1.0 Introduction 

Atesh (Crimean Tatar: Ateş; Russian and Ukrainian: Атеш) is a clandestine resistance movement formed in the fall of 2022, bringing together Ukrainians, Russians and Crimean Tatars united against Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. Initially started as small, scattered cells, Atesh quickly grew into a coordinated network, and over time evolved into a full-fledged movement operating both inside and outside Russian controlled areas. Atesh engages predominantly in intelligence gathering, target acquisition, sabotage and cyber campaigns. A key element of its expansion has been recruiting Russian military personnel, giving Atesh unprecedented reach inside the Russian Army. Its rapid growth and string of operational successes make it one of the largest organised resistance structures that operate within the Russian military. Atesh is a formidable problem for Russia, felt both on the ground and in morale. [source, source] 

2.0 Motto, Symbols, Patches 

2.1 Motto 

There is no officially recognised motto of Atesh. However, the movement carries a clear thematic identity centered around its name – Atesh, meaning “fire” in Crimean Tatar. Such symbolism conveys the group’s spirit of resistance and disruption. [source]

“We are the ones who are not silent. We are the ones who are fighting. We are Атеш.” [source]

2.2 Symbols 

Atesh updated their logo, confirming the change in late March 2023. They stated that the colours, blue and yellow/gold, were chosen to reflect the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar flags. [source] 

Cyber Atesh uses an image on its Telegram profile that depicts their logo placed on the back of a computer. [source]

2.3 Patches 

When Atesh showcased its updated logos, the group also presented a patch that mirrors the same symbol and colour theme. [source] 

3.0 Organisation 

3.1 Place within broader government structure

Atesh operates as a decentralised and cell-based structure without a formal hierarchy. Available information indicates that the unit functions autonomously and maintains limited contact internally. In 2024, the BBC reported that those they contacted within Atesh work alone, “contacting only a ‘curator’” to whom the information is passed. [source, source]

According to analysts from the Laender-Analysen institute, Atesh is a multi-layered partisan network. One, is the Atesh Civil Force, that gathers intelligence and identifies targets, and another is the combat wing that disrupts, damages, and enables strikes in the rear. Additionally, Atesh in April 2024 launched a cyber unit, “Cyber-Atesh,” as part of their efforts to expand beyond physical sabotage into the digital domain. According to their Telegram, the information collected by Cyber Atesh is transmitted to the Atesh combat wing and is further used in operations by Atesh agents. [source, source]

2023 video footage of Atesh claiming preparations in Dzankoi, including weapon caches and planned railway sabotage, while stating they are awaiting the advance of the Armed Forces of Ukraine into Crimea. [source]

Atesh School

Atesh also operates an initiative referred to as “Atesh School,” a project that mostly disseminates sabotage instructions. In February 2023, Atesh reported on their Telegram channel that over 4,000 members joined the school, learning the “art of breaking equipment and sabotaging orders.” In its own messaging, they address “servicemen of the Russian Federation or a fighter of the Wagner PMC,” encouraging participation by portraying internal sabotage as a way to avoid deployment to the front while continuing to profit during the war. Euromaidan Press reported that the material specifically discussed methods of incapacitating armoured vehicles, by inducing mechanical or systems failures severe enough to remove them from combat use. For example, video footage shows Atesh operatives advising how to disable a T-73B3 tank by puncturing its cables. [source, source, source] 

The website listed for the school is currently not active. Yuri, a guerilla from Atesh, in 2024 told Euromaidan Press that the website may have been compromised. Furthermore, on Atesh’s Linktree, one of the channels listed is the “School of Sabotage “RIOT”,”  which is described as an online resistance school. The channel included examples of low level disruption, with one post mentioning the effective idea of pouring raw eggs into engines. This therefore may represent the group’s new online access point. [source, source, source]

3.2 Financing 

Atesh’s funding is opaque. According to the BBC, its handlers refuse to specify its financing channels, stating only that the movement has “several” sources of income. It is noted Atesh maintains links with the National Resistance Centre, a government-funded body under Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces, though there is no public evidence that Atesh itself receives direct state funding. [source]

Individual operatives told the BBC that they do not receive salaries but are reimbursed for operational expenses, such as fuel and basic costs. Additionally, Kyiv Post reports that the group offers monetary incentives to potential agents, approximately $57 daily for partisan work like taking valuable photos and sharing locations. There is also an advance payment of $170 for when recruits join. [source, source]

3.4 Key Figures 

Eldar: Leader of Atesh 

Very little verifiable information about identities within Atesh is publicly available as operational security is paramount. However, a Telegram page titled “Eldar is the leader of Atesh” created on 15 January 2024, introduces an individual named Eldar as “one of the leaders of the Atesh movement.” Reporting from the New Voice of Ukraine also notes that, when the outlet contacted Atesh, an individual identifying himself as Eldar responded. [source, source]

3.5 Recruitment 

Methods 

Atesh’s recruitment is selective, decentralised and security driven. The movement targets residents of occupied territories, Crimean Tatars, and individuals embedded within Russian military or occupation structures. Secure online channels act as entryways, local outreach campaigns draw attention in targeted areas, and money is also offered as incentives for recruitment. 

