Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 marked an evolution of Russian strategy in modern warfare, blending traditional military power with cyber, information, economic, and psychological tools. Moreover, Moscow started developing this approach towards “New Generation Warfare” as far back as 2013 under the “Gerasimov Doctrine” for Russian strategy.

“Information is now a type of weapon. It does not simply compliment fire strikes and maneuvers, it transforms and unites them.” Thus, “information is becoming an armed struggle in its own right”.

This evolution, often referred to as “New Generation Warfare,” allows Russia to operate below the threshold of open, overt conflict with NATO while eroding Western adversaries from within through covert means. Additionally, Russian strategy in Ukraine, Syria, Georgia, the African Sahel region, and even in the United States and Europe, and within the Russian Federation itself, reflect a deliberate and integrated doctrine of “the long game” in achieving its long-term geopolitical goals. 

For instance, Russian Strategy is offensive, adaptive, and waged across all domains: physical, cognitive, cyber, and informational. Whereas U.S. foreign policy can evolve around election cycles, Russian President Vladimir Putin enjoys overwhelming public support—in large part through Russia’s tight grip on state-controlled media and elections—which allows Russia to wage this type of war, both hot and cold, for years to come. Malevolent Russian aggression against the U.S. and NATO has not been at this level since the height of the Cold War.

In addition, writing in the Russian journal Military Thought, I. Vorobyev and V. Kiselyov noted, however “Information is now a type of weapon. Lastly, it does not simply compliment fire strikes and maneuvers, it transforms and unites them.” Thus, “information is becoming an armed struggle in its own right”. [source, source, source, source]

Images Sourced From: The Moscow Times, Vadim Savitsky, Presidential Executive Office of Russia, The Kremlin

1 Recent History of Russian Strategy Shift

The Russian Army General Staff redesigned the Russian Army for decentralized operations including the possibility of unconventional operations, conventional weapons, and tactical nuclear environments to counter a more technologically sophisticated, and battle-experienced West. Additionally, the Russian military shift began taking shape in the late 2000s—taken from lessons learned in victories and failures—building into the framework of New Generation Warfare by 2013 with the publication of General Valery Gerasimov’s “Gerasimov Doctrine” article outlining how non-military means can exceed traditional military action in achieving strategic objectives, culminating in the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea and the war in the Donbas, and interference in the 2016 U.S. elections.

Presently, in Ukraine, Russian strategy adapts tactics and subvert sanctions through use of the New Generation Warfare strategy. Despite high casualties and tactical failures, Russia remains entrenched, and willing to wait out the West in overt war while actively engaging in hybrid warfare throughout NATO and the west, while subverting sanctions through closer diplomatic ties with China, India, Iran and North Korea. [source, source, source]

1.1 Evolution of Russian strategy through Conflict

Accordingly, the development of Russian strategy can be traced through conflicts over the past three decades:

2 Key Elements

2.1 Broader Government Integration

Accordingly, Russian strategy and operations operate under the Security Council of the Russian Federation, with direct command from President Vladimir Putin. The system is deeply siloed in its strategic thinking, and alignment with Putin’s grand strategy—if Putin shifted away from a New Generation Warfare approach to a different strategy altogether, his inner circle of core advisors would also shift ideologies. For example, the Siloviki, or security elite, exert immense control over strategy, and like Putin developed their core anti-Western philosophy through the Soviet Doctrine of the Cold War. [source, source, source]

2.2 Financing

Above all, financing of the new generation warfare approach is state-directed, enabled by resource extraction (oil/gas), defense industry profits, and dark-money flows. Sanctions have limited but not halted this stream, and potentially even solidified stronger economic ties between Russia and states like Iran, North Korea, Egypt, and India. Additionally, funding flows through private military contractors (PMCs) and state-run media/NGOs for influence operations. [source, source]

2.3 Key Figures

For instance, several current, or recent, leadership figures in various capacities have contributed to the development of the Russian strategy:

