PLARF: China’s Tactical Missile Force

The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) is China’s strategic and tactical missile force. It is the fourth branch of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) and is responsible for China’s expansive arsenal of land-based ballistic, hypersonic, cruise missiles as well as its nuclear arsenal. Formed in 1966, it has evolved from a force widely regarded as small and underequipped in stature compared to Western forces, into an essential component of the Chinese Army. Equipped with advanced weaponry including newly developed Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs), it is poised to be China’s strategic deterrence against its perceived enemies including Taiwan and the United States.

1 Symbols and History of the PLARF

1.1 Symbols of the PLARF

The PLARF uses several different symbols to represent the formation. This includes:

1.1.1 Emblem of the PLARF

The emblem of the PLARF features a rocket with exhaust fumes and the star of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) overlaid on top.

1.1.2 Flag of the PLARF

The Chinese characters ‘八一’ to the right of the star (literally “eight one”) are a reference to 1 August 1927 when the PLA was created by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 

The yellow on the bottom of the flag is said to represent the flare of a missile launching. 

[Source, source]

1.2 History of the PLARF

The History of the PLARF dates back to the 1960s under the force’s previous title as the PLA 2nd Artillery Force (PLASAF). It has undergone developments at a relatively rapid pace and has undergone several name changes since its inception.

1.2.1 1960s-1970s

The PLA 2nd Artillery Force (PLASAF) was established in 1966 and was given the command of China’s small inventory of land-based regional nuclear missiles. These first-generation nuclear missiles were regarded as unsophisticated and low in terms of range and capacity to cause destruction.

However, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the PLASAF developed increasingly sophisticated weapons systems. One of these was the DF-5, the first Chinese ICBM that could strike mainland America. It was introduced to the PLASAF in the early 1980s.

[Source]

1.2.2 1980s-1990s

With the introduction of the DF-5 in the early 1980s the PLASAF’s capabilities began to increase. 

The PLSAF began to develop more sophisticated systems including the DF-21, the PLA’s first road-based mobile ballistic missile system. It also decided to start fielding conventional and nuclear missiles which led to the development and introduction of the DF-11 and DF-15 SRBM in the early 1990s.

[Source]

1.2.3 1990s-2010s

The PLSAF began to rapidly increase in size throughout the 1990s and 2010s which included four new brigades being stood up by 2000 and three of these being equipped with the latest missiles which the PLSAF and its associated academic institutions had developed. 

This expansion however accelerated even further and between 2000 and 2010 the PLSAF stood up as many as eleven new missile brigades. These new brigades also began to be equipped with newly developed weapons systems including the CJ-10 and the PLSAFs first road-mobile ICBM, the DF-31.

[Source]

1.2.4 2010s-2020s

This acceleration in the growth of the PLASAF throughout the early 2000s increased between 2010 and 2020. The PLASAF, following changing its name to the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), added 13 new brigades between 2020 and 2020. It also developed more sophisticated weapons such as the DF-21D anti-ship missile and the DF-41 road-mobile ICBM.

The PLARF also developed high-tech weapons systems such as the DF-17 Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV).

Additionally, between 2017 and 2019 the PLARF added at least ten new missile brigades resulting in an expansion of 33% in only three years. In 2021 the PLARF began massively expanding their silo-based ICBM force.

[Source]

2 Organisation of the PLARF

The PLARF is a vast organisation with 9 main bases aswell as several other departments. Directly subordinate to the Central Military Commission (CMC), the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) overarching national defence organisation. Additionally, the nuclear forces operate under a different administration: during peacetime, they remain subordinate to their individual bases. However, during wartime, the Central Military Commission (CMC) assumes control over the nuclear weapons and their use.

[Source]

2.1 Organisation Structure of the PLARF

The overarching structure of the PLARF is as follows:

• PLARF HQ – Beijing

• Staff Departments
  • Staff Department
  • Political Work Department
  • Equipment Department
  • Logistic Department

• Bases
  • Base 61 – Operations Huangshan
  • Base 62 – Operations Kunming
  • Base 63 – Operations Huaihua
  • Base 64 – Operations Lanzhou 
  • Base 65 – Operations Shenyang
  • Base 66 – Operations Luoyang
  • Base 67 (Nuclear Stockpile) – Baoji
  • Base 68 (Engineering) – Luoyang
  • Base 69 (Test & Training) – Yinchuan

[Source]

2.1.1 PLARF Operations Base Structure

Each of the six Operations bases (Base 61-66) is set to a standardised structure and consists of 6-8 missile brigades aswell as other supporting regiments and staff departments. This structure is as follows:

• Base HQ

• Staff Departments
  • Staff Department
  • Support Department
  • Political Work Department

