Executive Summary 

Cases of Russian Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) jamming and spoofing operations* in the Baltic region have increased drastically since 2024 despite weak mitigation efforts. These interferences jeopardise maritime and civil aviation safety and are closely linked to Russia’s ongoing hybrid war against Europe. Given the lack of urgency and coordination of EU-level mitigation efforts, we do not expect to see a de-escalation at this time. Additionally, GNSS interference is shaping operator behaviour rather than causing direct system-failure, likely offering Moscow opportunities to identify and observe backup procedures and resilience protocols.

*Russian blocking of GNSS signals and transmission of false signals are electronic warfare tactics frequently observed in the Baltic region since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The disruption affects drones, aircraft, and ships specifically in the neighbouring areas of Russia’s borders.

Key Judgements 

KJ-1. Russia’s GNSS interference in the Baltic region—part of its broader hybrid pressure on NATO’s eastern flank—deliberately and persistently poses a threat to civil aviation and maritime safety. 

1. Finland’s Coast Guard on 31 October 2025 reported constant disturbances to satellite navigation signals in the Baltic Sea since April and, in late October, tankers spoofing their location data to cover up visits to Russia. [source]
2. Finnish and Estonian representatives at the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) assembly on 3 October 2025 blamed Russia for jamming GPS navigation devices in the Baltic airspace. The Lithuanian representative reported hundreds of GNSS interferences every week, circa 20 times higher than in 2024. [source]
3. A research team from GPSPatron and Gdynia Maritime University from June to October 2025 recorded GNSS jamming and spoofing in Baltic waters near Gdańsk, Poland, resulting in false position data or making it no longer possible to track or receive satellite signals. [source]

KJ-2. Ongoing mitigation efforts lack tangible action and urgency, enabling continuation—if not escalation—of Moscow’s operations, and we are not seeing indications that European governments are planning to address the situation more aggressively.

1. On 9 September 2025, the European Commission announced the implementation of a new anti-spoofing authentication service, encrypted signals for governmental use, and a planned monitoring service to detect and localise interference starting 2026. [source] 
2. UN agencies ICAO, the ITU and IMO in March 2025 issued a joint-statement addressing security risks of aviation and maritime navigation. By summer 2025, the ITU reviewed member states complaints and the ICAO threatened to refer Russia to its Assembly for potential violations of international law. [source]
3. NATO’s Secretary General Mark Rutte has addressed Russian jamming and spoofing operations through cooperation and recommendations with Committees of Resilience and Aviation, Planning Groups and the aviation sector, according to the European Policy Centre in November 2025. [source]

KJ-3. GNSS interference is shaping operator behavior rather than causing direct system-failure, likely offering Moscow opportunities to identify and observe backup procedures and resilience protocols.

1. In December 2025, the Swedish Maritime Administration Sjöfartsverket emplaced and activated the first of ten completely ground-based radio answering beacons on Öland. [source]
2. GPS Innovation Alliance Executive Director Lisa Dyer in mid-December 2025 noted that industry groups are developing multi-band satellite systems and low Earth orbit positioning technologies that operate in various frequencies to offer alternative navigation signals in case of GPS jamming. [source]
3. On 24 July 2025, EUSPA, the operational service provider for Galileo, launched the Open Service – Navigation Message Authentication (OSNMA), an authentication mechanism that lets Open Service users verify the authenticity of navigation data. [source]

Statement on Analysis 

We have moderate-to-high confidence in our assessments given the wealth of publicly available reporting on the mass recordings of incidents of Russian GNSS jamming and spoofing across the Baltic region and NATO’s Eastern Flank. However, given the extent and frequency of ongoing GNSS jamming and spoofing operations, this report assumes that all GNSS jamming and spoofing are completely intentional. While spoofing is a deliberate action, jamming can happen accidentally and operate indiscriminately when executed intentionally. As interference does not respect the boundaries of conflict zones, civil and commercial operations in these regions may be affected as a consequence. 

It is also assumed that GNSS interference shaping operator behaviour brings alternative procedures to light, allowing for Russian insight into action and response mechanisms. However, this form of intelligence exploitation is not documented nor is it proven to be a Russian deliberate strategy. A possible development that could change the trajectory of this situation and, thus, our analysis would be any effort by NATO, the EU, or the UN to more forcefully address Moscow’s behaviour.

Intelligence Cut-Off Date: 24 December 2025