Executive Summary

China’s expanding lunar programme signals a clear ambition beyond scientific inquiry, positioning the nation as a major space power. As the first nation to land anything on the dark side of the moon and retrieve samples, China has already established a lead in lunar exploration. From the Chang’e-8 mission to its planned International Lunar Research Station (ILRS) in partnership with Russia, China’s space strategy signals a push to acquire strategic resources. This particularly concerns helium-3 and rare earth elements. China aims to secure future energy and technological dominance, while also strengthening its geopolitical position against the longstanding US space leadership. The collaboration with Russia, underscored by plans for a lunar nuclear power plant, strengthens this rival space bloc. Moreover, it presents significant challenges to the US, especially given existing US policy constraints on cooperation with China. Operationalising lunar resources could confer substantial advantages in economic and information markets. Not only by altering global power dynamics, but also by potentially enabling breakthroughs like affordable quantum computing.

Key Judgements 

KJ-1. The planned China-Russia International Lunar Research Station (ILRS), powered by a lunar nuclear plant, challenges US leadership in space exploration. China’s initiative establishes a rival bloc and highlights differing approaches to international cooperation and lunar resource governance.

a. Announced in April 2025, China is considering building a nuclear plant on the Moon to power the ILRS. [source]

b. In 2024, Russia’s space agency, Roscosmos, announced plans with the China National Space Administration (CNSA) to build a lunar nuclear reactor by 2035 to power the ILRS. Formal support from Beijing has not been confirmed. [source][source][source]

c. The ILRS, envisioned as a scalable, autonomous lunar base located near the Moon’s unexplored south pole, is designed to support diverse scientific and technological missions. Attracting 17 partner countries, the installment challenges the US-led Artemis programme. [source][source]

KJ-2. China’s lunar programme is primarily driven by strategic resource acquisition and geopolitical objectives. This makes it a likely key component of Beijing’s planned future dominance of energy and information markets.

d. Cooperation between Roscosmos and CNSA has increased since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in 2022. Chinese analysts note China can help alleviate pressure on Russia from Western sanctions on space technology by assisting in satellite launches, lunar exploration, and space stations. [source]

a. China aims to become a major space power and land astronauts on the Moon by 2030. The planned Chang’e-8 mission for 2028 is intended to lay the groundwork for constructing a permanent, manned lunar base. [source]

b. Evidence suggests China’s focus on the far side of the Moon and its Chang’e missions is primarily aimed at strategic resource extraction. It also serves, however, as advantageous diplomatic and military positioning. [source]

c. China’s discovery of the rare-helium-3 isotope-containing mineral Changesite-(Y) from the Chang’e-5 sample provides an attractive option for fuelling nuclear fusion reactors. According to the University of Wisconsin’s Fusion Technology Institute, the potential energy output from 40 grams of helium-3 is equivalent to 5,000 tons of coal. [source, source, source]

d. Ouyang Ziyuan, director of China’s Moon exploration programme, has explicitly stated since 2002 that the Moon could serve as a new and tremendous supplier of energy and resources. These acquisitions are crucial for sustainable human development. Therefore, Ziyuan claims that the first nation to conquer this area will benefit first. [source]

KJ-3. China’s leveraging of lunar resources like helium-3 and rare earth elements has potential applications in advanced technologies such as quantum computing. This may shift global power dynamics if the US fails to adapt its space strategy. 

a. If successfully mined and used in nuclear fusion, Helium-3 could become a significant lunar export for global power generation and advanced technological operations such as quantum computing. [source]

b. Experts say it is likely that if China has enough lunar helium-3, it could efficiently cool technology required to operationalise quantum computing to the necessary temperature of 80 millikelvin. [source] 

c. Moreover, the affordable operationalisation of quantum sensing, computing, and communication could potentially break any code or encryption. This would give China a significant information advantage. [source][source] 

d. Lunar soil also contains rare earth elements and critical minerals essential for electronics, renewable energy, and defence systems. Control over these resources could therefore reduce China’s reliance on terrestrial supply chains and bolster its technological dominance. [source]

e. According to the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), China already monopolises heavy rare earth processing. This is critical for key US defence technologies such as F-35 fighter jets, submarines, Tomahawk missiles, and radar systems, among others. [source]

Statement on Analysis

This analysis draws on recent news articles, government reports, and expert commentary, providing a multi-faceted assessment of China’s lunar ambitions and their broader implications. The diversity of sources, including commentary from key figures, lends credibility to the reported intentions and therefore our confidence is moderately high. However, many claims, particularly about China’s current lunar mining capabilities or future applications like helium-3–powered quantum computing, are based on expert speculation rather than confirmed data, indicating a gap between stated goals and verified progress. The analysis also assumes that extracting and utilising lunar resources like helium-3 and rare earth elements at scale is feasible, though this remains technologically and economically uncertain. Moreover, the West has no satellite coverage of the dark side of the Moon, making verification difficult.  Future developments in fusion technology, lunar mining, international space governance, or shifts in national space policies could therefore significantly impact these projections.