German Security Paradox: The U.S. Army’s Role in Europe

A Guest Author Feature

by Curtis L. Fox*

Introduction

Despite Western Europe’s ascension as a major economic player from the destruction of World War II, the United States Army has maintained a permanent presence in Europe, the anchor of American strategic overwatch. While some European economies, especially Germany, are robust enough to provide a national—and even continental—defence, the US Army was and remains the major counterbalance to the massive tank armies and nuclear arsenal of the Soviet Union and its modern Russian successor. This is due, in part, to Germany’s paradoxical economic partnership with its most formidable strategic competitor—Russia itself which complicates German Security.

Following the Battle of Stalingrad, the Red Army gained the initiative and rapidly pushed back the invading Germans. By 1945, the German Wehrmacht, which had not only been technologically superior but was also perhaps the world’s most professional fighting force, had been utterly shattered by Soviet ground forces that exceeded 12.5 million men in the European theater alone.¹ Under the command of Georgy Zhukov, the Red Army’s massive numbers were organized into over 500 highly mobile infantry divisions and another 60 tank divisions. Although a shocking number of Red Army divisions were entirely destroyed, the Soviet Union raised over 700 divisions over the course of the war.²

In comparison, the U.S. Army had 1.9 million soldiers in Europe organized into 62 divisions.³

The Red Army steamrolled its way across Eastern Europe, crushing all organized resistance, and capturing Berlin. Zhukov’s forces soon linked up with their Anglo-American counterparts who were simultaneously invading Germany from the west.⁴

Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin soon crushed Western notions of self-determination and imposed authoritarian socialism in each of these newly conquered territories. Countries like Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania—which would later be forced to participate in the Russian-led Warsaw Pact in 1955—would now serve as buffer states and satellites.⁵

The Truman Administration read the tea leaves regarding Stalin’s vision for Western Europe and rapidly adopted a grand strategy focused on containing further Communist expansion.⁶

The United States’ first step in containment was to undermine the allure of communism. After World War II, the devasted economies of Europe offered few opportunities for employment (not to mention housing, clean water, and food), giving rise to pro-socialist populist movements across the continent. The United States proposed to rebuild and stabilize Europe through its own economic alliance program based on free trade.⁷

The Breton-Woods Conference established a new global trade system. All currencies would be convertible to the US Dollar, and the American consumer market—the only consumer market that remained intact after the War—was opened for imports from abroad.⁸ The Marshall Plan channeled $13.3 billion of foreign aid (more than 5.2% of US GDP in 1948) into European infrastructure.⁹

The World Bank was established to channel investment capital into the Third World. The International Monetary Fund was established to support global liquidity and convertibility to the US Dollar. The US Navy—which, by 1945, was larger than the combined navies of the planet—would patrol the global commons.¹⁰ Devastated European economies would not only be able to export their way back to affluence but they would no longer need overseas colonies to resource raw materials or navies to protect mutually exclusive supply chains. The United States had facilitated the integration of a global economy out of the ashes of the old imperial trade system.

While Washington was successful in using economics to create a global alliance system, the U.S. Army was responsible for ensuring that Soviet ground forces would not seize West Berlin (which was under joint US/UK/French occupation) or attempt a breakout into West Germany (formally known of the Federal Republic of Germany).¹¹ The United States and the Soviet Union soon demobilized the bulk of their standing forces (which were both extremely expensive to maintain in their 1945 volume), but an irreconcilable strategic standoff ensued. 

Winston Churchill proclaimed, “From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent.”¹²

In the wake of the Soviet collapse, the U.S. Army continued its role in strategic overwatch in Europe. The Army’s regular presence in Europe included a Forward Command Post for V Corps, a division headquarters, and three brigade combat teams.¹³

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the United States has surged another 20,000 service members into theater, totaling over 100,000 service members across Europe. US European Command now includes a full corps headquarters, a second division headquarters, two additional brigade combat teams, as well as additional Air Force fighter squadrons, a naval Carrier Strike Group, Amphibious Readiness Group, and a Marine Expeditionary Force.¹⁴

Some populist voices in Washington are asking whether this is an appropriate use of American military resources. The European Union has a population of over 448 million people—far larger than the United States.¹⁵ Why do these advanced economies, especially Germany, require American hard power to deter Russian aggression? 

