Europe stands at a crossroads, confronted by a security environment that has arguably never been more complex or unpredictable since the end of the Cold War. In the first months of the Trump administration, signals emerged of an unsteady transatlantic relationship, particularly regarding NATO. Washington’s warmer stance toward Moscow, combined with more antagonistic economic policies toward its European allies, has created doubts over the durability of the partnership that underpinned Europe’s security architecture for decades after World War II. All these developments pose a direct challenge to Europe: either fortify its defence posture or risk folding under the weight of global shifts.
Simultaneously, Russia’s war in Ukraine has proven a watershed moment, showcasing a new blend of conventional, proxy, and influence operations on NATO’s very doorstep. The shock of this war has exposed weaknesses in Europe’s deterrence posture and laid bare the reality that major conflict on European soil is not just a distant scenario. A recent report on Europe’s future defence capacity argued that the Continent could need an additional 300,000 troops and a massive increase in annual defence spending – on the order of at least €250 billion – to independently deter or repel a large-scale Russian attack in the absence of U.S. forces. While that figure is substantial and politically sensitive, these estimates highlight the scale of resources required. Against this backdrop, a new Commission on the National Defence Strategy (NDS) emphasised that changing balances of power, emerging technologies, and alliance complexities demand fresh thinking. This paper argues that Europe is indeed facing a defining moment: either fortify its collective defence posture or risk folding under global pressures. [Source, source]
Images Sourced From: USNI, Spc. Trevor Wilson, NATO, Elena Baladelli
The Challenge: An Evolving Threat Matrix
Russia and the Eastern Flank
For the majority of Europeans, the most urgent concern is Russia’s renewed assertiveness. Its full-scale military operations in Ukraine – dating back to 2022 – signalled that the Kremlin was prepared to discard post–Cold War norms for the sake of territorial revisionism. Although the Russian army suffered major setbacks early in the campaign, Moscow has since mobilised additional personnel, retooled its military-industrial base, and leaned on partners like Iran for drone technologies. Despite losses, Russia’s armed forces may now have greater manpower than before the war, and they possess a reservoir of battlefield experience that Western states have not had to acquire at such scale in decades. [Source]
The Commission on the NDS referred to Russia as a “chronic threat,” emphasising that its challenge will likely persist and evolve, rather than dissolve in the near term. In other words, Russia is learning from its missteps, refining tactics, testing new technologies, and modernising older Soviet gear. Whether or not the war in Ukraine reaches a negotiated settlement, NATO’s eastern flank – and by extension the European Union (EU) – must plan for a Russia that remains militarily formidable, capable of launching further aggression as it sees fit. [Source]
Washington’s Uncertain Commitment
Decades of relative peace and prosperity in Europe were built on the premise of a robust U.S. presence through NATO. Yet recent shifts in U.S. foreign policy, including “America First” rhetoric and a friendlier tone toward Russia under the Trump administration, undermined transatlantic solidarity. Even as subsequent U.S. administrations attempted to reassure Europe, persistent tensions over burden-sharing endure. Many U.S. analysts argue that China’s growing strategic weight in the Indo-Pacific will demand ever more American focus and resources in that theatre. If the United States pivots to the Pacific in a crisis, can Europe adequately secure its own neighbourhood? [Source]
Given this uncertain long-term commitment, European leaders are forced to question the old assumption: if something major breaks in Europe, Washington will inevitably handle it. This assumption may no longer hold. European policymakers now face a stark choice: dramatically increase military readiness and unify defence capabilities, or risk being caught off guard in a moment of crisis when U.S. bandwidth is consumed elsewhere.
