1.0 Introduction 

The Mistaʽarvim, or musta’ribeen, a Hebrew term meaning “those who become like Arabs” or “Arab pretenders,” are Israel’s network of undercover units trained to operate covertly through impersonation and disguise within Arab communities. The Mistaʽarvim are trained to dress, speak, and act like members of the local population, often immersing themselves in the activities of their opposition to carry out their missions. Integrated across the IDF, Border Police, and Israel Police, these formations specialise in disguise, intelligence-led counterterrorism, infiltration, and rapid interdiction operations. Often referred to as Israel’s “Death Squads,” the known active units include Yamas, Duvdevan, and Gideonim, alongside defunct units such as Samson and Rimon, with the earliest institutionalised formation being the Arab Section. [source, source]

2.0 History, Symbols, Patches and Mottos

2.1 History of Mista’arvim

Historically, Mista’arvim referred to Jews who assimilated into Arab society. After the 1492 expulsion from Spain, many Sephardic Jews who found refuge in the Arab world were themselves referred to as Mista’arvim when they joined long-established Jewish communities in Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen that had adopted local language, dress, and customs.   Over time, what began as describing cultural assimilation for identity gradually transformed into deliberate imitation for security and intelligence purposes — the modern meaning most closely associated with Mista’arvim. [source, source, source] 

The origins of the Mista’arvim trace back to British military operations during World War II. Facing growing threats from Nazi Germany and instability in the Middle East, the British sought intelligence operatives fluent in Arabic and familiar with regional cultures. This cooperation with the Jewish underground led to the creation of the Arab Department (Ha-Machlaka Ha-Aravit) in 1942 within the Palmach, the elite branch of the pre-state Zionist paramilitary that later became the core of the Israel Defense Forces. Its members — Jews raised in or deeply acquainted with Arab environments — were trained to operate undercover within Arab populations, marking the first official Mista’arvim unit. Furthermore, after Germany’s defeat, the British disbanded the platoon, and Palmach reconstituted it as Ha-Shahar (“The Dawn”).  [source, source, source] 

Following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and the rise of global guerrilla and insurgent movements, Israel formally recognized the need for dedicated undercover units. In 1986, the-then Major General (and future Prime Minister) Ehud Barak established the Duvdevan Unit, significantly advancing the modern Mista’arvim doctrine. [source, source, source] 

2.2 Symbols

2.21 Duvdevan Unit (Unit 217)

The unit’s emblem depicts a double-edged sword, inspired by the biblical tale of Ehud ben Gera from the Book of Judges. In this story, Ehud used deception to gain access to the Moabite King Eglon’s palace, where he assassinated the king to free Israel from Moabite domination. The anchor motif further alludes to the unit’s founding members, many of whom were drawn from Shayetet 13. Shayetet 13 is an elite Israeli naval commando unit, often compared to the U.S Navy Seals. [source, source]

MOTTO: “For by clever deception thou shalt wage war” [source, source]

2.22 Samson Unit (Unit 367)

The emblem depicts a central black silhouette holding two pillars, often framed by stylized black and red wings. Additionally, the insignia was based on the biblical figure Samson, as described in Judges 16:29, where Samson pushes apart the two pillars supporting the Philistine temple. [source, source, source]

2.23 Yamas (Yehidat HaMista’arvim)

Yamas’ insignia features a tower motif with the emblem of the Israel Border Police. No authoritative sources explain the design, and its specific rationale remains undisclosed to the public. [source, source, source, source]

MOTTO: “The easy day was yesterday” [source]

Ynet News reported all members of the unit have silver bracelets engraved with the sentence: “I’ve got your back” [source]

2.24 Sayeret Rimon (Pomegranate) unit

The insignia of the original Rimon Unit depicts a winged dagger topped with a grenade. No available sources explain the emblem’s design. However, the dagger-grenade motif likely suggests offensive precision and destructive capability. 