Initial contact is typically made through secure online channels, most notably Telegram. Moreover, Atesh publicly directs prospective supporters and interested operatives to the Telegram contact @Svyaznoy_Atesh. They describe the account as a coordination and communication channel for joining or assisting the movement. Furthermore, Atesh has also previously directed supporters to the Telegram account @atesh_fire as a contact for communication, information sharing and coordination. [source, source] 

Atesh also uses information and agitation campaigns, including leaflets, posters and messaging throughout Russia and in occupied areas for both recruitment and psychological messaging. [source, source, source]

The danger to members is continuous before, during and after the recruitment process, making OPSEC paramount to the group’s survival. As with many resistance groups like Atesh, fake and impersonator accounts are regularly created – likely by Russian state actors – to identify and entrap potential recruits. Atesh’s main Telegram channel (@atesh_ua) has around 50,000 subscribers, while a known fake account has attracted over 20,000, underscoring the high level of vulnerability and the degree of caution recruits must exercise when communicating. An Atesh coordinator told Euromaidan Press that the FSB “constantly tries to penetrate Atesh’s ranks.” [source, source, source, source] 

3.6 Connections to other important organisations 

• Berdyansk Partisan Army, Maripol Resistance, and Atesh coalition: In June 2023, the three groups announced they are starting an “active phase of cooperation.” They stated they were not forming a new unified movement but would coordinate operations to more effectively target the Russian occupying forces. [source]
• National Resistance Center (NRC): According to The Insider, Atesh, like other underground networks, likely takes orders and receives support from the NRC. The NRC is a unit of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Special Operations Forces. [source]
• Ukraine Defense Forces: Atesh states that it cooperates with Ukraine’s Defense Forces primarily by collecting and transmitting intelligence to support their operations. [source]

4.0 Tactical-Operational Information 

Atesh’s activities are structured around two core operational functions.  First, Atesh conducts intelligence operations focused on reconnaissance and surveillance of Russian military activity, with intelligence passed to the Ukrainian Defence Forces. Their operatives include covert informants and double agents operating within Russian military units and civilian settings, providing intel on air defences, depots, military bases and geospatial data to support Ukraine’s operational planning and targeting. Second, the movement undertakes sabotage operations, targeting Russian military logistics, railways and other infrastructure to degrade Russian operational mobility. These operations occur in occupied Ukrainian territories and inside Russia. Furthermore, Acled’s data from November shows Atesh accounted for over half of the 30 sabotage incidents in occupied areas in 2025. [source, source, source]

4.1 Operations 

December 2025: Railway sabotage in Bataysk 

On 21 December, Atesh claimed it carried out a sabotage operation against a key railway logistics hub in Bataysk, Rostov-on-Don region, targeting relay cabinets at the Nataysk-Sortirovochnaya junction. According to the group, the attack disrupted a major supply artery used to move troops, armored vehicles, fuel and ammunition toward the southern fronts like Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk and Crimea, triggering delays in Russian military logistics. [source, source] 

August 2025: Cyber Atesh attack on Russia’s SPIMEX

On 20 August 2025, Atesh reported on their Telegram that their “specialists disabled a key Kremlin-controlled commodity exchange where the main resources of Putin’s regime are traded.” The target was SPIMEX, where the attack temporarily disrupted the platform that reportedly handles nearly all of the country’s organised trading in oil, gas, coal, metals, timber and other raw materials. Furthermore, the group framed the exchange as a financial pillar of the Kremlin’s war effort. They stated the goal was to halt the ‘faucet’ of petrodollars that fund Russia’s invasion in Ukraine. According to Atesh, the attack resulted in the platform being inaccessible to 99% of users. [source, source]

Screenshot uploaded by Atesh via Telegram, showing the impact of its cyber attack on SPIMEX.

May 2023: Involvement in the assassination attempt of Russian propagandist Zakhar Prilepin 

On 6 May 2023, a car bomb targeting a prominent pro-Kremlin and pro-war propagandist, Zakhar Prilepin, exploded in the Nizhny Novgorod region of Russia. The attack injured and hospitalised Prilepin and killed his bodyguard. The bodyguard, and driver of the vehicle, was a Luhansk separatist fighter. Alexander Permyakov confessed to the attack, and he alleged that he had been recruited by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU). The SBU neither confirmed nor denied their involvement. Atesh claimed they took part in the event, however the claims are not verified. Furthermore, OBOZ.UA reported Atesh’s Telegram post, where it stated: 

“The Atesh movement has been hunting for Prilepin since the beginning of the year. They got him. It’s all just beginning for the rashists. Zakhar Prilepin was a shitty writer, and a shitty person. There was a feeling that sooner or later he would be blown up. Just as a feeling. And it came true – he was driving his trump Audi Q7 to his relatives in Nizhniy Novgorod. But I was not driving by myself, but with a surprise on the car bottom. The surprise worked. Zakhar is in hospital. Our predictions always come true, because we not only talk, but also do.” [source, source, source, source]

