Egypt possesses one of the largest and most influential intelligence communities in the Arab world. At its core is the General Intelligence Service (GIS) (Gihaz al-Mukhabarat al-‘Amma), commonly referred to as the Mukhabarat, which is responsible for both domestic and foreign national security intelligence.
The GIS is the most prominent of Egypt’s three main intelligence agencies and stands out for its direct line of authority to the president. Modelled on the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the GIS was designed not only to conduct intelligence and covert operations but also to oversee and coordinate the activities of Egypt’s wider intelligence community.
However, beneath its glossy exterior is a murky world of brutal statecraft, backchannel diplomacy, and surveillance. The GIS is a power broker that influences Egypt’s future behind the scenes, as evidenced by its sinister hawk-and-snake seal and its clandestine operations in Gaza, Sudan, and Libya.
1 Symbols
1.1 Seal of the GIS
The emblem of Egypt’s GIS features a bird of prey swooping down to grasp a venomous snake, symbolising vigilance and domination over hidden threats. A lightning bolt cuts through the background—possibly representing the agency’s speed and power—while the protective Eye of Horus watches over, adding an ancient Egyptian symbol of protection and divine insight.
2 Historic Overview
2.1 Founding and Early Operations
The Egyptian GIS was established in March 1954, during the early years of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s leadership, to fulfil the need for a strategic foreign intelligence body. Inspired partly by the CIA model, GIS assumed responsibilities for foreign intelligence, covert operations, and coordinating national intelligence efforts. One of its early missions included surveillance of the Suez Canal Company ahead of its nationalisation.
2.2 Suez Crisis and Expansion
During the 1956 Suez Crisis, after official Egyptian radio disabled, the GIS continued broadcasting clandestinely. The crisis signalled the start of its international operations, which grew significantly under Director Salah Nasr. By the late 1950s, GIS operated across the Arab world, especially in Iraq and Yemen, often working with Soviet intelligence. [source]
2.3 Struggles and Realignment (1960s–1970s)
Despite early victories, Egypt lost the Six-Day War (1967), in part due to its reliance on faulty Soviet intelligence. After the war, the GIS secretly pursued peace with the West and briefly assumed domestic duties. The organisation turned back towards the West under President Anwar Sadat, strengthening its relationship with the CIA and joining the Cairo-based Safari Club, which is an alliance of intelligence services from France, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and other countries.
2.4 The Mubarak Era: Islamism and Regional Affairs
After Sadat’s 1981 assassination, seen as an intelligence failure, GIS refocused on domestic security and regional Islamist threats. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, it was instrumental in suppressing Islamist militancy both within Egypt and abroad. Under long-serving director Omar Suleiman, GIS increased cooperation with the CIA, particularly during the “War on Terror,” and played an important role in extraordinary rendition programmes targeting jihadist suspects. [source]
2.5 Resolution and Diplomacy (1990-2000s)
GIS Director Suleiman also served as a mediator in major regional conflicts, such as Israeli-Palestinian talks and Sudanese reconciliation efforts. The agency maintained a presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan and took part in operations against al-Qaeda leaders.
2.6 Revolution and Reorientation (2011–present)
The 2011 Egyptian Revolution (also known as the 25 January Revolution) revealed flaws in GIS’s foresight, temporarily undermining its reputation. However, its influence increased after the 2013 military-led government took power. President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has since expanded GIS’s role in foreign policy, as evidenced by its mediation of Palestinian issues and disputes with Ethiopia over the Nile dam.
Today, GIS is key to Egypt’s security and diplomacy, leading regional intelligence efforts and engaging in backchannel negotiations. [source]
3 GIS Organisation
3.1 GIS Structure
The GIS operates independently within Egypt’s state apparatus, reporting directly to the president, who also appoints its director. Unlike most government bodies, it is not subject to ministerial oversight, giving it a uniquely autonomous role.
Details about the agency’s internal structure, staffing, and resources remain classified. Given the Middle East’s volatile security environment, the GIS is reasonably assumed to be both well-funded and well-equipped.
GIS headquarters is located in the district of Kobry El Koba in Cairo. Very few images exist of the building.
3.2 Egyptian Intelligence Community (Mukhabarat)
The term “al-Mukhabarat al-‘Amma” specifically refers to the GIS. While people often use the word “Mukhabarat” colloquially to mean the GIS, it more broadly denotes Egypt’s entire intelligence apparatus, with each agency having its own distinct name, mandate, and chain of command.
GIS stands as the most internationally recognised and politically influential of Egypt’s three intelligence agencies, which include:
- Military Intelligence Services and Reconnaissance – Subordinate to the Ministry of Defence, it primarily handles battlefield and military-related intelligence. Egypt’s military intelligence has older roots, as one of the nation’s principal agencies.
- National Security Agency (NSA) – A domestic agency under the Ministry of Interior, focused on internal dissent and counterintelligence. NSA was formerly known as the State Security Investigations Service (SSIS). This service is best known to Egyptian citizens, whereas the GIS is more internationally recognised.
3.3 Key GIS Figures
3.3.1 President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi
President Sisi won election in 2014, re-election in 2018, and amended the constitution in 2019 to extend presidential terms. After securing a third term in December 2023, he will remain in power until 2030. Sisi rose through the ranks of the Egyptian military, eventually serving as head of military intelligence.
Sisi’s early presidency saw limited ties with the GIS, as his influence stemmed from the military. That shifted in 2018 with the appointment of his close aide Abbas Kamel as intelligence chief. Kamel expanded GIS’s role, helping Sisi consolidate power—most notably through the 2019 constitutional referendum that extended presidential term limits. [source]
3.3.2 GIS Director Hassan Rashad
Hassan Rashad is GIS’s newly appointed Director, taking the reins from Major General Abbas Kamel in October 2024. Rashad is a career GIS officer, rising through the ranks, although he has generally stayed away from the media spotlight.
