The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) is the Special Missions Unit (SMU) branch of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU). Headquartered in Kyiv, the command is tasked with conducting unconventional warfare and designing influence operations, as well as training conventional soldiers in deep reconnaissance and direct action. Their ongoing operations involve raids behind enemy lines and deliberate ambushes on rear areas.

2.0 Motto, Symbols, and Patches

2.1 Motto

“I’m Coming For You!” is a quote attributed to the Grand Prince of Kyiv Sviatoslav the Brave and was adopted as the command motto in 2016, when the formation was placed under a single independent military branch. The quote was inserted along with the two different symbols the unit uses as emblems. [source]

2.3 Symbols 

The Ukrainian commandos have two symbols that are used in emblems and patches. Vovkulak, a silver werewolf that represents magical warriors in local folklore, is the main one alongside a golden combat waistband. The second symbol is represented by the coat of arms of Sviatoslav the Brave. [source]

2.4 Patches 

Official patches in the Ukrainian special forces vary from unit to unit, but the most common imagery is regimental variations of the silver werewolf. Some formations display the werewolf head in a corner, over the top of their brigade or detachment symbol, while others have two mirroring werewolves in their unit patches. [source]

3.0 History of Ukrainian Special Operations Forces

3.1 Post-Soviet Formation

The Special Forces Command (SSO) was founded from remnant units of the Directorate of Military Intelligence (HUR), which were originally from Soviet-Ukrainian Spetsnaz (SSR) formations. The Ukrainian Defence Minister Hrytsenko did the initial groundwork in 2007 by creating a special forces training centre. [source]

Various initiatives from government officials to dismantle the formation hindered the efforts to build manpower and consolidate the doctrine. It was not until the Crimean Crisis and the Donbass Conflict in April that the Ukrainian President Petró Poroshenko decided to accelerate the process to build a special operations force. [source]

Sergei Krivonos, first deputy commander and chief of staff of the airborne forces, was appointed in 2014 as the head of the Special Operations Directorate of the General Staff of Ukraine due to his advocacy for “reforming the Ukrainian army in accordance with Western standards and establishing a professional contract army”. [source]

3.2 Westernisation Process 

Going forward with the reform process, the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces took the decision to give control of the Special Operations Directorate to the Minister of Defence and push for a total restoration. Based on this, a new concept for the Special Operations Forces was provided in the Strategic Defence Bulletin of Ukraine on 5 January 2016. [source] 

The Ukrainian Ministry of Defence kept Sergei Krivonos as first deputy and appointed Major General Igor Lunvov as commander. Under their leadership, the Special Forces Command and 140th Special Operations Forces Centre adopted Western doctrines and reached European standards in less than three years. [source, source]

4.0 Leadership and Structure

The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces operate as a separate branch with different units and centres under its command. Among the formations named in the structure are the combat units, the training centres, the information elements and the partisan command. [source, source, source, source, source, source]

Special Operations Forces General Command

• 99th Headquarters and Support Battalion (А3628), in Brovary, Kyiv Oblast
• 142nd Training Centre of SSO (А2772), in Berdychiv, Zhytomyr Oblast
• Recruitment Centre of SSO, in Kyiv
• 77th State Secrets Protection Centre (A4327)
• 111th Information and Telecommunications Node (A4423)
• Signal Regiment (A4423), in Kyiv

Intelligence and Information Warfare Centre

• 16th Centre of Information and Psychological Warfare (A1182), Guyva, Zhytomyr region
• 72nd Centre of Information and Psychological Warfare (А4398), Brovary, Kyiv region
• 74th Centre of Information and Psychological Warfare (A1277), Lviv
• 83rd Centre of Information and Psychological Warfare (A2455), Odessa