• Brigades and Regiments
  • Missile Brigades – between 6-8 of them
  • Training Regiment – Responsible for basic training of new recruits
  • Communications Regiment – Responsible for communications between Base HQ and subordinate elements
  • Operations Support Regiment – Functions of this regiment include  security, meteorology, survey and mapping and NBC defence
  • Comprehensive Support Regiment – This regiment is responsible for the repair and maintenance of base vehicles and equipment, as well as storage of missiles, fuel, munitions, and other supplies, and transport of these assets via road and rail to base units
  • Equipment Inspection Regiment/Brigade – This regiment is responsible for the storage, management, and distribution of nuclear warheads assigned to each base
  • Base Hospital – In wartime these hospitals deploy field medical teams to provide comprehensive medical care to base units at the front line

[Source]

2.1.2 PLARF Missile Brigade Structure

The PLARF oversees around 40 missile brigades which conform to a standardised structure which is as follows:

• Missile Brigade
  • 1st Launch Battalion
    • 1st Launch Company
    • 2nd Launch Company
  • 2nd Launch Battalion
  • 3rd Launch Battalion
  • 4th Launch Battalion
  • 5th Launch Battalion
  • 6th Launch Battalion
  • Communications Battalion
  • Operations Support Battalion
  • Comprehensive Support Battalion
  • Technical Battalion

[Source]

2.2 PLARF HQ – Rocket Force Command

PLARF HQ, also known as Rocket Force Command, is located in the Haidan District, Beijing. It is responsible for the command of the PLARF, and it is directly commanded by the Central Military Commission (CMC). [Source]

2.3 PLARF Staff Department

The Staff Department is one of the departments within the wider command network of the PLARF. Mainly based out of Beijing it has several other regiments and groups within it which are based elsewhere. Its structure is as follows:

• Staff Department – Beijing
  • Operations Support Group – Beijing
    • Recon Regiment – Beijing – Responsible for battlefield reconnaissance and intelligence support
    • Survey and Mapping Group – Beijing – Dispatches personnel responsible for on-site surveying and measurement
    • Communications Regiment – Beijing – Responsible for communications between PLARF Headquarters and subordinate operations elements
  • Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) Regiment – Dingxing
  • Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Regiment – Quanzhou – Located beside the Taiwan Strait and may play a role in target acquisition in the event of conflict with Taiwan
  • Automated Command Center – Beijing 
  • Training Regiment – Tangshan – Responsible for training new soldiers
  • Meteorology Center – Beijing – Responsible for both meteorological and hydrological support
  • Remote Sensing Unit – Tianjin – Responsible for satellites and remote sensing missions
  • Cruise Missile Planning Center – Beijing – Responsible for conducting a wide range of research related to UAVs, scene matching, navigation and mapping, ballistics, signals, missile guidance, and remote sensing. May also be responsible for research into LACM navigation and guidance, with a specific focus on DSMAC (digital scene matching area and correlation) Guidance
  • Technical Recon Bureau – Beijing – responsible for the PLARF’s signals intelligence (SIGINT) activities

[Source]

2.4 PLARF Political Work Department

The PLARF Political Work Department is responsible for all political and cultural activities within the PLARF. It has several known subordinate bureaus which are:

• Organisation Bureau
• Cadre Bureau
• Propaganda Bureau
• Military and Civilian Personnel Bureau
• Mass Work Liason Bureau

[Source]

2.5 Logistics Department of the PLARF

The logistics department is responsible for the overall logistics of the PLARF and it is located primarily in Beijing but has several other known locations in which it operates. The structure of the logistics department is as follows:

• Logistics Department – Beijing
  • Yanqing Comprehensive Depot – Beijing – Responsible for storing and transporting PLARF equipment, including heavy equipment such as vehicles, and has its own rail transport and armed escort capabilities.
  • Haidian Comprehensive Depot – Beijing –  Responsible for the storage, management, transportation, and distribution of special equipment, vehicle spare parts, medication, and many other items
  • PLARF Medical Center – Beijing – The PLARF Medical Center is the PLARF’s primary general hospital
  • Disease Control Center – Beijing – Responsible for providing medical and sanitation support to both the PLARF and civilian communities as needed
  • Agricultural Base – Beijing – Responsible for the testing, cultivation, and training of new agricultural techniques
  • Comprehensive Training Base – Zhangjiakou – This base serves as the PLARF’s only base for training personnel in various support specialities, including meteorology, communications, camouflage, chemical/NBC defence, reconnaissance, and survey and mapping aswell as NCO training
  • Guangzhou Convalescent Center – Guangzhou –  Reported to serve the dual functions of providing convalescent care to personnel, including those with drug addiction issues, as well as serving as a rest/vacation destination awarded to top cadres
  • Emei Convalescent Home – Emeishan – This home serves as a spot for recuperating personnel, as well as a vacation spot awarded to model personnel and their families for exemplary service

[Source]

2.5.1 Subordinate Bureaus to the Logistics Department

The Logistics Department has several subordinate bureaus which are:

