The concept of Active Measures, or “aktivnye meropriyatiya” in Russian, was coined in the 1920s. It represents a broad array of offensive operations aimed at spreading disinformation, deception, and sabotage against foreign nations. These tactics, an essential part of Soviet and Russian foreign policy, encompass disinformation and forgeries, the use of front groups, political influence operations, media manipulation, and secret radio stations. Initially developed during the early days of the Soviet Union, these measures became a cornerstone of Soviet intelligence during the Cold War. These were then used to exploit divisions in order to undermine Western societies.
In the post-Soviet era, Russia has modernised and expanded these capabilities, adapting them to the digital age. Modern strategies involve cyber espionage, social media manipulation, and the deployment of front groups to project Russia’s influence. This reflects a sophisticated blend of traditional espionage and modern tactics. The integration of digital platforms has spread the reach and impact of Russian active measures. These continue to pose complex challenges to international stability.
This article explores the historical evolution, methodology, and modern adaptations of Russian active measures. The article will highlight the enduring threat they pose to democratic institutions. It displays the importance of a coordinated response, involving cybersecurity enhancement, intelligence sharing, and public awareness, to safeguard against this evolving form of information warfare.
1.0 Historical Overview
1.1 Early Use and Development
The origins of Soviet active measures can be traced back to the 1920s. One of the earliest and most notable operations was the “Trust” operation conducted by the Cheka, the Soviet secret police. This operation was a sophisticated deception strategy aimed at neutralising the exiled tsarist opposition. By creating a fake anti-Bolshevik organisation, the “Monarchist Union of Central Russia,” Cheka successfully infiltrated and manipulated the Russian emigrated community and foreign intelligence services. They ultimately dismantled opposition efforts and gained valuable intelligence. (source) This early use of deception laid the groundwork for future Soviet disinformation tactics.
The institutionalisation of active measures took a significant leap forward with the establishment of Department D within the KGB in January 1959. This department was specifically designed to produce and disseminate disinformation, marking an expansion of Soviet capabilities in psychological warfare. By 1963, Department D evolved into Service A of the First Chief Directorate of the KGB. They employed hundreds of staff dedicated to crafting and executing active measures on a global scale. (source) These developments underscored the Soviet commitment to using disinformation as a strategic tool to influence international perceptions and destabilise adversaries.
1.2 Cold War Era
During the Cold War, active measures became a cornerstone of Soviet intelligence operations. This reflected the KGB’s view of intelligence as a “secret form of political struggle.” These operations spanned a wide range of activities. This included disinformation, forgeries, front groups, political influence operations, media manipulation, and clandestine radio stations. A notorious example of Soviet disinformation was the propagation of the myth that the U.S. government had created the AIDS virus as a biological weapon. This claim exploited existing fears and prejudices, aiming to sow distrust and damage the reputation of the United States globally. (source)
Forgeries played a crucial role in Soviet tactics, with fabricated documents used to discredit Western governments and institutions. These documents were often planted in sympathetic media outlets or distributed through covert channels to amplify their impact. Additionally, the Soviets established front groups, ostensibly independent organisations that covertly advanced Soviet interests. The World Peace Council, for instance, was used to promote Soviet foreign policy. This was done under the guise of advocating for global peace. (source)
Political influence operations targeted key individuals and institutions in foreign countries. They sought to sway public opinion and policy decisions in favour of Soviet objectives. Media manipulation was another critical aspect. This involved the KGB feeding biased or false information to journalists and broadcasters to shape narratives and perceptions. Clandestine radio stations, such as Radio Peace and Progress, broadcasted pro-Soviet content to foreign audiences. This further extended the geographical reach of Soviet propaganda. (source)
1.2.1 The Broader Soviet Strategy
These active measures were not merely isolated incidents but part of a broader strategy to undermine the cohesion and stability of Western societies. By exploiting societal divisions and amplifying existing tensions, the Soviets aimed to weaken their adversaries from within. The Cold War era thus marked the height of Soviet active measures. It showcased the lengths to which the USSR would go to achieve its geopolitical aims through subversion and deception.