Land Special Purpose Combat Units

• Special Operations Centre East (А0680), in Kropyvnytskyi, Kirovohrad Oblast
• Special Operations Centre West (А0553), in Khmelnytskyi, Khmelnytskyi Oblast
• 140th Special Purpose Centre (А0661), in Khmelnytskyi, Khmelnytskyi Oblast
• 47th Separate Special Purpose Detachment (А2620), Zaporizhzhia
• 7th Special Operations Centre “Ukrainian Volunteer Corps”
• “Ranger” Corps SOF-AFU
  • 4th Special Purpose Regiment
  • 5th Special Purpose Regiment
  • 6th Special Purpose Regiment
  • 7th Special Purpose Regiment

Attached Ground Combat Units

• Separate Black Fog Detachment, in Kamyanske, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Separate Special Tactical Group Irpin, Irpin, Bucha Region
• Special Purpose Sabotage Unit (А4790), Brovary, Kyiv Oblast

Resistance Movement Command 

• Rukh Oporu
  • National Resistance Centre
    • Kharkiv Resistance Centre
    • Khmelnytskyi Resistance Centre
    • Kyiv Resistance Centre
    • Oleksandria Resistance Centre
    • Zakarpattia Resistance Centre
  • Rukh Oporu North
  • Rukh Oporu East
  • Tactical Group Kruk

Sea Special Purpose Combat Units

• Special Operations Centre South (А3199), in Ochakiv, Mykolaiv Oblast

Air Special Purpose Combat Units

• 35th Mixed Aviation Squadron (А3199), Havryshivka Air Base, Vinnytsia region

5.0 Selection and Training 

The 142nd Special Operations Forces Training Centre in Khmelnitsky mainly serves—as its name indicates—a qualification facility for approved candidates. The Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS) is modelled after the framework of similar courses in the United States and the European Union under the umbrella of the Joint Multinational Group training program. [source]

During selection, the cadets live in tents on the training ground without any contact with the outside world. Even text messages to their families are prohibited. Moving around the camp is only allowed by running. According to official data, only 10% of the candidates pass the five-week physical test. Below is a breakdown of the fitness requirements. [source, source]

Week 1

• Swim for 100m
• Run for 3km with an average pace of 5 minutes per km
• Loaded march of 16km in less than three hours with a 14kg rucksack
• A test of general physical training such as push-ups, pull-ups, and sit-ups

Week 2

• 50 squats carrying a 16kg rucksack
• Run for 8km with an average pace of 5 minutes per km
• Loaded march of 13km in less than two hours, carrying a 16kg rucksack

Week 3

• Sets of push-ups and pull-ups
• 50 squats with an 18kg rucksack
• Run for 10km with an average pace of 4’20’’ per km
• Loaded march of 19km in less than four hours with an 18kg rucksack

Week 4

• Sets of push-ups and pull-ups
• 50 squats with a 23kg rucksack
• Run for 10km with an average pace of 4’20’’ per km
• Loaded march of 29km in less than four hours and 45 minutes with a 23kg rucksack

Week 5

• Swim for 500m
• Run for 5km with an average pace of 3 minutes and 45 seconds per km
• Loaded march of 29km in less than four hours and 30 minutes carrying a 23km rucksack

After completing the selection course, the training focuses on long-range scouting and close-quarters combat and intelligence collection operations. During the training program, candidates are also expected to undergo training for specialties qualification like combat medicine, mountain warfare, military free fall, and combat engineering. [source]

Recently, the branch command opened the books for the recruitment and training of foreign citizens. Although the secretive nature of the special forces does not allow us to assess if the assessment phase and the training pipeline are the same as those reserved for national candidates, we assess that it is likely that only candidates with previous experience in-country are considered. [source] 

6.0 Weapons and Equipment

Ukrainian operators carry a variety of Western and Eastern small arms, with most of them being equipped with advanced attachments. Based on publicly available information, we present below a primer on the common weapons sported by operators, which could include assets assigned by the national government, donated by allied nations or sourced through private donors.  [source, source, source, source]

