Executive Summary
Caracas is highly likely to have played a more active role than publicly acknowledged in the U.S. operation in June that killed Tren de Aragua leader “Niño Guerrero” in southern Venezuela. Civilian observers reported the deployment of Venezuelan air combat controllers and intelligence operators in Bolívar during, and in the immediate aftermath of, the operation.
We assess that security cooperation between Caracas and Washington almost certainly will continue, if not expand, with military operations currently increasing around mining sites in Bolívar. Activity by the local Counterintelligence Directorate, coupled with White House statements, suggests that there will be additional operations targeting criminal networks in the Orinoco Mining Belt.
Recent kinetic operations will likely degrade criminal actors’ operations in mining locations, at least in the near term, but they are unlikely to improve conditions for foreign investment. Meanwhile, Grey Dynamics’ interviews in April and May with industry stakeholders indicate that mining investors remain cautious about the long-term stability of Bolívar. As a result, significant mining investments and concession development are unlikely to materialise before September.
Key Judgements
KJ-1. Caracas’ involvement in the operation was highly likely more extensive than publicly acknowledged by Washington.
- The Venezuelan 10th Special Operations Group, known for coordinating air operations, was spotted on Jun 9 by the local civilian population during the military deployment in the Orinoco Mining Belt. [source]
- Local paramilitary operations officers, assessed by Grey Dynamics to be from the Counterintelligence Directorate, were also filmed that same day in the vicinity of Las Claritas. [source]
- According to a media report published by CNN, citing a source inside Langley, CIA officers provided Venezuelan authorities with actionable intelligence on the Niño Guerrero. [source]
KJ-2. Venezuelan-U.S. joint efforts almost certainly will expand across the mining regions, as military and intelligence operations increase in southern Venezuela.
- U.S. Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth disclosed during an interview in the aftermath of the strike that further strikes against similar targets could be expected in Venezuela. [source]
- El Pitazo media reported that since the strike, the Venezuelan Counterintelligence Directorate increased its operations in Bolívar and seized an outpost belonging to the Venezuelan National Guard. [source]
- Local environmental activists reported that intelligence officers and military operators began demining activities in the indigenous territories of Amazonas days after the strikes. [source]
KJ-3 Kinetic strikes will likely limit non-state actors’ operational activity, at least in the short term, but they are unlikely to accelerate negotiations of mining contracts in Venezuela.
- Field interviews of local fixers (with direct knowledge of mining agreements) conducted by Grey Dynamics during April and May showed that mining initiatives increased their caution involving investment opportunities in Venezuela.
- European contractors involved in the mining negotiations reported to Grey Dynamics during our visit to Venezuela that the security situation involving the presence of armed non-state actors in Bolívar will stall mining exploitation until at least until September.
Statement on Analysis
We have a high degree of confidence in our key judgements, which draw on reliable sources, including interviews with local contacts. Despite the sources’ quality, the fragmented information environment in Bolívar almost certainly leaves gaps and blind spots in our understanding.
Among our main data gaps is the absence of official information regarding the ongoing efforts, as well as the current disposition of armed non-state actors in Bolívar. Furthermore, restricted access and unverified reporting in the area do not allow us to produce more detailed assumptions about the complete scope of the local military deployment around the Claritas. Unknown information in these gaps could affect our understanding of the scale, duration, and expansion of future security operations in southern Venezuela.