• Finance Bureau
• Medical Bureau
• Transport and Delivery Bureau
• Military Infrastructure and Construction Bureau
• Purchase and Supply Bureau
• Functional Bureau
• Combat Service and Planning Bureau
• Directly Subordinate Work Bureau

[Source]

2.6 Equipment Department of the PLARF PT1

The equipment department of the PLARF is responsible for not only the maintenance of but also the research of new equipment used by the wider PLARF. It is primarily based in Beijing but several of its subordinate bases and groups are based elsewhere. Its structure is as follows:

• Equipment Department – Beijing
  • Research Academy – Beijing – The PLARF’s principal institution for weapons and equipment research and also plays a key role in developing PLARF theory, strategy, strategic development and planning, and equipment procurement planning
    • Engineering Design Institute – Beijing – Primarily responsible for surveying, designing, and engineering PLARF facilities, including tunnelling for underground facilities, launch sites, roads and bridges, and camouflage
  • Unit 96902 – Beijing – Reportedly involved in a wide range of research, this unit focuses on medical fields (disease control, mental health, pharmacology, etc.), equipment support, communications, navigation, basic physics research, and social science.
    • Unit 96922 – Dalian – Allegedly responsible for missile exports to Saudi Arabia
    • Unit 96923 – Dalian
  • Meteorological Station – Beijing – Responsible for verification and precision calibration of weapons and equipment, ensuring equipment and facility standards, and conducting relevant repairs and scientific research

2.6.1 Equipment Department of the PLARF PT2

• Inspection and Repair Center – Beijing – Responsible for missile inspection and repair, with a focus on solid rocket engines
• Armament & Radar Repair Center – Beijing – Responsible for conducting mobile repairs and regular testing and maintenance of at least 13 types of radar, including warning, meteorology, reconnaissance, ballistic measurement, and hypsography radars
• Repair and Measurements Regiment – Shangrao –  Responsible for inspection, testing, measurement, and repair of “special” equipment including tunnelling equipment, missile components, vehicles (including missile loading vehicles), and missile launch sites
• Technical Service Group – Zhangjiakou – Responsible for missile testing, storage, site management, transport, and armed escort
• Reserve Equipment Repair Group – Beijing – Provides maintenance support for missile launch equipment to several launch brigade
• Reserve Special Equipment Repair Group – Nanchang –  Focused on integrating with active units to provide repair of missiles, vehicles, and other high-tech equipment

[Source]

2.7 Base 61

Base 61, first established in 1965 is headquartered in the city of Huangshan and is an operations base covering eastern and parts of southeastern China. 

Located close to the Taiwan strait, its large number of SRBM-equipped brigades likely means that in the event of a conflict with Taiwan, it would primarily use these short-range ballistic missiles against the island. 

Its structure and equipped missiles, aswell as warhead type (nuclear, conventional, cluster etc) are as follows:

• Base 61 – Huangshan
  • 611 Brigade – Chizhou – DF-21A MRBM – Nuclear + Road-mobile
  • 612 Brigade – Leping – DF-21A MRBM; likely converting to DF-31AG – Nuclear + Road-mobile
  • 613 Brigade – Shangrao – DF-15B SRBM – Conventional
  • 614 Brigade – Yong’an – DF-17 MRBM – Conventional
  • 615 Brigade – Meizhou – DF-11A , and/or DF-11AZT SRBM – Conventional
  • 616 Brigade – Ganzhou – DF-15 A/B/C SRBM – Conventional
  • 617 Brigade – Jinhua – DF-16A SRBM – Conventional
  • 618 Brigade – Nanchang – Unknown
  • Training Regiment – Jiangshan
  • Communications Regiment – Huangshan
  • Operations Support Regiment – Huangshan
  • Comprehensive Support Regiment – Shangrao
  • Technical Services Brigade – Jingdezhen City
  • Equipment Inspection Regiment – Jingdezhen City
  • UAV Regiment – Dongyang

[Source]

2.8 Base 62

Base 62 was established in 1966 and is headquartered in the Chinese city of Kunming. It is an operations base covering much of southern and lower southeastern China.

It contains several brigades including what is likely the PLARFS first hypersonic MRBM brigade.

Its structure and equipped missiles, aswell as warhead type (nuclear, conventional, cluster etc) are as follows:

• Base 62 – Kunming
  • 621 Brigade – Yibin – DF-31AG ICBM – Nuclear + Road-mobile
  • 622 Brigade – Yibin – DF-31A ICBM – Nuclear + Road-mobile
  • 623 Brigade – Liuzhou – CJ-10A LACM – Conventional + Cruise Missile
  • 624 Brigade – Danzhou – DF-21D ASBM – Conventional + Anti-ship
  • 625 Brigade – Jianshui – DF-26 IRBM – Dual Nuclear-Conventional + Road-mobile
  • 626 Brigade – Qingyuan – DF-26 IRBM – Dual Nuclear-Conventional
  • 627 Brigade – Puning – DF-17 MRBM – Conventional
  • Training Regiment – Chuxiong
  • Communications Regiment – Kunming
  • Operations Support Regiment – Kunming
  • Comprehensive Support Regiment – Kunming
  • Equipment Inspection Regiment – Mi’le

[Source]

2.9 Base 63

Base 63 is headquartered in the southern city of Huaihua and is an operations base covering southeast China.

