Executive Summary

Iran’s global covert action program is well documented. Numerous accounts of targeted assassinations and covert influence operations in Western Europe and the United States are recorded. Less well understood and less reported on is Iran’s use of local gangs to affect clandestine operations in Sweden and Denmark. The gangs offer plausible deniability and operational flexibility to their handlers. This makes it likely that Iran will continue using Swedish gangs as proxies for the foreseeable future. We have not seen indicators that the Iranian Regime intends to cease, or even reduce, clandestine operations in Europe and it denies charges that it use gangs as proxies.

The issue has clearly captured Stockholm’s attention. We assess that Sweden will devote more resources, including surveillance, to the threat. Foxtrot and Rumba, two local gangs identified as covert Iranian assets, are now major targets of the Swedish Security Service, which is collaborating with Israel’s Mossad on the target.  Sweden’s parliament in May voted to designate the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization. Then, its foreign ministry démarched the Iranian representative in Stockholm. Its prime minister this month requested that the EU designate the IRGC as a terrorist group.