Grey Dynamics published a report on 02 February regarding the recent advance of Rwandan-backed M23 rebels in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. We offered several analyses regarding M23’s capabilities and intentions for the following month. In this postmortem assessment of our analysis, we examine the accuracy of our key judgments and dissect how effective our sourcing was at painting a comprehensive picture of the rapidly evolving threat landscape. 

Our analysis contained the following key judgements:

1. KJ-1: M23 rebels are likely to advance within the vicinity of Bukavu in the next 72 hours.
2. KJ-2: A foundation has been laid for the DRC to formally declare war against Rwanda in the next 72 hours, though Kinshasa’s immediate plans and intentions remain unclear.
3. KJ-3: M23’s seizure of Goma, and the expected resulting prolonged violence, will likely worsen existing food insecurity.  

1 Statement on Analysis for KJ-1:

Our statement that M23 rebels would advance within the immediate vicinity of Bukavu within 72 hours of the publication of this report held mostly true. The usage of the term “in vicinity of” deliberately left room for common sense interpretation by the reader. 

By 5 February (approximately 72 hours post report publication), M23 units had captured Nyabibwe, a strategically critical location located 30 miles north of Bukavu. The speed at which rebels advanced past Goma southwards generally conformed with our understanding of the prevailing threat landscape. 

However, while the advance of rebel forces confirmed our understanding of M23’s capabilities at combating FARDC troops, we did not account for the pause in fighting on 3 February after M23’s leadership called a “unilateral ceasefire.” [source] [source] The advance on Bukavu only resumed on 11 February. 

1.1 Known and Unknown Variables

Our analysis would have benefited from a more geostrategic focus, for example, incorporation of the available statements by Burundian, South African and Tanzania leadership leading up to the summit on 8 February. 

Assessing the impact these may have had on the decision of M23 leadership to unilaterally declare a ceasefire was beyond the scope of the report. Even then, it is not immediately clear that EAC or SADC leadership had any direct effect on the decision making process in M23’s leadership chain. 

2. Statement on Analysis for KJ-2:

Our analysis that the DRC had laid a foundation for a formal declaration of war, though accurate, was ultimately based on the fluidity of the situation as it evolved and a need to consider all plausible, high-impact scenarios. Our assessment was largely based on the situational severity of the capture of Goma, the DRC’s second most critical city. We assumed that such a major, pivotal event could catalyze Tshisekedi to issue a formal declaration since an effective state of war already exists in practice between Rwanda and the DRC. 

Though Kinshasa did not take advantage of the laid groundwork for a declaration of war, and it is still a possible scenario, we believe the probability of such a development is progressively decreasing, even though recent peace talks between Tshisekedi and Kagame in Doha failed to produce any substantive agreements. To that point, we note the recent flurry of peace talks starting in Doha reported on 29 March. [source]

2.1 Known and Unknown Variables

That being said, there are several unknown variables that were beyond the scope of our consideration. 

1. First, Tshisekedi’s agitated rhetoric during his reelection campaign may have been a play on latent nationalistic sentiments among his base. His private, personal sentiments may not align fully with his public statements. 
2. Second, Tshisekedi and other DRC officials, particularly in the military establishment, may be cognizant of the relative inadequacy of FARDC troops compared to RDF troops. Where the RDF are generally considered highly capable and professional, Tshisekedi is aware that an open and direct confrontation with the RDF would lead to significant loss of territory and therefore damage his political capital. 
3. We did not have access to any reporting on the internal discussions between the DRC and African Union, SADC, US or other regional stakeholders. As such, we are unable to assess if the DRC is under an external mandate to not directly engage Rwanda in a state of war. 

Ultimately, our analysis on this front suffered from the availability of international open source reporting on the intentions of both Tshisekedi’s government and its external stakeholders. The rapidity of the unfolding events precluded us from more effectively leveraging our information network to include discussions about the intentions of Tshisekedi’s government in the scope of the report.

3 Statement on Analysis for KJ-3:

1. Our assessment that M23’s seizure of food stores in Goma would greatly exacerbate overall food insecurity in the wider region ultimately proved correct. 
2. Local NGOs report an immediate and tangible rise in food prices in Goma following M23’s capture of the city. [source]
3. Basic food goods such as baking flour, beans and cooking oil were the most affected commodities. [source] 
4. Most notably, the price of bottled drinking water doubled across a week period. [source]
5. Similar episodes of food store looting were recorded in Bukavu on 18 February. [source]
6. Most recent data from Cluster Nutrition indicate 1.5% of children in sampled areas suffer from severe acute malnutrition while 10% suffer from moderate malnutrition. [source]
7. Health and nutritional centers around IDP camps near Goma were destroyed by advancing M23 units. [source]

4 Conclusion

Overall, though based purely on international open source information, our analysis accurately tracked with the events that unfolded. We acknowledge that access to reporting from in-country assets and dialog with experts in our network (had the pace of the evolving situation allowed) may have helped fine tune our observations. Grey Dynamics products, including this one, provide links to all sources in the interest of transparency. This postmortem on our analysis reflects the company’s commitment to improving internal processes and research methodology to continually improve the standards of our analysis.