Its structure and equipped missiles, aswell as warhead type (nuclear, conventional, cluster etc) are as follows:

• Base 63 – Huaihua
  • 631 Brigade – Huaihua – DF-5B ICBM – Nuclear + Silo-based
  • 632 Brigade – Shaoyang – DF-31AG ICBM – Nuclear + Road-mobile
  • 633 Brigade – Huaihua – DF-5A ICBM – Nuclear + Silo-based
  • 634 Brigade – Huaihua – Unknown “new missile type” – Unknown
  • 635 Brigade – Yichun – CJ-10 LACM – Conventional + Cruise Missile
  • 636 Brigade – Shaoyang – DF-16/DF-16A – Conventional
  • Training Regiment – Shaoyang
  • Communications Regiment – Huaihua 
  • Operations Support Regiment – Huaihua 
  • Comprehensive Support Regiment – Huaihua 
  • Equipment Inspection Regiment – Huaihua 
  • Service Regiment – Huaihua 

[Source]

2.10 Base 64

Base 64 is an operations base covering northwest and northern central China. Headquartered in the western Chinese city of Lanzhou it has doubled in size since 2017. 

Its structure and equipped missiles, aswell as warhead type (nuclear, conventional, cluster etc) are as follows:

• Base 64 – Lanzhou
  • 641 Brigade – Hancheng – DF-31 ICBM – Nuclear + Road-mobile
  • 642 Brigade – Xining – DF-31 ICBM, possible upgrade to DF-31AG – Nuclear + Road-mobile
  • 643 Brigade – Tianshui – DF-31AG ICBM – Nuclear + Road-mobile
  • 644 Brigade – Hanzhong – DF-41 ICBM – Nuclear + Road-mobile
  • 645 Brigade – Yinchuan – Unknown – Unknown
  • 646 Brigade – Korla – DF-26 IRBM – Dual Nuclear-Conventional + Road Mobile
  • 647 Brigade – Xining – Unknown – Unknown
  • Training Regiment – Xining
  • Communications Regiment – Xining 
  • Operations Support Regiment – Lanzhou 
  • Comprehensive Support Regiment – Xining 
  • Equipment Inspection Regiment – Xining 

[Source]

2.11 Base 65

Base 65 is an operations base covering northeast China and the Shandong Peninsula and is headquarters in the northeastern city of Shenyang. Since 2017 it has doubled in size going from 3 to six missile brigades.

Its structure and equipped missiles, aswell as warhead type (nuclear, conventional, cluster etc) are as follows:

• Base 65 – Shenyang
  • 651 Brigade – Chifeng – DF-41 ICBM – Nuclear + Road-mobile
  • 652 Brigade – Tonghua – DF-31 or 31A ICBM – Nuclear + Road-mobile
  • 653 Brigade – Jinan – DF-21D ASBM – Conventional + Anti-Ship
  • 654 Brigade – Dalian – DF-26 IRBM – Dual Nuclear-Conventional + Road-mobile
  • 655 Brigade – Tonghua – DF-17 MRBM – Conventional
  • 656 Brigade – Jinan – CJ-100 LACM – Conventional
  • Training Regiment – Panjin
  • Communications Regiment – Shenyang 
  • Operations Support Regiment – Shenyang 
  • Comprehensive Support Regiment – Tonghua
  • Equipment Inspection Regiment – Tonghua

[Source]

2.12 Base 66

Base 66 is headquartered in Luoyang and is an operations base which covers part of inland, central China. Since 2017 it has expanded from four to six missile brigades.

Its structure and equipped missiles, aswell as warhead type (nuclear, conventional, cluster etc) are as follows:

• Base 66 – Luoyang
  • 661 Brigade – Lingbao – DF-5B – Nuclear + Silo-based
  • 662 Brigade – Luoyang – DF-4 ICBM – Nuclear + Roll-out-to-launch
  • 663 Brigade – Nanyang – DF-31A ICBM – Nuclear + Road-mobile
  • 664 Brigade – Luoyang – DF-31AG ICBM – Nuclear + Road-mobile
  • 665 Brigade – Changzhi – Unknown – Unknown
  • 666 Brigade – Xinyang – DF-26 IRBM – Dual Nuclear-Conventional + Road-mobile
  • Training Regiment – Luoyang  
  • Communications Regiment – Luoyang   
  • Operations Support Regiment – Luoyang   
  • Comprehensive Support Regiment – Luoyang  
  • Equipment Inspection Regiment – Sanmenxia 

[Source]

2.13 Base 67

Base 67 is a support base responsible for the oversight and security of the PRC’s nuclear weapons storage complex in Taibai and is also responsible for the distribution of nuclear warheads to operations bases.

