1.0 Introduction
As a concept, drone warfare is far from a 21st century particularity. The use, purpose and scope of drones has shifted over the years. From military reconnaissance tools, precision strike platforms and assassin drones they are now mass-produced, cheap, DIY lethal machines. This shift has punctuated the evolution of modern warfare along the way. From niche state assets to central players in conflicts across the world, drones have evolved to quintessential factors in operations globally.
The mass proliferation of drones, their commercial development and the notable leaps in mass production played an essential role in this evolution. However, it was also the evolving nature of warfare from Cold War hands-off operations and ISR, to Global-War-on-Terror-era counterinsurgency-style operations, advanced tactical reconnaissance and precision strikes, to cheaply mass produced force multipliers in middle and small power competitions, that marked the taking off of drones as essential pieces of the future battlefield.
The applications of drones are as multivaried as the domains of warfare in the 21st century. Complex urban environments, large front operations, electronic warfare, naval combat, air-to-air and anti-air functions all are made more complex with the use of these small, sophisticated platforms. Drone integration into conventional operations and the great power arms races has elevated the tool in discussions of operational realities and in policy-making circles.
This article will explore the history and notable uses of drones. We will also look at core principles in drone warfare and key applications, such as drone swarms. Lastly, we will examine the geopolitical dimension of drone warfare, and the future of this rapidly evolving vector of combat.
2.0 Origins and Evolution of Drone Warfare
2.1 Early Experiments in Drone Warfare
The earliest experimentation with drones can be traced back to late World War I. Then the United States and British governments developed the first unmanned flying vehicles. The US model was called Kettering Bug, and it was an unmanned torpedo which flew first in October 1918. The British Aerial Target, a small radio-controlled aircraft, was first tested in March 1917.
World War II saw advancements such as the V-1 flying bomb. It was developed and used by Germany against the Allies in Operations Overlord and Crossbow. It was a terror-bombing tool that proved very effective in terrorizing British civilians. The French, Soviets, and Americans used crashed V-1s to reverse engineer the device and produce their own missile systems. These saw limited action towards the end of the war and affected designs of devices used later.
Early designs did not resemble modern drones in anything but name, differing substantially in scope and flexibility. They are considered predecessors of cruise missiles or other controlled projectiles. Irrespective, the concept of drones and their potential applications in warfare can be said to date back to this time.
2.2 Cold War Reconnaissance Era
During the Cold War, drones matured into indispensable reconnaissance tools, especially for missions too risky for manned aircraft. The U.S. employed the Ryan Model 147 “Lightning Bug” extensively over Vietnam and China, logging thousands of sorties. From the mid 1960s onwards, advanced projects like the Lockheed D-21 explored supersonic, high-altitude autonomous flight.
Ryan Model 147 [image source]
The Soviet Union developed their own counterparts for battlefield reconnaissance. Examples are the Tu-141 and Tu-143, in the 1970s and 80s. These are still occasionally seen in modern conflicts.
Tu-141 [image source]
In Europe, France pursued early strike-capable drones like the CT20, underscoring a shared Western interest in unmanned combat potential. These programs revealed both the promise of Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle (UCAV) concepts and the era’s limits in guidance, data links, and survivability.
2.3 Post-9/11 and the Age of Precision Strikes
The 1990s saw drones evolve into precision strike platforms, a good example being the U.S. MQ-1 Predator retrofitted with Hellfire missiles during operations in the Balkans.
After 9/11, armed drones became central to U.S. counterterrorism campaigns in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and beyond. They offered persistent ISR and low-risk strike options under Title 50 covert action authorities (CIA) and Title 10 U.S. military authorities of the United States Code. More recently, the MQ-9 Reaper extended these capabilities, shaping public perception of drones as synonymous with targeted killings. This period marked the operational mainstreaming of UCAVs, but also sparked debates over legality, sovereignty, and civilian harm.
MQ9 Reaper [image source]
This era demonstrated unmanned systems ability to reshape strategy by enabling long-duration surveillance-to-strike missions that were previously reserved for manned aircraft.
2.4 From State Monopoly to Mass Proliferation
By the 2010s, advances in consumer drone technology—led by manufacturers like China’s DJI—made small, capable UAVs widely accessible. Non-state actors such as ISIS quickly adapted relatively inexpensive commercial drones for reconnaissance and improvised attacks. Drone warfare was no longer confined to state militaries. This democratization blurred the line between civilian and military applications. Private R&D and startups rapidly expanded the market for both hardware and software.
