The Volontaires pour la Défense de la Patrie or Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland (VDP) are one of the most significant armed actors in Burkina Faso behind JNIM, the Burkinabé military and IS Sahel. They are an auxiliary, civilian militia formed in 2020 and greatly expanded under the leadership of Ibrahim Traoré. They have become a central pillar of Burkina Faso’s counterinsurgency strategy. Human rights organisations have also connected them to numerous ethnic-based massacres. While the VDP play a crucial role in the Burkinabé fight against insurgents, their actions fuel terrorist recruitment and fracture social cohesion. Traoré has described the militia as “our Wagner“. [source]
1 Motto, Symbols, Patches and History
1.1 Motto
“La Patrie ou la mort, nous vaincrons” – “Homeland or death, we will prevail”
While the VDP has no official insignia or motto, the force is strongly associated with the newly adopted national slogan. Official speeches and messages of solidarity with the VDP in Burkinabé media frequently invoke the phrase. The famous Burkinabé leader Thomas Sankara used the slogan and it replaces the previous official motto of “Unity, Progress, Justice” in alignment with the political narrative of the Traoré junta. [source, source, source]
1.2 History of the VDP
The first self-defence groups, known as “Koglweogo,” appeared around 2013, towards the end of President Blaise Compaore’s regime—a period of rising insecurity. The Koglweogo fought against bandits in many regions and jihadist groups spilling over from Mali. After the formation of JNIM in 2017 and Islamic State offshoots in 2019, the Koglweogo fought against new insurgent threats, particularly in the north. In January 2020, President Roch Kaboré turned the Koglweogo into an auxiliary corps, creating the Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland. Kaboré explained that “Today, terrorists are on the move… they stop in a village… and kill civilians because there is no security in the village. Technically and materially, the army cannot be deployed in 8,000 villages at the same time.” [source, source source]
Ibrahim Traoré’s rise to power marked a significant shift in the Burkinabé approach to counterinsurgency, notably the banning of local dialogues with jihadists. Traoré’s “total war” approach required a boost in manpower, and so the junta launched a nationwide VDP recruitment drive in October 2022. 90,000 individuals applied, with around 50,000 VDP personnel recruited. This mass mobilisation reflects both the widespread support for Traoré’s strategy and the militia’s elevated status in Burkina Faso’s national security architecture. Under Traoré, the militia has become a core component of Burkinabé counterinsurgency. [source, source, source]
2 Organisation of the VDP
2.1 Place within broader government
All VDPs are subordinate to the Patriotic Watch and Defence Brigade (BNVP). The auxiliary force is divided into two categories – national and local VDP. Security forces train local VDPs at police headquarters or the gendarmerie barracks closest to their home community. Local VDP are responsible for security in their “commune,” granting them a broader mandate than Kaboré’s VDP, which operated at the village level. Their main task is carrying out patrols to prevent jihadist expansion or return to reclaimed locations. Depending on national need and a candidate’s success during training, the BNVP will offer them a place in the national VDP. Such candidates will receive further training at BNVP Ouagadougou or one of two other specific army camps. Personnel fight alongside the Burkinabé armed forces throughout the country, carrying out joint attacks as part of “mixed battalions.” [source, source, source, source]
2.2 Financing
The VDP are primarily financed by the Patriotic Support Fund (PSF) created in January 2023 to support counterinsurgency efforts. The fund utilises various taxes, but mainly relies on donations. While Burkinabé media reports on the size of the fund are likely exaggerated, popular support for this fundraising also appears strong. [source, source]
Volunteers are supposed to receive 60,000 CFA francs a month, roughly $105. There is an additional allowance of between 200,000 and 300,000 CFA Francs (USD $350-$525) for food, fuel and vehicle maintenance made available to VDP units (by the BNVP). Some volunteers have complained about delays in payments and a lack of equipment and weapons. [source, source]
2.3 Business Structure
Livestock and cattle rustling have become a core component of Burkina Faso’s war economy. JNIM are the key perpetrators of theft and “taxation” of cattle. However, some decentralised VDP units, working with local leaders, are also guilty. [source, source]