Through these operations, the Soviet Union demonstrated a sophisticated understanding of psychological warfare. They employed a range of tactics to achieve their strategic objectives. The legacy of these efforts continues to influence Russian intelligence operations today. Therefore it reflects a long-standing tradition of using disinformation as a weapon in international relations.
2.0 Methodology of Active Measures
2.1 Disinformation & Forgeries
Disinformation is the deliberate dissemination of false or misleading information with the intent to deceive and manipulate public perception. It is a strategic tool used by state actors to influence foreign entities, undermine adversaries, and achieve geopolitical objectives. (source) Forgeries, a specific form of disinformation, involve the creation of fabricated or altered documents to spread false information and cause confusion among adversaries. (source)
One historical example is the KGB’s use of forged documents to influence Western perceptions during the Cold War. In 1961, the CIA reported 32 known forgeries of U.S. documents, reflecting the scale and impact of this tactic. These forgeries were strategically disseminated to create diplomatic tensions and erode trust between allies. For instance, forged NATO documents were used to suggest that Western countries were plotting against each other. Thereby sowing discord within the alliance. The Soviets also forged letters and reports purportedly from Western leaders, aiming to undermine their credibility and influence public opinion. This method of disinformation was not limited to political documents. It extended to scientific and economic reports, designed to mislead and manipulate international discourse. (source)
In recent years, similar tactics have been observed, with Russia using digital platforms and troll farms to spread forgeries and disinformation. The advent of the internet and AI has amplified the quality, reach and speed of these operations. Therefore this allows for faster dissemination of false information across borders. This evolution highlights the enduring relevance of disinformation and forgeries as tools of geopolitical influence. (source) (source)
2.2 Front Groups
Front groups are organisations that appear non-political and independent but are, in fact, vehicles for Russian propaganda. These groups are used to promote pro-Russian narratives while criticising governments or organisations that oppose Russian interests. (source) One prominent example is the World Peace Council. During the Cold War, it served as a mouthpiece for Soviet foreign policy while masquerading as a global peace advocacy group. (source) (source)
The International Organisation of Journalists is another example. It functioned as a front to spread Soviet propaganda under the guise of promoting journalistic integrity. These organisations provided platforms for disseminating disinformation and rallying support for Soviet initiatives. This all occurred whilst it maintained an appearance of neutrality and legitimacy. (source)
In the modern context, front groups have evolved to include online journals and think tanks that propagate anti-Western sentiments. These entities often present themselves as independent research bodies, yet they subtly promote Kremlin-approved narratives. The U.S. Department of State has documented a network of such organisations acting as proxies to further Russian geopolitical objectives. These include the platforms as Global Research, SouthFront, New Eastern Outlook, and Strategic Culture Foundation. (source)
2.3 Political Influence Operations
Political influence operations involve Russian agents covertly engaging in political, press, business, or academic activities to convey false information and sway foreign policies. These operations are designed to manipulate decision-makers and public opinion in favour of Russian interests. A notable case is that of Pierre-Charles Pathé, a French journalist who secretly acted as a Soviet agent from 1959. Using his position he influenced media narratives and political discourse in France. (source)
Such operations also include efforts by Soviet officials to build close relationships with influential political figures in foreign countries. By establishing these connections, they were able to insert disinformation into political debates and policy-making processes. This approach allowed the Soviets to subtly guide foreign policies in directions beneficial to Moscow. This was often without the knowledge of the individuals involved. (source)
Today, similar tactics are employed, with Russian operatives engaging in activities that blend seamlessly with legitimate political and business operations. These efforts are often difficult to detect, as they exploit existing networks and relationships to further Russian strategic goals. For example, Russian media have targeted NATO missions in the Baltics with fabricated stories. They also influenced European politics through disinformation during the Italian referendum. Additionally, they have also conducted cyber operations against political figures in Germany and France. (source)
Additionally, the Kremlin’s financial support for far-right parties like France’s National Front and strategic energy projects such as Nord Stream 2 exemplifies how Russia integrates influence operations into legitimate sectors to achieve geopolitical objectives. (source).