The answer: German security is a paradox.

The Strategic Predicament of Germany

Germany sits on the North European Plain, a highly fertile stretch of land that offers a plethora of rivers and natural waterways. These rivers all run north into the North and Baltic Seas, meaning all of Germany’s waterways are interconnected. Shipping goods by water is a tenth the price of shipping goods by rail (which, in turn, is far cheaper than road or air).¹⁶

Additionally, Germany’s latitude ensures a potent winter, which kills many of the insects and diseases that would frustrate agricultural production in a warmer environment like the tropics. Germany leveraged these advantages into agricultural prosperity. Agricultural surplus rapidly translated into urbanization, specialization in skills and labor, working capital, and industrialization.¹⁷ Germany became the leading industrial power in Europe after unification under Prince Otto von Bismarck in 1871. 

The world soon discovered that a unified Germany had the capacity to dominate continental Europe—provided it can obtain the raw materials needed to feed its massive industrial base.

But Germany has another, more unfortunate quirk. Germany’s location on the North European Plain means that its populace is not protected by robust natural barriers. Julius Caesar was the first of many invaders to cross an army over the Rhine, demonstrating to marauding Germanic tribes that the great river was a trivial impediment to the might of a well-trained army. Germany is naturally wealthy and lacks any degree of insulation from its regional rivals.¹⁸

Geography also imposes challenges on Russia. Russia has enormous tracts of farmland, but the soil is of very poor quality and there is a short growing season. Russia is also not blessed with inland waterways in the same way that Germany is. The Volga River, which is small in comparison to the great commercial waterways like the Yangtze, the Rhine, or the Mississippi, functions as a superhighway in Russia because it is the only river on which the Russians can move goods. The Volga also freezes for much of the year, forcing engineers to use explosives to break up the ice so that trade with the outside world doesn’t cease entirely during the winter season.¹⁹

The low productivity of the farmland and high transport costs have always frustrated Russian capital creation and urbanization. In addition to the lack of working capital, the vast expanses of open steppe and tundra, as well as the brutal winter, have always frustrated the construction of efficient roads, railways, and other infrastructure.²⁰ But Russia does have vast resources—both in raw materials and labor. 

Germany, therefore, features prominently in Russian strategic thinking as a financier, economic partner, and military threat. And Russia features prominently in German strategic thinking as a source of raw materials and complimentary heavy industries.²¹

This relationship has profound implications for the NATO alliance, through which Washington projects stabilizing hard power into Europe.

The Prussian Inheritance

The Kingdom of Prussia emerged from the decaying Holy Roman Empire in 1701. Though the Holy Roman Empire would survive until French Emperor Napoleon delivered the coup de grâce in 1806, the Kingdom of Prussia remained preeminent amongst a confederacy of Germanic principalities.²²

Prussian leaders realized they were surrounded by enemies with no natural defenses against attack. The only way for Prussia to survive was to simply be better—better centralized planning, better education, better infrastructure, better technology, better army. The Prussians became the driving force behind German unification, which was realized in 1871.²³ A united Germany was more secure and more powerful than independent principalities. 

The Prussians also created the General Staff corps: a professional fraternity of military officers that were selected through exhaustive training regimes, rigorous education requirements, and meritocratic advancement.²⁴ These professional staff officers rotated between line and staff duties as they advanced through different echelons of command over the course of their careers, developing common methods and practices. 

These staff officers oversaw all administration and logistics for Prussian commanders at the regimental, division, corps, and army levels. The Chief of Staff of a Prussian formation also had the right to submit in writing any objections he had to orders issued by a commanding officer. This was effectively a request for review by an officer in the next echelon of command, and was an extremely effective check on incompetence. Only the most stubborn and prideful commanders dared to ignore warnings by their Chief of Staff. 

As a result of these innovations, Prussia (and, by proxy, the other German principalities) fielded the most skilled, professional, and disciplined armies in Europe.²⁵ The Army of the Second French Empire, which was also well-known for promoting its officers meritocratically, was nevertheless crushed by the Prussians in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, highlighting the enormous strategic advantage of the Prussian Staff Officer corps.