2.4 Key Figures
Ibrahim Traoré – Under Traoré’s leadership, the VDP was massively expanded and politically elevated as a core component of Burkina Faso’s security structure. Under Traoré, the militia became a symbol of national resistance directly tied to his legitimacy. Traoré enjoys wide support among the militia. Traoré’s mobilisation of thousands of his supporters in Ouagadougou following rumours of a coup against him in September 2023 is indicative of the patriotic sentiment that underpins the VDP and his junta. [source]
2.5 VDP Recruitment
The VDP recruitment process relies heavily on local vetting by community leaders. The Committee for Village Development mediates the process, inherently favouring sedentary communities, like the Mossi and Gourmantché peoples, at the expense of pastoralist Fulanis (Peuhl). The Mossi are the largest ethnic group in Burkina Faso and make up the vast majority of VDP units. The supposed connection between JNIM and Fulani’s also works against Fulani recruitment into the VDP. This, in part, explains the extensive violence committed against Fulani civilians by the VDP. There are Fulani VDP members, but they are a great minority. There have also been instances of forced recruitment into the VDP of vocal critics of Traoré’s junta. [source, source, source, source, source, source]
3 Equipment
The capabilities of the VDP vary widely. Most units have modern small arms and light weapons including AK rifles and PKM machine guns. China supplies most of these. Some of the less well-equipped units use traditional hunting rifles and bladed weapons. Most VDP use motorbikes for their patrols. When embedded with the Burkinabé army, volunteers will have access to armoured transport like the Norinco CS/VP14 pictured below. The national VDP are typically much better equipped than local VDP, given their offensive role. [source, source, source]
4 Tactical-Operational Information
4.1 Core Purpose of the VDP
- Provide auxiliary support to the army in remote areas.
- Hold territories and secure communities post army withdrawal.
- Function as intelligence assets and early warning systems for the Traoré junta.
4.2 Operations
VDP units in the Northern provinces, some of the most contested areas, have earned reputations as particularly battle-hardened and resilient. Volunteers played an important role in the September 2023 recapturing of Koumbri, which had been under JNIM control since 2020. The VDP also worked alongside Malian armed forces in the April 2023 “Operation Kapidougou” in the Boucle du Mouhoun region. [source, source, source source]
Human rights organisations have connected the VDP to numerous massacres of civilians, mostly Fulanis. In the last three years, attacks on civilians have increased exponentially. This is partly due to increased terrorist targeting of VDP-aligned civilians but is primarily carried out by the VDP themselves. The VDP are on track to cause the same number of civilian deaths in 2025 as they did in 2023 and 2024 combined. Burkinabé authorities have so far failed to hold any VDP personnel accountable for these large-scale crimes. [source, source, source, source]
5 The Future of the VDP
The VDP are likely a permanent fixture in Burkina Faso. The threat from insurgents will likely persist and Kaboré’s 2020 statement that “The army cannot be deployed in 8,000 villages at the same time” remains true. There is a risk of ethnic fragmentation or state loss of control if oversight remains weak. Traoré seems to enjoy broad support from the VDP currently. However, the evolution of the VDP into a parallel security structure with more political influence is conceivable. The VDP have suffered more casualties than the army at the hands of insurgents and there have been some complaints about lack of support. This could cause a rift with the Traoré junta.
International attention may increase if abuses persist or expand across borders. Human Rights Watch has already identified the VDP as guilty of war crimes. Most significantly, the actions of the VDP may fuel insurgent recruitment and exacerbate ethnic tensions. JNIM leaders refer to VDP massacres in their publications and call on all ethnicities to join them in “achieving justice” for civilian massacres. With increasing Burkinabé-Russian cooperation we might expect to see Russians training the VDP or supplying weapons to its personnel. [source, source, source, source]
6 Conclusion
The VDP fill a critical gap in Burkina Faso’s security infrastructure and are central to the Burkinabé counterinsurgency. Their role in the rising civilian death toll raises issues of accountability and ethnic/social cohesion. Understanding the VDP is essential to understanding Burkina Faso’s modern-day response to jihadist insurgency.