With fewer than 500 employees, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) is the smallest member of the United States intelligence community (IC). As an element of the US State Department, its main mission is to provide all-source intelligence analysis to the Secretary of State and US diplomats in support US foreign policy. [source]
Due to its small size but the fact that it punches above its weight, the INR is comparable to the biblical figure of David who slays Goliath. [Source]
Contrary to the mission of other US intelligence agencies, such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), INR is chiefly an analytical institution and does not conduct espionage (intelligence collection), counterintelligence, or covert action. It produces more than 2000 analytic products annually, including contributions to the President’s Daily Brief (PDB). Despite its size, INR has often stood out for the quality of its analysis. [source]
1 Historical Overview
Established in 1947, INR is the oldest civilian intelligence agency in the US. It was formed out of the Research and Analysis Branch (R&A) of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which is considered the precursor of the CIA. During WWII, R&A’s main target was Nazi Germany. After the war, in 1945, its resources were transferred to the State Department, building the foundation of INR. [source, source, source]
2 Major Intelligence Successes
Over the years, INR has built a solid reputation for the quality of its assessments. While certainly not fault-proof, INR was credited several times for standing by its analysis despite going against the consensus in the IC.
2.1 Analysis on the Vietnam War
“Armed” with only two analysts on North and South Vietnam in 1961, INR correctly assessed that South Vietnam’s fight against the North was likely to fail due to the North’s strong support in the villages. Further, INR was right in its assessment that China would send troops into North Vietnam and that the massive US bombing campaign would not achieve their desired goal of cutting supply lines. Many of the analysts were women. [source, source]
A declassified review from 1969 pointed out that, while INR did not anticipate the scope of the Tet offensive from 1968, its predictions during the Vietnam War were more accurate than other sources. [source]
2.2 Invasion of Iraq
In 2002, INR was mistaken in its assessment of Iraq’s capabilities in biological and chemical weapons. However, it was the only member of the IC that went against the majority-consensus that Iraq was determined to acquire nuclear weapons. [source, source]
2.3 Ukrainian Resistance
In 2022, INR was the only intelligence agency that disagreed with the assessment that Ukraine would fall within days after a Russian incursion. While it also overestimated Russian military capabilities, it was correct in assessing Ukrainians “will to fight”, an intangible yet important category, which is notably difficult to estimate. That said, INR managed to use simple and openly accessible polling data that showed decreased support for Russia in Ukraine’s eastern regions. [source, source]
3 Structure and Organization
INR maintains a relative flat structure compared to other agencies, which contributes to its efficiency and reduces the number of edits on intelligence products. INR is led by an Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and reports directly to the Secretary of State. The annual budget is $81.3 million. [source]
The Bureau consists of 13 analytic offices and 9 functional and policy offices, providing 24/7 intelligence support. Unique to INR is the composition of its staff. The majority are civil servants, often hired from universities and academia. Many of them have PhDs and have an average of 14 years of expertise in their respective country, region, or specialty.
According to a former senior INR officer who spoke with us, the years of experience among INR staff (some of who were foreign service officers themselves) adds credibility to the shop’s analysis, while the civil-servant status of the analysts ensures a certain continuity. While many new CIA and DIA analysts lack “on the ground” experience in a region they are assigned to analyze, many INR analysts have worked in their area of expertise and have often met key local decision makers before assuming their analytic duties. Knowing the people and places first-hand gives INR analysts a unique perspective. This setting, and the trust in expertise of the staff, encourages an atmosphere in which people dare to disagree and “rock the boat.”