Many of these Prussian practices live on today in German culture and politics. German children are taught from a young age to collaborate. German schools require students to meet higher standards. Germany uses standardized testing to channel the best students into an elite university system, while offering universal access to high quality trade schools and apprenticeships for the rest of the bell curve. German politics are highly stable, favor long-term planning, prioritize cultural stability, and shun populism. Similarly, Germany’s industrial infrastructure—power grid, roads and highways, railroads, and ports—is centrally planned by state-appointed experts. And, of course, all of these factors are enhanced by the innate industriousness of the German people themselves. 

German Unification Heralds a New Strategic Paradigm in Europe

Prince Otto von Bismark unified Germany in 1871, and the resulting political stability created the conditions for rapid population growth and grand economic expansion.²⁶ Soon, the German economy was too vast and sophisticated to survive on the country’s own indigenous resources. 

If Germany had been located on the Atlantic, it might have developed a sophisticated navy and an array of overseas colonies to feed its industries—similar to Great Britain, France, Spain, and Portugal. Geography, however, throttled Germany’s access to the Atlantic, relegating the country to a second-tier naval power and, thus, limiting colonial trade. For Berlin to feed its growing population and industries, it had to purchase raw materials at a premium from neighboring empires (primarily Russia, Great Britain, or France)—or conquer nearby territories.

This confluence of factors reinforced Germany’s uniqueness in Europe. From 1871 forward, France and Britain saw this rising economic power to the east as an immense threat. This was largely what led to the system of alliances that were in place at the beginning of World War I. Great Britain, Russia, and France were each individually outclassed by Germany, so they formed the Triple Entente alliance.²⁷ To even the odds, Germany allied itself with Austria-Hungary, the remnants of the Hapsburg Empire. 

Germany Requires Eastern European War Materials

Germany’s strategy in World War I revolved around the Schlieffen Plan. At the instant war was declared, Germany would leverage forward deployed divisions, a carefully planned network of railroads, and specially stockpiled supplies to conduct a lightning invasion of France through neutral Belgium. To the east, Germany would fight a defensive war against Russia, inviting the Tzar to hurl his soldiers against a fortified network of trenches until the Imperial Russian Army exhausted itself.²⁸

As the war dragged on Germany struggled with scarcity at home and a general lack of sufficient war materials (especially coal), but the High Command began to suspect that Russia was too impotent and politically fractious to continue the war. Tzar Nicholas II abdicated the throne in February 1917, and a weak provisional government led by Alexander Kerensky tried to hold the country together until full elections could be arranged.²⁹ Kerensky foolishly attempted to sustain Russia’s participation in the War, despite overwhelming domestic opposition, creating an opportunity for another regime change. The German government put Vladimir Lenin, who had been living in exile in Germany, on a train to St. Petersburg. He would intrigue against the Kerensky government and lead the Bolsheviks in a hard coup in October and November of 1917.³⁰

Russian soldiers soon abandoned their trenches and fortifications in huge numbers. The Bolshevik Revolution removed Russia from the complex equation of World War I, which was exactly what Germany needed. However, negotiations for peace were frustrated by the diplomatic amateurism of Leon Trotsky. 

The Germans had dramatically expanded their territorial dominance over the course of the War (over 150,000 square kilometers in Eastern Europe), catastrophically eroding territorial gains made by the Russian Empire over the last two centuries.³¹ Realizing that conceding to Germany’s harsh terms for peace would irreparably damage the nascent Bolshevik-Communist regime, Trotsky chose chicanery instead of good faith negotiation. Trotsky simply walked into the negotiating room, declared to the German generals and diplomats that Russia’s war was over, and then he left.³²

The German High Command was as insulted as they were shocked. Germany desired produce from the vast farmlands of Eastern Europe and coal from her mines. The German High Command hoped that these surpluses would both feed their army and fuel an offensive on the Western Front.³³

Trotsky actually believed his tactic had worked until 16 February 1918, when General Carl Hoffmann, the Central Powers Chief of Staff on the Eastern Front, notified him that the war would resume. 53 German divisions advanced against near-vacant Russian trenches, capturing modern day Poland (which the Germans had never recognized as an independent state), Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Finland, Ukraine, and Belarus. Russia would now be forced to renounce claims to all of these territories, which had previously been possessions of the Russian Empire.³⁴

Lenin used all of his powers of persuasion (and coercion) to force the Communist Central Committee to sign Germany’s new peace treaty—the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk—before the Imperial German Army crushed his workers revolution in its cradle.