• Vladimir Putin – President of Russia, former KGB foreign intelligence officer
• Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman, longtime ally of Putin, some domestic policy disagreements
• Valery Gerasimov – Chief of General Staff, architect of New Generation Warfare, one of three members (Putin and Belousov) to have access to Russia’s nuclear arsenal
• Nikolai Patrushev – Close Putin ally, Security Council advisor, considered one of Putin’s most trusted advisors
• Sergei Shoigu – Former Minister of Defense and current Secretary of the Security Council, considered a loyal friend of Putin
• Sergei Naryshkin, Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), longtime ally of Putin, intentionally publicly embarrassed by Putin for not stating the party line regarding Ukraine
• Alexander Bortnikov, Director of the Federal Security Service (FSB), formerly KGB, trusted member of Putin’s close inner circle
• Andrey Belousov, Minister of Defense, close and trusted Putin ideologue
• Vladimir Kolokoltsev, Minister of Internal Affairs, professional working relationship with Putin
• Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Putin Loyalist and most senior diplomat, little decision-making power
• Yevgeny Prigozhin (deceased) – Wagner founder, shadow warfare architect

2.4 Putin’s Ideologues 

Methods:

• For instance, propaganda in state media and Telegram
• For example, emphasis on patriotic duty, revenge, and traditional values
• Evidently, Wagner (now absorbed under state military control) and other PMCs recruit via prisons, online ads, foreign outreach [source, source, source, source]

Requirements:

• Loyalty to state over law
• Physical fitness for elite spetsnaz units in combat roles
• Some PMCs accept ex-convicts or foreign fighters

Foreign Recruitment:

• Evidence of Serbian, African, North Korean, and Central Asian fighters attached to Russian military
• Some ideological allies from Western far-right groups have joined militias
• Famously, U.S. citizen and son of a senior CIA official Michael Gloss was killed in Ukraine fighting for Russia in 2024. [source, source, source]

2.5 Connections to Other Organizations Aligned with Russian Strategy

• PMC and quasi-government / civilian-run “troll farms” – extensions of Russian power with plausible deniability
• Russian Orthodox Church – Cultural legitimacy for war narrative
• FSB & GRU – Central players in cyber, covert, and sabotage operations
• Russian loyalists in puppet governments (Donbas, Chechnya, Sahel region, Syria)
• Russia Today (RT) / Sputnik / InfoRos – State-sponsored disinfo arms / Paid local and regional “influencers” [source, source, source]

3 New Generation Warfare Grey-Zone Tactics

3.1 Sabotage 

• Energy and infrastructure sabotage in Europe
• Railway and logistical-hubs targeting
• Industrial and military sabotage
• Targeted foreign sabotage operations against pro-Western governments and businesses
• Cyber sabotage (malware, ransomware) and power grid targeting
• False-flag attacks to justify military action
• Recruitment of Ukrainian saboteurs by FSB to conduct attacks internally and spread propaganda

3.2 Cyber Operations

• Undermine critical infrastructure, steal sensitive information, and enable hybrid influence campaigns
• Hack-and-leak operations (e.g., U.S. political email leaks)
• Attacks on governments/financial institutions
• Cyber attacks against Ukraine’s energy grid and satellite communications

3.3 Political Influence Operations

• Shape political outcomes and weaken pro-Western governments
• Narrative warfare on social media both internally and externally of the Russian state
• Attacks abroad under plausible deniability, yet show reach of Kremlin power
• Funding or supporting fringe political parties 
• Russian financial support for European far-right parties (e.g., Le Pen’s National Rally loan in France)
• Weaponized use of mass migration (North Africans and Syrians) against the EU
• Rapport development with foreign leaders whose policies are determined to benefit Russia
• Extensive and sophisticated bot / troll farms to intentionally raise divisiveness on key U.S. and EU issues

3.4 Propaganda and PSYOPS

• Shape perceptions, erode trust in institutions, and fracture adversary societies
• Promotion of divisive narratives in the west, specifically targeted at marginalised groups
• Use of “gray” media outlets, paid “influencers” and “alternative experts” to push Kremlin-aligned narratives
• Fake news articles, forged documents, fabricated “leaks”
• Front NGOs, cultural associations, “friendship societies”
• Russian Orthodox Church as a soft-power extension of the Kremlin narrative