Additionally, the unit’s name Rimon is the Hebrew word for “pomegranate.” In Jewish tradition the pomegranate is a long-standing symbol of abundance, righteousness and the Torah — it is one of the Seven Species, appears in biblical descriptions of the Temple and priestly garments, and is popularly associated with the 613 mitzvot. [source, source]

2.25 Gideonim Unit 33

The Unit 33 Gideonim insignia depicts a winged lion, with prominent upward-sweeping wings and sharply defined features. [source]

3.0 Organisation 

3.1 Place within the Israeli government

3.1.1 IDF

• Duvdevan 217

Unlike conventional combat units that operate under brigade or manpower command structures, Duvdevan functions under the direct authority of the Judea and Samaria Division (West Bank Division), giving it an area-focused operational mandate. Since 2015, the unit has been officially part of the Oz Commando Brigade and is commanded by a lieutenant colonel, though its missions are often planned and executed in close coordination with the Shin Bet. [source, source, source]

The unit does not maintain a defined wartime role — instead, its primary mission lies in conducting day-to-day covert operations. An Israeli combat training company, Adrenaline, reports that Duvdevan is organised into five principal platoons. [source, source, source]

• Rimon 

Rimon operated under the IDF Southern Command, initially formed in the 1970s by Ariel Sharon and led by Meir Dagan. It conducted undercover and reconnaissance missions in Gaza in coordination with the Shin Bet until it was disbanded in 2005. Rimon is indeed one of the lesser-known Mista’arvim units. After its 2010 revival, Rimon became a unit within the Givati Brigade, specializing in desert warfare. No reports indicate that the newer Rimon is a Mista’arvim unit. [source, source, source, source]

•  Samson

Samson (Shimshon) was an IDF Mista’arvim unit tasked with undercover counter-terror and reconnaissance operations in the Gaza sector, organised under the IDF southern command structures. Officials disbanded the unit in 1994, and other units, particularly Duvdevan, later absorbed its personnel. [source]

3.1.2 ISRAEL POLICE, ISRAEL BORDER POLICE

• Gideonim

Gideonim (Unit 33) is an undercover/intelligence-oriented unit of the Israel Police (linked to the national investigations/special-operations structures) and is commanded within the police hierarchy for domestic undercover arrests and counter-terror operations. Furthermore, the unit is subordinate to Lahav Unit 433. [source]

• Yamas

Yamas is a unit of the Israel Police’s Border Police (Magav), organised regionally under police command and was established in 1989. Yamas answers directly to the Shin bet (Shabak). [source, source]

Unverified sources, therefore to be treated with caution, have provided insights into the internal structure of YAMAS. According to a report by the outlet VPK News, YAMAS is comprised of four regional companies, each operating within a defined geographic sector, mirroring the regional organisation of other Israeli security formations. [source] 

The first company reportedly operates in the Judea and Samaria (Shomron) area, focusing on urban counterterrorism and the detention of wanted individuals. The second, referred to as YAMAS-South, is active along the Gaza Strip and cooperates closely with the Gaza Border Guard, conducting arrests and border-security operations aimed at preventing militant movement and cross-border smuggling. YAMAS-Jerusalem is described as responsible for operations in and around Jerusalem, specialising in working within dense civilian environments and apprehending insurgent elements. The fourth component, YAMAS-Sinai, is said to patrol the Israeli–Egyptian border in the Sinai region, focusing on smuggling prevention, counter-infiltration and anti-terror missions. [source] 

The same unverified source claims that each company includes four assault platoons, a sniper detachment and an engineering or demolitions group, with an approximate strength of around 100 personnel per company. [source] 

3.4 Key Figures 

Ehud Barak

Former Israeli Prime Minister and Israeli army general, Barak played a key role in institutionalising Mista’arvim operations. Specifically, he founded Sayeret Duvdevan, the unit designed specifically to operate disguised within Arab populations. [source]

Ariel Sharon

As commander of the Southern Command, he was instrumental in establishing the first modern Mista’arvim framework, founding Unit Rimon in the early 1970s. Sharon appointed Meir Dagan as its first commander and personally oversaw many of its operations. Furthermore, news outlet Haaretz described Sharon as “the spiritual progenitor” of Israel’s modern Mista’arvim units. [source, source]

