Redut PMC is a pseudo private military company funded and equipped by Russia’s military intelligence. Russia’s Ministry of Defence uses Redut as a front company to contract personnel into the armed forces and circumvent restrictions around mobilisation. Since 2022, Redut has undergone significant expansion and the PMC is now an integral element of Russia’s recruitment strategy. However, unlike the now infamous Wagner Group, Redut PMC is closely under the Kremlin’s thumb.
1.0 Who is Redut PMC?
Redut is best characterised as an umbrella organisation with various units and detachments operating under their banner. These units range from the Neo-Nazi football hooligan battalion, Española, through to the Borz Battalion which recruits women as sharpshooters and medics. With no overarching ideology, Redut’s main attraction is the increasingly lucrative contracts offered out by the Ministry of Defence.
Since the demise of Yevgeny Priogzhin in August 2023, Redut has been widely touted as Russia’s natural successor to Wagner PMC. While Russia’s Ministry of Defence has largely consumed Wagner forces in Ukraine, the transition has been less straightforward in Africa where Russian PMCs have propped up military juntas. Redut is clearly the Kremlin’s creature and the PMCs lack of autonomy is making replacing Wagner a hard sell.
2.0 The History of the Redut PMC
2.1 Murky Origins
Despite various investigations, the origins of Redut PMC remain unclear. It is believed that Redut is the spiritual successor to the PMC called “Group-R” which was created by the GRU during the collapse of the Soviet Union. Group R reportedly operated in the UAE, Bahrain, Zaire (Democratic Republic of Congo) and Iraq. [Source]
Another origin story often cited is “Centre-R”, a 2006 joint venture by Russia’s “anti-terror family” to perform missions abroad. This so-called “anti-terror family” consisted of veterans of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), Russian Airborne Forces (VDV), the Main Directorate of the Russian General Staff (GRU), and the Internal Troops of the Russian Ministry for Internal Affairs (MVD). There is evidence that Redut trained Russian armed forces during the 2008 Russo-Georgian War and acted as a military consultant. [Source]
After 2008, the Redut name disappeared and then reappeared in 2017 as protective security forces in Syria. This iteration of Redut has direct continuity with the modern Redut seen in Ukraine and also across the globe. In Syria, Redut was primarily tasked with protecting the oil and gas interests of the influential Russian oligarch, Gennady Timochenko. The PMC also was noted to occasionally launch raids on ISIS hideouts. [Source]
Prior to the invasion of Ukraine, Redut consisted of around 100 personnel and was little more than a small security force. Comparable to the US PMC, Blackwater, Redut primarily engaged in convoy security, executive protection and static security. While Redut’s origins are unclear, it is obvious that throughout the PMC various interactions have consisted of institutions and organisations loyal to the Kremlin. [Source]
2.2 The War in Ukraine and the Making of Redut PMC
In late 2021, Vladimir Alexseev, the deputy head of GRU and mastermind of Redut, tasked the PMC’s leader, Anatoli Karazi with significantly expanding Redut’s capabilities. Alexseev envisioned Redut playing a decisive role in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Karazi embarked on his mission, recruiting new personnel and scouting out potential training sites. As the former head intelligence for Wagner, Karazi began recruiting Wagnerites as well as fresh recruits of 16th GRU Special Forces Brigade. [Source]
By January 2022, Redut had swelled to “several thousand” personnel of which a not insignificant number were former Wagner personnel. This angered Yevgeny Prigozhin, who stormed into a meeting with Alexseyev and demanded an explanation for the GRU’s encroachment on his PMC. The feud was resolved by a one-on-one meeting between Prigozhin and Karazi but the spat on the eve of the war was an ominous premonition of future tensions between Wagner and the Ministry of Defence. [Source]
When the invasion of Ukraine kicked off in February, Alekseyev’s vision became a reality and Redut led the charge on Kyiv. Redut’s exact role is unclear but it is believed elements were tasked with the assassination of Ukrainain’s President Volodymyr Zelensky. What is clear however is that the assault on Kyiv nearly wiped Redut out, with reports of 90% casualty rates among the PMCs detachments. Over the next 18 months, Redut licked its wounds as Wagner entered the stage as Russia’s spearhead in the Donbas. [Source, source, source]
2.3 The Wagner Mutiny and Opportunity for Redut
Following Prigozhin’s march on Moscow and the dissolution of Wagner, international media speculated Redut would take over the PMCs international operations. In June 2023, the Kremlin demanded former Wagner fighters sign “volunteer contracts” with the Ministry of Defence, effectively nationalising Wagner and the Prigozhin PMC system. In Ukraine, this transition was relatively smooth, former Wagner fighters were divided between the armed forces, the national guard and additionally, various Ministry of Defence PMCs including Redut. [Source]
2.3.1 Redut PMC in Syria
However outside of Europe, replacing Prigozhin has been less straightforward due to the complex network of informal arrangements that underpinned Wagner’s influence. In Syria, for example, RUSI has observed that once Redut took over Wagner’s oil and gas interests, the “profitability collapsed”.