Rising Geopolitical Complexity
While Russia remains the central threat to European territory, it is not the only actor reconfiguring the global chessboard. China’s long-range strategic ambitions increasingly brush up against European interests, particularly around technology, cybersecurity, and strategic infrastructure like ports. Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative extends to Africa, the Middle East, and the Arctic, creating potential friction points. Moreover, cyberspace presents an open arena for malign interference, espionage, and infrastructure sabotage by state or proxy actors. [Source]
The Commission on the NDS highlights a reality that applies equally to the EU: conflict in the 21st century may emerge anywhere, with global knock-on effects that transcend neat geographic boundaries. The notion that European security concerns stop at the eastern flank is now obsolete. Rather, the Continent must anticipate that conflicts abroad – from the Indo-Pacific to North Africa – can swiftly turn into crises affecting energy supplies, communications, trade, or diplomatic stability. [Source]
The Imperative: Updating Capabilities and Doctrine
Rethinking Force Posture and Sizing
Europe historically structured its defence posture around the premise of U.S. leadership in NATO, including the presence of some 100,000 U.S. troops in Europe and the potential for another 200,000 or more to surge in a crisis. If that surge arrives more slowly – or at a smaller scale – European forces would need to fill a massive gap, requiring an additional 300,000 troops to reach comparable combat power. Such forces must prioritise mechanised and armoured units, rapid deployment capabilities, and advanced command-and-control systems. [Source]
Of course, the EU and its non-EU neighbours within NATO collectively possess around 1.5 million active-duty troops on paper. But these are split across nearly 30 national armies that differ in doctrine, readiness, and procurement standards. Turning this patchwork into a coordinated force, able to operate under a single command and with consistent levels of operational readiness, is no trivial task. Moreover, the strategic enablers that amplify combat power – logistics, ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), aerial refuelling, and space-based assets – still rely heavily on U.S. support. [Source, source]
Achieving Technological and Industrial Parity
Success in modern warfare depends on more than raw numbers of troops and tanks. It hinges on technological advantages, from AI-driven battle management software to hypersonic weapons and advanced drones. Europe has strong research-and-development potential, but national protectionism, a fragmented procurement market, and bureaucratic drag have stalled progress in areas like collaborative drone swarms, advanced air defences, and next-generation fighter projects.
In the Commission on the NDS, the call for integrating “all elements of national power” resonates with Europe’s need to unify industrial policies and technology initiatives. By pooling resources across the EU, launching larger combined orders, and incentivising agile contracting, European defence industries could compete at a global scale, aligning more closely with the demands of high-intensity conflict. The alternative is to cede the technological edge to rivals – especially Russia and China – who are actively experimenting with cutting-edge platforms. [Source]
Addressing Hybrid, Cyber, and Influence Operations
Modern conflicts increasingly feature “grey zone” tactics – cyberattacks, espionage, and disinformation – designed to paralyse societies from within. Russia has excelled in these areas, employing disinformation campaigns to undermine election outcomes and deepen social rifts inside European countries. Such tactics require a fraction of the cost of conventional deployments but can yield disproportionately large gains by disrupting political unity. [Source]
A robust European defence posture must devote attention to cybersecurity, digital literacy, public-private partnerships for critical infrastructure, and layered defences against propaganda. This is where synergy among governments, technology companies, and civil-society groups becomes vital. A purely military response is insufficient; Europe needs a cohesive strategy that safeguards information channels and fosters resilience across the population. [Source]
Reforming Europe’s Defence Architecture
Streamlined Decision-Making and Joint Command
The single largest obstacle to an effective European defence remains fragmentation. Multiple states within the EU, plus non-EU European NATO members like the UK and Norway, oversee separate procurement methods, operate different systems, and maintain varying levels of readiness. NATO’s command structure, led by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, traditionally relies on heavy U.S. leadership. If that leadership wanes, European states must coordinate far more closely among themselves.