Mier Dagan

Dagan was Sharon’s protégé and the first commander of Rimon, and later became head of the Mossad (2002–2011). [source, source]

Gamliel Jamil Cohen

Cohen was one of the first operatives to embody the Mista’arvim concept within the pre-state Palmach Recruited into the Arab Section in the 1940’s. Cohen moved to Beirut in 1948 and set up Israel’s first official intelligence outpost, living undercover as Yussef el-Hamed, a textile shop owner. In his last years, he wrote the book ‘Undercover: The Untold Story of the Palmach’s Clandestine Arab Unit’. Furthermore, media has referred to Cohen as the “father of Israeli espionage.” [source, source]

Shimon Somekh

Shimon Somech, an Iraqi-born Jew and Arabic teacher at Kibbutz Mishmar Ha’emek, was recruited in 1942 by the Palmach to establish and command the new Arab Section. [source, source]

3.5 Recruitment 

Methods 

Recruiting individuals for mistaʽarvim is through a mix of channels. Many have been identified via internal scouting within the IDF, Israel Border Police and Israel Police, while at other times candidates are encouraged to join through official enlistment or police recruitment channels. 

Duvdevan recruits through three main pathways. The first is the pre-draft track, where candidates attend Yom-Sayarot (special forces screening). Following this, those who succeed move on to Duvdevan’s dedicated tryout (gibbush). The second is via the Paratroopers Brigade, where draftees complete the brigade’s gibbush and can then request an interview for Duvdevan. The third route is through lateral intake from other elite-unit selections: candidates who advanced in tracks such as Sayeret Matkal, Shayetet 13, Shaldag 669, or the Air Force’s pilot and naval officer courses, but were ultimately released, may be reassessed during a special “interviews week.” Israeli media further note that Duvdevan typically runs a three-day gibbush and forms two new teams in each draft cycle. [source, source, source]

Recruitment into Gideonim begins through the Israel Police, where candidates first apply via standard police channels. Their official website provides a form for those interested in joining. Initial screening includes a resume review and questionnaire, followed by suitability tests at the recruitment office. Promising applicants then face a personal interview before a selection committee and two assessment centers — one physical and one in the field – to evaluate operational aptitude in non-classified scenarios. The final stages are a security debriefing and obtaining clearance. [source, source]

Yamas has little information regarding its recruitment process. Kasda, an Israeli military store, states that recruits must first complete Border Police training before being invited to the gibbush. Additionally, those who pass sign a one-year contract and begin service in the unit. [source]

Requirements 

Considering the Mistaʽarvim serve in different branches of the IDF and police forces, each unit may set its own requirements. However, some of the reported and publicly available requirements for joining active mistaʽarvim units include: [source, source, source]

• Jewish heritage
• Israeli citizenship
• Recruiters likely place strong emphasis on familiarity with Arab culture.
• High physical fitness
• Medical profile of 82 or higher (combat-eligible).
• Kaba/Dapar (psychometric score) of 51 or higher on IDF cognitive testing.
• Minimal vision limitations; moderate correction (glasses/contacts) may be accepted.
• High reliability and social maturity, assessed through psychological screening and peer evaluations.
• Mandatory security clearance and background investigation prior to acceptance.
• Minimum age of 18.

 Training

Mistaʽarvim units train their members in combat and deep cultural and linguistic immersion that defines its Mista’arvim character. Their instruction covers: [source, source]

• Fluent Arabic, including regional slang and dialects such as Palestinian, Yemeni, and Tunisian.
• Understanding of local customs, religious practices, and body language.
• Disguise and behavioural adaptation techniques, such as changes in clothing, hair, and overall appearance.
• Urban navigation and intelligence awareness.
• Close-quarters-combat and unarmed combat training, including sniper and driving courses. 
• Counterterrorism training.