Its structure is as follows:

• Base 67
  • Technical Service Brigade – Baoji
  • Unit 96038 – Luzhou
  • Emergency Management Group – Baoji
  • Training Regiment – Baoji
  • Communications Regiment – Baoji
  • Operations Support Regiment – Baoji
  • Comprehensive Support Regiment – Baoji
  • Air Defense Regiment – Baoji
  • Electronic Countermeasures Regiment – Nanchang
  • Equipment Inspection Institute – Baoji
  • Equipment Transport Regiment – Baoji

[Source]

2.14 Base 68

Base 68 is the PLARF’s engineering support base headquartered in Luoyang. It is responsible for the construction of physical infrastructure for the PLARF.

Its structure is as follows:

• Base 68 – Luoyang
  • 1st Engineering Brigade – Baoji
  • 2nd Engineering Brigade – Putian
  • 3rd Engineering Brigade – Huaihua
  • 4th Engineering Brigade – Luoyang
  • 5th Engineering Brigade – Luoyang
  • 6th Engineering Brigade – Beijing
  • Training Regiment – Luoyang
  • Mobile Communications Regiment – Nanchang
  • Comprehensive Support Regiment – Luoyang
  • Communications Engineering Regiment – Sanmenxia
  • Engineering Support Group – Hanzhong

[Source]

2.15 Base 69

Base 69 is a new, Test and Training (T&T) base established in early 2017. Not much is known about the operations of this particular base bit it was set up following the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) reforms that year.

Its structure is as follows:

• Base 69
  • 1st T&T District – Alxa
  • 2nd T&T District – Baishan
  • 3rd T&T District – Delingha
  • 4th T&T District – Guiyang
  • Kelan Service Station – Xinzhou
  • Opposition Force (OPFOR) Regiment – Baishan
  • Measurement & Control Regiment – Alxa
  • Measurement & Control Group – Shuangliao
  • Missile Test Range – Delingha
  • Several Unidentified Units
    • Unit 96795
    • Unit 96796
    • Unit 96893
    • Unit 96894
    • Unit 96895
    • Unit 96898
    • Unit 96899

[Source]

2.16 Academic Institutions Connected to the PLARF

There are a variety of academic institutions which are connected to the PLARF and they all serve a variety of roles. They are as follows:

Rocket Force Command College 

Wuhan – Established in 1977 as the 2nd Artillery School, in the 40+ years of its operation it has graduated over 30,000 cadets and 120 of them have gone on to become generals.

[Source]

Rocket Force University of Engineering 

Xi’an – Established in 1951 it has undergone several name changes. This includes it being called the Northwest Military Region Artillery School, the PLA 1st Artillery School, the Xi’an Artillery School and also the PLA Artillery Technical College among other names. It delivers education specialising in strategic missile education.

[Source]

Rocket Force NCO School

Weifang – Established in September 1970 as the Yunnan Shipin 2nd Artillery 814th Regiment, the Rocket Force NCO School is responsible for the training of Non-Commisioned Officers (NCOs).

[Source]

Rocket Force NCO School 4th Student Group

Hebei – Founded in 1954, the Rocket Force NCO School 4th Student Group, is responsible for the basic training of directly recruited NCOs.

[Source]

2.17 Miscellaneous and Unidentified Units Connected to the PLARF

There are several miscellaneous and unidentified units connected to the PLARF. Little to no public information is available about these units, making it impossible to place them within the wider PLARF hierarchy, despite their confirmed existence. They are as follows:

• Unit 96610 – Beijing
• Unit 96611 – Shanxi
• Unit 96621 – Beijing
• Unit 96627 – Beijing
• Unit 96632 – Beijing
• Unit 96638 – Beijing
• Unit 96650 – Beijing
• PLARF Unit Field Cultivation and Training Base – Hebei
• Unit 96591 – Liaoning
• Guazhou, Hami, and Hanggin Silo Fields
  • Guazhou County, Gansu
  • Hami, Xinjiang UAR
  • Hanggin Banner, Ordos City, Inner Mongolia

[Source] 

3 Equipment of the PLARF

The PLARF uses a wide variety of missiles and missile launchers. These take the form of both short-range and long-range ballistic missiles, and they also include highly advanced hypersonic missiles that have also reportedly been fielded.

3.1 Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs)

A Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV) is a type of warhead for a ballistic missile which can manoeuvre and ‘glide’ at hypersonic speed. HGVs separate from their rocket boosters shortly after they are launched and the in-flight manoeuvrability of HGVs makes them extremely unpredictable which allows them to evade air defences. 

[Source, source]

3.1.1 Dongfeng-17

The Df-17 is an MRBM developed by China and can be equipped with an HGV. The accompanying DF-ZF HGV can reportedly reach speeds of Mach 5-10 and it possesses a range between 1,800-2,500km. Although it has a conventional mission it can also be equipped with nuclear warheads. In January 2019, PLA officials claimed to of have been developing an anti-ship variant.