For years, discussions of an “EU army” generated political backlash in multiple capitals. Yet more pragmatic variants of deeper cooperation – such as Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund – are already under way. The Commission on the NDS emphasises that effective integration comes from well-defined authorities and agile processes, not ad hoc arrangements. Europe thus must pursue legally binding commitments on collective defence projects, cross-national exercises, and combined R&D. [Source, source]
Defence Industrial Base and Burden-Sharing
Another critical challenge is how to scale up Europe’s defence industrial base (DIB). Disorganised procurement – where countries place small, uncoordinated orders – yields high unit costs and restricted production capacity. By contrast, large pooled orders significantly reduce per-unit expenses while improving interoperability. Several EU nations have announced defence budget increases, yet the estimated €250 billion annual hike required for robust deterrence is orders of magnitude above current planning. [Source]
Equally urgent is preventing free-riding, where certain nations with smaller militaries benefit from the collective umbrella without contributing adequately. The Commission on the NDS flagged similar risks, noting that alliances only work when all participants share burdens proportionally. Reconciling the tension between national sovereignty and collective defence is tough, but forging new mechanisms to ensure compliance, possibly using weighted voting or financial incentives, could help. [Source]
Personnel, Training, and Readiness
Even if Europe boosts defence spending and invests in technology, success depends on well-trained and motivated personnel. Mechanised units and advanced aircraft are useless if the operators, logisticians, and support staff are ill-prepared for joint missions. National militaries that rely on antiquated conscription models or limited-service professionals might find that pivoting to high-tech warfare is a cultural and structural challenge. [5]
Europe must also address readiness shortfalls. Many armies continue to grapple with outdated infrastructure, insufficient stocks of ammunition, and logistical bottlenecks. The Commission on the NDS underscores that readiness is not just about more funding – it is about leadership, strategic discipline, and streamlined processes for maintenance and deployment. If a crisis erupts, slow mobilisation could render large parts of Europe’s hardware irrelevant before it even arrives at the battlefield. [Source, source]
Leveraging Alliances and Partnerships
NATO’s Enduring Value
Despite concerns about U.S. consistency, NATO remains Europe’s strongest and most experienced security framework. If Europe can bolster its own contributions while the United States focuses more of its defence priorities in the Indo-Pacific, NATO’s integrated chain of command and decades of operational experience still offer enormous value. [Source]
Equally important is bridging NATO and EU structures. Because the EU brings economic heft, industrial coordination, and a legislative mechanism, while NATO provides operational doctrine and standardisation, synergy between them is essential. The Commission on the NDS suggested broadening alliance frameworks to keep pace with adversaries who employ holistic strategies, from cyber infiltration to conventional power projection. [Source]
Broadening the Network
Security partnerships no longer hinge solely on state militaries. As technology evolves at breakneck speed in the private sector, new forms of collaboration matter more than ever. Companies that develop cutting-edge AI can shift the balance in modern battle management and logistics far more than a conventional arms manufacturer might. Consequently, Europe needs strong public-private partnerships, offering flexible contracting and clear security vetting so that commercial breakthroughs in space or software can rapidly transition to the defence realm.
