Executive Summary 

Recent US airstrikes in Syria targeted senior operatives of Al-Qaeda affiliate Hurras al-Din (HaD). Key figures such as Muhammad Salah al-Za’bir and Wasim Tahsin Bayraqdar died in these strikes. These operations highlight the determination of the US to destroy what remains of the group, despite its declaration of dissolution in January 2025. The disbandment proclamation occurred during the rapidly shifting Syrian landscape, after the fall of the Assad regime and former ally Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham’s (HTS) increasing dominance. The concurrent group’s calls for the continuation of armed resistance sparked concerns, including sowing doubt about the claim to have dispersed. 

Images Sourced From: Enab Baladi

Key Judgements

KJ-1. The killing of senior Hurras al-Din operatives likely reflects the new US administration’s strategic effort to bolster counterterrorism in Syria.

1. US Central Command (CENTCOM) on 21 February killed senior HaD operative Wasim Tahsin Bayraqdar. [source]
2. A CENTCOM airstrike in Syria on 30 January 2025 killed senior HaD operative Muhammad Salah al-Za’bir. CENTCOM Commander General Michael Erik Kurilla characterised the operation as part of a broader plan to pursue and destroy regional terrorist threats. [source, source, source]
3. U.S. forces, in the month following HaD’s declaration of its dissolution on 28 January 2025, conducted five airstrikes against HaD members. [source]
4. The new US administration pays careful attention to the developments in Syria. The State Department continues considering possible areas of engagement and released statements focusing on addressing “Islamist extremism” in the region. The strikes on HaD match this stated commitment. [source]

KJ-2. Hurras al-Din’s announcement of dissolution likely was driven by the shifting power and political dynamics in Syria, but the group’s future remains unclear.

1. HaD cited the deposition of the “tyrant” Assad regime as one reason for its decision to disband. [source]
2. The group’s failure to participate meaningfully in the offensive overthrowing Assad is viewed as a sign of their decreasing influence and a cause for further loss of significance in the post-Assad Syrian landscape. [source]
3. HaD’s influence in Syria began to diminish after HTS began administering Idlib. HTS since 2020 has been increasingly less tolerant towards hardline jihadist groups, partly due to their distancing from Al-Qaeda. [source]

KJ-3. The group’s members are likely to continue posing a threat to local stability, despite the recent, severe setbacks. 

1. The continuing presence of former HaD members, former al-Qaeda affiliates, in the region following the group’s announcement of dissolution raises concerns for Syria’s ongoing, delicate transition process. [source]
2. HaD, in its dissolution statement, urged Sunnis in Syria to keep their weapons. [source]
3. HaD has a history of periods of dormancy, such as a time after 2020, raising suspicion regarding the permanency of any disbandment. [source]

Statement on Analysis

This analysis is based upon various sources, including CENTCOM press releases, international press, and regional outlets. The targeting of HaD operatives in the first months of 2025 aligns with the tightening of counterterrorism efforts by the new US administration. Nonetheless, no official strategic doctrine regarding this situation in Syria is available yet. There is little to no transparency around HaD’s internal dynamics and decision-making, and no reliable reporting on what is left of its structure.

We assume that HaD’s official dissolution reflects, to some degree, a concrete structural breakdown. Nonetheless, the possibility of deception or even attempts to rebrand cannot be excluded. A number of future events could alter the current analysis. Namely, Israel’s increasing presence in Syria, HTS’ policy shifts and public stance, and US strategic engagement in the country might change HaD’s future and threat levels quite significantly. 

Intelligence Cut-Off Date: [18 April 2025]