The newly captured grain supplies of Eastern Europe (especially Ukraine) enabled Germany’s last offensive of the war. Following the carefully laid plans of military mastermind Erich Ludendorff, First Quartermaster General of the Great General Staff, Germany transferred 30 divisions to the Western Front for the 1918 Spring Offensive—a final push to deliver a knockout blow to France. This rapid influx of experienced German troops and fresh supplies to the Western Front nearly broke the Allies. Germany came within a gasp of capturing Paris. The German advance was only blunted by an emergency deployment of all French and British reserves against the salient.³⁵

Even with the new grain supplies, however, the German people were slowly starving to death. Germany did not have the resources to continue the war—especially not with a potent British naval blockade still in place. By the summer of 1918, ships from the United States were offloading 200,000 soldiers a month into France, and fresh American divisions were taking to the trenches on the Western Front. The German High Command realized that the war was lost and sued for peace.³⁶

After Adolf Hitler’s elevation to the office of the Chancellor in 1933, he rapidly set about rebuilding the German economy and, soon after, the war machine. 

In a similar paradox to World War I, Germany required grain, steel, aluminum, coal, and oil—all things that Russia and its satellites could provide. Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin needed hard currency to build out the USSR’s foreign exchange reserves, and he was willing to trade Russian raw materials in exchange. This created a marriage of convenience that allowed Berlin to build the Wehrmacht, Luftwaffe, and Kriegsmarine (Army, Air Force, and Navy). The panzers that rolled into Poland in 1939 were all made with Russian steel, as were the panzers that broke France in 1940, and the panzers that raced into the USSR in 1941. 

After World War II, Germany was occupied by the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union.³⁷ The Western Allies consolidated their occupation zones into what became known as West Germany (officially the Federated German Republic), which was formed into a parliamentary democracy and integrated into the American-led NATO alliance. 

The innate nature of German productivity soon made West Germany an engine of European economic growth and, amidst the chaos of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the citizens of the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) implemented a reunification with their countrymen in the West.³⁸ The German economy was soon the largest in Europe and one of the largest in the world. In 2022, Germany was the fourth largest economy in the world by GDP following the United States, China, and Japan.³⁹

Preconditions of a Golden Era

The fall of Communism began a golden era for Germany and it would emerge as the de facto leader of the European Union. This golden era required a few important pre-conditions and German Chancellors prioritized sustaining these pre-conditions in their respective foreign policies. 

First, the American-backed global trade system and convertibility to the US Dollar ensured Germany could build extraordinary prosperity through an export driven industrial economy and feed its supply chains with raw materials that were unavailable in the pre-WWII colonial trade system. In 2018, German exports reached 47.9% as a percentage of GDP.⁴⁰

Second, the European Union provided a system of tariffs and regulatory barriers that throttled imports into Europe, especially from highly productive industrialized economies like the United States and Japan.⁴¹ For instance, German tariffs on foreign automobiles are 10% compared to American tariffs of 2.5%.⁴² The European Union also provided Germany with a captive market under a single currency for its high-quality industrial exports (at the expense of weaker producers like Italy, Greece, and Spain).

Third, the United States via NATO provides security overwatch for Germany. NATO was designed to keep the Soviet Union at bay, but the alliance also prevented rival European powers from making war on one another, as they regularly had since the fall of the Roman Empire. While the Soviet Union threatened to devour Western Europe, Germany maintained a credible contribution to NATO. However, when Communism collapsed in 1991, Germany reduced its defense expenditures (as a percentage of GDP) and refocused national investment into things like infrastructure, healthcare, and a national pension system.⁴³

Germany has not met NATO’s mandatory military spending target of 2% GDP since the Soviet collapse in 1991.⁴⁴ Despite considerable American pressure, Chancellor Merkel ignored the NATO requirement of spending 2% GDP on defense for the duration of her 16-year term. A Rand corporation study conducted in 2016 found that Germany could not field a single armored brigade, even within its own borders, without cannibalizing equipment and personnel from other units.⁴⁵ At present, the Bundeswehr is in a moribund condition.

