Executive Summary

Sino-Russian joint air and naval patrols are likely serving primarily as strategic signalling instruments rather than operational warfighting preparations. Despite this, they produce measurable interoperability gains. 

The two countries conducted their first joint submarine patrol in August 2025. This built on joint naval patrols going back to 2021. Since 2019, joint air patrols have expanded from the Sea of Japan to the Alaskan Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). Each iteration introduced a new geographic or platform dimension. Interoperability at the command and technical level likely remains shallow, constrained by divergent military architectures and limited mutual trust. The pattern is, nonetheless, obvious. Each patrol establishes a new baseline from which the next escalation in scope or domain becomes normalised.

Nuclear submarine cooperation remains a small possibility through 2027. It constitutes the principal threshold indicator for whether this relationship is transitioning from political signalling toward a genuine combined military capability.