1.0 Introduction 

The Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media (Roskomnadzor) is one of the Russian Federation’s key bodies in the digital and communications sphere. The agency is responsible for monitoring, controlling and censoring mass media. Established in 2008, the body has become increasingly prominent in the era of information warfare, where the Kremlin increasingly treats narratives, digital platforms, and online spaces as both vulnerabilities and weapons. [source, source]

Roskomnadzor has been placed under Western sanctions and continues to face international scrutiny for its role in state censorship and repression of independent media, ultimately leading to a drop in the freedom of Russian people as well as international opposition. [source, source]

2.0 Motto and Symbols

2.1 Motto

Publicly available information does not address an official motto for Roskomnadzor.

2.2 Symbols

The emblem of Roskomnadzor features a golden double-headed eagle. Upon the eagle’s chest is a blue heraldic shield, with a golden “pillar of law” superimposed on a golden lightning bolt crossed with a goose feather. Another official version of the logo has appeared in silver tones with the blue shield. [source]

The flag of Roskomnadzor displays the emblem as described previously, set against a blue background. A narrow stripe of the Russian Federation’s national flag colours appears along the hoist side. [source]

3.0 Organisation

3.1 Place within Russian government

3.1.1. Role within Russian government

Roskomnadzor holds an exceedingly important role in Russia’s governance system. It serves as a key instrument in the state’s broader strategy to control and shape the information environment. Officially, Roskomnadzor is responsible for supervising and surveilling Russia’s mass media, telecommunications, and personal data regulation. Additionally, it manages blacklists of prohibited online content, issues blocking orders, and enforces data-localisation requirements. Furthermore, under the Sovereign Internet Law, it has authority to control traffic routing and impose technical measures on Russia’s internet service providers (ISPs), making it the state’s central body for information oversight and censorship. [source, source, source, source]

In addition, Roskomnadzor has a key role in maintaining and providing registers for higher authority. Specifically, it regularly produces a blacklist of websites that companies are required to block. The site currently shows 48,245 pages of sites listed. According to law service sites that retrieved information from unavailable Russian media, Roskomnadzor is also required to fulfil other registers. These include: [source, source]

• Register of copyright infringers
• Register of extremist materials
• Uniform register of prohibited information
• Register of infringers of personal data
• Register of information dissemination organisers and bloggers
• Register of personal data operators

3.1.2 Unofficial Roles

Although the Russian government publicly frames Roskomnadzor as a regulatory body focused on communications oversight and data protection, evidence consistently points to a more coercive role. Multiple investigations and leaked documents—including material exposed by Cyberpartisans—highlight the agency’s policing style of enforcement, characterised by surveillance, censorship, and punitive action against non-compliant actors. [source, source, source]

Independent observers and legal practitioners confirm this role. Lawyer Vladimir Voronin, who has defended activists and media outlets targeted by Roskomnadzor, told The New York Times that the service functions as a “police agency” that “persecutes oppositionists, activists, and the media”. This assessment aligns with reports and leaked documents showing Roskomnadzor’s integration into state security workflows and its operational use as a tool of political repression rather than neutral regulation. [source, source] 

3.1.3 Command structure

Roskomnadzor is a federal executive body formally under the jurisdiction of the Government of the Russian Federation, but it operates as part of the Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media. Its head is appointed by the Russian Prime Minister. [source, source, source]

3.1.4 Organisational Structure

Archived material from Roskomnadzor’s official site provides some insight into the agency’s structure and reach. The service is composed of both territorial bodies dispersed across the Russian Federation and coordinating/advisory bodies concentrated within its headquarters in Moscow.

Roskomnadzor maintains a wide operational footprint through territorial departments aligned with Russia’s federal districts. These include the Central, Northwestern, Southern, North Caucasus, Volga, Ural, Siberian, and Far Eastern districts, with subordinate offices covering 75 regional jurisdictions. This structure ensures consistent enforcement of directives across the country’s vast geography and embeds the agency into local administrative and media environments. [source]

At the centre, Roskomnadzor operates a set of advisory councils that supposedly provide policy guidance and technical oversight: [source]

• Expert Council on Mass Communications under the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media.
• Advisory Council under the Authorised Body for the Protection of the Rights of Personal Data Subjects.
• Scientific and Technical Council of the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media.

