Executive Summary

NATO allies — primarily Poland and Romania, with Denmark participating early — have begun integrating the U.S.-supported MEROPS counter-drone capability after repeated Russian drone incursions along NATO’s eastern flank. The system was publicly demonstrated in Poland in November 2025 and is designed to intercept small unmanned aerial systems (UAS) quickly and at a lower cost than conventional air-defence weapons.

MEROPS is a small, mobile interceptor that uses one drone to stop another. It can find and follow small UAVs using sensors, working even when electronic signals are being jammed. It can either bring the drone down itself or pass the target to other air-defence systems.

Since November 2025, Romania has moved from testing the system toward putting it into service, while Poland is building a wider national counter-drone network planned for 2026–2027. This suggests MEROPS should be seen as an initial operating tool inside a larger, layered air-defence structure, not a complete solution on its own.

At the same time, several European countries are pursuing similar low-cost defences based on experience from the war in Ukraine. Taken together, these steps indicate NATO is moving toward a model that relies on many inexpensive systems, quick reaction, and multiple defensive layers to deal with small drones.

Key Judgements

KJ-1. Poland and Romania’s deployment of MEROPS reflects NATO’s concern over recent Russian drone activity along its eastern flank.

1. Romania has moved from testing toward operational integration, transitioning from experimental capability to a standing defensive posture. [source, source]
2. Poland and Romania are deploying the U.S. developed MEROPS counter-drone system to defend against Russian drones, according to Associated Press reports citing NATO officials and Poland’s Defence Minister. Warsaw began testing the systems in November, and Bucharest began testing them the month before with U.S participation, with the aim of integrating them with NATO command and control structures under stricter standards to ensure compatibility. [source, source, source, source]
3. Denmark has also adopted the MEROPS, indicating that more allies are beginning to integrate this system. [source]
4. Approximately 20 Russian drones entered Polish and other NATO airspaces in early September alone. [source, source, source, source]

KJ-2. MEROPS provides mobile, AI-enabled drone detection and interception that can operate irrespective of jamming efforts, demonstrating NATO’s fledgling reliance on AI and automation to fight drones and raising questions about command authority guidelines.

1. NATO describes the MEROPS system as a small and compact enough “to fit in the back of a midsize pickup truck,” allowing quick protection of bases, borders, and airports. [source, source, source, source]
2. NATO officials stress that MEROPS uses artificial intelligence (AI) to detect drones that are difficult to see on conventional military radars, even when satellite and electronic communications are jammed. [source, source]
3. NATO officials stressed the operational importance of giving commanders time “to assess the threat and decide—shoot or not shoot,” indicating continued emphasis on human decision points even with automation. [source, source, source]
4. NATO’s AI strategy emphasizes reliance on AI-driven target classification and interception brings potential accountability challenges in decision-making under NATO’s AI Strategy and Article 5 operational handling. [source, source]

KJ-3. The procurement and deployment of MEROPS highlight NATO’s awareness of cost-benefits and its need for cheaper counter-drone systems, not temporary, and its direction towards commercial solutions backed by investments from high-profile figures.

1. NATO officials say the MEROPS system is a much cheaper way to stop drones than using F-35 fighter jets or high-end surface-to-air missiles (SAM). [source, source, source]
2. NATO’s and EU talks of a “drone wall” reflect increasing emphasis on low-cost unmanned threat mitigation rather than traditional air defence becoming an enduring capability line, not a temporary patch. [source, source, source]
3. MEROPS’s mobile design and AI-enabled detection fit directly into NATO’s layered short-range air defense (SHORAD) and ground-based air defense (GBAD) structure. [source]
4. Several media outlets attribute the system’s development to a U.S. program with private investment participation by former Google CEO Eric Schmidt, who secretly tested AI military drones in a Silicon Valley suburb in 2024 and later signed a long-term strategic partnership with Ukraine in July 2025. [source, source, source, source]

KJ-4. NATO is likely to expand MEROPS, and other established anti-drone systems, across its eastern flank in 2026 if deployments prove reliable, and it could become an essential component of NATO’s “drone-wall” strategy. 

1. EU officials are discussing a “drone wall” framework to protect Europe’s eastern border, and Merops is featured in this initiative. [source, source, source]
2. Romania’s current political messaging emphasizing Black Sea counter-drone and air-defence needs suggests geographic prioritization may expand from the land eastern flank to the Black Sea area. [source, source]
3. NATO’s broader eastern flank reinforcement, as in Operation Eastern Sentry, provides the broader strategic structure in which MEROPS operate. [source, source, source]
4. Denmark’s adoption alongside Poland and Romania signals early integration potential and offers a model for wider Allied procurement through 2026, but not necessarily a single-system standard across the flank. [source, source, source, source]
5. The emergence of a multinational European low-cost air-defence initiative (LEAP) signals that 2026 may bring additional complementary low-cost effectors and C-UAS solutions into effect.
6. Danish defence companies MyDefence and Weibel are producing jamming devices and drone-tracking technology, which may complement MEROPS within a broader counter-drone architecture. [source]
7. Additionally, French defence firm Atreyd has shipped to Ukraine a “drone wall” system built from AI-guided FPV interceptors that work in GPS-denied environments, offering another low-cost model similar to the MEROPS system. [source]

Statement on Analysis

Overall confidence in this assessment is moderate to high, based on open-source reporting from NATO, national defence ministries, and reliable international media. Confidence in the system’s technical performance and future expansion (KJ-4) is moderate, as many MEROPS specifications remain classified or come from secondary sources.

The analysis assumes that MEROPS represents a new wave of affordable, AI-enabled defence tools that NATO can plug into its existing short-range air defence networks. While real-world data remains limited, early indicators show that MEROPS could reshape NATO’s counter-drone approach by combining commercial technology, mobility, and autonomy in one system. Variables that could affect our analysis include the effectiveness of the systems on the battlefield and any effort by competitors to sell to NATO counter-drone systems that are more effective or less expensive.

Intelligence Cut-Off Date: 20 February 2026