The Karen National Army (KNA) has spent decades operating in the shadows, a force both feared and mysterious at the Myanmar-Thailand border. Once a militia with deep ties to Myanmar’s military, it has since evolved into a powerful, semi-autonomous group with control over not just territory but a vast and lucrative network of illicit businesses. From human trafficking to cybercrime and cross-border smuggling, the KNA has thrived in the grey areas of power, navigating shifting allegiances and economic opportunities.

Not to be confused with the Karen National Union (KNU), the Myanmar military’s oldest and most formidable opponent, the KNA is led by Saw Chit Thu, a figure whose influence extends far beyond the battlefield. In December 2023, Britain sanctioned Chit Thu for his alleged involvement in the trafficking of individuals to the Shwe Kokko Special Economic Zone, where victims were forced to work in gruelling conditions as scammers.

But as international pressure mounts and its criminal empire faces increasing scrutiny, the KNA finds itself at a crossroads.

Images Sourced From: Casino, Frontier Myanmar

1 Symbols

1.1 KNA Badge

The KNA badge was adopted in spring 2024. Following the announcement of the BGF rebranding, many factions within the newly formed KNA continued wearing their old patches, while others simply removed them from the uniform.

The KNA badge features a new shape and colours, differing clearly from the previous design resembling the military junta’s badge.

Though widely shared online, the KNA badge is mostly absent from uniforms, with many soldiers not adopting the new insignia.

2 History of the Karen National Army

2.1 Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA)

The Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) emerged in 1994 when a faction of Buddhist Karen soldiers, disillusioned with the predominantly Christian-KNU, broke away. Backed by the Myanmar military, the DKBA launched attacks against its former comrades, playing a key role in the fall of Kawmoora—a major KNU stronghold.

For over a decade, the DKBA served as a Myanmar military proxy, fighting alongside the Tatmadaw in joint offensives. In exchange, the DKBA was granted control over strategic economic hubs, such as Shwe Kokko and Myawaddy, where its units became deeply involved in cross-border trade, smuggling, and illicit industries.

However, by 2010, the DKBA fractured again. A significant portion, including Saw Chit Thu, agreed to integrate into the Border Guard Force (BGF) under the direct command of Myanmar’s military, while another faction—DKBA-Brigade 5—continued to resist military control. [source]

2.2 Border Guard Force (BGF)

Formed in 2010, the BGF absorbed most DKBA units into a formal military structure under direct Tatmadaw command. Unlike independent ethnic groups, BGF battalions followed Myanmar military command, receiving weapons, salaries, and logistical support directly from the Tatmadaw.

The rise of Shwe Kokko New City in 2017 marked a turning point. With Chinese investors funding casinos, BGF units under Saw Chit Thu became enforcers and partners in the cyber scam industry. Their involvement in illicit trade grew transnational, turning the BGF into a group motivated more by profit than military goals. [source]

2.3 KNA: Rebranding

In January 2024, Saw Chit Thu declared the BGF’s transformation into the KNA, claiming it had broken from military control. To some, it signaled a long-awaited break from the junta and possible alignment with the KNU.

However, the reality was more complex. When the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and People’s Defence Force (PDF) seized Myawaddy in April 2024, KNA forces remained untouched, avoiding confrontation with either side. Behind the scenes, as the Myanmar military planned retaliatory airstrikes, Saw Chit Thu made an agreement with the military that would secure his control over the area in exchange for letting their forces retake bases that had been lost. Following this, scam hotspots grew, and several new illegal business districts appeared. 

Today, the KNA is little more than the BGF under a new name. With over 10,000 troops, the KNA controls Myawaddy’s criminal economy, from human trafficking to border smuggling. Led by Saw Chit Thu, Lt-Colonel Saw Mote Thone, and Major Tin Win, its leadership profits from the illicit empire. The KNA thrives without external military support, while its low-ranking soldiers continue to earn meagre wages. [source]

3 Karen National Army Organisation

3.1 Militia Structure

Several years ago, reports indicated that the then-BGF consisted of 13 battalions across four regiments. With no clear incentive to alter its manpower, there is little reason to believe this number has changed.

