Executive Summary

Russia and Belarus are increasingly employing low-level airborne tools along NATO’s eastern flank. Russian balloons as normalized grey-zone shaping tools, exploit the absence of a coherent below-Article-5 response architecture. NATO’s eastern members remain unprepared to counter these activities in the near term. This is likely driving emerging demand for hybrid-focused capabilities rather than immediate escalation.

Since late 2025, repeated balloon incursions, drone airspace violations, and other ambiguous airborne activities affecting Lithuania, Poland, and neighboring states have been widely securitized by affected governments despite denials of state intent from Minsk and Moscow. Responses to date have been ad hoc, civilian-led, and largely reactive. This exposes gaps between conventional deterrence postures and the requirements of persistent hybrid pressure. 

NATO and the EU have emphasized sanctions, coordination, and preparedness over escalation. This signals tacit acceptance of these actions as non-kinetic strategic pressure rather than a casus belli. In the near term, this dynamic is likely to persist, incentivizing procurement, ISR, and R&D focused on integrated grey-zone defense rather than traditional force deployments.