China’s International Communication Centres (ICCs) are media institutions that operate under the Central Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). They are established by municipalities across the country and use the resources of larger state media, such as China Daily or Xinhua News Agency for their operations.
ICCs are part of the broad strategy of the CCP to shape global narratives, silence dissent, and project pro-Beijing messaging. The establishment of 100 centres across China since 2018 marks a systematic effort to centralise and amplify China’s propaganda apparatus. The aim is to create a “strategic communication system with Chinese characteristics,” as stated by CPP General Secretary Xi Jinping. [source]
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1 Historical Expansion
The ICC system was established in 2018 after Xi Jinping directed the innovation of China’s approach towards foreign messaging. The earliest provincial-level ICC was established in Chongqing in mid-2018, following approval from the local Chongqing CCP Propaganda Department. This led to the creation of the Chongqing International Communication Center by the Chongqing Daily Newspaper Group. [source, source]
In May 2021, Xi Jinping called for the establishment of a “strategic communication system with Chinese characteristics” during a Politburo study session. The expansion of ICCs significantly increased after 2023, as most were created in response to directives from central CCP authorities aimed at improving China’s international communication capabilities.
The reach and sophistication of ICCs keep expanding, with some offices using artificial intelligence (AI) to generate content. Additionally, Beijing’s efforts expanded globally, with liaison offices and media partnerships in Australia, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Cambodia, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Guyana, Hungary, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Panama, Peru, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, Uzbekistan, and other countries. [source]
The number of ICCs is growing steadily. 2024 alone saw an addition of 45 new centers. One of the most recent expansions was seen in September 2024 through the launch of the Tibet International Communication Center in Lhasa, Tibet Autonomous Region, shaping the global perspective on Tibet in China’s favor and suppressing information on issues of concern to human rights watchers. [source, source]
The evolution of ICCs marks Beijing’s ambitions to shift from monolithic state media to a decentralized yet tightly controlled network capable of micro-targeting audiences.
2 Organization and Objectives
ICCs are generally established under the guidance of local propaganda departments. They work within a framework set by the CCP and local government. Implementation is often carried out by major local media organizations, which serve as the operational backbone for these centers.
Most ICCs maintain accounts across popular social media platforms to promote their content. They typically feature a “main brand” that represents their primary identity, alongside smaller auxiliary brands that may focus on specific themes or audiences. For instance, the iChongqing brand serves as the main brand for the Chongqing International Communication Center, but it may also operate under other names for different content. [source]
Well-resourced ICCs often provide content in multiple languages to reach a broader audience and utilise dedicated mobile applications and websites in languages other than English. Additionally, some ICCs have sub-centers throughout their jurisdictions and establish liaison offices with media organizations in foreign countries to enhance their outreach and collaboration.
Collaboration and resource sharing are also significant aspects of ICC operations as multiple ICCs and state media can work together on common targets. Advanced ICCs can function as fusion centers that integrate resources from various jurisdictions, allowing for coordinated communication efforts across different regions.
2.1 Targeted Messaging
China’s ICCs target their messaging to specific regional, cultural, and political audiences. ICCs can be roughly divided into:
- Provincial ICCs: Focus on localized narratives such as promoting economic partnerships or countering separatist sentiments in Taiwan. Examples include Tianjin International Communication Center (established in June 2024) and Hebei’s Great Wall International Communication Center (established in January 2024).
- Thematic ICCs: Target more sensitive geopolitical issues, leveraging partnerships with large Chinese state companies. For instance, they promote narratives of “ethnic harmony” as seen in the Tibet-based ICC. [source, source, source]
3 Modus Operandi
The CCP blends both overt and covert tactics to promote its messaging. One significant strategy involves social media manipulation, where numerous unmarked accounts on platforms such as TikTok, YouTube, and Facebook actively promote pro-Beijing content. For instance, the Fujian International Communication Center operates covert accounts like “Two Tea Eggs,” specifically targeting Taiwan’s government and highlighting Taiwanese individuals who express support for Beijing. This tactic seeks to create a sense of a grassroots movement in support for China’s ambitions. [source, source]
Another crucial element of the CCP’s strategy is collaborating with foreign influencers and media outlets. By partnering with journalists and media organizations worldwide, the CCP expands its content-sharing agreements. These collaborations create an illusion of organic coverage, allowing the CCP to shape narratives that align with its interests while countering negative portrayals in Western media.
Furthermore, ICC messaging has increasingly used AI and digital tools. AI can generate optimized content that aligns with party messaging; for example, content based on speeches by Xi Jinping. The integration of AI not only enhances the scalability of propaganda efforts but also allows for rapid production of content tailored to specific audiences. [source, source]
3.1 Global Impact
Beijing has invested billions of dollars to create an information ecosystem that allows PRC propaganda and disinformation to gain traction and dominate the narrative. The growing capabilities of its ICCs allow China to project its soft power beyond its borders.
In Africa, China establishes training programs for journalists and enters into content partnerships, such as with Kenya’s Nation Media Group. The goal is favorable coverage of Chinese investments and silencing critiques of debt-trap diplomacy or labor abuses. [source, source]
China also expanded its media influence in the West. In 2015, the Chinese company CEFC obtained a stake in Czech Empresa Media, leading to the disappearance of negative coverage of China. In 2019, Italian state-run news agency ANSA signed a memorandum of understanding with Xinhua, translating its content into Italian and running dozens of its stories daily. Later in 2020, Twitter (now X) removed over 20,000 pro-Chinese accounts for spreading disinformation. [source, source]
According to a report by the US Department of State, The PRC’s approach towards shaping information narratives consists of five mutually reinforcing elements:
- Leveraging propaganda and censorship
- Promoting digital authoritarianism
- Exploiting international organizations and bilateral partnerships
- Pairing cooptation and pressure
- Exercising control of Chinese-language media
Domestically, the volume of official PRC content in the international Chinese-speaking environment puts pro-Beijing narratives into reporting that the PRC does not directly control. Journalists widely use PRC state media content due its availability and low cost. [source]
4 Challenges
Despite its successes, China also faces challenges in its global media outreach. A primary issue for ICCs is the lack of professional talent, making it difficult for them to attract and retain skilled personnel. Data limitations and funding issues further exacerbate these hurdles, as many ICCs struggle with inadequate financial support and lack access to critical information necessary for effective communication strategies. Many centers encounter translation difficulties when attempting to convey local developments to foreign audiences, leading to potential disconnects. Also, the uniformity of social media account names makes them vulnerable to identification and blocking by other governments. [source, source]
5 Conclusion
China’s ICCs present an intentional national media effort to influence global narratives in its favor. While sharing Beijing’s perspective on the world contributes to a diverse media landscape, these centers are often a tool of state propaganda. They blend localized messaging, technological innovation, and covert influence operations to try to shape hearts and minds throughout the world.
While their effectiveness varies by region, and despite facing challenges, China views this as a long-term project and investments in ICCs are likely to continue, with stronger integration of AI. The proliferation of ICCs marks the CCP’s attempt to shape global media narratives in pursuit of its geopolitical ambitions.