2.4 Media Manipulation
Media manipulation is a critical component of active measures. It involves the strategic dissemination of disinformation through various media channels to influence public perception. During the Cold War, the KGB regularly fed false information to foreign media outlets. This shaped narratives to align with Soviet interests. This included planting stories in sympathetic newspapers, such as India’s The Patriot, which was created with Soviet funding and was the original source of the rumour that the CIA had invented AIDS. Additionally, the USSR supplied stories to the Indian media via cut-outs and official organs like the news service TASS. (source) (source)
2.4.1 State Controlled Media Manipulation
State-controlled media played a significant role in amplifying these disinformation operations. By publishing falsely attributed documents and misleading information, they were able to create a controlled media environment that supported Soviet propaganda objectives. This manipulation extended to radio, television, and print media, ensuring that the Soviet narrative reached a wide audience. For instance, after the assassination of Indira Gandhi, Soviet officials blamed the U.S. for using a misrepresented CIA report. However, the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) in India successfully countered this narrative by providing the correct report to major newspapers. This led to widespread criticism of the Soviet attempt to exploit the tragedy. Moreover, the USIA’s efforts in India included maintaining contact with editors of credible English-language newspapers and informing them about Soviet disinformation themes, thereby fostering scepticism and encouraging fact-checking among media professionals. (source)
2.4.2 Modern Day Media Manipulation
In the contemporary era, media manipulation has expanded to include digital platforms and social media. Russian state media, such as RT and Sputnik, continue to serve as tools for disseminating disinformation. They often target Western audiences with narratives that undermine trust in democratic institutions. The use of bots and also trolls to amplify these messages further enhances their reach and impact. This illustrates the evolution of media manipulation tactics in the digital age. (source)
2.5 Clandestine Radio Stations
Clandestine radio stations have historically been used to disseminate pro-Soviet messaging while concealing the origin of the broadcasts. These stations operated covertly, transmitting propaganda to target audiences in foreign countries. Radio Ba Yi, for example, was used to broadcast pro-Soviet content to China. Another example is The National Voice of Iran which targeted audiences in Iran with similar messaging. (source)
These stations served as powerful tools for spreading disinformation and also promoting Soviet policies, often operating under the guise of independent or local broadcasters. By reaching audiences in regions where direct Soviet influence was limited, they were able to sow discord and support Soviet geopolitical objectives from afar.
In the modern context, while traditional radio has declined in influence, the principles of clandestine broadcasting have been adapted to digital platforms. Online streaming and podcasts now serve as modern equivalents, allowing for the covert dissemination of targeted propaganda to global audiences.
3.0 Modern Developments of Active Measures
3.1 Post-Soviet Era
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia continued to employ active measures as an integral part of its foreign policy strategy. Under President Vladimir Putin, Russia’s foreign intelligence services, notably the SVR (Foreign Intelligence Service) and FSB (Federal Security Service), were revitalised, restoring and expanding capabilities honed during the Soviet era. These efforts aimed at influencing Western democracies by exploiting political divisions and also undermining adversaries, extending beyond the post-Soviet “Near Abroad” to a global stage. (source) (source)
The resurgence of active measures under Putin reflects a sophisticated blend of traditional espionage and modern tactics. Russia’s strategy includes manipulating media narratives, such as during the annexation of Crimea in 2014, where outlets like RT and Sputnik disseminated disinformation to justify Russian actions. (source) Additionally, Russia supports political movements sympathetic to Moscow, exemplified by the alleged financial backing to European far-right parties like Italy’s and Salvini’s Lega. (source)
Furthermore, Russia engages in cyber operations to disrupt political processes in countries like the United States and European Union members. (source) This comprehensive approach also leverages economic ties, energy dependencies, and cultural connections to exert influence over neighbouring countries and beyond.
