The Zhuhai Air Show in November 2024 revealed the newest installment in Chinese modernization and drone warfare: the Jiu Tian. Translating to “High Sky” or “Ninth Heaven,” Jiu Tian is a Chinese drone mothership that made its first scheduled flight in late June 2025.
The security balance in the Pacific largely centers around a China-US bipolar security architecture. This structure prioritizes technological edge due to China’s unique geography and the tyranny of distance that limits US interference in the region. Differences in domain warfare, asymmetric capabilities, industrial power, supply chain resilience and multi-domain operations all support and fuel this dynamic security architecture. As a result, a drone mothership such as Jiu Tian is poised to upset this balance.
While Jiu Tian is not a game changer in terms of technological sophistication, superiority or novelty, it is not a Chinese propaganda prop. Above all, it reconsiders large-scale drone warfare away from land and into the naval and air domains in the Asia-Pacific. It raises critical concerns regarding air-defense capabilities across Asia, both in terms of production and operability within the context of drone swarm warfare.
1 What is it?
1.1 The Idea behind Jiu Tian
Jiu Tian is intended as an air power multiplier. A platform that can release 100 drones, all of which are networked via AI to coordinate in swarm formations and attacks. In other words, it is meant to function as a command node, fully unmanned, and able to work as coordinator mothership for smaller drones, mid-flight. This radically rethinks the way China imagines aerial warfare and, while it is not a silver bullet solution to Chinese security concerns, it recasts multi-domain operations and raises questions about adversary air defense capabilities.
1.2 Stats & Specs
- Wingspan: ~25 m (~82 ft)
- Maximum takeoff weight: ~16 tonnes
- Internal payload capacity: Up to 6 tonnes of loitering munitions or drones
- Swarm capacity: Carries and deploys up to 100 smaller UAVs
- Service ceiling: Capable of flying up to 15,000 m (~50,000 ft)
- Operational range: Up to 7,000 km (~4,350 miles)
- Propulsion: Jet-powered for high-altitude and long-endurance missions
- Launch system: Dual belly bays for internal drone deployment; eight external hardpoints for missiles or electronic warfare (EW) payloads
- Mission duration: Estimated endurance of 12 hours per sortie
1.3 Chinese UAVs Tradition
Jiu Tian builds on China’s long-standing UAV doctrine. Therefore it focuses on long-endurance and modular platforms for asymmetric warfare. It follows models like the CH‑7 stealth drone, Wing Loong-X, TP1000 transport drone, and the supersonic WZ‑8 recon platform. However none match its strike-swarm focus. Additionally, Jiu Tian is notable for being developed in partnership between private aerospace firm Jiutian and state-backed industry (AVIC, Xian Chida). This signals Beijing’s shift toward commercial–military innovation hubs. [source, source]
2 Context: The Indo-Pacific Security Architecture
2.1 Drone Doctrine in Chinese Security
Air warfare is at the core of the Chinese Anti-Access/Aerial Denial (A2/AD) doctrine. Thus it aims at denying control over areas such as Taiwan or the South China Sea. Drones enhance this by enabling persistent surveillance, rapid strikes, and distributed air operations without risking human lives. As a result, the PLA increasingly views drone swarms as airborne artillery that can exhaust enemy air defenses and disrupt logistics, all with a low cost of engagement. UAVs are not simply supportive, but will act as primary actors in operations, particularly within the naval and aerial battlespace.
Concepts like Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM‑T) and AI-hardened swarm clusters allow for distributed assault packages capable of overwhelming layered defenses. This doctrinal evolution lays the groundwork for evaluating platforms like the Jiu Tian: not as a gimmick, but as an operational extension of China’s layered air and naval denial posture.
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2.2 US Security Architecture & Drones
The US security architecture in the Pacific is based on a multi-billateral framework between significant allies, such as Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, agreements and loose alliance systems with Australia and the Pacific Islands, and the presence of the US Navy 7th fleet. In such a system, joint operations are essential. Paramount to success is the ability of allies that are closer to China to sustain operations and defend themselves until the US military can fully engage.
Air defense, and naval warfare are the primary areas where China will potentially mobilize forces in a first-strike scenario. When the US-led security in the Pacific is tested, the ability of US-allies to withstand a Chinese barrage and maintain control over essential bases, including control of the First Island Chain, will be key. The way Jiu Tian reconceptualizes aerial warfare, air defenses and integrates UAV swarm tactics with relatively cheap bodies is a critical challenge both to US allies and the US itself.
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2.3 Modernisation or Propaganda?
The technical limitations of Jiu Tian along with its operational limitations raise questions. Jiu Tian has not seen combat or credible live-fire demonstrations. Furthermore Jiu Tian’s capabilities and particularly, swarm control remain untested in peer-conflict scenarios. This invites doubt over whether it presents a credible threat or is simply a propaganda tool with little fighting value. [source, source]
3 Jiu Tian Operational Integration
3.1 Air or Navy?
Jiu Tian likely falls under PLA Air Force command for high-altitude missions, however its sea-skimming drone capabilities suggest dual integration capacity with PLA Navy. Its platform versatility enables missions launched from land bases or amphibious ships, making joint airborne-naval operations much easier. [source, source]
3.2 Flexible Wings
Built around a modular “Isomerism Hive Module,” Jiu Tian can quickly be remodeled for ISR, EW, loitering munitions, and cargo roles. Its payload bays and hardpoints allow it to be adapted for support missions, electronic jamming, or precision strikes. Therefore, it is a potentially multi-mission asset. [source]
3.3 Zones of Operation
In all zones, Jiu Tian marks a shift to large-scale drone warfare moving from land domains into air and sea spaces. Its altitude and payload offer standoff reach and operational resilience. That capability challenges Asia-Pacific air defenses, demanding investment in high-altitude interceptors, layered radar, and UAV-specific counter-swarm tactics.