At the same time, state-driven proliferation accelerated: China leveraged civil–military fusion to become the world’s largest drone exporter. Iran developed loitering munitions like the Shahed-136, now deployed in Ukraine and the Middle East. Russia shifted from imports to mass-producing domestic designs under wartime pressure.
Shahed-136 [image source]
Together, commercial innovation and state-sponsored proliferation fueled an era in which drones became strategic equalizer. Drones provide irregular forces, sanction-constrained militaries, and even criminal groups—such as narcotics organizations in Central and South America—access to air assets.
3.0 Notable Uses in Combat
3.1 Nagorno-Karabakh 2020
In the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Azerbaijan’s use of loitering munitions, notably the Israeli-made Harop. They targeted and disabled Armenian air-defense radars by homing in on their emissions, effectively opening gaps for other aerial operations. This proved decisively effective against Soviet-era systems like the S-300 and SA-8/Osa. Strategically, this allowed Azerbaijan to establish air superiority early in the conflict.
Harop Drone [image source]
Meanwhile, Turkish Bayraktar TB2 UCAVs conducted hunter-killer missions deep into Armenian rear areas, destroying tanks, artillery, and multiple air-defense installations—including as many as 12 Osa systems.
Bayraktar TB2 [image source]
Together, these drone platforms resulted in important advantages. Armenian forces were unable to hide from high-resolution aerial surveillance and were often neutralized before they could react. The combination of cost-effective strike capability and persistent ISR helped shift the battlefield balance and accelerate a paradigm shift in modern air warfare, demonstrating inexpensive unmanned systems ability to provide real strategic victories.
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3.2 Russia-Ukraine War
In Ukraine, drones have become indispensable for high-precision ISR and artillery correction, with commercial quadcopters and UAVs providing real-time targeting data that markedly increased artillery accuracy throughout 2024 and 2025. Simultaneously, the deployment of first-person view (FVP) “kamikaze” drones with payloads, like PG-7 grenades or shaped charges, has enabled direct attacks on tanks, artillery, logistics convoys, and even individuals, turning low-cost platforms into lethal weapons.
On the maritime front, Ukraine has utilized small unmanned surface vehicles (USVs), such as the “Ursula,” capable of ferrying FPV drones to strike enemy naval assets and radars from the Black Sea or rivers, blending naval reconnaissance and attack capabilities. This highlights the unique and versatile nature of drones across domains of war.
Nevertheless, electronic warfare (EW) has played a central role in shaping this drone revolution on the Ukrainian battlefield. Russia’s use of jammers and spoofers prompted Ukraine to rapidly adapt through technologies like analog FPV links, distributed video transmission, frequency hopping, and even hard-wire control via fiber optic filament, making drone operations increasingly resilient to interference.
Perhaps the most significant use of drones during this war to date was Operation Spiderweb. Over 100 inexpensive FPV drones—some enhanced with AI-based autonomous navigation—were covertly smuggled deep into Russia. They were launched from hidden containers near airbases, and struck strategic assets including Tu-95 and A-50 aircraft. This delivered a devastating blow to Russia’s bomber fleet and redefined how operators can use cheap drones for deep strike missions in enemy territory.
Footage from Operation Spiderweb [image source]
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3.3 Recent Drone Warfare
3.3.1 Gaza
Israeli forces have repurposed commercial DJI drones—the Agras, Mavic, and Avata—for lethal roles, including dropping explosives on buildings and surveilling operating areas. One incident saw a modified DJI Agras drone deliver a bomb within 100 meters of a school-turned-aid site in Jabalia, illustrating how civilian-grade UAVs are being weaponized in dense urban combat.
3.3.2 Sudan
In Sudan’s civil war, drones have become central to wider power projection. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have conducted over 280 drone strikes—mostly in and around Khartoum—while the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) deployed swarm attacks and even targeted remote locations like Port Sudan and the Red Sea with suicide drones. An important escalation occurred on 24 January 2025, when RSF drones struck the Saudi Maternal Teaching Hospital in El Fasher, resulting in at least 70 civilian fatalities.
3.3.3 Thailand-Cambodia
The 2025 Thailand–Cambodia border conflict marked one of the first instances of interstate drone use in Southeast Asia. Thailand deployed domestically-built armed UAVs to drop mortar bombs on Cambodian military depots and rocket launch systems, while Cambodian authorities reported drone incursions into their airspace near cultural heritage sites. This “Ukraine-style” drone employment shows the growing presence of unmanned systems, even in traditionally conventional regional conflicts.