November 2022: Killing of 25 Russian Russian soldiers in Simferopol 

On 12 November 2022, Atesh claimed its agents killed 30 wounded Russian servicemen inside military hospitals in Simferopol, in Russian-occupied Crimea. According to the report by the New Voice of Ukraine, Atesh asserted that the killings could be verified by checking hospital wards and morgues. They published a list of 25 alleged victims. [source]

2023: Black Sea Fleet intelligence

According to reports by the Kyiv Post and Business Insider, Atesh claimed to be involved in enabling the September 2023 strike on Russia’s Black Sea Fleet headquarters in Sevastopol by facilitating the transfer of insider intelligence. According to these reports, disgruntled Russian naval officers, some allegedly unpaid by the Russian forces, provided sensitive information to partisan contacts in Atesh. Atesh subsequently passed on the intelligence to Ukrainian intelligence services and reportedly helped identify an optimal window for the strike, which used long-range cruise missiles. The attack caused extensive damage to the headquarters building. While the specific claims of the involvement of Atesh and their double agents can not be confirmed, the report by Kyiv Post on the matter referred to Andriy Yusov, a representative of Main Directorate of Intelligence (HUR), stating that they were working with partisans and that they had played a crucial role in the ongoing Ukrainian strikes on Russian targets in occupied Crimea. [source, source]

4.2 Core Purpose 

Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars created Atesh in September 2022 in response to Russia’s full scale invasion of Ukraine. While Atesh is a large movement, whereby each wing serves its own function, their central purpose is to conduct partisan resistance in Russian occupied territories and inside Russia itself, operating primarily as a clandestine force. Furthermore, Atesh focuses on intelligence collection, sabotage, reconnaissance, and infrastructure-focused disruption designed to undermine Russian military capacity from within. 

Interviews conducted by the outlet Soldier of Fortune suggest that individuals from Atesh join the movement out of a mix of personal conviction, national identity, and a sense of obligation to resist occupation. Operatives have described the work as dangerous but necessary, with one member stating that “we know we are risking our lives…but the mission is worth the risk.” Others have framed participation as tied to defending their homeland and continuing a tradition of Crimean Tatar resistance. [source, source]

4.3 Tactics 

• Sabotage: Atesh employs disruptive actions against infrastructure, such as damaging rail signalling equipment to disrupt military transport. [source, source] 
• Targeted assassinations: Claimed responsibility for high-profile assassination attempts, including the attack on Russian propagandist and writer Zahkar Prilepin. [source]
• Static and vehicle-borne IED attacks: Atesh frequently reports the use of improvised explosive devices against fixed targets and vehicles to damage military assets. [source]
• Arson attacks: The movement regularly employs arson against military, logistical and administrative targets to degrade resources and to impose repair and security costs on occupying forces. [source,  source, source] 
• Insider exploitation: Atesh especially leverages sympathisers inside opposition structures like the Russian military, to access information, facilities and vulnerabilities. [source]
• Small unit raids: According to analyses by the Estonian International Centre for Defense and Security, Atesh operates in small, flexible units to conduct small-unit raids. [source]
• Ambushes: The group uses ambush tactics to strike occupiers opportunistically, as documented by the International Centre for Defense and Security. [source]
• Intelligence gathering and dissemination: A core function of Atesh is collecting tactical intelligence and passing it to Ukraine’s Defence Forces to support operational planning and strikes. [source] 

4.4 Personnel Numbers 

Personnel figures for Atesh are difficult to verify. In February 2023, the organisation stated on its Telegram channel that it had reached 2,000 agents within the Russian Armed Forces and the National Guard. The month previous, they claimed they reached the mark of 250 Atesh agents within the PMC Wagner. On the other hand, a February 2024 Center for European Analysis interview with Atesh operatives reported that the group, at the time, had about 1800 informants, agents, and activists. Additionally, as participation is fragmented and highly decentralised, with individuals contributing in varying ways, estimates of total figures can vary considerably. Assuming the average of the publicised figures are somewhat accurate, the number is likely to have grown since their reporting in accordance with patterns of growth over the years. [source, source, source, source] 

5.0 The Future 

Based on growth patterns since 2022 and trends involving other groups like Atesh, we expect the organization to continue expanding in scale, sophistication, reach, and influence. The movement’s decentralised structure makes it resilient to infiltration and crackdowns, and the recruitment of Russian military insiders gives Atesh a unique operational advantage. Furthermore, Moscow, for its part, is likely to continue—if not increase—surveillance and countermeasures, to include efforts to penetrate the group with human sources, demanding continued vigilance in OPSEC by the group’s leaders. [source] 

6.0 Conclusion 

Atesh has grown from small, scattered groups to a formidable resistance movement, challenging Russia both physically and psychologically. Through sabotage, intelligence operations and the recruitment of insiders, Atesh has demonstrated real impact on the rear areas of Russian forces. The determination of Atesh and groups alike is unwavering. If Russia continues its aggression in Ukraine, it is highly likely that resistance movements will continue to rise.