Additionally, forging deeper ties with like-minded nations – Japan, South Korea, Australia – extends Europe’s strategic horizon. If Russia and China draw closer to each other (and to allies like Iran or North Korea), Europe stands to gain by cultivating relationships that reinforce democratic norms and open collaboration on defence R&D. [Source]
The Role of Ukraine
The war in Ukraine has proven both a cautionary tale and a crucible of innovation. On one hand, Russia’s decision to invade demonstrates the fragility of the rules-based order on Europe’s eastern edge. On the other hand, Ukraine’s effective use of Western-supplied weapons spotlights the importance of advanced systems, real-time intelligence sharing, and a population willing to defend its territory. [Source]
If the United States were to limit or alter its assistance, European nations would need to fill that vacuum, potentially requiring them to do everything from providing satellite intelligence to scaling artillery-ammunition production. More broadly, direct support to Ukraine’s armed forces serves as a live demonstration: rapidly shipping equipment, sustaining supply lines, integrating new technologies, and absorbing lessons from actual combat can all shape Europe’s modernisation drive. [Source]
Winning the Home Front: Public Opinion and Political Will
Costs Versus Benefits
European citizens remain sharply divided over how much to spend on defence and whether a massive buildup is even necessary. Some fear fueling an arms race with Russia. Others see increased defence investments as essential to preserving democracy and averting future conflict. The Commission on the NDS notes that public understanding is critical: unless populations understand the severity of external threats, governments cannot sustainably raise defence budgets. [Source]
Leaders must thus communicate that proactive defence investment is not about stoking militarism but ensuring stability, safeguarding economic well-being, and upholding shared values. The same advanced defence sector that yields new platforms and munitions can also spark broader scientific progress, industrial jobs, and cross-border technology collaboration. Ultimately, the alternative – failing to build credible deterrence – risks a far costlier conflict that could undermine peace across the entire continent. [Source]
Political Unity: Difficult but Necessary
National interests, electoral politics, and longstanding historical sensitivities frequently complicate European defence integration. While states near Russia’s border – Poland, the Baltic states – push for stronger deterrence, countries further west may prefer to avoid higher defence budgets. Likewise, questions of arms exports and the ethics of advanced military systems can trigger heated debates in European parliaments.
Despite the difficulties, a unified approach is crucial. Fragmented defence planning will raise costs and reduce interoperability. The Commission on the NDS warns that political bickering wastes precious time when adversaries are modernising their forces and forging alliances of convenience. If forging continent-wide consensus in the EU proves too slow, coalitions of willing countries may proceed to coordinate industrial orders and capabilities, inviting others to join later. [Source]
Countering Disinformation and Internal Division
Russia’s use of disinformation campaigns underscores how external actors exploit Europe’s domestic divisions. Media manipulation, cyber intrusions, and covert funding for extremist groups are all part of a grey zone strategy to weaken Europe’s unity. The Commission on the NDS points out that these low-cost tools can yield high-impact results. [Source, source]
The best countermeasures include transparent fact-checking platforms, tighter oversight of foreign money in political processes, and a broad-based effort to enhance digital literacy. Governments alone cannot shoulder this. Civil-society organisations, schools, and the private sector – particularly social-media giants – must align on responsible information governance. Europe’s response must be as agile and holistic as the threats themselves.
Call to Action
The battle lines of Europe’s security environment are drawn across multiple frontiers: Russia’s conventional and hybrid threats in the east, potential flashpoints with rising powers like China, and the uncertain level of U.S. support in the coming years. The
Commission on the NDS underscores a stark reality: absent major reforms, Europe’s security apparatus may struggle to handle crises alone. [Source]
Fortifying Europe’s defence posture requires doubling down on advanced technology, forging new partnerships with the private sector, expanding the defence industrial base, and – perhaps hardest of all – building a durable political consensus that greater spending is a worthwhile investment in peace. At the same time, NATO’s underlying value endures; a stronger European pillar within NATO can complement rather than supplant the alliance, ensuring that Washington is not the sole provider of deterrence. [Source]
While calls for 300,000 additional troops and a €250 billion annual boost in defence spending may seem drastic, they arise from genuine concerns about what it will take to deter or defeat a large-scale invasion if U.S. forces cannot respond at prior levels. Admittedly, money alone will not solve fragmentation. That requires unity of effort: deeper EU-NATO coordination, streamlined procurement, interoperable doctrines, and a public convinced that fortifying the Continent is far cheaper – financially and morally – than folding under aggression. [Source]
In the end, Europe’s defining moment is about strategic choices, not just budgets or troop numbers. By investing in defence innovation, forging genuine collaboration among states, and securing robust domestic backing, Europe can ensure the stability that has underwritten its prosperity for generations. The alternative – failing to modernise and unify – risks ceding the initiative to adversaries unafraid to use force or meddle in Europe’s affairs. Faced with this volatile new landscape, Europe can either fortify its defences or risk folding under the weight of shifting global power dynamics. The time for decisive action is now.