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4.0 Core Principles and Capabilities of Drone Warfare
Drone warfare, and other uses of drones in operational environments, is characterized by four key aspects: ISR function, strike capabilities, electronic warfare role, AI integration.
4.1 ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance)
ISR remains the key role of drones, enabling persistent surveillance without exposing pilots to risk. High-altitude, long-endurance systems, like the U.S. RQ-4 Global Hawk and MQ-9 Reaper, provide strategic intelligence over vast areas. On the other hand, small tactical drones, such as the RQ-11 Raven or DJI Mavic, provide real-time battlefield awareness to on-the-ground units.
RQ-11 Raven [image source]
In Ukraine, even commercial drones have improved artillery effectiveness by reducing to minutes the sensor-to-shooter cycle. Drones with ISR capabilities have also reshaped naval warfare. Maritime UAVs have the ability to conduct reconnaissance over littorals and contested waterways. Data gathered by drones not only supports tactical operations but feeds into broader intelligence ecosystems, enabling pattern-of-life analysis and target development.
However, electronic warfare (EW) increasingly threatens the effectiveness of ISR drones, which can disrupt communications, jam GPS, or hijack control signals. As a result, the ISR domain is evolving toward autonomous navigation, hardened data links, and satellite-independent positioning systems.
4.2 Strike & Loitering Munitions
Drones are also now central to strike missions, from reusable military-grade UCAVs, like the MQ-9 Reaper or the Chinese GJ-11, to one-way loitering munitions such as Israel’s Harop or Iran’s Shahed-136. Loitering munitions and strike drones are a unique tool. They combine the surveillance capability of ISR drones with the precision strike role of guided munitions. These allow operators to hover above battlefields for hours before engaging when the time is tactically appropriate.
GJ-11 [image source]
In Ukraine, mass use of more commercial first-person-view (FPV) kamikaze drones has shown how inexpensive, improvised systems can neutralize expensive tanks and costly fortified positions at scale. Their proliferation is transforming the cost of warfare. It is forcing militaries to consider whether expensive armor is viable against swarms of cheap strike drones.
In parallel, state programs are developing larger UCAVs capable of carrying heavier payloads, including precision-guided bombs, bridging the gap between drones and traditional strike aircraft. The Chinese Dark Sword and Sharp Sword programs are an excellent example of this. However, strike drones remain vulnerable to sophisticated air defenses, particularly when operating in heavily contested airspace. This vulnerability has, in turn, spurred innovation in stealth, electronic countermeasures, and swarm tactics to overwhelm defenses.
4.3 Electronic Warfare & Counter-UAS
Drone warfare has become inseparable from EW and is engaged in a constant cycle of adaptation between drones and various forms of countermeasures.
In Ukraine, Russia’s extensive use of jammers has forced Ukrainian forces to adapt rapidly, experimenting with frequency-hopping control systems, autonomous navigation, and hardened communication links, to include fiber-optic hardwire solutions.
Counter-UAS measures are diverse: kinetic approaches include shotguns, anti-aircraft guns, missiles, and even drone-on-drone interceptions, while non-kinetic measures include EW jamming, GPS spoofing, and directed-energy weapons. The increasing density of drones on the battlefield has driven the development of layered defense systems, where long-range radar and missiles are integrated with short-range EW and point-defense weapons.
Even advanced militaries are struggling with the economics of counter-drone warfare, as shooting down a cheap quadcopter with a $100,000 missile is unsustainable. This challenge has stimulated demand for low-cost countermeasures, such as anti-drone rifles, nets, and compact laser systems. Ultimately, counter-UAS is emerging as its own warfare domain, with militaries devoting resources to achieve drone dominance both offensively and defensively.
Drones have also become platforms for EW tools. Modified Chinese variants of the GJ-11 and American drones equipped with electronic warfare capabilities now conduct jamming and radar interfering operations. Drones are becoming an essential part in EW, particularly in the air and naval domains.
4.4 AI Integration
AI is transforming drone warfare by enabling greater autonomy, efficiency, and coordination. AI systems process sensor data in real-time, allowing drones to identify and track targets without continuous human input, and allow the coordination of the movements of multiple drones (swarms).
These capabilities are especially valuable in contested electromagnetic environments, where communications may be jammed or disrupted. China has invested heavily in AI-driven swarm technology, aiming to deploy large numbers of autonomous drones capable of overwhelming enemy defenses.
