Executive Summary

China’s ability to hold an occupied Taiwan is fundamentally constrained by its inability to sustain air power beyond the first island chain. Effective control of regional airspace will be essential in consolidating the success of any Taiwanese Reclamation operations through ensuring defence against external intervention.

While the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) operates a vast fleet of modern fighters capable of reaching beyond the first island chain, limited endurance and an underdeveloped air-to-air refuelling capability will prevent effective, enduring, defensive combat air presence. 

China’s investment in air-to-air refuelling platforms, aircraft carriers, carrier air combat wings and the operational training to employ these capabilities will take years to mature. Until then, the PLA cannot establish or maintain an effective defensive air combat presence east of Taiwan, tempering Beijing’s desires of reclamation, and delaying action until this gap in capability can be overcome. 

Key Judgements

KJ-1. The PRC is highly unlikely to maintain air superiority beyond the first island chain in defence of a Chinese occupied Taiwan.

1. In the event of a successful amphibious landing and occupation of Taiwan, historical precedent and standard military doctrine indicate that China’s strategic problem would immediately shift from seizure to consolidation. A U.S. led counterattack, projected from the east via Pacific bases, primarily Okinawa and Guam, will require the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to defend not only Taiwan itself, but also the air and maritime approaches beyond the first island chain. [source] [source] 
2. At present, the PLA’s inability to project combat air power beyond the first island chain is represented by a combination of limited fighter endurance, insufficient tanker capacity, and an immature AAR enterprise. This represents a decisive constraint on Beijing’s ability to hold Taiwan following any initial success.[source] [source] [source] [source] 
3. Efforts to maintain air superiority would face the United States’s ability to project significant airpower in the Indo-Pacific through a combination of forward-deployed naval and air forces. The U.S. Navy’s 7th Fleet, headquartered at Yokosuka Naval Base, Japan, typically operates approximately 150 aircraft, including the USS George Washington Carrier Strike Group. This is supported by both the 18th Fighter Wing housed at Kadena Airbase, notably the largest combat wing in the United States Air Force, and the 35th Fighter Wing, housed at Misawa Airbase. Combined, this forward deployed force structure, including supporting elements such as command and control, electronic warfare, air to air refuelling and strategic strike capabilities projected from Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, allows the United States to project significant air and maritime power across the Indo-pacific at short notice. [source][source]

KJ-2. Range limitations across the PLAAF’s current line fighter fleet will almost certainly fail to address a Chinese occupied Taiwan’s defensive air combat requirements. 

1. The longest-ranged line fighter in the PLAAF’s inventory, the Shenyang J-16, has an approximate maximum flight range of 3,000 km. While this would allow the aircraft to physically reach patrol areas east of Taiwan, fuel constraints would severely restrict on-station times, rendering patrolling tactically pointless. [source] 
2. Available J-16 specifications indicate that a return transit to a Barrier Combat Air Patrol (BARCAP) station over the Philippine Sea could consume up to 70% of the aircraft’s internal fuel, leaving roughly 6,000 lb available. This would be sufficient for approximately one hour of low-power on-station cruise, or less than twenty minutes of high-output or afterburner use. [source] 
3. Available data on PLAAF airframes indicate that PLAAF BARCAP operations beyond the first island chain would be severely fuel limited, rendering them predictable, and highly vulnerable. [source] 

KJ-3. The PLAAF’s ability to seize and use Taiwan’s airfields to sustain operations is unclear, but we assess that such a scenario is unlikely. 

1. The mobilisation and deployment of the PLAAF ground support equipment and personnel necessary for sustained aircraft launch and recovery operations will be substantially longer than the projection of an international response. [source source] 
2. Initial PLA strike operations are expected to prioritize degrading Taiwan’s defensive air power by targeting critical airfield infrastructure , including runways, taxiways, and associated fuel and support facilities, to constrain the Republic of China Air Force’s operational effectiveness. [source] [source] 
3. The exposure of high-value air combat platforms, along with their aircrews and associated support personnel, to ongoing irregular warfare activities by Taiwanese forces will represent unacceptable levels of risk in the event of the occupation and utilisation of major Taiwanese airports, including Taipei and Kaoshiung. [source] 
4. Refueling options east of Taiwan, including Lanyu Airport on Orchid Island and Green Island Airport on Green Island, are too short to support heavy fighter launch and recovery. [source] [source][ source] 

KJ-4. The PLAAF lacks the air-to-air refueling capacity and experience to sustain large-scale air combat operations beyond Taiwan.