And finally, the German golden era relied on access to cheap Russian energy. The German economic marriage of convenience with Russia was as much alive in 2021 as it was in 1939. 

However, during the decade leading up to the current Russo-Ukrainian War, the shoe was on the other foot. German purchases of Russian commodities underwrote the restoration of the Russian Armed Forces. Under twin $700 billion state procurement programs (GPV 2020 and GPV 2027), Russia invested in its decrepit defense industries and slowly began to restore their capacity to build modern tanks, fighter planes, warships, and munitions.⁴⁶

In 2008, Russian planners set the goal for GPV 2020 to increase the “modern” share of Russian armaments to 30% by 2015 and to 70% by 2020.⁴⁷ In 2017, Russia’s Ministry of Defense estimated that “modern” armaments accounted for 79% of Strategic Rocket Forces, 45% of Ground Forces, 53% of the Navy, and 73% of Aerospace Forces.⁴⁸ GPV 2020 is now closed, and GPV 2027 is building on these successes. 

To enable Germany to more easily purchase Russian natural gas, the Nord Stream pipeline was constructed in 2011. It runs under the surface of the Baltic Sea, from the Russian city of Vyborg to the German city of Lubmin, and delivers natural gas to German industries at a discount by circumventing middlemen like Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine. The Nord Stream 2 pipeline was completed in 2021. It runs from Ust-Luga near the border of Estonia, along the floor of the Baltic Sea near its sister pipeline, and rises from the depths in Lubmin, Germany. The Nord Stream pipelines were owned by Gazprom (51% stake), the Russian state-owned natural gas conglomerate.⁴⁹

So complete was Germany’s dedication to this relationship that former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder was appointed as Chairman of the Board for the Nord Stream AG, a consortium to build and operate Nord Stream, as well as Chairman of the Board at Rosneft, the Russian state-owned oil conglomerate. He was also offered, but ultimately declined, a position on the board at Gazprom, the Russian state-owned natural gas conglomerate.⁵⁰

Russia Invades Ukraine

On 24 February 2022, Russia officially invaded Ukraine in what Vladimir Putin called a “Special Military Operation”. Newly elected Chancellor Olaf Scholz was confronted with the fact that Russia was hostile to the West, that Germany was 100% dependent on decisions made in Washington and London for its defense, and that Russia had rebuilt its war machine with German money.⁵¹

Germany withheld opening permission of Nord Stream II, in reprisal to Russia’s annexation of the separatist Donetsk and Luhansk Republics in Ukraine (part of Moscow’s pre-war aims).⁵² A mysterious explosion soon took the first Nord Stream offline in September 2022 (possibly attributable to the Ukrainian SBU security service).⁵³

German inflation was extreme in 2022 and 2023 as Berlin sought new industrial partners but, oddly, Russia remained fat with oil and gas revenues.⁵⁴ German businesses (and the rest of Europe) were evading sanctions by buying Russian commodities from middlemen in Central Asia, the Balkans, Turkey, and India.⁵⁵ While this behavior decreases the potency of sanctions, the only alternative for these firms would be to turn the lights off and deindustrialize. 

German and Russian economic cooperation is so deeply entrenched that it is now very difficult to truly sever. 

Washington is treaty-bound to protect Germany and the rest of Europe from a monster of its own creation. Washington is also outraged by Berlin’s flagrant NATO treaty violations regarding defence spending and the poor condition of the Bundeswehr, but the German people are wary of their history. The Bundeswehr has been quietly but intentionally managed into institutional decline.⁵⁶

Before the Russo-Ukrainian War, Defense Minister Christine Lambrecht was supposed to keep the lights on—nothing more. Lambrecht was a longtime politico and, as a faithful party foot-soldier, she had earned her time in cabinet. However, she was entirely inexperienced in defence matters. Lambrecht was chosen to run the Ministry of Defense for a reason: Germany doesn’t want the institution to function “too” well.⁵⁷

German Rearmament: A Cause for Celebration or Dread?