An important and relatively well-known unit is the Radio Frequency Service, which Roskomnadzor oversees. Specifically, they have the Main Radio Frequency Center (GRFC), a department within Roskomnadzor, which supervises the use of radio frequency channels. Therefore, GRFC can be understood as the technical backbone for RKN’s censorship and monitoring. Leaked documents derived from a 2022 breach by the Cyberpartisans reveal that its authority has expanded significantly, extending mere monitoring of radio frequencies and spectrum use. These documents revealed it as Roskomnadzor’s covert operational arm, conducting political surveillance, direct censorship enforcement and predictive threat monitoring. [source, source, source]

3.4 Key Figures 

Andrei Yurievich Lipov

Andrei Lipov is the current Head of Roskomnadzor, appointed in March 2020. Furthermore, in this role, he directs the agency’s regulatory and supervisory functions across mass media, communications, and information technology. Before this appointment, he held senior positions in the Ministry of Telecom and Mass Communications and in the Presidential Administration, where he worked on information technology and communication policy. [source, source]

Vadim Alexseevich Subbotin

Vadim Subbotin is the current Deputy Head of Roskomnadzor. He oversees the Department of Permitting, Control and Supervision in the Field of Mass Communications and the Department of Control and Supervision in the Field of Electronic Communications. In this capacity, he has been directly linked to decisions that limited Russian society’s access to information and also contributed to the closure or restriction of independent media outlets. [source]

Oleg Alexandrovich Terlyakov

Oleg Terlyakov was appointed Deputy Head of Roskomnadzor on 13 April 2020. Terlyakov assists in overseeing regulatory and supervisory functions within the agency. [source, source]

Milos Eduardovich Wagner

Milos Wagner is also a Deputy Head of Roskomnadzor. According to the Archived official website dated April 2024, he oversees the Department for the Protection of the Rights of Personal Data Subjects and the Department of Legal Support, International and General Cooperation. [source]

Alexander Zharov

Alexander Zharov is a Russian official who led Roskomnadzor from 2012 to 2020. During his tenure, he oversaw the expansion of the state’s control over Russia’s media and internet space, including high-profile attempts to block platforms such as LinkedIn and Telegram. Originally trained as a doctor before moving into journalism and later government communications, Zharov became a prominent figure in the tightening of Russia’s information environment. In March 2020, a day after leaving Roskomnadzor, Gazprom-Media Holding appointed him CEO, one of Russia’s largest media groups. [source, source, source]

5.0 Tactical-Operational Information 

5.1 Operations 

5.1.1 Website blacklists and takedowns:

Roskomnadzor maintains the Unified Register of Prohibited Information, used to block domains, URLs, and IP’s. Leaked documents analysed by Radio Free Europe show operational workflows where Roskomnadzor and its GRFC analysts identified opposition-linked content, added it to registers, and circulated removal demands to service providers. For example, Roskomnadzor circulated leaked operational spreadsheets labelled “Yandex U Special Task” to the company, instructing it to delist specific articles and search results. Furthermore, these included materials critical of senior state officials and of Russia’s conduct in the war. [source, source]

In Bashkortostan, local censors flagged a regional news site, ProUfu.ru, after it published an editorial critical of President Putin during the early days of the Ukraine invasion. A dossier was compiled on the outlet, noting its ownership structure and top editor. Shortly afterwards, authorities pressured the site economically by warning businesses not to advertise with it, illustrating how blacklisting and targeted monitoring paired with coercive tactics to undermine independent media.[source]

In parallel, Roskomnadzor has repeatedly sanctioned major international platforms. Roskomnadzor blocked LinkedIn in 2016, throttled Twitter in 2021, and blocked Facebook and Instagram after February 2022. [source, source, source,  source]

5.1.2 War-time censorship:

Leaked dispatches dated 28 February 2022, show how Roskomnadzor categorised dissent as a destabilising threat. One report titled “Presence of Protest Moods” logged support for demonstrators and calls to “stop the war.” Another report highlighted social media criticism of Putin’s motives for the invasion, recording the ownership details of the outlet that published it. Officials rapidly reported these notes to leadership and aligned them with nationwide instructions that media outlets must cite only official state sources on Ukraine. [source, source]

5.1.3 Political censorship and policing:

Roskomnadzor’s records demonstrate its role as a security organ. In Bashkortostan, a six-page “information space” report included charts measuring sentiment shifts after the arrest of activists. Opposition leader Aleksei Navalny was monitored intensely. Workers flagged any article, video, or website where his name appeared, even in margins. Navalny supporter Lilia Chanysheva was placed on a “destabilizing sources” list in 2020. She was later arrested on extremism charges, and her detention logged with an assessment that online “resonance” remained low. [source, source, source]

In another case, 24 year old Laysan Sultangareyeva staged a lone anti-war protest in Tuymazy. After her Instagram post circulated, Roskomnadzor flagged the content, and her subsequent arrest was noted with bureaucratic precision: “Protest activity took place, the protester was detained”. Russian authorities fined Sultangareyeva 68,000 rubles (roughly $900) and prosecuted her with evidence drawn from social media posts. [source]