3.2 Business Structure

Saw Chit Thu and his family have established a powerful network of businesses through their involvement with the BGF. More recently, the militia that has demonstrated its capacity to flourish with and without the Myanmar military’s support. 

Saw Chit Thu’s family controls six BGF-linked companies by strategically distributing shares among relatives.
They also hold stakes in Apollo Park and Yulong Bay Park, major cyber scam hubs on the Thai-Myanmar border.

3.2.1 Key Business Ventures

• Illegal Casinos and Online Gambling: The KNA oversees numerous illegal casinos and online gambling operations, generating significant revenue. These activities are often concealed within legitimate-looking establishments and are managed by criminal elements with ties to local elites.

• Cyber Scam Centres: The KNA profits from cyber scam operations, where trafficked individuals are forced to work under harsh conditions. These centres are a major source of income, exploiting vulnerable workers and scamming victims worldwide.

3.2.2 Revenue Streams

• Taxes on Businesses and Workers: Businesses operating in KNA-controlled areas are taxed, and workers are charged fees.

• Smuggling and Illicit Trade: The KNA profits from smuggling goods across the Thai-Myanmar border, including vehicles, fuel, electronics, and alcohol.

• Utilities Sales: The KNA sells electricity and internet services to support cyber scam and gambling operations.

3.3 KNA Companies

• Chit Linn Myaing Toyota Company Limited

• Chit Linn Myaing Mining & Industry Company Limited

• Chit Linn Myaing Energy Company Limited

• Myanmar Apollo International Investment Company Limited

• Myanmar Yatai International Holding Group Company Limited

• Shwe Myint Thaung Yinn Industry & Manufacturing Company Limited
• Yulong Bay Resort Tourism Development Company Limited

Saw Chit Thu’s sons, Saw Htoo Eh Moo and Saw Chit Chit, are heavily involved in these businesses, holding shares and directorships in multiple companies. His daughter, Nan Hnin Nandar Aye, also holds shares and directorships in several KNA businesses. [source]

3.4 Key KNA Figures

3.4.1 Colonel Saw Chit Thu

Saw Chit Thu, born San Myint, is a colonel and serves as the militia’s general secretary and senior advisor.

3.4.2 Lieutenant Colonel Saw Mote Thon

Secretary-General Saw Mote Thun commands Regiment 4, overseeing southern Myawaddy. This includes Dongmei City, New Myawaddy, and Jin Xian Park, located directly across from Mae Kon Ken in Thailand’s Mae Sot district. [source]

3.4.3 Major Saw Tin Win

The direct subordinate to Saw Chit Thu, Saw Tin Win commands Regiment 2, overseeing southern Myawaddy and the new KK Park, located across from Mae Ku, Mae Sot district. [source]

3.4.4 Lieutenant Colonel Maung Win

Saw Chit Thu has appointed Lieutenant Colonel Maung Win as the new commander of Regiment 3, overseeing the Shwe Kokko Economic Zone along with the scam cities of Yulong Bay and Apollo Park.

3.5 Recruitment

Following the transition from BGF to KNA, reports indicated that recruitment efforts intensified, with posters inviting new members appearing in villages within former BGF-controlled areas.

The KNA has acknowledged the concerns of the Karen people regarding its past affiliations. However, it claims to be fully independent and no longer affiliated with the Military Council, or junta. [source]

3.6 Connections to Myanmar Military

Despite shifting allegiances over time, the KNA’s ties to the junta remain well-established. Saw Chit Thu has played a key role in granting Chinese criminal organisations access to land and security for scam operations in Shwe Kokko—a town just north of Myawaddy and home to the KNA headquarters. 

