Executive Summary

Northern areas of the Gaza Strip have suffered disproportionate levels of structural damage since assessment of destruction began in October 2023, according to satellite imagery analysis, open source data, and historical comparisons. Civilian residential complexes near military strongholds have also seen higher-than-average levels of structural degradation. As the conflict continues in Gaza, and the situation remains fluid, we assess that post-conflict reconstruction plans floated by Washington since February remain unrealistic. 

Key Judgements

KJ-1.Our analysis of publicly available imagery indicates that the majority of the infrastructural damage is concentrated in the north of the Gaza Strip.

1. Based on surveyed imagery between 4 July 2023 and 4 July 2025, northern Gaza presents significantly more battle damage than southern Gaza.
2. A roughly 105 sq. km area in northern Gaza presented severe damage compared to the area surveyed around Khan Younis (41.3 sq. km) [see Fig. 1]. 
3. Additionally, we observed significant ecosystem degradation in northern Gaza. Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) values in July of 2023 indicated large areas of healthy vegetation and agricultural activity (NDVI between 0.6 – 0.8) (see Fig. 2)
4. NDVI imagery from 14 July 2025 does not demonstrate any areas with NDVi values above 0.3 – 0.4, indicating major ecosystem damage to areas which previously supported agricultural activity (see Fig. 2). 
5. Gaza City contains several large areas in which 97% of buildings in the sampled area are totally destroyed (see Fig. 3, Fig. 4)

KJ-2. Civilian residential complexes near militant strongholds have suffered disproportionate structural degradation.

1. Satellite imagery from Gaza City between 2024 and 2025 indicates disproportionate destruction concentrated around Gaza Old City [see Fig. 5].
2. The residential complexes in this area suffered major or catastrophic damage between 2023 and 2024 [see Fig. 6]. 
3. Reporting documents recent airstrikes in Gaza City concentrated in Gaza’s Old City, where Hamas and various other Palestinian militant groups still control remnant pockets.  [source, source, source, source, source].
4. Old City neighbourhoods such as Al-Zeytoun and Al-Daraj contain significant residential areas hosting prewar populations of 78,000 [source]. 

KJ-3. The details of the Trump-Netanyau “Riviera” Gaza reconstruction plan, first raised in February, remain vague and there are many obstacles to the realization of such a plan, making it highly unlikely to be a viable scenario for the region’s future. 

1. President Trump appointed a former real estate investor, Steve Witkoff, to lead US efforts to mediate the Israel-Hamas ceasefire. However, statements by Trump and Netanyahu in February and May did not address any logistical or legal considerations of the reconstruction plan. We have not seen any clarifications issued by Washington or Tel Aviv in the subsequent months. [source, source, source] 
2. The redevelopment of Gaza into a luxury Riviera would necessitate the forced displacement of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians [source].
3. Direct US involvement in reconstructing Gaza would require Congressional approval for funding while the Trump administration exhibits systematic hostility and rejection of many forms of foreign spending and aid.  [source, source]

Statement on Analysis

The breadth of recent, highly reliable, and low-bias international news reporting and analysis that is publicly available on this issue, and upon which we base our key judgements, gives us high confidence in our assessments.

That said, our analysis rests on three assumptions: 

1) Destruction signatures in Gaza City are generally the result of airstrikes and not ground operations.

2) Airstrikes tend to target Hamas-related sites where residential complexes are only incidentally targeted;

3) Tel Aviv’s intentions towards post-war Gaza do not include a costly and extensive occupation with the aim of reconstructing the territory. 

An information gap that could create a blind spot in our understanding of the situation exists regarding Israel’s post-war intentions towards Gaza. It is not entirely clear, based on Prime Minister Netanyahu’s statements and expressed government policy, that Israel intends to own the Gaza Strip in the same fashion that it owns, for example, the Golan Heights or portions of the West Bank. There is significant, potentially deliberate, ambiguity from Tel Aviv about its postwar vision for Gaza. Despite a flurry of online media deeming Israel’s intentions towards Gaza as “defacto annexation,”, and despite recent news that Israel now intends to completely occupy Gaza City, Netanyahu’s vision for a post-Hamas Gaza remains clouded, transitory, and ultimately constrained by internal political divisions. 

Intelligence Cut-Off Date: 12 August, 25