[Source]

DZ-ZF

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) developed and deployed the DZ-ZF, an HGV, in 2019. This vehicle is believed to reach speeds between Mach 5 and Mach 10. Although it can be used to deliver nuclear weapons it could also be used to carry out precise anti-ship ballistic missile duties aimed at penetrating 

“the layered air defences of a U.S. carrier strike group.”

[Source]

3.2 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs)

An Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) is a ballistic missile with a range greater than 3,400 miles (5,500 km). Primarily designed to deliver nuclear warheads, they can also potentially carry biological, chemical, and conventional explosives. The US, UK, Russia, China, France, India, Israel, and North Korea are the only countries known to possess operational ICBMs.

[Source]

3.2.1 Dongfeng-41

The Dongfeng-41 (DF-41/CH-SS-20) is a Chinese solid-fueled rail/road-mobile ICBM operated by the PLARF. It reportedly has a range of 7,500 to 9,300 miles (12,000 to 15,000 km), a top speed of Mach 25, and the capacity to carry up to 10 nuclear warheads.

[Source]

3.2.2 Dongfeng-31 Variants

The PLARF fields two variants of the DF-31 missile. The Chinese Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT) began research and development on a solid-fueled, three-stage ballistic missile in August 1970. They then began developing the submarine-launched variant of this missile, known as the JL-2 in January 1985. They debuted the DF-31 in a military parade in 1999.

[Source]

DF-31A

In 2007 the PLARF introduced an improved version of the DF-31 called the DF-31A which extended its range past 11,000 km using a lightened guidance system amidst other, unspecified, improvements.

[Source]

DF-31AG

In 2017, the DF-31AG was revealed in a public display and features an upgraded launcher with lower support requirements. Developed by the China Aerospace Science Corporation (CASC) and the Tai’an Special Vehicle Company, the DF-31AG’s wheeled TEL can traverse unpaved terrain. With this off-road mobility, the DF-31AG would be less susceptible to counterforce attack since it could scatter to a greater range of hidden locations.

[Source]

3.2.3 Dongfeng-5 Variants

DF-5A

The development cycle of the DF-5 (DF-5A) began in 1966 and China conducted its first limited test of the missile in 1971. It completed its first full test flight in May 1980 and began operational service in 1981. 

The DF-5 has an effective range of 12,000km (7,456 miles) and can be equipped with a 1-3 megaton nuclear warhead.

[Source]

DF-5B

The DF-5B is identical to the DF-5A but can carry MIRVed warheads. MIRV, or Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle, warheads allow a ballistic missile to target multiple locations with a single missile by splitting the payload into several independent warheads.

[Source]

DF-5C

Media reports emerged in January 2017 that a new variant of the DF-5 had been developed increasing the number of MIRV warheads from 3 to 10. This would significantly increase the targeting capabilities of the DF-5 as it would allow for more targets to be input.

[Source]

3.2.4 Dongfeng-4

The DF-4s development began in 1965 and was originally designed to strike US military bases in Guam. However, following the clashes along the Sino-Soviet border in 1969 its range was extended to be able to strike Moscow.

With an estimated range between 4,500km-5,500 km, it can accommodate a single nuclear warhead with a yield between 1-3 megatons.

[Source]

3.3 Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs)

An Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) is a ballistic missile with a range of 3,000-5,500 km (1,864-3,418 miles). The IRBMs progenitor missile was the A4b rocket designed and based on the V-2 rocket produced by Nazi Germany as a part of the Aggregat series of ballistic missiles designed and developed between 1933-1945. 

[Source]

3.3.1 Dongfeng-26

The DF-26 is a road-mobile IRBM with a range of 4,000 km and can be armed with a conventional or nuclear warhead. An anti-ship variant, the DF-26B, was tested in 2020. 

[Source]

3.4 Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs)

A Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) is a type of ballistic missile with a maximum range between 1,000-3,000 km (620-1,860 miles).

[Source]

3.4.1 Dongfeng-21 Variants

The DF-21 was the first solid-fuel road-mobile missile which entered service with the PLARF to replace the DF-2. It has a short launch time and can be equipped with a 600kg payload. It has a minimum range of 500km (311 miles) and a maximum range of 2,150km (1336 miles)

The PLARF uses several variants of this missile such as:

• DF-21A – Nuclear warhead MRBM operational since 1996
• DF-21C – Conventional MRBM warhead with a likely reported range of 2,150km
• DF-21D (ASBM)  – Anti-ship/conventional warhead with a range between 1,450-1,550km
• DF-21E – Nuclear warhead (Reported to have been developed but not revealed)

[Source, source]

3.5 Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs)

A Short-Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM) is a ballistic missile with a range of 1,000km (620 miles) or less and is generally used for tactical targeting.

