’s Intelligence Agency, known in Albanian as Agjencia e Kosovës për Inteligjencë (AKI), began operations in 2009, in the wake of Kosovo’s 2008 declaration of independence, making it a relatively new player among state intelligence agencies.
AKI’s mission is to identify threats to the security of Kosovo’s territorial integrity. The integrity of its institutions, its constitutional order, its economic stability and development, as well as global security threats that could negatively affect Kosovo.
This article provides an overview of the agency as it exists today. Taking into consideration the complexities derived from Kosovo’s emergence from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) just 17 years ago.
AKI’s emblem.
2.0 Origins
2.1 From SHIK and IHSOP to AKI
The intelligence community in Kosovo, once part of the former Yugoslavia (SFRY), was shaped by a state-centric security system dominated by the secret police, which was widely perceived as repressive, especially after the 1981 demonstrations led by Albanian students demanding republic status for Kosovo. After Kosovo’s autonomy was revoked in 1989, Slobodan Milosevic’s regime increased its repression, using the state security services to monitor, intimidate, and control the Albanian majority until 1999.
As hopes for independence faded and repression continued after the 1995 Dayton Agreement, the armed Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) emerged to replace the nonviolent resistance, establishing the Kosovo Information Service (SHIK) as one of its first military intelligence units.
In 1999, after the Milosevic regime rejected the Rambouillet Agreement, the KLA formed the unrecognised Provisional Government of Kosovo, which informally legitimised the role of SHIK—a secretive intelligence service that, despite claiming to serve the public good, operated without a legal framework.
Fast forward to June 2008. Kadri Veseli, the chief of SHIK, unexpectedly announced the disbandment of SHIK, declaring its mission accomplished. This came amid growing public debate about the agency’s secretive activities and its close ties to the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), including allegations of political assassinations and infiltration of the government by former operatives. Meanwhile, it was also revealed that the opposition Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) operated its own covert intelligence unit, IHSOP, composed largely of former Yugoslav-era intelligence personnel. [source, source, source]
2.2 AKI’s Creation
In June 2008, Kosovo’s Assembly passed Law No. 03/L-063 forming the AKI, outlining its mandate and limiting its powers, such as prohibiting arrests or the use of force. The establishment of AKI is based on Article 65(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo. It reflects the Assembly’s recognition of the need for accurate and timely intelligence to address threats such as terrorism, organised crime, and other security challenges. [source]
3.0 AKI’s Structure
According to its legal framework, the AKI operates as an independent agency that reports directly to both the Prime Minister and the President. It is not part of any ministry, nor does it fall under the Office of the Prime Minister. The AKI director also serves in an advisory role on the Kosovo Security Council.
3.1 The Role of Internal Control in AKI
AKI’s internal oversight is led by an Inspector General, jointly appointed by the President and Prime Minister, with a four-year renewable term. The Inspector General has the authority to report to the Prime Minister and Parliament, conduct audits, initiate investigations, and recommend changes. However, due to slow agency development and recruitment challenges, internal controls were only partially functional until mid-2011. A major concern is a legal loophole that allows the Director to halt investigations by the Inspector General by citing “vital security interests,” a vague clause that could be misused, prompting calls for the law to be amended.
3.1.1 Three key positions
Director: Appointed jointly by the President and Prime Minister of the Republic of Kosovo. In accordance with Law No. 03/L-063 on the Kosovo Intelligence Agency, the Regulation on Internal Organisation, and other applicable laws, the Director is responsible for overseeing all aspects of AKI’s management. He also serves as an advisor to the President and Prime Minister on intelligence matters concerning Kosovo’s security.
Deputy Director: Also appointed by the President and Prime Minister. He supports the Director in managing the agency and oversees the operational activities of its organisational units under the Director’s supervision. In the Director’s absence or temporary incapacity, the Deputy Director assumes the Director’s responsibilities.
Inspector General: Appointed by the President and Prime Minister. His role includes inspecting and evaluating AKI’s activities to ensure legality, efficiency, and effectiveness. He is responsible for keeping the Director informed of any potential issues within the agency and for promoting accountability and adherence to the law. [source]
3.2 Parliamentary Oversight
The AKI is also subject to external democratic control through the Assembly’s Committee for the Oversight of the Kosovo Intelligence Agency, a functional committee composed of one representative from each parliamentary group.