The U.S. approach emphasizes manned–unmanned teaming (MUM-T), where AI-enabled drones extend the reach of piloted aircraft by carrying sensors, jammers, or strike payloads. China has also attempted to advance in this area with the development of UCAVs able to follow the manned J-20 fighter as ‘loyal wingmen’ platforms.
J-20 fighter [image source]
In Ukraine, improvised FPV drones with onboard AI-assisted target recognition are already being tested, showing how quickly AI can migrate from research labs to the battlefield. The potential of AI to shorten decision cycles and scale strike capacity is immense, but it also raises serious concerns over control, accountability, and compliance with international humanitarian law.
5.0 Drone Swarms
5.1 What is a Swarm?
A drone swarm is more than the mass use of UAVs; it is defined by networked coordination and distributed intelligence between platforms. While mass employment of drones, as seen in Ukraine, can overwhelm defenses, it is essentially a scaled-up version of traditional operations.
In contrast, drone swarms are conceptualized to operate collectively, with each unit communicating and adjusting to the actions of others in real time. This autonomy allows swarms to continue functioning even if individual drones are destroyed or cut off from human operators or the other drones. Algorithms modeled on natural systems—such as flocking birds or swarming insects—enable emergent behaviors like adaptive formations, collective target selection, and shared sensing. Such capabilities create a system that is greater than the sum of its parts, offering resilience and flexibility unmatched by single UAVs.
The distinction between swarms and mass use is crucial. The latter is already changing warfare, but the former represents a disruptive leap that could redefine airpower doctrine.
5.2 Combat Roles
Drone swarms are likely to play multiple combat roles. One of the most anticipated applications is saturation strikes, in which dozens or hundreds of drones overwhelm air defenses by attacking simultaneously from multiple vectors. Beyond such strikes, swarms could also serve as distributed sensor networks, allowing the thorough mapping of battlefields, detection of targets, and feeding enhanced real-time intelligence into command systems.
Another role is EW jamming, whereby swarm drones may act as a dispersed antenna array to disrupt enemy communications, radar, or GPS. Naval warfare scenarios highlight further potential, with swarms overwhelming ships, confusing targeting systems, and forcing adversaries to expend costly interceptors. In urban environments, swarms could clear buildings and scout subterranean spaces in ways humans or larger systems cannot. By covering both offensive and support functions, drone swarms can be a highly versatile tool for future operations.
5.3 Technical Challenges
Despite rapid technological advances, swarms face significant challenges before full operational deployment can be achieved. Communications remain a primary hurdle, as contested electromagnetic environments can disrupt links and force reliance on decentralized autonomy.
Achieving sufficient AI autonomy raises its own difficulties, especially in balancing initiative with control and ensuring compliance with rules of engagement. Preventing drones from colliding or interfering with one another also becomes increasingly complex as swarm sizes scale up. Energy and endurance are also limiting factors, as small drones have constrained flight times, which restricts sustained swarm operations. Integrating swarms into broader command-and-control structures is another unresolved problem, particularly in ensuring operators can issue intent without micromanaging individual drones.
Finally, adversarial countermeasures—from directed-energy weapons to EW interference—could exploit the connectivity that gives swarms their advantage against them. Overcoming these challenges is essential before swarms can move from demonstrations to tools for battlefield dominance.
6.0 Strategic and Geopolitical Perspectives
The global drone ecosystem is fragmenting along strategic competition lines. The U.S. is pursuing Manned–Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T) and the “loyal wingmen” concept to extend high-end airpower. Russia is weaponizing EW-dense battlespaces to degrade links and GPS. China is leveraging civil–military fusion to scale exports and field stealthier UCAVs. Lastly, non-state actors exploit cheap commercial tech plus state assistance to punch above their weight. This divergence will shape doctrine, budgets, export controls, and escalation dynamics in contested regions.
6.1 United States
Washington’s next-generation approach pairs crewed fighters with Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA), which are lower-cost, “attritable” drones that carry sensors, jammers, or weapons. The USAF has set up an experimental unit to develop tactics, training, and sustainment for CCA, signaling a transition from demos to force design. Budgets and planning documents tie CCA directly to the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program’s “family of systems,” positioning the crewed jet as a battle manager for unmanned wingmen. The operational logic is to kill more, lose less—push risk onto drones, widen magazine depth, and saturate A2/AD.