3.3.1 Jiu Tian over Taiwan
In a Taiwan scenario, Jiu Tian’s drone swarms could serve as airborne saturation artillery, pressuring Republic of China Air Force (ROCAF) radar and missile batteries. Multiple drones could overwhelm local air defenses, degrading response time and creating openings for PLA air or missile strikes. Ceremony-free deployment in contested airspace would be its strategic value against the Taiwanese porcupine defense. Consequently, Taiwanese doctrine focuses on asymmetric warfare, access denial, and the use of plenty of cheap materiel. [source, source, source]
3.3.2 South China Sea
Here, Jiu Tian can team up with maritime militia to conduct grey-zone operations coordinating patrol drones, EW payloads, and surveillance in disputes over artificial islands.
Swarms from altitude complicate A2-AD coverage, and low-visibility drone threats could enforce de facto control with legal ambiguity in the South China Sea. The technological inferiority of local adversaries, such as Vietnam, and their lesser air-power reach, would be a significant weakness that Jiu Tian’s range could capitalize on in such operations to overwhelm critical strategic hubs such as the Spratly Islands. [source]
3.3.3 Japan
Operating out of the eastern China, Jiu Tian could patrol beyond Japan’s Air Defense Identification Zone, flying missions over the East China Sea near Okinawa and the Senkaku Islands. Its 15,000 m ceiling places it above typical Japanese Air Self-Defense Force surface-to-air missile ranges. [source]
Deploying swarms from this distance would complicate early-warning and reaction timelines for Japanese and allied air defenses. Thus, this would significantly compromise current Japanese reclamation doctrine for warfare in its southern islands. [source]
3.3.4 Korean Peninsula
In the Korean Peninsula, Jiu Tian could act as a hub for surveillance and precise strike drones targeting naval assets or infrastructure across the peninsula. Its high-altitude operation aids overflight missions across North Korea, while swarms pose unpredictable challenges for ROK air defenses.
If employed, it could support allied DPRK operations—providing the Kim regime critical ISR or strike capability and upgrading its limited air space capabilities enough to make a considerable challenge for ROK or US airpower.
4 Operational Concerns
4.1 Jiu Tian Technical Issues
Jiu Tian has important limitations. It is large, slow, and lacks stealth capabilities, making it detectable by radar and infrared systems. Consequently, it can be vulnerable to modern air defense networks and clumsy in high-risk operations.
It relies on pre-programmed swarms and untested AI coordination for drone movements. Since electronic warfare or signal jamming disrupts its network, the entire swarm could fail. Furthemore, logistical demands of sustaining multi-hour, high-altitude missions may present issues over sortie frequency and resilience.
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4.2 Countering Jiu Tian
Defenders equipped with layered air-defense systems, including directed-energy weapons, high-energy microwaves like the Hurricane‑3000, and laser systems such as the Silent Hunter, could neutralize Jiu Tian drone swarms in a cost-effective manner, downing dozens of drones per incident without wasting expensive missiles. [source, source, source]
Moreover, traditional anti-air systems and anti-drone tactics may be able to disrupt an attacking swarm. While Jiu Tian is not a technological breakthrough, it compels adversaries to redistribute resources across multiple threat vectors. It increases defensive costs and forces broader defensive adaptability for all involved actors. [source, source]
5 Implications for the Defence Industry
5.1 Chinese Defence Industry
Jiu Tian exemplifies China’s military‑civil fusion strategy, merging private-sector agility with state-led programs to accelerate drone development and mass production. The test flights in June signal a shift toward software‑defined platforms which can be rapidly reconfigured for ISR, electronic warfare, or kamikaze strikes.
5.2 US Response
Jiu Tian challenges the U.S. defence sector on three fronts: innovation, production, and supply chain resilience. Despite this, current U.S. platforms remain fragmented and do not reflect a strong future warfare direction.
Industrial capacity is also mismatched. Despite China preparing for swarm drone deployment and already possessing immense drone production capacity, U.S. drone manufacturing remains dispersed, with limited output.
US reliance on Chinese rare earths also exposes vulnerabilities. Even though Jiu Tian itself may not be revolutionary, its concept forces a systemic response from the U.S. defence-industrial base on whether and how it can sustain deterrence at scale. [source, source]
6 Conclusion
Jiu Tian is not a revolution in drone warfare technology. It has significant weaknesses and faces an important lack of experience in operational use. However, its concept and potential, along with what it demonstrates for the direction of PLA doctrine, must be well understood by Western and Eastern nations hoping to effectively counter China in any conflict. As supply chains, industrial capacity, and defence are updated across the Asia-Pacific, new tools of war like the Jiu Tian must be factored into considerations of development and operational realities.