Executive Summary 

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are increasing their use of drones in the Sudan conflict to target critical infrastructure in population centres controlled by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). Their unmanned airframes have expanded the range and scope of their kinetic operations from South Darfur into Port Sudan and other cities, with satellite images confirming the presence of long-range drones in rebel-controlled territory. 

Private military contractors, especially from Colombia and the Sahel, continue to support the RSF in Nyala and Al Fasher through training missions in a covert capacity. Around 18,000 contractors from West Africa and the Arab Maghreb are reportedly operating in Sudan, while an estimated 100 Colombian operators are entering Sudan through the Libyan border.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is highly likely to continue its covert support for the RSF through proxy groups and arms transfers. Among the indicators available in the report are Dubai weapons seized from rebel forces and suspicious patterns of cargo planes that were flagged by the United Nations.  

Key Judgments

KJ-1. The RSF are highly likely to develop emerging but limited capacities in drone warfare during the next months.

1. “Hemedti” Dagalo forces launched an unprecedented series of suicide drone attacks that struck Port Sudan in May 2025. [source]
2. Sudanese rebels expanded the range of action of their drones beyond the White Nile and the Nile River into Omdurman and El Fasher in April 2025. [source]
3. Maxxar satellite images posted by Reuters in January 2025 show at least three drones and the construction of hangars by rebel forces in South Dafur. [source]
4. From late 2024 to the beginning of June 2025, the rebel side conducted 50 drone attacks against critical infrastructure in the government enclave. [source]

KJ-2 Private military contractors involved in the conflict show no indication of reducing their activity in support of the RSF.

1. Colombian contractors previously deployed to Sudan confirmed on the record that training operations for rebel forces are still taking place in Nyala and Al Fasher. [source]
2. According to a Wall Street Journal investigation from last year, more than a hundred Colombian former soldiers are serving as private contractors in Sudan. [source]
3. British open-source outlet website Bellingcat determined Colombian contractors were entering Sudan through the Libyan desert less than six months ago. [source]  
4. European military reports cited by British media in September 2023 estimate 18,000 contractors from Chad, Niger, Mali, Nigeria and Libya are in Sudan. [source]

KJ-3 UAE covert activity against the SAF is highly likely to continue through proxy militias and armed groups. 

1. SAF retreated from the Libya-Sudan border in June 2025 following an attack by the UAE-backed Khalifa Haftar forces. [source]
2. Chinese GB50A guided bombs and 155mm AH-4 howitzers re-exported by Dubai were seized from the rebels following a government assault on Khartoum. [source]
3. UN experts documented a consistent pattern of cargo flights from the UA that were reported as a “possible covert operation.” [source]

Statement on Analysis

Grey Dynamics analysis used publicly available information obtained from credible international organisations and open-source experts. These range from on-the-record eyewitness accounts to leaked reports of humanitarian agencies. Furthermore, satellite imagery and documented events cross-reference and confirm the credibility of our sources. Likewise, multiple independent investigations and triangulated combat footage support the ongoing involvement of private contractors on behalf of the rebel side. Despite the high quality of the sourced data, some reports involving covert operations or proxy involvement by external actors are based on indirect evidence. Among the other weak corners of our analysis are the developing situation in the Middle East, as peer-on-peer escalation of the conflict between Iran and Israel could shift the power balance in the immediate region.