Now that the Russians are on the warpath, Germany has shown some signs that it is taking national defense a little more seriously. In his famous Zeitenwende speech, Chancellor Olaf Scholz promised the public a €100 billion rearmament program in 2022 as a reaction to the Russo-Ukrainian War.⁵⁸ Scholz has also fired Christine Lambrecht, who was completely out of her depth in updating strategic policy or managing complex defense procurement programs.⁵⁹ She was replaced by Boris Pistorius. 

Interestingly, Pistorius was not an obvious candidate for Minister of Defense either. Like Lambrecht, he has no military experience. Pistorius’ job is to administer procurement (which creates jobs), fix underperforming programs, ensure that troops are retrained in basic skills, and placate concerned allies—all without building a real expeditionary capability or updating German strategic policy.⁶⁰ Pistorius will likely get pummeled in the press just like his predecessor Lambrecht because his decisions will seem equally tone-deaf.⁶¹

That’s the way Berlin wants it. 

With Pistorius’s promotion over more qualified candidates and the Bundestag already balking at long-term enhanced defense spending, it is clear that Germany’s commitment to defense modernization is temporary.⁶²

The German national defense establishment will continue to behave this way as long as the United States continues to underwrite their security through NATO. 

Alternatively, the United States could withdraw from its treaty commitments and pursue isolationism. This would mean withdrawing not only the U.S. Army’s additional forces deployed to deter Russian aggression since February 2022, but also the three brigade combat teams permanently stationed in Europe.⁶³ This is essentially the remnant U.S. Army contingent of a force that has protected Europe since the mass demobilization following World War II (US Senators would beg, borrow, and steal to restation any of those units in their home states). 

Without American strategic overwatch, Europe would be restored to the conditions of 1871. With the economic powerhouse of the North European Plain once again vulnerable (especially to predators like Moscow), Germany would finally be forced to restore its armed forces in a real way. Berlin’s economic relationship with Russia would also continue unabated, channeling capital through state-owned energy conglomerates Rosneft and Gazprom into the Russian Ministry of Defense. 

Germany is the industrial and financial heart of the European Union. So complete is its preeminence in European politics that the EU President and European Commission (cabinet) glance at the German Chancellor for policy guidance.⁶⁴

A unified and rearmed Germany has the power to dominate the continent—which means the rest of Europe would be forced to rearm as well. The power struggles and wholesale destruction nearly 100 years hither could once again become reality.

The U.S. Army has an important role in Europe—a role that extends far beyond merely deterring Russian aggression. The cost of permanently stationing heavy ground forces of the U.S. Army in Europe pales in comparison to the cost of another war between Europe’s great industrial powers. 

* Author Bio

Curtis L. Fox is the author of the recently published book Hybrid Warfare: The Russian Approach to Strategic Competition and Conventional Military Conflict. Despite being accepted to the graduate engineering program at Virginia Tech, Curtis chose to enlist in the Army, where he learned to speak Russian and won his Green Beret. After completing his time in service, Curtis studied at Georgetown University’s McDonough School of Business, earning a Master’s of Business Administration. He now works as an author, public speaker, and program manager/systems engineer. 

Disclaimer:

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 

References: 