The committee’s chair must not belong to any political party or the ruling coalition, reflecting the principle of political neutrality. Its mandate is to review the legality of AKI’s activities, examine its budget, and investigate allegations of misconduct.[source]
4.0 Key Figures
4.1 AKI’s first Director – Bashkim Smakaj
Bashkim Smakaj was appointed as the first director of AKI at the very young age of 32. An ethnic Albanian and former colonel in the Strategic Planning Unit of Kosovo’s police force, Smakaj saw his appointment delayed by internal disagreements between the two ruling coalition parties—Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi’s Democratic Party of Kosovo and President Fatmir Sejdiu’s Democratic League of Kosovo. According to media sources, the delay also stemmed from political negotiations involving foreign intelligence services. At the time, Kosovo depended heavily on military protection from the U.S. and several EU countries. It also relied on their financial support. Smakaj served from 2009 until January 2015, when he resigned. [source, source]
4.1.1 From the Head of Intelligence to The Hague
Bashkim Smakaj is currently in detention in The Hague—alongside other high-profile figures, including former Kosovo Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi—under the authority of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers. Prosecutors accuse Smakaj of committing criminal offences against the administration of justice. They allege that between July and October 2023, he attempted to obstruct official proceedings. He also tried to influence witnesses in coordination with other groups. The pre-trial judge ruled that Smakaj poses a risk of flight and obstruction of justice. The judge also warned that he may commit further offences, given his ties to influential networks within the KLA and political circles
On 14 January 2025, Bashkim Smakaj submitted his written plea to the Kosovo Specialist Chambers, following an invitation from the Pre-Trial Judge during the status conference on 17 December 2024, pleading not guilty to all counts in the indictment, making him the last of the accused in the case to formally deny the charges. [source, source]
4.2 From Deputy Director of AKI to the Director of Albania’s Intelligence – Vlora Hyseni
Vlora Hyseni, a Kosovar national, is the head of Albania’s State Intelligence Service (SHISH), following her official nomination by Prime Minister Edi Rama. Hyseni had previously served as Deputy Director of the AKI. She was appointed for a five-year term by then-President Hashim Thaçi and Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj. However, President Vjosa Osmani and Prime Minister Albin Kurti dismissed her from her position on 30 June 2021, citing Article 6(4) of the Law on AKI. The dismissal order required her to return all official materials and maintain the confidentiality of all classified information, with legal consequences for any breach.
By 2023, she was leading SHISH, despite being a Kosovar national with no clear vetting or Albanian citizenship. This move has sparked legal and ethical concerns, especially regarding loyalty, transparency, and the potential breach of Kosovo’s secrecy laws. Critics argue that such an appointment would be unacceptable under EU standards, which require strict vetting and loyalty for intelligence roles. The situation raises broader fears about the politicisation of intelligence in Albania and the consolidation of power within Rama’s government, possibly at the expense of institutional accountability and regional trust.[source, source, source]
4.3 The controversial Director – Shpend Maxhuni
Shpend Maxhuni’s role in the controversial 2018 deportation of six Turkish nationals when he was the Police Director of Kosovo has a significant shadow over his leadership in the agency. Turkish intelligence orchestrated the operation, which bypassed standard legal and extradition procedures and drew condemnation from the European Union
Then-Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj claimed he was not informed and demanded accountability, calling for the dismissal of Interior Minister Flamur Sefaj and AKI Director Driton Gashi. However, a parliamentary investigation produced conflicting accounts. Gashi insisted he had informed Maxhuni three days before the deportation. Maxhuni denied this, claiming he only learned of the operation after the Turkish citizens were removed. A media report later revealed that KIA officials led the operation, even taking over police offices and issuing commands throughout the deportation process.
Despite the scandal and unresolved questions over his involvement, Maxhuni was shortly after appointed as head of the KIA in November 2018, a move that fueled further controversy. However, he resigned in April 2019, and three weeks later, the Police asked him to return, appointing him as advisor to the Director. [source, source, source, source, source]
5.0 Recent Operations: Serbian Espionage Networks Exposed
5.1 Serbian Spies Under the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Umbrella
In February 2025, a woman from the Serbian community in Kosovo, identified by the initials J.Dj (J.Gj), was arrested in the Mitrovica region on suspicion of espionage. According to media sources, the woman is reportedly an employee of the OSCE and is suspected of collaborating with Serbia’s intelligence service (BIA). The arrest followed a months-long investigation conducted by the Kosovo Special Prosecution, in cooperation with the Kosovo Police’s Counter-Terrorism Directorate and the AKI. Authorities detained her for 48 hours and searched her residence to gather further evidence. OSCE officials have reportedly called for her release. [source, source]
5.2 A Double Spy in the Block
In May 2024, the Kosovo Police arrested Marko Knezhevic, a Serbian national and long-time operative of the Serbian Security Intelligence Agency (BIA), following an investigation initiated by AKI. Knezhevic, who had operated under dual identities since 2002, posed as a journalist for TV Most in northern Kosovo. According to open-source reporting, he used his media cover to gather intelligence, spread disinformation, and allegedly organise extremist groups such as the Northern Brigades and Bridge Guards. His close links to senior Serbian officials, including former BIA director and Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandar Vulin, underscored Belgrade’s direct involvement. The discovery of advanced surveillance equipment in his possession suggested a significant investment by Serbia in covert operations inside Kosovo. [source]
6.0 Conclusion
As one of Europe’s youngest intelligence agencies, the AKI has struggled to remain low-profile. Its history is already marked by leadership instability, political entanglements, and scandals. At the same time, the agency has begun to demonstrate tangible capabilities, particularly in counter-intelligence operations against Serbian espionage networks. Considering it has been operating for less than two decades, AKI is still in an institutional learning phase. A fuller judgment will depend on whether it can professionalise, strengthen oversight, and consolidate its role as a credible and accountable security actor in the years ahead. All this said, public accountability remains a central challenge for the AKI. Their success relies heavily on the capacity of the population to understand and express their views on intelligence issues. Many Kosovars still refer to their experience of ‘intelligence’ under previous regimes, perceiving intelligence matters with a high degree of scepticism and even fear.