3.1 Analytic Offices
- Office of Analysis for Africa
- Office of Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific
- Office of Economic Analysis
- Office of Analysis for Europe
- Office of the Geographer and Global Issues
- Office of Analytic Integration
- Office of Analysis for Near Eastern Affairs
- Office of Opinion Research
- Office of Analysis for Russia and Eurasia
- Office of Analysis for South Asian Affairs
- Office of Strategic, Proliferation, and Military Issues
- Office of Analysis for Terrorism, Narcotics, and Crime
- Office of Analysis for the Western Hemisphere
3.2 Intelligence and Policy Coordination Offices
- Office of Consular and Management Liaison
- Office of Cyber Affairs and Emerging Technology
- Office of Intelligence Operations and Oversight
- Policy and Sharing Center
- Office of Technical Collection Affairs
3.3 Front Office and Bureau-wide support
- INR Front Office
- Office of the Executive Director
- Office of Analytic Outreach
- Technology and Innovation
- INR Watch
3.4 The Working Experience
Our contact recalled an exchange between a senior policy maker and senior INR official:
- Policy maker scornfully: “If you really knew the issue, you could give me a clear answer.”
- INR reply: “If you really understood the problem, you would know there is no clear answer.”
The smaller size and the lack of regular rotations between assigned regions limits opportunities for promotion, but it adds expert knowledge and understanding to intelligence problems. (CIA and DIA can rotate analysts between accounts every few years). [source, source]
Our former INR contact confirmed that Bureau analysts are attracted to the fact that they are “paid to think,” have few layers of bureaucracy and editors above them, and are in close proximity to their customers.
4 Mission and Means
INR considers itself a “diplomatic support agency.” Its work aims to produce actionable finished intelligence that provides decision superiority to the Secretary of State, ambassadors, and foreign service officers. Its main product is the Secretary’s Morning Summary or Secretary’s Intelligence brief — a PDB-style product aimed at the needs of the Secretary of State. That said, it also contributes to the PDB, National Intelligence Estimates, and other products for the National Security Council and other senior decision-makers [source].
In its work, INR analyzes all-source intelligence, diplomatic reporting, and its own overt public opinion polling, which is often conducted through contracted local polling agencies. The Bureau is the leader in foreign public opinion research, conducting surveys worldwide in the interests of US foreign policy [source].
Working closely with its customers (foreign service officers), often in the same building, allows INR to better deliver tailored finished intelligence that helps promote US national security and diplomacy. It is also the State Department’s main point of liaison with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI).
INR’s recently published Open Source Intelligence Strategy 2025 highlights the importance of open source intelligence (OSINT) in supporting its mission. INR intends to build out its capabilities in the OSINT sphere to enhance its tradecraft and advance US interests [source, source].
4.1 Diplomatic support
According to INR’s own account, it supports US diplomacy through:
- Intelligence Policy Support and Coordination
- Intelligence Analysis and Production – INR is one of only three agencies that conducts all-source analysis.
- Analytic Exchanges with experts in and outside the IC
- Global Opinion Research
- Geography and Global Issues – representing international boundaries through cartography
- Managing the Department’s TS/SCI network
- Operating INR Watch, a 24/7 intelligence nerve center co-located with the State Department’s Operations Center [source]
4.2 Going its own way
The smaller size of INR means that they need to compromise on things other than analytic standards. As our contact said:
“If you go to the CIA, they will provide you with a 20 page booklet with visuals and graphs, have five people brief you, and show you a video. An INR product might be a 2-page monospace memo.”
That might mean diverting from some standardized analytical methods, such as elements of Structured Analytic Techniques (SATs) that require more manpower, to more informal ones, like in-house reviews. That said, the fact that different intelligence agencies arrive at different conclusions is not uncommon and adds to a more vivid exchange of views, despite the extra time needed for coordination.
5 Conclusion
Resources do not always determine effectiveness in the intelligence world as INR effectively demonstrates. Despite its size, it often shows great analytical prowess. It punches above its weight.
Its success stems from a unique combination of factors: highly educated civil servants with deep regional expertise, a willingness to challenge consensus, and a streamlined organizational structure that reduces bureaucracy. (The absence of any intelligence collection responsibility may also allow it to focus in a unique way). Most reports are written by individuals rather than committees, with fewer editors and managers in between, fostering individual perspectives, and reducing groupthink, while ensuring intelligence products directly serve diplomatic needs.
The State Department, and US foreign policy more broadly, will continue to rely on INR’s finished intelligence products to advance US interests and national security, making it an indispensable voice in the IC.
