Executive Summary

Venezuela’s military has critical readiness shortfalls as it faces Washington’s increased pressure on the South Caribbean through counternarcotics deployments. Miraflores air force assets are seriously limited in offensive capability and defence structure, with some combat groups having only three available fighters—with unguided ordinance—and the main drone unit of the force out of operational readiness status. Half of the country’s long-range air detection radars are out of service due to a lack of spare parts.

Constrained by a limited number of available vessels, the Venezuelan Navy’s current response is seemingly limited to coastal defence through patrol boats and corvette cutters concentrated along the maritime corridor between Nueva Esparta and Delta Amacuro. Compounding the drawbacks in sea and air, the Venezuelan Army is also facing logistical issues—including extensive ammunition diversity in the local arsenal and the resulting incompatibility among infantry and artillery formations—that are likely to hinder conventional deployment of larger forces at the national level. 

Key Judgements

KJ-1. Venezuela Aviation’s operational readiness is in critical condition, with minimal defence infrastructure and deficient offensive capabilities.

1. The Venezuelan Military Aviation only had three to four operational F-16s under the 16th Fighter Air Group as of July 2025. These airframes lack air-to-ground offensive capabilities, with payload limited to unguided ordnance. [source, source]
2. The 83rd Unmanned Aerial Systems Squadron and the Francisco de Miranda Control and Vigilance Eight Group do not have the operational readiness necessary to conduct combat missions, according to Grey Dynamics’ source on the ground. [source]
3. Miami Strategic Institute’s proprietary sources inside the Venezuelan Military Aviation reported in June 2025 that at least 50% of JYL-1 and JY-11B long-range air detection radars are out of service due to a lack of spare parts. [source]

KJ-2. Despite limited available vessels, the Venezuelan Navy will likely focus its efforts on coastal defence along the Nueva Esparta-Delta Amacuro maritime corridor.

1. Venezuela deployed the oceanic corvette Guaiquerí Kariña (PC-14) and the Agustín Armario (PG-62) patrol vessel to Nueva Esparta island around September 2, 2025, five days after the U.S. kinetic strike on the Tren de Aragua unmarked boat. [source]
2. Defence Minister Vladimir Padrino on 7 September announced that a military operation is underway along the eastern coastline, with Nueva Esparta and Delta Amacuro states receiving additional vessels and manpower.  [source]
3. Satellite imagery obtained by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in May 2024 displays increased activity on Venezuela’s eastern coast, with Zolfaghar missile boats and Fraile landing ships being unloaded in Guiria. [source]

KJ-3. The Venezuelan Army’s logistical shortcomings are likely to hinder conventional deployments on a national scale, with ground mobilisation being contained to small units at a local level.

1. South American military expert and research director Andrei Serbin Pont shared with Grey Dynamics that the Venezuelan Army is capable of mobilising small units at local level through the “Unidades de Reacción Rápida,” but currenlty lacks the structure to project larger forces on a national scale. [source]
2. Serbin Pont also noted that ammunition supply issues inside the Venezuelan Army improved from 2021 to 2025, but the extensive logistical diversity among available weapons platforms remains a handicap in the logistical structure of the ground forces, particulary infrantry and art. [source]
3. According to Reuters, an assessment by Brazilian military commanders in 2024 concluded that Venezuela does not have the military capability to sustain conventional operations in peer-to-peer conflicts due to “little logistical capacity.” [source]

Statement on Analysis

Grey Dynamics’ assessment of the Venezuelan military’s current defences and operational readiness is grounded on publicly available information— ranging from satellite imagery to online reports—human ground reporting from proprietary sources, and an interview with an expert. The strength of the reporting, coupled with Grey Dynamic’s analyst’s nine years in country and deep knowledge of the local military situation, gives us high confidence that all Venezuelan military branches have a critically low operational readiness. We have not identified additional variables that could change our analysis in the near term, but we are monitoring one that could further strengthen our assessment. Conscription of civilians into the militia (confirmed by human sources on the ground) may increase pressure on the logistics infrastructure. 

Intelligence Cut-Off Date: 09 September 2025