3.3.3 Deputy Director Mahmoud al-Sisi
As the president’s eldest son, Mahmoud has risen quickly through the agency. Not much information exists regarding his career, and he rarely appears in the media.
3.4 Technical Research Department (TRD)
The GIS houses the Technical Research Department (TRD), which reports directly to the president and operates outside public view. Authorities established it during Hosni Mubarak’s reign to carry out sensitive work, such as surveilling political figures and other government officials.
The TRD is known for using advanced surveillance tools with a large budget, free from typical government oversight. However, because so little is known about how it operates or who runs it, there are serious concerns about its legality, transparency, and adherence to human rights. [source]
4 GIS Equipment
Much of what’s known about GIS and TRD tools comes from a 2016 Privacy International report, based on leaked documents and insider accounts of their surveillance systems.
According to the report, the TRD has purchased a variety of sophisticated surveillance technologies from European companies, giving it powerful capabilities to monitor communications throughout Egypt. This includes:
- Phone and Internet Monitoring: The TRD bought systems from Nokia Siemens Networks that allow them to intercept calls and internet traffic across Egypt. These systems let the government listen in and monitor digital communications in real time.
- Spyware for Computers and Phones: The TRD collaborated with Hacking Team, an Italian company, to gain access to a tool called Remote Control System (RCS). The software secretly accesses devices, logging keystrokes, capturing screenshots, and activating cameras and microphones to monitor targets covertly. They also used FinFisher, a product that works similarly.
- Tools for Internet Shutdowns and Backup Access: The TRD also purchased older internet infrastructure known as an x25 network, which could keep internet connections operational even if Egypt’s main networks were turned off, as happened during the 2011 revolution.
- Surveillance Hardware and Video Tools: The TRD obtained surveillance hardware such as CCTV systems and tools for inspecting internet traffic in detail from a local Egyptian company called SEE Egypt—technologies made by companies such as Blue Coat (which provides internet monitoring software) and Axis (which manufactures surveillance cameras).
- Unspecified Equipment: Reporting also indicates the TRD bought devices from a German company called AGT (Advanced German Technology), though it’s not clear exactly what these tools were used for.
The Privacy International report highlights important privacy issues, particularly in a nation where surveillance has intimidated political opponents, journalists, and activists. [source]
5 Tactical-Operational Information
5.1 Influence of GIS
The GIS and the Egyptian intelligence community more broadly are deeply embedded in nearly every facet of Egypt’s political, economic, and media landscape. These agencies exceed traditional intelligence roles, wielding broad influence across Egyptian society unmatched by counterparts in Western democracies.
In the 2000s, GIS covertly acquired private media firms, forming United Media Services (UMS), a state-backed corporation. UMS now owns well-known newspapers like Youm7 and major TV networks like CBC and ON E. According to a 2022 report by the German think tank SWP, the GIS can influence public opinion and discredit critics by using its media dominance to label human rights organisations as terrorist sympathisers. [source]
Its influence extends beyond media and business. The intelligence services have begun to occupy physical and institutional spaces that are typically separate from intelligence operations. For example, the Joint Intelligence Service owns the International Convention Centre in Sharm El Sheikh, which hosted COP27, after purchasing it in 2017. Recent legislation allows Egypt’s intelligence services to expand, enabling them to establish their own economic enterprises. [source]
6 Current GIS Operations
6.1 Gaza
Egypt’s president and the GIS have long been central to mediating between Israel and Hamas, especially during Gaza escalations. The GIS has frequently acted as a key channel for negotiations, helping to broker and maintain ceasefires. [source]
The GIS will likely remain heavily involved in ceasefire discussions for the foreseeable future, regardless of a formal agreement between its eastern neighbors. [source]
6.2 Sudan
Since the outbreak of the current Sudanese conflict in 2023, Egypt has supported its southern neighbour’s military and allied forces by providing intelligence and resources.
In early April, Hassan Rashad met with Sudanese army chief and Sovereignty Council leader General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Port Sudan to reaffirm Cairo’s support for Sudan’s unity and stability. [source]
6.3 Libya
To the west, in Libya, Egypt is once again backing a faction in the ongoing conflict. The GIS plays a key role in shaping Cairo’s approach, focusing on advancing the political process in a way that promotes security and stability—both in Libya and across the broader region. [source]
7 Future of GIS
Given Egypt’s unstable neighbourhood—bordering ongoing conflicts in Sudan, Libya, and Gaza—the role of the GIS is likely to expand rather than contract. As regional volatility continues, GIS will remain central in managing threats and shaping Egypt’s foreign policy in conflict zones.
The GIS is anticipated to continue its function in surveillance and regime maintenance at home, where political dissent is still strictly regulated, especially as President Sisi nears the end of his term in 2030. Putting family members and trusted allies in important roles suggests continuity rather than change.
Mirroring the military’s role in Egypt’s economy, GIS’s involvement in business, media, and infrastructure shows no signs of stopping. Unless a major shake-up occurs, the agency will likely maintain or deepen its influence over Egypt’s domestic and regional affairs.
8 Conclusion
As Egypt navigates a volatile regional landscape and tightens its grip on internal dissent, understanding the General Intelligence Service is critical to determining how power operates in the country. It is more than just a spy agency; it is a silent architect of policy, propaganda, and political power. To understand Egypt’s current trajectory, one must first understand the institution that is shaping it from behind the scenes.