As the personnel had remained largely the same, the collapse pointed less to incompetence and instead to the loss of Prigozhin’s “shadowy business skills”. Furthermore, during Wagner’s time in Syria, Prigozhin’s “wild capitalism model” has generated jealousy and anger among Syria’s elite.
With the war also winding down since 2020, there has been less appetite for Russian PMCs in Syria. These factors combined have made it significantly more difficult for the Russia Ministry of Defence to pitch an expanded role for Redut in the country. [Source]
2.3.2 Redut PMC in West Africa
In West Africa, Prigozhin’s autonomy and plausible deniability had enabled Wagner to act as a no-limits regime survival package. Wagner’s heavy handed approach to counter-terrorism and also silencing dissent was highly valued by the Sahel’s military juntas. This has made replacing Wagner a challenge for the Russian Ministry of Defence. [Source]
In Mali, for example, when Russia attempted to replace Wagner with Redut, Mali insisted Wagner must stay in the country. Ultimately, Russia compromised with Mali and 80% of the old Wagner fighters will remain. Nonetheless, Wagner has faced recruitment problems in Mali since 2023 and there appears to be a strong desire to subordinate, consume and eventually replace all remaining elements of Wagner. [Source]
3.0 Structure and Organisation of Redut PMC
As previously mentioned Redut is not a single entity and does not have an overarching structure or ideology. What unites the PMC’s disparate patchwork of units, is that they are all contracted to the same Russian-registered front company. In an RFE investigation, Redut fighters described signing a contract with a limited liability company called “Redut” associated with the name Igor Ivanovich Shorikov. Of the 50 Igor Ivanovich Shorikov’s found in Russian public records, none had any connections to companies by the name of Redut. [Source]
It is estimated that 33 individual units have contracts through Redut. These vary from division size units all the way down to individual battalions. The lack of uniformity has led Redut to resemble a patchwork of units with unique identities and structures. For example, Redut has supported Neo-Nazi units such as Rusich and Espanola. Simultaneously, Redut has also assisted corporations such as Gazprom with filling the ranks of their PMC units Fakel (Torch), Potok (Flow), and Plamya (Flame). [Source]
As previously mentioned the number of Redut personnel swelled significantly in late 2021, prior to the invasion of Ukraine. By mid-2023, Redut was estimated to have between 7,000 and 25,000 personnel. The dissolution of Wagner has likely increased these numbers with Wagner numbering over 50,000 personeel at the time of the mutiny. [Source, source]
4 Equipment of the Redut PMC
Units belonging to Redut have full access to the Ministry of Defences arsenal. It is notable that personnel belonging to Redut tend to be better equipped with fully kitted weapons and hefty body armour. Once again, Redut’s units are not uniformly structured and with some elements specialising in drone warfare or long range marksmanship. The following is a list of identified weapons and equipment Redut units have been spotted carrying in Ukraine and across the globe. Redut’s arsenal is by no means limited to this list and does not include captured weaponry:
4.1 Weapons and Equipment
Assault Rifles
- 5.45x39mm AK-74
- 5.45x39mm AK-74M
- 7.62x39mm AKM
Shotguns
- 12 Gauge Vepr-12
Light Machine Guns
- 7.62x39mm RPK-74
Medium Machine Gun
- 7.62x45mm PKM
Heavy Machine Gun
- 12.7x108mm NSV
Pistols
- 9x18mm APS
- 9x18mm Makarov
Sniper and Designated Marksman Rifles
- 7.62x54mm SVD Dragunov
- 7.62x54mm SV-98
- 6.5x47mm ORSIS T-5000
Rocket Launchers
- RPG-7
Above is an image posted by a Redut soldier known by the callsign “Psycho” on Telegram. In the post Psycho lists the equipment as:
- StKSS – Structural Kinetic Support System
- A-20 Titian – Plate Carrier
- Wartech Belt – For Medical Supplies
- Omnitek Ballistic Helmet
- Ear Pro X
5.0 Conclusion
As Russia has continued to experience staggering casualties in Ukraine, Redut PMC and the contract soldier system allows the Kremlin to avoid a politically sensitive mass mobilisation. Despite many contracted personnel being coerced or pressured into fighting, they are foremost “volunteers” who have chosen to go to the front. SWP has characterised the Kremlin’s new form of recruitment as “covert mobilisation”. By coercing recruits through money rather than force, Moscow is ensuring that soldiers are drawn from Russia’s most economically deprived and least politically active regions.
Recent indicators however suggest that the supply of volunteers is not endless. In 2024, the Ministry of Defence is offering ever greater sums of money for Russians to “volunteer”. For example, in 2022, the average contract soldier received a monthly wage of €330. By April 2024, the monthly average had risen to €2,110 with starting bonuses of over €2,000. This is a considerable amount of money given the national average monthly wage is €800 and €400 in poorer regions. Having declared in 2023, the desire to expand the military to 1.5 million personnel, the Ministry of Defence appears to already be encountering supply issues. With the contract system appearing to reach its upper-limit pressure will only increase on the Kremlin to call a mass mobilisation to fill the ranks in Ukraine.
