Executive Summary

The armed conflict between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and the Jubaland administration does not show any indications of de-escalating, despite mediation from mutual ally Kenya. The FGS and Jubaland administration likely require continued military coordination to recover towns captured by Al-Shabaab in July 2025. 

The FGS hosts a unique fragmentary political and economic dynamic; it has six federal member states, two of which are the semi-autonomous Jubaland state and Puntland state, including the self-declared Republic of Somaliland. Since July 2025, the FGS and the Jubaland administration have engaged in a violent conflict that has resulted in the deaths of civilians. This will likely continue unabated, unless allied countries initiate immediate mediation.

Somalia is also the victim of the Al Qaeda-linked Islamist extremist group Al-Shabaab. In July 2025 alone, they captured several strategic towns throughout Somalia, with one town that is a significant gateway to other towns, including regions under the Jubaland administration. To recover the towns captured by Al-Shabaab, the FGS and the Jubaland administration must continue coordinating their military action.

Putland, Somaliland and Jubaland are home to a wealth of resources, including hydrocarbons and critical rare earth minerals. The economic potential for growth has attracted a range of countries and non-state actors that are all vying for control of these natural resources. Incidents have included Islamic State Militants operating throughout the Puntland and a UAE drone striking a clan leader opposed to their access to Puntland’s gold and mineral deposits. 

Key Judgements

KJ-1. We do not see indications that the armed conflict between the Federal Government of Somalia and the Jubaland administration will wind down in the coming three-to-five months, despite mediation by allies.

1. As of November, one year after the Jubaland presidential election in 2024, Jubaland President Ahmed Mohamed Islam is still not recognised by the FGS due to its view that the election was illegal and its rejection of the contest’s authority. [source]
2. On 6 October, negotiations between the FGS and the Jubaland administration ended in a deadlock. A Kenyan mediation team is facilitating the process, engaging in an intensive shuttle diplomacy strategy aimed at bridging the gap between governments. [source]
3. In August, the Jubaland administration accused the FGS of attempting to establish an administration in the Jubaland region of Gedo, in the town of Garbaharey. [source] 
4. In July, the FGS in appointed former Jubaland Security Minister Abdirashid Janaan as head of Somalia’s National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) in the Gedo region. This sparked fierce clashes between Jubaland regional forces and Federal troops, resulting in the deaths of more than 30 people, including civilians. That same month, the FGS deployed additional troops to the Gedo region and seized control of Beled-Hawo town. [source, source, source, source]
   

KJ-2. Meanwhile, to recover towns captured by Al-Shabaab in July, the FGS and Jubaland administration likely are required to continue coordinating their military actions.

1. Jubaland Dervish forces in Lower Juba, in coordination with the SNA’s Danab commandos, on 29 November launched a series of operations targeting Al-Shabaab that resulted in the killing of a local senior Al-Shabaab leader Farab Jibril and seven other terrorists. [source]
2. This action followed Al-Shabaab’s 28 July capture of the town of Maxaas, some 300km from Mogadishu. [source]
3. Three weeks prior, on 9 July, Al-Shabaab recaptured the town of Moqokori following clashes in that town with the Somali National Army (SNA). This town is strategically located, acting as the gateway to many other significant towns in the Hiraan region. [source, source]
   

KJ-3. The existence of critical resources in Putland, Jubaland, and Somaliland will likely attract state and non-state actors vying for economic gain.

1. In late December, U.S. ally Israel recognized Somaliland as an independent nation. This follows the Somali breakaway region’s offer in July to give the U.S. its critical minerals and land at the entrance to the Red Sea for a military base in exchange for recognition as an independent country. [source, source]
2. In September, a UAE drone strike in North Eastern Somalia killed Omar Abdullahi Abdi, a respected clan leader who refused to endorse a resource deal granting the UAE access to Puntland’s gold and mineral deposits in the Al Madow mountain range. [source]
3. In August, security forces in the semi-autonomous region of Puntland discovered Islamic State networks of caves and bunkers, including a bomb factory used to assemble loitering munitions, drones, rockets and suicide vests. Eight months prior, in December 2024, Puntland launched a new offensive to constrain the growing Islamic State insurgent presence in their area, where it is estimated that as many as 1,200 Islamic State militants are strategically positioned in the Bari mountains. [source, source] 
4. The Jubaland corridor, specifically Lower Juba and Gedo, is integral to regional annual trade worth USD $500 million. Resources identified in Gedo include hydrocarbons and rare earth minerals, whereas the Juba Delta has titanium sands. Kenya’s reliance on secure access to this corridor underpins its trade. Relatedly, Nairobi’s resource ambitions were undercut by Mogadishu in 2021 when an International Court of Justice maritime ruling recognised Somalia’s claims over a significant amount of the Indian Ocean seabed.  [source, source]

Statement on Analysis

We have a high level of confidence in our key judgments, given the quality, depth, and breadth of the reporting available in public sources. That said, we acknowledge that tribal biases may exist in some local Somali news sources and that gaps in information may cloud our understanding of some aspects of the situation. 

Our analysis rests, to some degree, on the assumption that all actors’ actions, from Islamic State to the UAE, will continue along their current and historical trajectories. Another assumption is that the FGS and Jubaland military forces cannot contain Al-Shabaab independently and require military coordination. 

One possible future event that could alter the line of analysis would be any peace-building dialogue that might spring from the continued coordination of counter-terrorism operations between the FGS and the Jubaland administration. 

Intelligence Cut-Off Date: 28 December 2025