1. As of 2025, China operates 46 tanker aircraft, including 17 Xi’an YY-20s, 24 Xi’an H-6U/DU BADGERs, and 3 Ilyushin IL-78 MIDAS. Notably, the Chinese RDC-1 drogue utilised on the H-6U/DU tankers are incompatible with the Russian UPAZ series probe operated by the J-11 and J-16 fighter fleet, heavily limiting current refueling options for the PLAAF’s entire long-range interceptor fleet to the YY-20 and IL-78, a total of 20 compatible tanker aircraft. [source] [source]   
2. Defending Taiwan against a U.S. led counterattack projected from Okinawa, Guam or the wider Pacific would require the PLA to establish a defensive air patrol barrier approximately 1,500 km in length, stretching between the East China Sea, dog legging south of Taiwan, and culminating in the South China Sea. This would demand a minimum of four CAP stations, each maintained by at least two aircraft. [source] [source] 
3. Sustaining such a posture would require approximately 48,000lb of fuel per hour for eight fighters in cruise, plus an additional 12,000lb per relief cycle to bring ingressing aircraft to maximum fuel post-transit. This is further complicated by the maximum onboard fuel carriage of the J-16 at approximately 20,000lbs, combined with its cruise fuel burn rate of up to 6,000lbs per hour, and need for fighters to retain sufficient fuel, approximately 6,000lb, to return safely to mainland bases. Ultimately, refuelling would be required between every two to three hours to ensure aircraft did not drop below minimum return (Bingo) fuel levels.[source][source][source][source] 
4. While the YY-20 and Il-78 each carry around 200,000lb of transferable fuel, practical constraints severely limit their effectiveness. Available data on these airframes indicates that neither the YY-20 or IL-78 have a cruise speed that would allow the service of all four BARCAP stations on a 1500km defensive line, and allow for the tanker to return to the first station, before the patrolling fighter dropped below its minimum return fuel level. Maintaining continuous coverage would therefore require at least two tankers permanently airborne, driving extremely high sortie rates across a small fleet of 20 compatible airframes. Further complicating this, any tanker diversion or mission-ending fault that was not remedied or replaced by a third tanker would result in the immediate collapse of all BARCAP coverage.[source][source] 
5. These demands would impose an unsustainable strain on crew rest, maintenance cycles, and aircraft availability, particularly for ageing platforms such as the IL-78, which has already demonstrated serviceability rates as low as 49% in other air forces.[source] 
6. Compounding this issue, AAR remains a relatively immature operational capability within the PLA. While training has expanded, PLAAF AAR remains in its infancy, lacking the depth of experience and procedural resilience found in Western air forces

KJ-5. PLA training and production suggest that it is addressing the shortfall in long range air power projection, but the timeframe by which Beijing will close the gap remains unclear.

1. The PLA has invested consistently in AAR training, expanded tanker production, and developed the Y-20B Multi-Role Transport Tanker (MRTT) variant. By late 2024, at least 18 Y-20B aircraft had been observed at Kaifeng Airbase, indicating a concerted effort to expand tanker availability and AAR capabilities. [source][source][source] 
2. Based on China’s production rate of approximately eight Y-20 frames per year, China will be capable of fielding up to 45 Y-20B MRTTs by 2030, and 86 by 2035. This would bring the requirement in line with the Counter Intervention Force design expected of China in its bid to take Taiwan.[source] 
3. As of 2026, China has two Short Take-Off But Arrested Recovery (STOBAR) carriers in service (Liaoning and Shandong), and a third (Fujian) with Catapult Assisted Take-Off But Arrested Recovery (CATOBAR) systems nearing operationalization. The J-15 remains the only fixed-wing combat aircraft embarked on these carriers. While the J-15 provides basic air defense and strike capability proximal to the carrier task force, STOBAR launch weight limitations constrain fuel and ordnance loads compared with CATOBAR naval aviation.[source][source][source] 
4. Notably, PLAN carrier aviation has had fewer than 15 years of active fixed-wing operations and suffers from similar capability infancy as PLAAF AAR. PLA carrier air operation priorities currently focus on development, with the transition toward more advanced carrier designs and aircraft variants (J-15T and future J-35), rather than active deployment.[source][source] 

Statements on Analysis

We have high confidence in our assessment of China’s requirements for large scale air combat protection in defending against international intervention. Whilst this assumes that U.S forces in the Indopacific will lead any intervention efforts, it remains possible that the American administration may opt to forego the defence of Taiwan, substantially lessening the demand on China’s defensive requirements.

Due to access limitations, we have middling confidence in assessments drawing on the specific accuracy of technical aircraft specifications for the Shenyang J-16. However, based on data regarding foundational systems and platforms, including the SU-30MKK and AL-31F Turbofan engine, and type-equivalent 4/4.5 generation aircraft, a functional average was identified that provided a consistent base for further analysis. This average fell within the expected norms for an aircraft of this type, size and weight, providing high confidence to the overall assessments on viability for BARCAP operations beyond the first island chain. Notably,  J-16 aircraft are capable of flying with externally carried drop tanks, adding an approximate maximum of 10,000lb of additional fuel. Although external fuel tanks could extend endurance, their use is incompatible with air combat requirements due to increased radar cross-section and degraded maneuverability. 

We have high confidence in assessments made regarding Chinese operational airfields and projection points for PLA air power. This assumes Taiwan is able to exert a scale of resistance that requires PLA strike against ROCAF operating areas, and enables the application of effective Taiwanese irregular warfare efforts.

We have very high confidence in assessments centered on Chinese combat capability development, including air to air refuelling and carrier aviation. It should be noted that the introduction of these capabilities, at the desired standard expressed by Beijing, represents an enabler of Taiwanese reclamation operations, and not a catalyst for their commencement.   

Intelligence Cut-off Date: 23 January 2026