The GJ-11 “Sharp Sword” is a Chinese Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle (UCAV) first seen in 2013. Since then, the prototype has undergone significant alterations and modifications. As such, it evolved from a less stealthy original variation to a more advanced and complex design.
Evidence emerged in July 2024 that GJ-11 development was ramped up. An increase in numbers of available GJ-11s, along with notably advanced designs indicate that real-world tests may now not only allow for a potentially higher degree of operational autonomy but also cooperation and Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T) integration. Tactics, techniques and procedures of deployment may also profit from such tests.
While the GJ-11 is not new, the recent focus on its development and the strides in progress are significant. Its flexibility—from strike missions to ISR—its stealth capabilities, its uncrewed status, and the fact that it may be able to operate independently are critical.
The GJ-11 may be able to target high-value assets in heavily defended areas. Consequently, its stealth characteristics make it difficult to detect and intercept. This allows it to penetrate enemy defenses, including highly important targets in South Korea, Taiwan and Japan. The GJ-11 heralds a future direction of drone-human integration in the People’s Liberation Army Airforce (PLAAF) and Navy (PLAN) strategic doctrine. It reveals not only Chinese operational ideas towards adversaries such as Taiwan, but also critical gaps in US planning in the APAC region.
1.0 Introduction
1.1 What is it exactly?
The first pictures of the “Sharp Sword” GJ-11 appeared online in 2013. That same year a prototype conducted its first flight. It is a UCAV designed for precision strike operations as well as aerial reconnaissance missions. In its earliest version it was less stealthy. However, over the years, in 2019 and 2024 particularly, Chinese researchers reworked it for far more stealth capabilities regarding its exhaust system and shape.
GJ-11 mirrors the US Loyal Wingman idea. In 2022 Chinese state media circulated computer generated content showcasing a Chinese J-20 manned fighter controlling a flock of 3 GJ-11 that were escorting the manned jet. The GJ-11’s primary mission is deep, high-precision strikes. It can operate as an escort drone for fighters, possibly as an independently operated ISR platform. It is able to launch from carriers and amphibious vehicles.
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1.2 What does it look like?
1.3 What are its specs and capabilities?
This is a list of known specifications for the GJ-11 based on military intelligence featured on the Operational Environment Data Integration Network (ODIN) as well as based on OSINT/ GEOINT sources:
1.3.1 Dimensions:
- Length: 11.63m
- Wingspan: 14m
- Empty Weight: 6,350 kg
- Maximum Weight: 20,215 kg
1.3.2 Automotive:
- Engine Type: 1 x Turbofan
- Maximum Speed: 1,111 km/h
- Minimum Speed: 333 km/h
- Maximum Range: See Sensor / EW (55.6 km -926 km)
1.3.3 Sensors:
- GJ-11 Sharp Sword UAV [EO/IR]: (Multi-Spectral Targeting System) Infrared Infrared, Surveillance Camera. Max Range: 55.6 km.
- GJ-11 Sharp Sword UAV ASIP: (Multi-Spectral Targeting System) ESM ELINT. Max Range: 926 km.
- GJ-11 Sharp Sword UAV Sensor Package [ISAR]: (Multi-Spectral Targeting System) Radar Radar, Surface Search, Medium-Range. Max Range: 185.2 km.
- GJ-11 Sharp Sword UAV AESA: (Multi-Spectral Targeting System) Radar Radar, FCR, Air-to-Air & Air-to-Surface, Medium-Range. Max Range: 222.2 km.
- GJ-11 Sharp Sword UAV SAR-8: (Multi-Spectral Targeting System) Infrared Infrared, Surveillance Camera. Max Range: 55.6 km.
1.3.4 Armaments:
- FT-7 Flying Strides SDB [GPS, 135kg HE Penetrator]: (China, 2016) Guided Weapon. Land Max: 92.6 km.
- LS-6-500 Extended-Range Bomb, GPS/INS [500kg HE]: (China, 2010) Guided Weapon. Land Max: 55.6 km.
- LS-6-500 GPS/INS [500kg HE]: (China) Guided Weapon. Land Max: 46.3 km
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The GJ-11’s electronic reconnaissance equipment allows for remarkable versatility. The aircraft integrates sophisticated active and passive sensor systems. Multi-mission adaptability, through modular configurations, allows for rapid mission adaptation.
GJ-11 sensors and real-time data collecting and transmission, along with all-weather operability. These allow for a very useful combat tool that can adapt to mission changes and weather, essential elements of any operations in the Western Pacific.
According to the official model displayed by AVIC at the Airshow China 2021 in Zhuhai, the GJ-11 has two weapons bays. They are symmetrically positioned between the drone’s three landing gears. Each bay has four ammunitions, which appear to be guided precision air-to-ground glide bombs. The GJ-11 will likely carry multiple types of precision ammunition.
1.4 Who developed GJ-11?
The Shenyang Aircraft Design Institute (SYADI) of the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) and the Shenyang Aerospace University (SAU) developed seven iterations of the AVIC 601-S, of which GJ-11 is one. It was one of two iterations which advanced beyond proof of concept. These were put into further development as a joint project between SYADI, SAU and Hongdu Aviation Industry Group.
The second model being developed is the “Dark Sword,” a model emphasizing speed more than stealth. This shows that Chinese developers, researchers and industrial heads are seeking to diversify and satisfy various needs, instead of seeking for a uni-linear direction of development.
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2.0 Drone Warfare in the PLA
Aerial warfare and modernization in China coincides with the Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011-2015). This is a period prioritizing innovation in technology, science, fostering of military-civil integration and boosting of the defense industry. By early 2010, advancements in drone production and design—such as the development of the GJ-11 itself—were evident. Now, a decade later, it is openly displayed and tested in greater frequency.