6.2 Russia
Moscow has treated Ukraine as a live lab for drone-EW interaction, blanketing sectors with jamming, spoofing, and direction finding to sever links and attrition UAV platforms. Russian units have also fielded fiber-optic-tethered FPVs that bypass RF jamming, illustrating rapid, field-driven adaptation. The outcome is a rear-area “interdiction zone” where drones complicate rotations, casualty evacuation, and logistics, pressuring Ukraine’s tempo.
6.3 China
China is a dominant actor in drone R&D as well as drone production commercially, and has seen significant technological advances in both combat uses for UAVs and UCAVs. The state of civil-military union in China has provided a unique advantage in terms of development efforts, production, and adaptation. Projects such as the drone mothership Jiu Tian and the UCAV Dark Sword and GJ-11 projects are excellent examples of China’s diversification in drone warfare technology. The attempt to integrate drones both to saturate enemy air defenses, project power with supersonic and stealth unmanned fighters, as well as allow for deep strike capabilities without risking pilots demonstrates both the state of drone warfare in People’s Liberation Army doctrine, as well as the strategic ambitions of the Chinese state in Asia.
6.4 Non-State Actors
Violent non-state actors stitch together commercial drones, simple munitions, and external state support (notably from Iran) to achieve effects once requiring an air force; ISR, precision harassment, and strategic disruption.
Particularly, multiple intelligence reports highlight the involvement of cartel members from Latin America infiltrating the International Legion in Ukraine. They get valuable insight into FPV drone warfare, according to intelligence from the Security Service of Ukraine. This may lead to drone proliferation to cartels, who will have access to cheap commercial drones and the skills to utilize them for their own offensive or defensive operations.
On the other, the Houthis’ long-range one-way attacks and ISIS quadcopter adaptations show how cheap platforms, mission kits, and permissive sanctuaries can yield asymmetric reach. This trend erodes airpower monopolies, imposes costly defense burdens, and complicates escalation and response.
7.0 The Future of Drone Warfare
7.1 Next-Gen UCAVs
Next-generation UCAV work splits into two visible tracks: large, low-observable strike UCAV concepts intended to penetrate advanced air defenses and lower-cost “loyal wingman” or attritable drones designed to operate alongside crewed aircraft. U.S. doctrine and budget documents explicitly link NGAD concepts to Collaborative Combat Aircraft and attritable wingmen as a way to increase strike depth and reduce risk to pilots.
China and a handful of other states continue to pursue flying-wing stealth UCAVs (the GJ-11, for example) that aim to trade cost for survivability in A2/AD environments. At the same time, program managers such as DARPA and service efforts focus on distributed four-ship or larger autonomy demonstrations to prove tactical teaming, not just single-aircraft performance. Stealth UCAVs aim to restore penetration capability against peer defenses, while loyal-wingmen aim to multiply effect and complicate enemy targeting.
7.2 Scenarios for 2030
We expect plausible scenarios by 2030 to include: (a) high-end peer contests where stealth UCAVs and loyal wingmen platforms probe and saturate integrated air defenses; (b) gray-zone coercion using persistent, low-cost drones to harass logistics, ports, and infrastructure below wartime thresholds; and (c) decentralized commercial networks that allow proxy or non-state actors to field coordinated effects remotely. Doctrine and escalation management will be decisive in whether or not drone use stabilizes or fuels crisis instability.
We assess that, based on historical precedence, China is likely to focus more on UCAV development and MUM-T systems. At the same time they are likely to focus on production of low-cost drones to integrate across domains. On the other hand, Russia will likely continue to integrate lessons from Ukraine across command structures. Russia will likely focus on integration of cheap and mid-tier drones across units. We expect the US to continue focusing on MUM-T development and allied integration of command for smoother operations in the Pacific.
From our optic, unifying threads in the drone narrative include cheaper production, AI-enabled autonomy, and cross-domain connectivity, which lower the threshold for use and complicate deterrence. Defenders, to be effective, must invest in layered Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems, electronic warfare and jamming capabilities, along with a thorough network of diplomatically handling escalation in situations where drones prove deciding factors in conflicts. In our view, drone networks will increasingly become instruments of coercion and sources of strategic ambiguity.
8.0 Conclusion
Drone warfare is now prominent in most conventional and unconventional conflicts, from Ukraine to Gaza, and from Sudan to Thailand. Drone development, doctrine, and uses vary among players, with swarms, electronic warfare, UCAVs and ISR all increasingly prevalent in discussion and plans. In our view, future warfare will increasingly rely on drones. The extent of drone universality in combat, flexibility, and limitations will continuously be tested.