[Source] 

3.5.1 Dongfeng-16

The DF-16 is a road-mobile, solid-fueled, SRBM first publicly displayed during a 2015 military parade. With a range between 800-1,000 km, it originally began development in the 2000s by the CASIC Academy of Launch Technology. It can be equipped with a variety of warheads such as:

• Conventional unitary explosive warheads
• Cluster munition warheads
• Bunker-busting warheads

The PLARF operates three different variants of the DF-16, the baseline DF-16 variant and two equipped with manoeuvring warheads known as the DF-16 Mod-1 (A) and Mod-2 (B).

3.5.2 Dongfeng-15 Variants

The DF-15 is a single-stage, solid-propellant SRBM with a range of up to 600km. It can be equipped with a variety of warheads including:

• Conventional unitary explosive warheads
• Manoeuvring warheads
• Cluster munition warheads
• Bunker-busting warheads

[Source]

DF-15A

The DF-15A is an improved variant of the DF-15 with a range of 600km. It uses an inertial guidance system and is reported to be nuclear-capable.

[Source]

DF-15B

The DF-15B possesses a finned warhead capable of manoeuvres at terminal speeds. Reports state that it incorporates a radar-correlation terminal guidance system and has a reported range greater than 725km. It is also reported to be accurate up to within 30 metres of its target site.

[Source]

DF-15C

Revealed in 2013, the DF-15C variant has a reported range of over 850 km. It carries an earth-penetrating, or bunker-busting, warhead capable of penetrating 25 meters of reinforced concrete.

[Source]

3.5.3 Dongfeng-12 (M20)

The DF-12 is an SRBM originally designed for export. It has an advertised range of 280km and was first put on sale in 2011 and entered service with the PLARF in 2013. Domestic variants of the missile are estimated to reach ranges of over 400km. Qatar is the only other known user of the DF-12/M20.

It features a variety of warheads such as:

• High-explosive
• Earth-penetrating (bunker busting)
• Thermobaric
• Cluster munitions

[Source]

3.5.4 Dongfeng-11 (M11) Variants

The DF-11 is a SRBM with a range of up to 600km and the export version, the M-11, is used by both Pakistan and Iran. It features a variety of warheads such as:

• Nuclear 2/10/20 kilotonnes
• High explosive
• Cluster munitions
• Thermobaric
• Chemical

[Source]

DF-11A

The DF-11A is an improved variant of the DF-11 and can carry a 500kg payload over a distance between 500-600km.

[Source]

DF-11AZT

The DF-11AZT is thought to be a variant of the DF-11A which features an earth-penetrating, or bunker-busting, warhead. It reportedly entered service with the PLARF before 2013.

[Source]

3.5.5 B-611 and Variants

The B-611 is an SRBM developed by  China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC) and has a reported range of 150-400km (93-249 miles). 

It has several variants, including ones produced by Turkey, and these are:

• B-611 – Range of 250–280 km (160–170 mi) and a 500 kg (1,100 lb) warhead. [Source]
• B-611M – Upgraded B-611 with a 480 kg (1,060 lb) warhead and a range of 80–260 km (50–162 mi). [Source]
• B-611MR – Anti-radiation missile which has a GPS-inertial guidance system and wideband passive radar. [Source]
• P-12 – A lighter variant of the B-611 it can carry an HE (High-explosive) fragmentation or blast warhead. [Source]
• BP-12 – Variant of the B-611 which features satellite guidance. [Source]
• BP-12A – Estimated range of 300-400km (190-250 miles) and a 480kg warhead. The missile can be integrated into the SY-400 missile launcher. [Source, source]
• BP-12B – This variant has a range of up to 295km and uses radar and infrared homing technology in order to hit slow moving targets like ships. [Source]
• Bora – China and Turkey developed the Bora as a tactical ballistic missile through their joint missile program. It has a range of 80-280 km and can be equipped with a High Explosive (HE) or fragmentation warhead. Its export version is known as ‘Khan’. [Source, source]
• J-600T Yıldırım – the J-600T Yıldırım is an SRBM developed by the Roketsan Turkish defence company based on the B-611. It has several variants which include:
  • J-600T Yıldırım I – 150km range [Source]
  • J-600T Yıldırım II – 300km range [Source]
  • J-600T Yıldırım III – 900km range [Source]

3.6 Cruise Missiles

A cruise missile is an unmanned self-propelled guided missile designed to deliver a large warhead over long distance with high precision. They can be equipped with a variety of warheads including:

• Conventional
• Nuclear
• Chemical
• Biological

[Source]

3.6.1 CJ-10

The CJ-10 is a Chinese, Land Attack Cruise Missile (LACM) developed and derived from the Kh-55 Soviet cruise missile. The China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation and the China Haiying Electro-Mechanical Technology Academy reportedly manufacture it. With an operational range of 1,500 km, it can carry either conventional or nuclear warheads.