The rise of drone technology, development, and production in China during the 2010s has naturally led the PLA down the path of integrating drones more and more into conventional doctrine. Drones’ strategic flexibility, cost effectiveness, and their role in the centrality of information warfare in the modern battlefield make drones a central point of focus for PLA doctrine and operations across all domains of combat.
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2.1 GJ-11 in the PLAN
Since 2019, variants of the GJ-11 have appeared on CCTV footage. They are shown launching from what appear to be Type 075 amphibious ships that entered service with the PLAN in 2021. This indicates that the PLAN is looking to integrate UCAVs, the GJ-11 in particular, in operations from its carriers and amphibious vessels. This, either to support naval operations or expand the range of offensive operations.
The versatility of the GJ-11 is further highlighted, as the footage shows, by its ability to launch a number of decoys which look very similar to Raytheon’s Miniature Air Launched Decoys (MALDs). MALDs are small cruise missiles which are geared with electronic warfare capabilities. They can interfere with enemy radar or give the illusion of high numbers of missiles or aircraft approaching.
Additionally, the ability of the GJ-11 to conduct high precision strike operations, escort naval fighters, perform ISR, and conduct electronic warfare that can overwhelm or interfere with adversary capabilities makes it an indispensable weapon that upgrades PLAN operational versatility and threat potential.
2.2 GJ-11 in the PLAAF
In the PLAAF, the versatility of the GJ-11 includes the aircraft acting alongside J-20 manned fighters in escort wings of multiple UCAVs. These can support pilots by carrying out electronic warfare, reconnaissance, and even deep strikes without risking the lives of pilots.
Many experts have noted that domestic production of the J-20 stealth fighter fleet has picked up in 2023-2024, totaling approximately 200 airframes. Thus production and evolution of the GJ-11, as a complement to the fighters, may increase in lockstep.
Less advanced variants of the GJ-11 are equipped to conduct reconnaissance and can later be reconfigured to autonomously conduct strikes against high-value US and allied targets in the region.
3.0 GJ-11 in Combat, in response
Pentagon officials have noted that the aerial warfare capabilities of the PLA are increasingly approaching US-standards in key areas. On the other hand, substantial weaknesses remain in command and control capabilities, as well as in long-distance logistics.
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3.1 Logistical Challenges
Logistical challenges for the GJ-11 arise predominantly in the naval domain of operations, and primarily along three vectors: 1) Operational integration with amphibious assault ships; 2) maintenance and support, including launch and recovery; and 3) personnel training.
3.1.1 Operation Integration of GJ-11
The GJ-11’s large size and stealth design, while advantageous for combat, may require significant modifications to the flight deck and hangar space of the Type 075 amphibious assault ship.
Especially for autonomous operations, which seem to be the main intent of amphibiously-launched GJ-11s, the drone would have to calculate for wind speed, sea state, glide slopes and other factors involved in landing an aircraft on a carrier or amphibious assault ship such as the Type 075. It is currently unclear whether the Chinese possess such capabilities.
Such capabilities are maintained by the US Marine corps and advanced airframes and capabilities such as the F-35B.
3.1.2 Maintenance and Support
The GJ-11’s unique design might necessitate specialized maintenance equipment and procedures not readily available on amphibious assault ships, requiring additional logistical support and installation.
Additionally, the GJ-11’s weapons bays will need to be integrated with the ship’s systems—be it a carrier or an amphibious assault ship—for efficient loading and deployment during time sensitive missions.
3.1.3 Personnel Training
The operation and maintenance of the GJ-11 on a ship will require specialized training for both the drone crew and the ship’s crew. Therefore this will necessitate shuffling of personnel, and logistical challenges of maintaining more crew members and integrating in the command structure.
3.2 Geographical Challenges
The integration of UCAVs in naval or aerial operations across the Western Pacific, the South China Sea, and the First Island Chain—which are the main areas of operation the PLA is preparing for—presents a host of challenges related to geographical realities.
Deploying and maintaining a fleet of stealth drones such as the GJ-11 in remote locations like the Western Pacific presents logistical challenges. These include fuel, maintenance, and communication infrastructure.
More specifically, the possibility of using the GJ-11 in a potential conflict over Taiwan or the Japanese Southern Islands highlights the need for the drone to operate effectively in areas that are geographically complex, have diverse weather patterns, and have the potential for adversary electronic warfare.
While the GJ-11 presents significant advantages in terms of stealth and potential carrier operations, its effectiveness in different geographical environments and scenarios depends on overcoming the challenges related to its operational environment, logistics, and interoperability with other platforms. This would allow it to maintain range of operation and function up to standard across the complex terrain of the APAC region.
4.0 Conclusion
The development of the GJ-11 signals pivotal growth in Chinese military capability. It points towards a future of increasingly integrated drone-human operations both within the PLAAF and PLAN.
Far from being a mere technological demonstration, the GJ-11 reflects a broader evolution in China’s strategic doctrine. China prioritizes autonomous capabilities, operational flexibility, and coordinated swarm tactics, while maintaining and advancing MUM-T potential.
Its deployment and potential roles across domains, highlight Beijing’s growing focus on PLA modernization to counter adversaries such as Taiwan or Japan. It also focuses on complicating U.S. presence and force projection in the Asia-Pacific. Simultaneously, the GJ-11 exposes critical blind spots in current U.S. and allied planning. Particularly, adapting to the accelerating pace of unmanned systems development and the doctrinal innovation it enables. Thus the GJ-11 is not only a platform to watch but a harbinger of the changing character of warfare in the region.