The purpose of this Grey Dynamics African Intelligence report is to forecast in the short term 6-12 months (April 2020-April 2021), a predictive analysis of the conflict in Kenya with Al-Shabaab. COVID-19 factors will be briefly included in the assessment. OSINT and HUMINT have been used for this report.
Key Judgments
KJ-1. Al-Shabaab (AS) is likely to conduct terror attacks in Kenya between April 2020-April 2021, synonymous with an increase in attacks in 2020. Tactics used will likely include IEDs/VIEDs, mortars, ambushes, and targeted killings.
KJ-2. AS targets will almost certainly be focused on Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF) forces. Civilians will also highly likely be a target for terror attacks, and this will most likely be in the Garissa and Lamu county region. Equal intent will focus on US/UK targets military and civilian to undermine cooperation
KJ-3. KDF increased airpower is a significant factor that will likely increase operation success against AS. Vulnerabilities in security raise the risk of AS raids and ambushes. These raids limit the counterattack success of KDF airpower because of the short time frame for response. An increase in capacity for sophisticated operations against permanent fortified bases is a possibility.
KJ-4. KDF is increasing military and counter-terrorism (CT) capacity which will likely undermine AS success in the country. Sustained operations may likely result in AS maneuvering to a defensive front in Somalia and shift KDF ops to deny accessibility into Kenya from the Gedo region. It is possible AMISOM/AFRICOM personnel may be reduced during the COVID-19 pandemic, limiting operation capacity.
METT-TC
| MISSION | The purpose of the operation is to neutralize AS threat to Kenya. This will be conducted in Kenya as well as across the border in Somalia where the group is primarily located. Protecting military assets and civilians’ main priority. |
| ENEMY | Estimated AS fighters range from 5,000-10,000 fighters. Well-equipped for guerilla warfare and increased sophistication evident. Intent to carry out attacks on Kenyan military, civilians, with equal intent on US/UK military and civilians where possible. |
| TERRAIN AND WEATHER | Main ops focused on rural areas along the Somalia border region. Rural terrain reduces the ease of access, opportunities for IED attacks and ambushes. Urban attacks are evident in public spaces for terrorism exposure. |
| TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT | 24,120 active KDF personnel, with a budget of $1,097,000,000 (FY2018/2019). Increased aircraft capability to target AS in addition to AFRICOM air support and training. |
| TIME AVAILABLE | According to recent attacks, there is a small gap for an opportunity in reaction time when countering AS offensives. Guerrilla tactics limit the effectiveness of response times. |
| CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS | Locals in the northeast are allegedly aware of impending attacks, HUMINT capacity is required to increase actionable intelligence. There are mixed attitudes to KDF and AMISOM, some positive and negative. AFRICOM was perceived negatively by many due to civilian casualties. Locals pose a threat of providing intelligence to AS or AS fighters in the midst. |
Background: Al-Shabaab
AFRICOM assessments on Al-Shabaab approximate personnel numbers at 5,000-7,000. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) assesses that there are possibly up to 10,000 fighters. While based mainly in Somalia, the group has conducted successful terror attacks in Kenya since 2011 Operation Linda Nchi by KDF forces. At least 15 attacks have been conducted in Kenya 2020. Cross-border attacks have been reduced over the last 2 years by 71%. Operations continue amid the COVID-19 outbreak and present issues for KDF forces. AS is likely to continue terror attacks in the country and cross-border ops. This is being limited by US AFRICOM joint operations and will likely be further affected by KDF’s increase in airstrike and reconnaissance capabilities. KDF is receiving specialist training that will also increase CT capacity. These developments are limiting the accessibility for AS bases in Kenya and shifting the battleground to a limited cross-border front.