The restoration of Russia’s intelligence apparatus has emphasised disinformation and propaganda, with state-controlled media disseminating pro-Russian narratives. Supported by a network of front organisations and additionally, informal alliances, Russia projects power and influence without direct military confrontation. This strategic approach reflects a long-standing tradition of using active measures and information warfare as a tool of statecraft, adapting to the changing global landscape while maintaining core objectives of destabilising adversaries and promoting Russian interests (source).
3.2 Digital Age Adaptations to Active Measures
The advent of the digital age has transformed the landscape of active measures, with cyber espionage and also cyberattacks becoming central components of Russia’s modern strategy. The integration of digital technologies has allowed for more sophisticated and far-reaching operations, enabling Russia to exploit vulnerabilities in cyberinfrastructure and social media to achieve its geopolitical objectives (source).
3.2.1 Internet Research Agency (IRA)
A prominent example is the activities of the Internet Research Agency (IRA) during the 2016 U.S. presidential election. The IRA conducted a coordinated campaign using fake social media accounts to amplify divisive content, sow discord, and influence public opinion. This operation highlighted the potential of digital platforms to serve as powerful tools for disinformation, allowing Russian operatives to engage with global audiences in real-time and at scale. (source)
3.2.2 Cyberattacks, Social Media Manipulation and Malware
Cyberattacks have also become a key element of Russia’s active measures, targeting critical infrastructure, political institutions, and private entities. The 2016 cyberattacks on the Democratic National Committee and the subsequent release of sensitive information via platforms like WikiLeaks demonstrated the impact of cyber operations on political processes. These attacks are designed not only to gather intelligence but also to disrupt and discredit adversaries, creating confusion and undermining trust in democratic institutions. (source)
In addition to social media manipulation and cyberattacks, Russia employs a variety of digital tools to conduct reconnaissance and gather intelligence. These tools include advanced malware and spyware, such as the infamous “Snake” malware, which has been used to infiltrate government networks and extract sensitive information. Russian operatives have also utilised phishing attacks to gain unauthorised access to email accounts and internal communications. Additionally, sophisticated hacking frameworks like “APT28” (also known as Fancy Bear) are deployed to conduct cyber probes into state election systems and other critical infrastructures. These activities aim to gather information that can be used to influence political outcomes and strategic decisions. (source)
3.2.3 Conclusion to Digital Age Adaptations
The digital age has facilitated the rapid dissemination of forgeries and fabricated information, with AI-generated content and deep fakes adding new dimensions to disinformation campaigns. This evolution underscores the enduring relevance of active measures, as Russia continues to adapt its methodologies to exploit technological advancements and address contemporary geopolitical challenges.
Overall, the last two decades have expanded the toolkit available for Russian active measures, allowing for more agile, covert, and impactful operations. The integration of cyber capabilities into traditional espionage and disinformation strategies reflects a sophisticated understanding of modern warfare, where information and perception are as critical as military might.
4.0 Effects and Implications of Active Measures
4.1 Social and Geopolitical Impacts
The use of Russian active measures has significantly impacted international relations and global political stability, leading to increased tensions and mistrust among nations. These operations have contributed to a climate of suspicion and rivalry, particularly between Russia and Western countries.
One of the most profound effects is the erosion of trust between nations. The dissemination of disinformation and fake news has undermined public confidence in democratic institutions and electoral processes. For example, the interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election through the Internet Research Agency’s social media campaigns sowed discord and polarised public opinion, leading to widespread allegations of foreign meddling in domestic affairs. This has resulted in strained diplomatic relations and increased scrutiny of Russian activities on the global stage. (source)
Moreover, the geopolitical landscape has been destabilised as countries respond to these threats with heightened security measures and policy shifts. The European Union and NATO have intensified their cybersecurity initiatives and intelligence sharing to counteract Russian influence operations. Key measures include the EU’s GDPR, Digital Services Act, Cybersecurity Act, the establishment of ENISA, and NATO’s Cyber Defence Pledge. The continuous cycle of accusations and countermeasures has led to a new form of Cold War-like tensions, where information warfare plays a central role. (source)
Furthermore, these operations have also affected alliances and international cooperation. The spread of disinformation has fuelled nationalist and populist movements, which often advocate for isolationist policies, thereby weakening multilateral institutions and collective security arrangements. The rise of populism, exacerbated by targeted disinformation campaigns, has led to increased polarisation within societies and social media, complicating efforts to build consensus on global issues and undermining democratic governance. The divisive nature of Russian active measures has thus contributed to a fragmented international order, complicating efforts to address global challenges such as climate change and terrorism. (source) (source)
4.2 Countermeasures and Responses to Russia’s Active Measures
In response to the challenges posed by Russian active measures, nations have developed a range of strategies to mitigate their impact and enhance resilience. These countermeasures include policy changes, intelligence efforts, and public awareness campaigns designed to protect democratic institutions and maintain political stability.
