Executive Summary
Myanmar’s pro-democracy fighters and ethnic armed groups made significant territorial gains in the last few years of the civil conflict. Rebel formations control approximately 42% of the country, while the military junta, aka Tatmadaw, retains only 21%. These gains have been achieved primarily through effective small-scale raids on military outposts, particularly in rural areas. Following this pattern, rebel operations are expected to expand beyond their traditional strongholds, while avoiding urban areas, in the coming months.
Despite recent battlefield successes, there are indications that the rebels may lose their tactical advantage in drone warfare before the end of the year. Myanmar’s military significantly improved its electronic warfare capabilities in the last few months, severely eroding the resistance groups’ drone operations with advanced jammers. Additionally, the Tatmadaw has been equipping its unmanned airframes with infrared systems, enhancing its ability to detect and engage rebel positions.
Meanwhile, widespread defections from the military and police provide the resistance movement with an opportunity to enhance human intelligence capabilities. Since the military coup in 2021, approximately 14,000 regime personnel have joined the opposition militias, including many who have embedded themselves as double agents within the junta. Furthermore, the armed wing of the opposition council has formed dedicated units to manage and coordinate the increasing number of intelligence assets within the regime.
Key Judgements
KJ-1. Pro-democracy fighters are likely to continue gaining ground in rural areas through small raids on military outposts.
- Karenni guerrillas expanded their control and area of influence along the Myanmar-Thailand border region from 2024 to 2025, forcing Tatmadaw troops to remain confined to fixed positions in the majority of the Kayin State and some parts of the Shan State. [source]
- Myanmar rebels in pro-democracy groups and ethnic armies as of March had established control of 42% of the country; the military’s control was estimated at 21%. [source]
- For the first time in the country’s history, in August 2024, Tatmadaw Northeastern Regional Military Command in Lashio was attacked and overrun by a rebel group, the Palaung State Liberation Front/Ta’ang National Liberation Army (PSLF). [source]
KJ-2. Rebel forces will likely lose tactical supremacy in drone warfare before the end of the year.
- Independent research on drone warfare in Myanmar by Armed Conflict Location & Event Data in July concluded that the junta is severely eroding the resistance groups’ drone operations with advanced jammers. [source]
- According to an insurgent source interviewed by conflict analyst Su Mon, the military jammers were able to disrupt up to four-channel frequencies as of May 2025. Most of the drones used by rebel forces only have three-channel frequencies. [source]
- Janes International Defence Review in February 2025 reported that the Tatmadaw Drone Force Directorate was adapting forward-looking infrared (FLIR) systems to their unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs). [source, source]
KJ-3. Tatmadaw defections provide Myanmar rebels with an opportunity to increase their intelligence networks.
- In December 2024, a British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) documentary reported that the People’s Defence Force (PDF) created a special team to manage the growing network of double agents embedded within the regime. [source]
- A Washington Post article in February 2024 on the current status of Myanmar’s military revealed through exploitation of human sources that the military was suffering from plunging morale and widespread defections. [source]
- National Unity Government (NUG) records state that since the military coup in Myanmar in February 2021, around 4,000 regime soldiers and 10,000 police officers have joined the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM). [source, source]
Statement on Analysis
Grey Dynamics assess with a medium level of confidence that Myanmar rebels will continue gaining ground from the Tatmadaw during the rest of the year. Variables that could alter our assessments include any role the upcoming presidential elections may play within the militias and any unforeseen ceasefires or negotiations. Furthermore, unseen internal dynamics along the ethnic lines of the rebel armies may also affect our projections.
Regarding drone warfare, we assess with high confidence that the rebel militias will lose tactical superiority in the near term. Information used for this assumption was sourced from reputable private intelligence companies and conflict research outlets. Additionally, the data supporting the existence of enhanced capabilities in drone warfare is backed by human interviews and combat footage.