Increasing Al-Shabaab Operational Capabilities
The January 5th Manda Bay attack displays an increased sophistication of operational capacity in terms of logistical, organizational, and intelligence gathering to conduct the attack. AS killed one US army personnel and two DoD contractors as well as nine reported Kenyan soldiers in the Manda Bay attack. Armed with rifles and explosives, approximately a dozen militants neutralized a UAV (Beechcraft King Air 350), along with damaging a mix of other surveillance aircraft, medical evacuation helicopters, and a fuel storage area with rocket-propelled grenades and assaulted the base. The US/KDF defense mechanism was found lacking, US Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA) caught by surprise took an hour to respond from Camp Lejeune, while many KDF hid in the grass. In response, approximately 100 troops from the 101st Airborne Division as part of the East Africa Response Force (EARF) have since been deployed to boost security. Weakness in perimeter security is apparent and the attack was conducted to avoid well-established US routine patrol patterns. According to the New York Times, US investigators are considering the possibility of Kenyan staff aiding AS.
Burdening KDF
Continuous attacks indicate AS cross-border capabilities are not severely reduced by CT ops. The January 2nd bus attack in Lamu County killed 3 people. January 7th killed 4 students and a teacher, Garissa. January 10th attack on a police station in Mandera county. 13th January killed 3 teachers in Garissa. Tactics used have forced KDF to increase patrols in the northeast region, creating opportunities for ambushes. Personal weapons such as AKs and pistols allow evasion from surveillance networks in the border region, facilitating opportunities to attack civilians and the military.
Al-Shabaab’s Destabilisation Efforts
AS increasing information gathering capacities and limiting response times of KDF. Locals recruited by AScan likely be a source of operational intelligence for the group (spotters). Since 2014, 42 teachers have been killed in the northeast region in the Garissa and Lamu counties. This has resulted in the government closing schools and an exodus of teachers. This has the desired effect of destabilizing the order in the region. Many locals have returned to pastoral life, easing the recruitment for AS. Telecommunication masts have been targeted in the region, cutting off communication with security forces limits the response times to intercept. The success of these efforts is limited when compared to efforts by the KDF to increase their own CT capacity.
KDF Capabilities
KDF presents capable military assets for CT operations which it is expanding. 24,120 active KDF personnel, with a budget of $1,097,000,000 (FY2018/2019), set to increase. Capable small arms including M4A1, FN SCAR, IMI Negev, and H&K G3. Vikers Mk3 (73) main battle tank equipped with 105mm gun L-7. Panhard AML (72) armored vehicles, and L-16 81mm mortars. Strong conventional warfare capability, exceeding Tanzania and Ethiopia combined. Conventional warfare is relatively not effective against insurgency and terrorism which includes IEDs/VEIDs, suicide bombings, and ambushes of a guerrilla warfare perspective.
Kenya officially takes new C-27J Spartans into service. Six new MD 530F armed scout helicopters entered service in January from the US. H3 Aerospace is to sell three-armed Cessna aircraft to Kenya, which can be fitted with laser-guided missile systems. An increased air strike capacity is a threat to the group, effective against rural ops as if intercepted leaves militants and equipment exposed in rural terrain. AS has been reportedly seeking to acquire Chinese-made, Man-Portable Air-Defence Systems (MANPADS) to counter this threat. The Battle of El Adde in 2016 can be compared in terms of the ease of militants breaching barriers. Increased air force capacity is an advantage for counter ops against such attacks but requires measures to ensure swift response and early warning for frontline troops through reconnaissance. Airpower effectiveness is reduced in urban areas, growing international speculation on civilian casualties may mitigate AFRICOM’s willingness to respond in current operations but unlikely.
KDF Counterterrorism Cooperation
KDF is benefiting from the specialist training from military allies, joint operations from AFRICOM have severely affected AS. Kenyan Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF-K), will receive FBI training in Virginia, United States for at least 3 dozen Kenyan personnel, increasing counter-terror capabilities. The viability of specialist training of KDF is a significant component in fighting AS, current conventional warfare capabilities are mitigated with AS tactics mentioned. Kenyan special forces such as the Recce Squad provide efficient CT capabilities but situating units in potential target bases may likely decrease the counter-attack vulnerabilities observed in the Manda Bay attack. British Army Training Unit in Kenya (BATUK) has suspended training operations. This facility provides training for KDF forces, the absence and reduces the capacity for KDF specialist training.