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2. Thomas M Gregg, “The Red Army in World War II: Rifle Divisions & Brigade 1941-45”, 2020,  https://tmg110.tripod.com/RedA3.htm 
3. Maurice Matloff, “Chapter 15: The 90-Division Gamble”, History of the Army, https://history.army.mil/books/70-7_15.htm
4. “The Eastern Front”, National World War II Museum, https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/eastern-front
5. David Roll, George Marshall: Defender of the Republic (New York: Dutton Caliber, 2019), p. 420-445;
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7. David Roll, George Marshall: Defender of the Republic (New York: Dutton Caliber, 2019), p. 446-481;
8. “Bretton Woods World: Peter Zeihan”, posted by “Learn Geography”, YouTube video, 21 January 2024, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lIE6ut7gR84
9. David Roll, George Marshall: Defender of the Republic (New York: Dutton Caliber, 2019), p. 446-481;
10. “Deglobalization: The US Navy’s Withdrawal as Global Protector”, Peter Zeihan, posted by “Zeihan on Geopolitics”, 09 October 2023, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RZ0IUCMpgEE
11. James Stejskal, Special Forces Berlin: Clandestine Cold War Operations of the US Army’s Elite 1956-1990, (Havertown, PA, Casemate Publishers, 2017), p. 1-18; 
12. “Churchill Deliver’s Iron Curtain Speech”, Posted by “editorial staff of History.com”, https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/churchill-delivers-iron-curtain-speech
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14. Ibid.
15. “Facts and figures on life in the European Union Size and population”, EU Official Website, https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/key-facts-and-figures/life-eu_en
16. “No. 96—The German Rhine”, Zeihan on Geopolitics, https://zeihan.com/portfolio/no-96-the-german-rhine/ and No. 17—Cologne Germany”, Zeihan on Geopolitics, https://zeihan.com/portfolio/no-17-cologne-germany/;
17. “No. 80—Brandenburg Gate”, Zeihan on Geopolitics, https://zeihan.com/portfolio/no-80-brandenburg-gate/
18. “No. 19—Europe”, Zeihan on Geopolitics, https://zeihan.com/portfolio/no-19-europe/
19. “No. 26—Nizhny Novgorod, Russia”, Zeihan on Geopolitics, https://zeihan.com/portfolio/no-26-nizhny-novgorod-russia/
20. “No. 60—Red Square, Moscow”, Zeihan on Geopolitics, https://zeihan.com/portfolio/no-60-red-square-moscow/
21. “Germany: Domestic and Foreign Policy”, Zeihan on Geopolitics, https://zeihan.com/germany-domestic-and-foreign-policy/
22. Ron Petrarca, “Unification of Germany: Summary & Timeline”, https://study.com/learn/lesson/unification-of-germany-summary-timeline-when-was-germany-unified.html
23. “Germany from 1871 to 1917”, Britannica, updated 19 June 2024, https://www.britannica.com/place/Germany/Germany-from-1871-to-1918
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25. Oberst iG Christian Millotat – German Army, “Understanding the Prussian-German General Staff System”, Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College, p. 59-64, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA249255.pdf
26. “Germany from 1871 to 1917”, Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/place/Germany/Germany-from-1871-to-1918
27. Ibid.
28. Michael Billington, “The Schlieffen Plan: Definition, Debate, & Result”, https://study.com/learn/lesson/schlieffen-plan-ww1.html
29. “Russian Revolution: Russian history [1917]”, Britannica, updated 24 May 2024, https://www.britannica.com/event/Russian-Revolution
30. Ibid.
31. “Foreign Relations of the United States: 1918 The Conclusion of the Peace of Brest Litovsk—The Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk 1918”, Yale Law School Lillian Goldman Law Library, The Avalon Project, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/brest.asp
32. “Treaties of Brest-Litovsk”, updated 30 January 2024, https://www.history.com/topics/world-war-i/treaties-of-brest-litovsk
33. “Germany from 1871 to 1917”, Britannica, updated 19 June 2024, https://www.britannica.com/place/Germany/Germany-from-1871-to-1918
34. Randall Lesaffer, “The Peace of Brest-Litovsk (3 March 1918)”, Oxford Public International Law, https://opil.ouplaw.com/page/679
35. “Germany from 1871 to 1917”, Britannica, updated 19 June 2024, ttps://www.britannica.com/place/Germany/Germany-from-1871-to-1918
36. Ibid.
37. Tanya Baldwin, “Germany after WWII: Division, Reconstruction & Economy”, https://study.com/learn/lesson/germany-after-wwii.html