Saw Chit Thu has personally met with junta chief Min Aung Hlaing and has made donations to his close associates, including Sitagu Sayadaw, a prominent monk with strong ties to the military leader.

The KNA’s decision to support the junta’s efforts to maintain control of Myawaddy in April 2024—rather than aligning with the KNLA and PDF—demonstrates a sustained relationship despite attempts to create distance. 

Additionally, a recent C4ADS study further highlights the KNA’s enduring ties to the junta, revealing frequent phone movements between Myawaddy scam hubs and Naypyidaw, including government buildings. Connections between sites like Shwe Kokko, KK Park, and other criminal-run zones suggest ongoing collaboration between the junta, the KNA, and organised crime networks, despite official denials. [source]

4 Operational Information

4.1 Core Purpose

The KNA portrays itself as focused on regional stability and peace, avoiding active conflict unless provoked or directly threatened. The KNA avoids offensives against the junta but maintains a defensive stance, stating it will respond if provoked or attacked. This framing allows the KNA to justify its actions as protective rather than aggressive, aligning with its broader strategy of navigating alliances and power dynamics in Myanmar. 

The KNA’s defensive stance is largely justified, though its main priority remains securing and maintaining its economic stability. Armed operations rarely benefit the group unless provoked, and reports seldom emphasize its role in direct military actions. [source]

4.2 Personnel size

Seven to eight years ago, reports estimated the BGF had 7,000 troops in 13 battalions across four regiments. Today, reports estimate KNA forces are between 7,000 and 10,000 in strength; however, nothing has yet emerged that tells us much more about how these troops are organised. [source]

5 The Future of the Karen National Army

5.1 Autonomy and Independence

The KNA believes it has the strength and resources to operate independently, making continued subordination to the military unnecessary. The assessment is accurate; they control the area and have the manpower to maintain their position without external military support.

Experts say KNA rebranding is likely symbolic, as BGF continues sending mixed signals about links to Myanmar’s military. This ambiguity benefits the junta by allowing it to distance itself from scam operations while also helping the BGF avoid a crackdown similar to Operation 1027-an aggressive offensive led by ethnic armed groups in the region.

5.2 Scam Crackdowns

The future of the KNA is uncertain, as it navigates mounting pressure from both international authorities and regional forces to crack down on the illicit activities tied to its territory, particularly in Shwe Kokko. With Thailand and China intensifying efforts to curb cyber fraud and human trafficking, Saw Chit Thu’s promise to dismantle scam operations in the area could signal a shift in the KNA’s priorities. This new stance may be driven more by external pressures than a genuine desire to reform. Additionally, the KNA remains deeply involved in these activities, particularly its ties with Chinese investors and organized crime syndicates.

The KNA’s reliance on illegal activities, such as gambling and cyber scams, has been a crucial part of its economic model, and any disruption to these networks could significantly impact its financial stability. As authorities in Thailand and China continue to target Shwe Kokko’s criminal operations, the KNA will need to carefully balance its relationships with the military junta, local authorities, and international stakeholders. [source]

6 Conclusion

The Karen National Army (KNA), once a military proxy force, has transformed into a semi-autonomous group with control over a vast network of illicit businesses, including human trafficking, cybercrime, and smuggling. Despite rebranding in 2024 from BGF to KNA, its involvement in illegal activities remains central to its operations. Led by Saw Chit Thu, the KNA thrived through shifting alliances, leveraging control of criminal hubs like Shwe Kokko.

This rebranding signals a potential shift in the KNA’s relationship with Myanmar’s military junta, yet its deep ties to criminal syndicates, particularly in China and Thailand, complicate its efforts to present itself as an independent force. With rising external pressure, the KNA must choose between managing its criminal empire’s future or risking potential crackdowns. Understanding the KNA’s structure, history, and operations is key to assessing its resilience under increasing international scrutiny. It remains unclear whether the group can adapt or will be forced to change course. The KNA’s evolution highlights how armed groups survive through state ties, military strength, and criminal networks.