US AFRICOM has stated they will continue operations as AS shows intent to continue operations. AFRICOM has conducted six airstrikes since April 2nd, one killing senior AS leader Yusuf Jiis. Joint KDF and US operations have significantly impacted AS, targeting infrastructure and leadership, reducing the expertise of experienced combat leaders, reducing the overall capability to organize sophisticated attacks. March 19th raid in Boni forest, Lamu county neutralized the last alleged AS base in Kenya. It is still possible that there are terror cells within Kenya and after regrouping in the Gedo region a new base is likely if not already existent. A 5 day AS conference in an undisclosed location showed frustration amid pressure from US airstrikes and internal disputes.
Lead Inspector General Report for East Africa And North and West Africa Counterterrorism Operations to US Congress map displays disclosed airstrikes targeting AS and ISIS militants and infrastructure.
Vulnerabilities of KDF
The response by KDF during the Manda Bay attack showed vulnerabilities in troop morale and quality of training. JTTF-K training can improve ISTAR capabilities which is vital for operational intelligence. Communications in rural areas can be targeted as noted in previous AS attacks on telecommunications masts. During the El Adde attack KDF were unable to inform the closest Ethiopian base because radio frequencies were not linked. While the neighbouring Somalian base was deserted indicating prior knowledge of attack and vulnerabilities in cooperation. Coordination with foreign countries are positive in regards to joint operations with AFRICOM as they target AS assets in Somalia, limiting AS capabilities. Tensions with the Federal Government of Somalia undermine cooperation to counter AS, lack of cooperation facilitates vulnerabilities AS can target when conducting cross border ops. AMISOM troops are not enough to contain the threat in Somalia because of AS capability to avoid detection, militants can still cross into Kenya and cooperation is required to counter this dilemma.
KDF Victory Scenario:
By using increased air assets of KDF and joint operations with AFRICOM and AMISOM CT operations become more effective in the Kenya/Somalia border region. Due to increased impact of CT operations, AS suffers significantly reduced operational capacity in the border region and attempts to regroup in Somalia in a defensive maneuver. KDF tactics change from elimination in Kenya to infiltration prevention from Somalia. Pre-emptive CT operations and border patrols increase. This scenario is highly likely as AS anti-aircraft capacity is limited with the significant increase of air strike and reconnaissance capabilities, combined with new CT training.
Cooperation Deterioration Scenario:
AMISOM and AFRICOM commitment is reduced amid regional disputes between Somalia/Kenya and COVID-19. AS now has the opportunity to regroup and resurge, with an increased logistical framework and organisational capacity. AS strength in Somalia spills out into Kenya, which is now more vulnerable to cross border attacks and attacks within the country. Kenyan air force effectiveness reduced by man-portable air-defense systems acquired by AS, facilitating more forward bases in Kenya. This scenario is a realistic probability due to tensions with Somalia and opportunities to regroup. However, AFRICOM cooperation is not under immediate threat which will limit AS success through joint ops.
Relative Stalemate Scenario:
CT Operations against the group continue with mixed success contrasting AS attacks launched against government and allied forces have existing relative success. Attacks on military and civilians continue, internal disputes are resolved, and framework is reorganised. KDF continues to have success against the group but attacks targeting Kenya are not avoided completely. North-east region witnesses an increase in attacks as AS is limited to the region. This scenario is likely as while KDF is having success in CT ops, AS still has the capacity to sustain terror attacks.
Al-Shabaab: General Prediction:
While AS is botching many operations, they are also having relative success. Increased pressure is resulting in sophistication of operations, further pressure will likely increase desperation and more indiscriminate attacks to promote instability likely. In the short term, the nature of the conflict is unlikely to change, changes in circumstances are minimal and the group still has the capacity to sustain conflict in the next 6-12 months. From the reconstructed scenarios, it is likely that some elements from each scenario will occur rather than a play-by-play actualization.