38. “German Reunification”, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Official Website, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_136311.htm
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40. “Germany Exports as a % of GDP (2010 – 2021, %)”, Global Data, https://www.globaldata.com/data-insights/macroeconomic/germany-exports-as-a-of-gdp/#:~:text=a%20%25%20of%20GDP-,Exports%20as%20a%20%25%20of%20GDP%20of%20Germany%20was%2038.9%25%20in,the%20year%202021%20at%2038.9%25.
41. “The Fruits of Protectionism: Made In Germany”, posted by “DW News”, YouTube video, video DW News, 01 December 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0Gg6y9v7LYQ
42. Felix Richter, “EU-US Automobile Trade a Lopsided Affair”, Statista, 23 July 2019, https://www.statista.com/chart/18771/passenger-car-trade-between-the-eu-and-the-united-states-in-2018/
43. “Germany Military Spending/Defense Budget 1960-2024”, MacroTrends, https://www.macrotrends.net/global-metrics/countries/DEU/germany/military-spending-defense-budget
44. Ibid.
45. Michael Shurkin, “The Abilities of the British, French, and German Armies to Generate and Sustain Armored Brigades in the Baltics”, Rand Corporation, 2016, p. 7-9,  https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1629.html
46. Curtis Fox, “Hybrid Warfare: The Russian Approach to Strategic Competition and Conventional Military Conflict” (n.p. 30Press, 15 December 2023) p. 126-166
47. Anton Lavrov, “Russian Military Reforms from Georgia to Syria”, Center for Strategic International Studies, November 2018, p. 24
48. Anton Lavrov, “Russian Military Reforms from Georgia to Syria”, Center for Strategic International Studies, November 2018, p. 25
49. “Who We Are” & “The Pipeline”, Nord Stream AG Official Website, https://www.nord-stream.com/about-us/
50. Katrin Bennhold, “The Former Chancellor Who Became Putin’s Man in Germany”, New York Times, 23 April 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/23/world/europe/schroder-germany-russia-gas-ukraine-war-energy.html
51. Curtis Fox, “Hybrid Warfare: The Russian Approach to Strategic Competition and Conventional Military Conflict”, (n.p. 30Press, 15 December 2023) p. 380-388
52. Sarah Marsh & Madeline Chambers, “Germany Freezes Nord Stream II Gas Project as Ukraine Crisis Deepens”, Reuters, 22 February 2022, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/germanys-scholz-halts-nord-stream-2-certification-2022-02-22/
53. “France’s Macron says still can’t attribute blame for Nord Stream attacks”, Reuters, 07 October 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/frances-macron-says-still-cant-attribute-blame-nordstream-attacks-2022-10-07/
54. “Germany Inflation Rate”, 5 Year window, https://tradingeconomics.com/germany/inflation-cpi
55. Guy Chazan, “Germany to crack down on companies evading Russia sanctions”, Financial Times, 23 February 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/6489d5a4-9c66-40be-bd3b-55b31e94542f
56. “A New Wave of German Strategic Defense Policy”, Zeihan on Geopolitics, 17 January 2023, https://zeihan.com/a-new-wave-of-german-strategic-defense-policy/
57. Ibid.
58. Angela Mehrer, “Turn of phrase: Germany’s Zeitenwende”, European Council of Foreign Relations, 15 August 2022, https://ecfr.eu/article/turn-of-phrase-germanys-zeitenwende/
59. Laura Pitel & Guy Chazan, “Olaf Scholz under pressure to find successor to Lambrecht as defence minister”, Financial Times, 16 January 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/99d6938d-9996-470f-8564-521aaba7fa08
60. Hans von der Burchard, “Germany’s new defense minister faces ‘ticking time bombs’ in his armed forces”, Politico, 25 February 2023,https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-defense-minister-boris-pistorius-army-forces-military/
61. “A New Wave of German Strategic Defense Policy”, Zeihan on Geopolitics, 17 January 2023, https://zeihan.com/a-new-wave-of-german-strategic-defense-policy/
62. Hans von der Burchard, “Germany’s new defense minister faces ‘ticking time bombs’ in his armed forces”, Politico, 25 February 2023,https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-defense-minister-boris-pistorius-army-forces-military/
63. US Department of Defense. Public Release: “FACT SHEET – U.S. Defense Contributions to Europe” https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3078056/fact-sheet-us-defense-contributions-to-europe/
64. Katya Adler, “Merkel legacy: EU’s queen with a tarnished crown”, BBC, 12 September 2021,https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-58498231