Sidearms

• Glock 17
• Glock 19
• Beretta M9
• Stechkin APS
• Makarov PM

Assault Weapons

• IPI Malyuk
• UAR-15
• FN M4A1
• Fort 221
• DD MK18
• CZ Bren
• SCAR-L
• SCAR-H
• SIG-516
• SIG MCX
• AKS-74U
• AK-74
• AK-103
• AK12 
• Diemaco C8
• HK416D

Squad Automatic Weapons

• PKM
• PKP
• M249
• FN MK3

Sniper Rifles 

• Fort 301
• Barrett M82A3
• AXMC
• TRG M10
• Barret MRAD

Rocket Launchers

• RPG-22
• RPG-26
• RPG-18
• RPG-30
• RPG-28
• AT4
• RPG-7 
• 9K38
• 9M111 
• SAAB NLAW

Kit and Gear

• PROF1 Group MM14 Field Uniform
• Crye Precision Multicam G3 Combat Uniform 
• Ops Core FAST High-cut Helmet
• UaArms TOR-D High Cut Helmet 
• Crye Precision Multicam AVS Plata Carrier 

• Arc’teryx LEAF Minotaur Half Shell
• Ops Core FAST High-cut
• FirstSpear Multicam Cover
• 3M Peltor Comtac IIIs
• L3 Harris GPNVG-18 
• Crye Precision High Back Blast Belt
• WarTech UP-102 “Spotter” Pouch
• Bastion “FORT” 
• VX600 Radio

7.0 Tactical – Operational Information

7.1 Operations

Ukrainian commandos’ operational patterns have shifted since their formation, when the operators acted as counterinsurgency elements in the First Battle of Mariupol and force multipliers in the Donetsk Airport Defence, nine years ago. Currently, the command is focused on unconventional warfare, with most of its publicly disclosed operations involving ambushes and raids deep behind enemy lines. [source]

During the last year, the Ukrainian special forces managed to execute several high-profile missions against the Russian military. These include a series of incursions on Kursk that lead to several attacks on Russian supply lines and rear personnel. The special forces breaches were followed by regular infantry troops that managed to control Russian territory for a few days. [source]

Other non officially confirmed operations of the Ukrainian special forces include clandestine activities in Sudan and Syria against Russian proxies and assets. The Kyiv Post in 2023 reported that Ukrainian commandos attacked Wagner mercenaries in the Sudan countryside. In 2024, the Washington Post reported that Ukrainian operators were planning lethal missions in Syria. [source, source, source]

7.2 Tactics

The 3rd Separate Special Regiment Commander publicly explained that tactics have evolved over the years since the beginning of the Russian invasion, primarily due to the proliferation of trench warfare and the threat of unmanned aircraft. Teams involved in reconnaissance missions, for example, are expected to extract their casualties on foot, as airlifted extractions are virtually non-existent near the frontline. [source]

Infiltration missions as part of unconventional warfare have also played a significant part in the evolution of the unit tactics. Available images in Ukrainian special forces channels indicate that the operators make heavy use of camouflage nets and leaf suits to sneak behind enemy lines. Due to the nature of the mission, reconnaissance teams are known not to use bright tape for identification purposes. [source, source, source] 

Ukrainian special forces more recently adopted the use of all-terrain vehicles to move around sectors of the frontline deemed as dangerous. Drone warfare is also exploited by different elements of the command, either to conduct counter-drone surveillance or to amplify the range of their strikes in enemy-controlled territory. [source, source, source]

8.0 Conclusion

The Ukrainian Special Forces Command (SSO) stands as one of the most capable and modernised branches of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU). Forged out of the remnants of the local Spetsnaz, the officers in command managed to purge the Soviet framework and build a professional force with Western equipment and standards. Their lengthy assessment and selection program contrasts with the current training of regular conscripts, ensuring a quality over quantity approach for the team members. Furthermore, the unit has managed to quickly adapt to emerging threats, shifting its operational approach from air assault and force multipliers to recce units focused on sabotage.