4.0 Equipment 

4.1 Weapons 

Mista’arvim operational roles and arsenal varies depending on its command and mission. As state security formations with specialist status, they draw on the capabilities and supply chains of their respective services. Additionally, given their operational importance, it is likely they will generally have access to modern, elite equipment appropriate to their tasks. The IDF does not publicly disclose exact unit inventories and loadouts. Nonetheless, reports indicate that during undercover operations, operatives use easily concealed weapons such as pistols, submachine guns, and knives. In addition, some of the weaponry reportedly used by Mista’arvim units, and evidenced in public images, includes: [source, source, source, source, source, source]

Assault rifles 

• CAR-15 14.5”
• Colt M16/AR-15 M4 Commando
• M4 Carbine 10”

Sniper Rifles 

• Mauser SR86
• Mauser sp66
• Israeli M36
• Sirkis M36

Machine guns

• IMI Mini Uzi
• IMI Para Micro-Uzi
• Heckler & Koch MP5 SD (noted as preferred for hostage rescue)

Pistols/sidearms

• SIG Sauer 228 9mm (backup & civilian carry)
• SIG Sauer P226 
• IMI 941 Jericho 
• Glock pistols (all variants)

Shotguns

• Remington 870 combat shotgun
• Remington Autoloader (12-gauge)

Other weaponry

• Knives: KA-BAR, Busse, Spyderco. Reported as a key weapon for the Duvdevan unit.
• Suppressors (especially on P226 for dogs / stealth)
• Reported use of the internationally prohibited dum-dum bullets

4.2 Vehicles 

Mistaʽarvim’s vehicle fleet combines standard military platforms with modified civilian models. Operatives configure some civilian vehicles to resemble local transport and adding internal modifications. For example, open-source reporting and video footage shows the use of disguised vehicles, including ambulances, civilian jeeps, and trucks marked with fictitious company logos. Duvdevan, in particular, maintains a sizeable vehicle fleet. [source, source, source]

4.5 Important Gear 

When operating covertly, Mistaʽarvim units blend into local populations and are generally indistinguishable from civilians. They frequently adopt civilian clothing, including jeans, t-shirts, keffiyas, and various religious garments. Some accounts note that operatives use subtle cues — such as leaving shirts untucked to cover their weapons. [source]

In overt operations the uniforms differ depending on type of operation and the specific unit. For those in the Police forces, Gideonim and Yamas, their service dress (מדי אלף Madei Alef – Uniform “A”) is their everyday uniform, which is a grey variant of the khaki Navy and Air Corps uniform. Their field dress (מדי ב, Madei Bet – Uniform ‘B’), which is their standard combat uniform, is most commonly the classic olive-green IDF combat fatigues, though grey or black variants are also visible as this reflects the Israeli Police uniforms.  [source, source, source, source, source]

Duvdevan operators also primarily wear the standard IDF olive fatigues, consisting of long-sleeve shirts and trousers, often paired with boonie hats or combat caps in the field. Public images show them wearing camouflage overgarments with netted hoods, as well as face paint to blend into terrain during training and rural operations. [source, source]

5.0 Tactical-Operational Information 

5.1 Operations

Mista’arvim units indeed operate under a high level of secrecy, with most of their missions remaining undisclosed. Despite this, several operations stand out as notable examples of their covert capabilities:

5.1.1 Balata/Nablus incident – 2024

On 19 December 2024, Mista’arvim operatives entered the Balata refugee camp in Nablus, located in the West Bank, disguised as medical personnel, using an ambulance with Palestinian license plates to infiltrate the area. Furthermore, once inside the camp, they emerged from the vehicle and opened fire, which killed 80-year-old Halimah Abu Leil and 25 year old Ahmad Sarouji. Regular army units later joined the undercover force, secured the scene, and withdrew the operatives. The use of the ambulance — bearing genuine medical markings — drew heavy condemnation after it was revealed that the disguise was not officially authorized, and the Israeli military later admitted the act violated its own operational procedures. The IDF did not address the civilian casualties and mistreatment.  [source, source, source]

5.1.2 Ibn Sina Hospital – 2024

On January 30, 2024, Israeli undercover forces conducted a covert operation at Ibn Sina Hospital in Jenin, West Bank. The operatives disguised themselves as medical staff and civilians to infiltrate the hospital, and killed three Palestinians they referred to as Hamas operatives that were receiving medical treatment.

