Executive Summary

Canada’s willingness to exist in a state of dependency on allies for foreign intelligence, providing reciprocal support where it can, has allowed it to delay the adoption of its own outward-facing, foreign-deployed service. While this approach has reduced pressure to build independent capabilities, it has created some limitations in its national security capabilities as Canada faces hostile foreign intelligence operations from China, Russia, and India, alongside the evolving risks of disinformation and radicalisation.

Decades-long policy discussions in Ottawa about creating a dedicated Canadian foreign intelligence service are not showing signs of movement towards implementation, and we expect any tangible progress towards realisation to fall out along a decade-long horizon. Meanwhile, we are not seeing indications that Ottawa’s stated concerns about the reliability of the U.S. as an intelligence partner under the current administration in Washington are resulting in any changes in its willingness to continue relying on the strongest Five Eyes partner, unlike some other allies.

Key Judgements

KJ-1. Canada’s willingness to exist in a state of dependency on allies for foreign intelligence, providing reciprocal support where it can, has allowed it to delay the adoption of its own outward-facing, foreign deployed HUMINT service, despite creating some limitations in its national security capabilities. 

1. Canada remains the only G7 country without a dedicated foreign intelligence agency like the CIA or MI6, relying instead on its membership in the Five Eyes network and shared information from allies like the U.S. and U.K., for strategic external insights on foreign HUMINT. [source]
2. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s (CSIS) enabling legislation requires it to focus on domestic threats—including terrorism, espionage, and subversion—and limits its foreign collection activities, such as WMD counterproliferation, to instances requested by other departments. [source]
3. A former senior CSIS officer who spoke to Grey Dynamics about the lack of a professionalised core of trained foreign intelligence collectors cited as a cautionary tale China’s detention in 2018 of a Canadian businessman and a Canadian former diplomat on espionage charges, a case that has become known as “The Two Michaels.” [source]
4. King’s College London’s Dr Kevin O’Brien points out that Canada’s unique position within the Five Eyes, relying on that collective and NATO for its intelligence needs, means it is a net consumer, a status that does not require certain in-house capabilities, which has fundamentally shaped Canada’s approach to intelligence. [source]
5. That said, Ottawa contributes wherever it can. In October 2024, CSIS, alongside Five Eyes Intelligence partners, launched a shared security advice initiative for tech companies, researchers and investors to protect them from foreign state-actor interference. In 2019, Canada’s SIGINT and cyber and information technology security agency, the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), provided valuable cyber threat information to the UK, regarding the UK’s general election, to “help defend against cyber threats directed at democratic processes.” [source, source]

KJ-2. Decades-long policy discussions within the Canadian government about creating a dedicated foreign intelligence service are not showing signs of movement towards implementation; we do not expect any progress towards realisation before 2030, absent the rise of unforeseen game-changing factors.

1. Canada’s lack of a dedicated foreign intelligence service has been a recurring policy debate for decades, with little movement toward institutionalisation. [source]
2. Canada’s hesitancy about HUMINT is based on concern for liberal-democratic norms after the 1981 McDonald Royal Commission found that officers of the security service of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) had flagrantly broken laws. The commission’s resulting recommendations led to the withdrawal of the RCMP’s national security mandate and the creation of CSIS in 1984, separating intelligence collection from law enforcement. [source]
3. Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) analysis notes calls to create a foreign-intelligence capability. To date, no Canadian statute establishes a foreign HUMINT service, and CSIS’s foreign-intelligence authority remains limited to collection inside Canada under section 16 of the CSIS Act. [source]
4. Policy experts and official reviews have flagged Canada’s foreign-HUMINT gap: Wesley Wark, at the CIGI, argued that Canada needs a foreign spy agency; Vincent Rigby (former National Security and Intelligence Adviser to the Prime Minister), Stephanie Carvin (Professor of International Relations, Carleton University), and Thomas Juneau (Professor, University of Ottawa) urged creating a Canadian foreign HUMINT service; and in April 2025 the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) stated its findings “evoke a renewed conversation on a dedicated Canadian foreign intelligence agency.” [source, source, source]

KJ-3. We are not seeing indications that Ottawa’s stated concerns about the reliability of the U.S. as an intelligence partner under the current administration in Washington are resulting in any changes in its willingness to continue relying on the strongest Five Eyes partner, unlike other allies.

1. Five-Eyes members have expressed concern about the reliability of the U.S. as an intelligence partner under the current administration and several allies, including the U.K., have announced plans to stop sharing intelligence with Washington. Canada informed the U.S that it does not want its intelligence used in the ongoing targeting of boats in the Caribbean, according to press reports. Additionally, the Netherlands and Colombia have also curtailed intelligence sharing with the US. [source, source, source, source]
2. In September, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney stated that Canada’s old relationship with the U.S., “based on deepening integration of our economies and tight security and military cooperation, is over.” Six months prior, in March, he stated that the US leak of classified military plans by senior US officials means that US allies must “look out for ourselves.” [source, source]
3. In February, Vincent Rigby, a former top intelligence adviser to Prime Minister Trudeau, stated that he fears that the U.S. may weaponise intelligence sharing to leverage to negotiate increased defence spending from Canada. That same month, White House official Peter Navarro, one of U.S. President Donald Trump’s closest advisors, proposed expelling Canada from the Five-Eyes. [source, source]

Statement on Analysis

We have high confidence in our key judgments based on the depth and breadth of reporting, which includes our interview of a former CSIS officer, analytic reports by policy experts and think tanks. We have not seen opposing narratives expressed publicly from within the government or the intelligence community. That said, areas of uncertainty in our assessment include a lack of available information about internal government deliberations on prioritising a foreign intelligence service, limited information regarding Canadian intelligence sharing and the potential for classified planning not reflected in open sources. 

Potential variables that could force Canadian leaders’ hands and accelerate Ottawa’s willingness to consider a dedicated foreign intelligence service sooner than the current decade-long horizon include any national security tragedy (a 9-11 type incident), continuing mercurial behaviour in Washington, and increased hostility by Russia or China that leads to a definitive decision on a need for a new, independently capable service and reduced reliance on partners. 

Intelligence Cut-Off Date: 23 November 2025