There are several variants operated by the PLARF which include:

• CJ-10 – The baseline variant, known as the DH-10 during the prototype phase. [Source]
• CJ-10A – Reportedly a stealthier, more accurate version of the CJ-10 LACM.

[Source, source, source]

3.6.2 CJ-100

The CJ-100 also known as the DF-100 is a Chinese, long-range high-supersonic LACM. It has an operational range ranging from 2,000-3,000km (1,200-1,900 miles) and can reach speeds of Mach 4-5.

[Source]

4 Key Figures of the PLARF

4.1 General Wang Houbin (王厚斌)

General Wang Houbin (王厚斌) is a former vice admiral of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) and as of July 2023, he is the serving commander of the PLARF. He had previously served as the Deputy Chief of Staff of the East China Sea Fleet and as the Deputy Commander of the Zhoushan Base. [Source]

4.2 General Xu Xisheng (徐西盛)

General Xu Xisheng (徐西盛) is currently serving as the political commissar of the PLARF and once served as the commissar of the Air Force Fuzhou Command Post. [Source]

4.3 General Sun Jinming (孙金明)

General Sun Jinming (孙金明) has served in several roles prior to becoming the Chief Of Staff of the PLARF. He was however expelled by the CCP Central Committee during a plenary session in July 2024. [Source]

4.4 General Wei Fenghe (魏凤和)

General Wei Fenghe (魏凤和) is a retired general who had served as the commander of the PLARF prior to being investigated and removed by the Central Military Commission on charges of corruption. [Source]

5 Tactical-Operational Information of the PLARF

5.1 Roles of the PLARF

The PLARF has two main roles which are acting as a strategic deterrence and also being able to carry out second-strike engagements in the events of nuclear war.

5.1.1 Strategic Deterrence

Strategic deterrence is the practice of using nuclear weapons to convince another party in a conflict to not engage in violence for fear of being obliterated by nuclear weapons.

Kenneth Waltz, an American political scientist stated that there are three requirements for successful nuclear deterrence

1. Part of a state’s nuclear arsenal must appear to be able to survive an attack by the adversary and be used for a retaliatory second strike
2. The state must not respond to false alarms of a strike by the adversary
3. The state must maintain command and control

[Source]

5.1.2 Second Strike 

A second strike, also known as a retaliatory strike is a country’s ability to respond to a nuclear attack with a retaliatory nuclear strike against the attacking country. 

States have diversified their capabilities in terms of nuclear weapons to include forms of strike capabilities which can still operate in the event of conflict breaking out. This includes nuclear-armed submarines aswell as high-tech HGV missiles which are often too fast for detection systems to give adequate warnings.

[Source]

5.2 Notable Engagements

5.2.1 Third Taiwan Strait Crisis 1995

The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis occurred after a series of missile tests carried out in 1995 by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), following the granting of a visa to President Lee Teng-hui of the Republic of China (ROC).

When the US granted President Lee of the ROC his visa to visit the US the CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin announced that missile tests would be conducted by the PLA (PLARF forces contributed to this).

From 21 July to 28 July 1995, the Second Artillery Corps (SAC – Forerunner organisation of the PLARF) conducted a round of missile tests and launches in an area 36 miles north of Taiwan.

On 21 July the SAC launched two DF-15 missiles 70 nautical miles from the coast of Taiwan and the next day they fired two more at an area 40 miles north. Two days later the SAC fired two more in the same area and the PRC began concentrating naval forces in the area of the strait and began conducting military exercises. 

Between July and December 1995, the US responded to the missile tests by the PRC by sending several ships including the USS Belleau Wood, USS O’Brien and the USS Nimitz through the Taiwan Strait in a show of force.

[Source, source, source, source, source]

5.2.2 Third Taiwan Strait Crisis 1996

Between January and February of 1996, the PRC concentrated 100,000 soldiers along the strait and began conducting large-scale exercises.

On 8 March the PRC (and likely the SAC) launched more missiles off the coast of the ports of Keelung and Kaohsiung, where 70 percent of Taiwan’s commercial shipping had been disrupted.

In response, US President Bill Clinton on the same day, announced that the USS Independence and Carrier Group Five would deploy to the waters near Taiwan.

From 18 March to 25 March, the PRC conducted military exercises, including guided missile destroyers, submarines and 150,000 troops at Pingtan Island. These exercises were focused on amphibious landings and also included paratrooper exercises.

[Source, source, source]

5 Conclusion 

The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) is China’s strategic and tactical missile force. It is responsible for China’s expansive arsenal of land-based ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missiles and its nuclear arsenal. Formed in 1966, it has evolved, into an essential component of the Chinese Army. With the PRC beginning to develop and equip the PLARF with advanced weaponry including newly developed Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs) such as the DZ-ZF, it is poised to be China’s strategic deterrence against its enemies and may also pose a sever threat to Taiwanese and US forces in the outbreak of conflict in the Taiwan Strait.