According to Tawfiq al-Shobaki, a hospital spokesperson, there was no exchange of fire during the raid; instead, Israeli forces attacked doctors, nurses, and hospital security. Furthermore, members of the UN condemned the raid, describing it as an extrajudicial killing and could amount to war crimes. [source, source, source, source]

5.1.3 Jabalia – 1993

Hamas planned to hold a rally at a mosque in Jabalia, Gaza, on 19 May 1993. Israeli intelligence had identified roughly 400 attendees, including several individuals who were long-standing targets of the IDF. To intercept them, Yamas operatives staged an ambush, while other IDF vehicles moved in from the opposite side to scatter the crowd and funnel the targets toward the orchard. When the operatives saw armed Palestinians approaching, they opened fire, killing one uninvolved civilian and injuring several others, including a 13-year-old boy. According to Rosenzweig’s policy paper for the Israel Democracy Institute, the IDF confirmed the Palestinians were carrying fake weapons and the IDF fired all the gunshots. [source]

5.2 Core Purpose 

Mista’arvim’s core purpose is to operate undercover within Arab populations, using deep disguise and cultural immersion to collect intelligence, monitor targets, and carry out targeted arrests. Their mandate is counterterrorism: by blending into the opposition’s areas they extend the reach and effectiveness of security forces while minimising overt deployments. [source, source]

Beyond their operational function, Mistaʽarvim units are noted by some reporters, including former Israeli detainee, that they also serve the purpose to fulfill psychological operations. Their covert presence within Arab communities is often described as contributing to an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty, where individuals cannot easily distinguish between civilians and undercover operatives. Moreover, a former Israeli detainee and researcher on Israeli operational tactics told the New Arab news outlet that Mista’arvim is “largely a psychological operation.” [source, source]

Esmat Omar, a Palestinian expert on Israeli affairs and intelligence, told the Guardian that one of the objectives of the Mista’arvim is to generate an atmosphere of mistrust, fear, and paranoia, “because you can’t really know if this person next to you [at a protest] is another protester like you, or an undercover agent that can abduct you at any moment or pull out a weapon.” [source]

5.3 Tactics 

Tactics of Mistaarvim indeed depend on the operation and unit. Common, publicly reported tactics include: 

• Undercover infiltration: Blending into civilian populations through disguise, language, and behavior to penetrate target areas undetected. [source, source, source]
• CQC: high intensity fighting in confined urban environments. [source]
• ‘Snatch and grab’: Operatives pose as civilians, sometimes even as protesters, until the target appears. [source, source]
• Ambush and interdiction: concealed positioning to intercept vehicles or suspects. [source, source]
• Sweep and arrests. [source, source]
• Hit-and-run raids  [source, source]

5.4 Personnel size 

Personnel size is difficult to estimate due to the secrecy surrounding these formations. Furthermore, no official headcounts are published, nor is it likely that all Mista’arvim units have been publicly disclosed. It can be inferred, however, from open-source reporting and the number of operational regions covered that mistaʽarvim elements likely number in the low-mid thousands across all branches combined. This estimate would encompass the known active teams within the IDF and Israeli police. Individual units themselves remain relatively small and compartmentalised, which operate in teams or company-sized elements. [source, source]

6.0 The Future 

Mista’arvim units are likely to remain a core element of Israel’s covert operational capability, but the future will see them more technologically integrated, urban-focused, and tightly regulated. Advances in AI, including tools like the AI-driven “Lavender” targeting system and facial-recognition programs are allowing the military to process intelligence, communications, and imagery faster than ever. Internal units such as Gideonim (Unit 33) and Yamas are expected to increasingly benefit from these systems, using them to improve surveillance, verify identities, and plan operations with greater precision. However, this also raises risks of misidentification and legal or ethical concerns. [source, source, source]

7.0 Conclusion 

In conclusion, Mista’arvim units remain a crucial element of Israel’s covert operations, combining highly specialized training, cultural expertise, and adaptability to operate effectively in complex environments. Further research into the psychological and social effects of their presence could illuminate how these operations shape behavior, perceptions, and societal dynamics, while also revealing the potential discreet strategic objectives guiding these units.