3.5 Other Russian Strategy and Covert Action

• Achieve military/political aims without overt Russian military action
• Assassination, coercion, blackmail, and intimidation of dissidents 
• Semi-overt paramilitary operations “little green men”
• Arms supplies and covert training for insurgent and paramilitary groups
• Economic and resource control (oil, gas, natural resources)  leverage against Europe
• Gazprom’s use as a tool of foreign policy against Europe
• Strategic investments to control critical infrastructure in other countries
• External foreign recruitment of spies and saboteurs via social media / telegram
• Drones for reconnaissance, sabotage, anti-personal and anti-vehicle (FPV, Shahed, Orlan, etc.) using various technologies including 4G Ukrainian sim cards or fiber optic cables
• Intentional targeting of civilians and civilian infrastructure to create fear [source, source, source]

4 Operational Information

4.1 Operations

• Ukraine: Donbas proxy war, 2022 Ukraine invasion purportedly to intervene in ethnic Russian oppression, Dnipro conventional military front, Kharkiv raids, southern counter-efforts
• Syria: Airbase support, suppression of opposition
• Cyber attacks across Europe, Baltics, U.S. and Europe  elections interference (via GRU/FSB Security and Intelligence services)

4.2 Core Purpose of Russian Strategy

Revenge against the west for perceived slights: The goal is not necessarily total battlefield victory in the near-term, but political erosion: creating frozen conflicts, doubt and mistrust amongst Western political parties, draining resources, and undermining democratic unity. Psychological destabilization is key. [source, source, source]

To summarize, In the twenty-first century we have seen a tendency toward blurring the lines between the states of war and peace. …

On this note… The very “rules of war” have changed. The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness. …

Furthermore… Frontal engagements of large formations of forces at the strategic and operational levels are gradually becoming a thing of the past. …

Finally… Asymmetrical actions have come into widespread use, enabling the nullification of an enemy´s advantages in armed conflict. Among such actions are the use of special operations forces and internal opposition to create a permanently operating front through the entire territory of the enemy state, as well as informational actions, devices, and means that are constantly being perfected. …

… The differences between strategic, operational, and tactical levels, as well as between offensive and defensive operations, are being erased.

—Gen. Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the Russian General Staff [source]

4.3 Personnel Size

• Total Russian Armed Forces estimated at 3.57 million troops as of 2025
• Russian Ground Forces: est. 400,000
• PMC & militia forces: est. 50,000–100,000
• Cyber/non-military cells: decentralized, unknown numbers [source]

5 Conclusion

Russia’s strategy of New Generation Warfare seeks to erode the U.S, and NATO’s ability to not just project power and win wars abroad, but to actively promote civil conflict within our own countries. While Russia has shown a willingness to adapt military tactics, and even whole strategies on different fronts (Ukraine, Syria, Africa, Europe)—many of the foundations are revitalized Soviet-era tactics. Therefore, understanding Russia’s New Generation Warfare is critical to anticipating future moves, understanding the Kremlin mind, and countering malice.  

Evolution and Hybridisation of NGW

In addition, Russian strategy will likely continue to evolve toward decentralized, autonomous, and hybrid capabilities. Therefore, we can expect:

1. Expanded cyber / information warfare attacks on NATO countries to circumvent the alliance’s collective defense clause against overt attacks.
2. Increased reliance on drones for targeting, reconnaissance, and long-range attacks.
3. Resurgence of proxy forces in both Africa and Latin America.
4. Stronger diplomatic and trade ties with the east (Iran, India, China, North Korea); North Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Morocco); and parts of Africa with the Alliance of Sahel States (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and Angola, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Central African Republic).
5. Further weaponization of mass migration, energy, and food exports against Europe.

Challenges Faced by NGW

However, Gerasimov’s doctrine of NGW is not without its own challenges and failures. Despite a superior sized force and a blitzkrieg invasion, Russia has faced four significant strategic failures in Ukraine: 

1. Failure to achieve a quick victory, capture the capital of Kyiv, and install a pro-Russian government or seize and hold meaningful territory.
2. Poor military planning and logistics, combined with wasted use of experienced combat soldiers.
3. Inability to quickly adapt conventional units, joint communications, coordinated firepower, and combined tactical operations. 
4. Failure to modernize the Russian military to a changing battlefield environment, understand the Ukrainian resistance, and miscalculating NATO.

Far beyond conventional military operations using infantry soldiers, tanks and missiles, NGW doctrine represents a full-spectrum approach to undermine the West, propagate division amongst allies, and erode trust and support using both visible and invisible weapons while not provoking NATO into a full-scale war. [source, source, source]