5.1.4 Public sentiment tracking

The NY Times analysis of Roskomnadzor’s leaked records indeed reveal a structured effort to measure and report on public opinion trends in near real time. Regional offices compiled “information space” assessments that resembled situational bulletins, sometimes complete with charts showing how public approval or disapproval shifted after events such as activist arrests or reports of military mobilization. These assessments coded topics as “destabilizing subjects” including antimilitarism, drug legalisation, and “sexual freedoms” treating them as potential threats. [source]

5.2 Core Purpose

Roskomnadzor’s publicly stated core purpose is to serve as the Russian state’s supervisory authority over communications, media, and information systems. It monitors, enforces, and shapes the online domain in Russia. Roskomnadzor’s overarching role is to ensure that the information environment remains aligned with state interests, giving it broad oversight powers and the capacity to enforce compliance across Russia’s information space. [source]

Roskomnadzor’s underlying purpose becomes clear when considered in the light of the Russian state’s goals within the information and cyber realm. In the words of Dickson and Harding, the principal goals are: “disruption, destruction, and control of information”. Roskomnadzor disrupts the information environment by destabilizing the flow of online discourse, including through the control and amplification of misleading or distorted content. Furthermore, it destroys the visibility of targeted narratives by directing takedowns, delistings, and applying legal pressure on platforms and media outlets. Above all, Roskomnadzor embodies the principle of control. It manages this by maintaining nationwide supervisory infrastructure, coordinating closely with security agencies, and determining what information is accessible. [source, source, source, source]

5.3 Tactics 

Due to the covert nature of Roskomnadzor’s activities, the tactics identified here cannot comprehensively capture the full scope of its methods. Nevertheless, leaked documents and investigative reporting provide insight into tactics used, particularly within the technical realm. Taken together, these tactics illustrate the agency’s large contribution to Russia’s strategy in the information realm.

• Use of Deep Packet Inspections (DPI’s): Mandated TSPU devices allow Roskomnadzor to filter, throttle, and also block traffic at scale. [source, source]
• IP address blacklisting: Large IP ranges are blocked to suppress targeted services. For example, operationally, it was reflected in the infamous Telegram ban attempt in 2018. [source]
• Platform throttling: Deliberate slowing of access to services before or alongside outright bans. [source]
• Domain Name System (DNS) bans: Blocking of DNS services, including encrypted DNS like Google or Cloudflare. This further circumvents citizen’s reliance on national DNS infrastructure. [source]
• Real-time monitoring via internal chat rooms: Members track protest sentiment and opposition discourse to forward to higher authorities. [source, source]
• Screen activity logging: Surveillance logs include indeterminate screen recordings that show activity down to the level of mouse movement. [source]
• Information tactics: Roskomnadzor dictates narratives and narrows the range of acceptable discourse without solely relying on technicality. For example, Roskomnadzor stated to the public that information is to be considered accurate only if it is based on Russian official sources. [source, source]

5.4 Personnel size 

Little open-source information is available on Roskomnadzor’s staffing. However, its extensive network of territorial bodies and the operational demands of its various roles, would seem to require a substantial workforce. One Russian media site—noted as a potentially unreliable source—cited figures from 2014 of approximately 215 staff in the central departments and 2804 in territorial bodies. If this figure is accurate, it is likely that the number has since expanded. This is through reported increases in its budget, the adoption of the 2019 “Sovereign Internet Law”, and the subsequent growth in Roskomnadzor’s technical and supervisory responsibilities. [source, source]

6.0 The Future 

Roskomnadzor has already evolved from a regulatory body into an operational arm of the Russian security state. Leaked documents and independent analysis suggest that this trajectory will continue, with the agency consolidating and expanding its powers rather than retrenching.

The agency will also likely play a greater role in information operations management. With the Kremlin prioritising narrative control, especially during wartime, Roskomnadzor is positioned not just to suppress dissent, but also to facilitate selective amplification of pro-government narratives and coordinate more closely with state media and private tech platforms. Its monitoring infrastructure, including systems like Vepr and operational chatrooms, may increasingly integrate artificial intelligence to detect dissent earlier and at greater scale. 

7.0 Conclusion 

Roskomnadzor’s existence and activities depict how the Russian state conceives of communication and the cyber realm: not as neutral infrastructure that needs regulating, but as contested terrain of high strategic value. The entity is a threat to the freedom of the Russian populace and their free speech, given that citizens are subject to highly shaped narratives, intrusive monitoring, and the systematic suppression of dissenting voices. 

The broader significance is that Roskomnadzor illustrates the merging of online regulatory authority with security agencies, blurring the line between civilian administration and security enforcement. In doing so, it reflects the Kremlin’s recognition that influence over information is as important as control over physical space. 

As censorship, surveillance and disinformation continue to overwhelm the current environment, analysis of bodies like Roskomnadzor remains essential to understanding the mechanisms of state control. Further investigation is recommended particularly through deeper examination of the leaked document sets.