4.2.1 Cybersecurity Upgrades
A significant approach has been the strengthening of cybersecurity frameworks. The United States has implemented initiatives like the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) to coordinate national efforts in defending against cyber threats. (source) Similarly, the European Union has adopted the Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive, which sets cybersecurity standards for critical infrastructure sectors, and the EU Cybersecurity Act, enhancing the role of the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA). (source) (source) (source)
4.2.2 Intelligence Sharing
Intelligence sharing and international cooperation have been pivotal in countering Russian active measures. NATO has established the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Estonia, providing a platform for research, training, and exercises in cyber defence. (source) The EU’s Rapid Alert System facilitates the exchange of information on disinformation campaigns among member states, enabling coordinated responses to emerging threats. (source)
4.2.3 Public Awareness and Political Manipulation Defense
Public awareness and media literacy initiatives are crucial in combating disinformation. Estonia, renowned for its digital society, integrates media literacy into its national curriculum, teaching students to critically evaluate information sources. The European Digital Media Observatory supports research and fact-checking initiatives across Europe, promoting collaboration among academics, journalists, and policymakers to tackle disinformation. (source)
Moreover, the EU has launched the European Democracy Action Plan, which includes measures to protect elections from manipulation and strengthen media freedom. (source) The EUvsDisinfo campaign actively debunks Kremlin-backed disinformation narratives, providing resources and analysis to the public. (source)
4.2.4 Conclusion to Countermeasures and Responses
Overall, the international community’s response to Russian active measures underscores the importance of a comprehensive and coordinated approach. By combining technological innovation, strategic alliances, and public engagement, nations aim to safeguard their political systems and uphold the principles of democracy and transparency in the face of evolving threats.
5.0 Resilience Against the Evolving Threat of Disinformation
The historical evolution of Soviet and Russian active measures underscores a persistent and sophisticated strategy of psychological warfare designed to influence global perceptions and destabilise adversaries. From the early deception operations of the Cheka to the modern era’s digital manipulations, these tactics have consistently sought to exploit societal divisions and erode trust in democratic systems. The Cold War era exemplified the height of such activities, with the Soviet Union deploying a vast array of disinformation and influence operations to achieve its geopolitical aims.
In today’s context, Russia continues to adapt these strategies, leveraging advanced digital technologies to enhance their reach and impact. The enduring use of disinformation reflects a longstanding tradition of using information warfare as a tool of statecraft, underscoring Russia’s commitment to shaping international narratives and exerting influence without direct military confrontation.
The ongoing challenge for the international community is to effectively counter these measures while readily defending democratic values and freedoms. Strengthening cybersecurity frameworks, enhancing intelligence cooperation, and fostering media literacy are crucial steps in building resilience against disinformation. Moreover, these efforts must be underpinned by a steadfast commitment to transparency, accountability, and the free exchange of ideas and core principles that define and sustain our democratic society.
As the landscape of information warfare continues to evolve, a proactive and coordinated approach is essential in addressing the complex and dynamic threat posed by Russian active measures. By standing firm in the defence of democratic values, we cannot only protect the integrity of our political systems but also reaffirm the principles of liberty, justice, and human dignity that underpin the global democratic order. In doing so, we send a clear message that while disinformation may evolve, the commitment to truth and democracy remains unwavering.
