Russian Glide Bombs: From Dumb to Deadly

Russian MoD video that shows UMPK-equipped 500kg-class FAB-500 M-62 high-explosive bombs just after release from a VKS Su-34 strike fighter.

In early 2023, Russia increasingly turned to the use of glide bombs in Ukraine. Glide bombs allow a so-called dumb munition to be turned into a precision weapon by adding an unfolding wing and a guidance system. These bombs can travel for miles, allowing aircraft to launch them out of range of air defences. Russian glide bombs’ low cost and high damage potential severely impact military and civilian infrastructure near the front line. Ukraine’s capacity to combat this attritional air threat will greatly influence the conflict’s outcome.

Images Sourced From: Mil.ru, Defence Security Asia

1 What are Glide Bombs?

Commonly referred to as “glide bombs,” these munitions fall within the broader category of guided bombs, a term that simply denotes precision-guided munitions. Unlike traditional free-fall bombs, glide bombs are equipped with aerodynamic surfaces that allow them to travel extended distances after release, increasing their range and flexibility in combat. 

The advent of smart bombs—precision-guided munitions—led to the retroactive classification of older, unguided bombs as “dumb bombs.” However, modern advancements have blurred the lines between these categories. Retrofitting a dumb bomb with a guidance system does indeed transform it into a precision weapon, yet it remains a hybrid of old and new technology—one might call it a “guidance-assisted dumb bomb” (if such a term existed).

While glide bombs share a fundamental design concept, their exact configurations and operational methods vary between nations and organisations. This article exclusively focuses on Russian unpowered guided glide bombs, which use old Soviet munitions and Russia currently deploys in Ukraine.

FAB-500 attached to the wing of a SU-34.

1.1 History of Glide Bombs

While glide bombs may be a new feature to many observers, given their prevalence in Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, they have a legacy that stretches back to WWII. 

During the Spanish Civil War, Germany’s Condor Legion struggled to hit moving ships with free-fall bombs. This challenge led to the development of guided weapons, beginning in 1938, when Dr. Max Kramer of Ruhrstahl A.G. added radio-controlled spoilers to a 550 lbs (250 kg) bomb.

By 1940, this technology was integrated into the Fritz X (FX-1400), a 3,080 lbs (1,400 kg) armour-piercing bomb capable of sinking battleships. The Luftwaffe began testing it in 1942, using a level-release method from 18,000 feet. A flare on the tail allowed bombardiers to guide it via radio signals. Allied radio jamming rendered the Fritz and Hs 293 useless, limiting their effectiveness in combat.

Fritz X glide bomb.

To counter jamming, the Germans added hardwire guidance to the Hs 293 using two streamlined pods on its wing tips. The pods contained 18 km (11 miles) of fine, 0.2 mm wire with similar spools of wire attached to the launching aircraft and carrying an additional 12 km (7.5 miles) for a maximum range of 30 km (18.5 m). 

Even more impressive was the Hs 293D, which featured television guidance. Its compact transmitter package, measuring 17 x 17 x 40 cm and weighing only 130 kg, was ideal for mounting in missiles. Though susceptible to radio jamming, this innovation allowed the aircraft to take evasive action after launch, as the bombardier no longer needed a clear view of the target or missile. However, the war ended before they fully implemented these advancements. [source]

1.2 Post-War/Cold-War

Following WWII, glide bomb development largely stagnated as the U.S. and other nations prioritised nuclear weapons. However, the Korean War (1950–1953) reignited interest in precision-guided munitions, leading to the refinement of glide bomb technology. The U.S. Air Force tested the RAZON (range and azimuth only) and TARZON (a larger version with a 12,000 lb warhead), but their use was limited due to technical challenges​.

During the Cold War, advancements in electronic guidance, inertial navigation, and laser targeting transformed precision weapons. The Vietnam War marked a turning point as laser-guided bombs, such as the Paveway series, significantly improved bombing accuracy. These munitions significantly improved bombing accuracy, allowing for effective strikes on high-value targets while reducing collateral damage​. [source]

GBU-10 Paveway laser-guided bomb loaded onto an A-10A.

Beyond Vietnam, precision-guided munitions evolved through conflicts like the Yom Kippur War and Falklands War, achieving notable success. By the late Cold War, guided glide bombs like the GBU-15 used electro-optical and infrared seekers for stand-off attacks. These advancements culminated in the 1991 Gulf War, where guided bombs played a decisive role.

1.3. 1990s to Modern Day

The 1991 Gulf War marked a pivotal moment, showcasing the effectiveness of precision-guided munitions (PGMs), like the GBU-12 Paveway II and the GBU-15. The United States and its allies made significant investments in enhancing guidance systems during the 1990s. Aerial bombing was transformed with the launch of the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) in the late 1990s. Unguided bombs could be converted into GPS-guided glide bombs with day-and-night capabilities and all-weather capabilities by attaching JDAM kits to them.

Conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrated the adaptability of JDAMs, which were enhanced by the GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb (SDB), which was created for urban warfare with greater accuracy and range while causing the least amount of collateral damage.

Since the 2010s, advanced stand-off weapons like the AGM-158 JASSM and JASSM-ER have improved glide bomb technology with stealth and precision guidance. UAV adaptations provide real-time targeting updates and greater deployment flexibility. Hypersonic glide vehicles, like the AGM-183 ARRW, combine speed and maneuverability, challenging missile defenses. The focus remains on enhancing precision, range, and survivability in modern warfare.

1.2 Russian Glide Bombs in Ukraine

On 4 January 2023, reports emerged of Russia using wing-equipped general-purpose bombs in Ukraine, a year into the conflict. By 21 February, the popular Fighterbomber Telegram channel reported that the production of modular standoff bomb kits began a few months prior, and that hundreds of glide bombs had already been used. [source, source]

Ukraine officially acknowledged this development on 4 April 4 2023, when Air Force spokesperson Yurii Ihnat stated that Russia was deploying up to 20 glide bombs per day. [source]

Despite these reports, Russia did not formally confirm its use of glide bombs until 8 May 2023, when it announced that a Su-34 fighter bomber, armed with glide bombs, struck a target near Kharkiv. [source]

Two FAB-3000 and three FAB-1500 in a production facility.

2 Components of Russian Glide Bombs

2.1 High-Explosive Bombs

Most of these glide bombs originate from Russia’s vast stockpiles of Soviet-era general-purpose bombs, known by their Russian acronym FAB (High-Explosive Aviation Bombs).

Their defining feature is sheer size, with three reported variants in use. Each FAB designation ends with a number that indicates the bomb’s weight in kilograms (kg). The main variants in use are the FAB-250 (250 kg/550 lbs), FAB-500 (500 kg/1,100 lbs), and FAB-1500 (1,500 kg/3,300 lbs). The higher the bomb’s weight, the greater its explosive power, making them highly destructive when adapted into glide bombs. 

The largest, the FAB-1500, carries almost 1,500 lbs of explosives, making it quite capable of levelling buildings. For comparison, a standard Russian 152mm artillery shell contains around 17 lbs of explosives.

In July 2024, Russia equipped the FAB-3000 with glide capabilities, though it was produced in smaller numbers than its counterparts. [source]

Russian FAB-3000 dropped on to a Ukrainian position.

2.2 Universal Planning and Correction Module 

The “smart” component of Russia’s glide bomb is the UMPK, or Unifitsirovannyi Modul Planirovaniya i Korrektsii, meaning universal planning and correction module.

The core of the UMPK system is the planning module, which calculates the munition’s trajectory before launch. It factors in multiple parameters, including the bomb’s initial speed, air conditions, climatic influences, and target location.

The correction module is the key component responsible for adjusting the munition’s trajectory during flight. It achieves this through GPS and other satellite technologies, sensors that detect deviations for real-time course correction, and adaptive algorithms that respond to changing battlefield conditions.

The navigation system ensures precise targeting by integrating Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) with Inertial Navigation Systems (INS), allowing for high accuracy, even in low-visibility conditions or during signal disruptions. Additionally, it includes remote control and correction devices to enhance guidance reliability.

Additionally, rudders are attached to the tail of the munition to aid steering and to stabilise the bomb in flight, while the pop-out wings help the bomb glide to its target. [source]

FAB-250 with a failed UMPK module.

3 Glide Bomb Capabilities

3.1 Advantages

Manufacturing and procurement: Russia possesses significant stockpiles of dumb bombs that can be quickly fitted with glide components.

Cost: The UMPK unit costs approximately USD $24,460—a relatively low price for a guided munition. [source]

Stand-off capability: With a range of just under 40 miles, Russians can launch bombs without leaving their own airspace. This allows Russian aircraft to stay further away from Ukrainian surface-to-air threats.

Launch efficiency: No need for complex launch platforms, as they can be dropped from existing aircraft, which are capable of carrying and launching multiple glide bombs at once.

Difficult to destroy: Due to the small radar signature and size and lack of thermal signature, glide bombs are inherently difficult to shoot down. 

Impact: Glide bombs’ utility of GNSS provides precise targeting. If jamming or environmental factors cause off-course landings, the large explosive payload still ensures significant damage to the target.

3.2 Challenges 

Static only targets: Once dropped, Russian glide bombs trajectory is fixed; they lack the capacity to track moving targets.

Vulnerable to jamming: GNSS planning and trajectory signals are already weak by the time they reach Earth, making them vulnerable to interference. Even relatively low-power jamming signals can disrupt the guidance of an UMPK-equipped bomb by overpowering the signals they rely on. [source]

4 Ukraine’s Response to Russian Glide Bombs

4.1 Air Defences

Surface-to-air missiles seem like an obvious solution to counter Russian glide bombs, but the situation is more complex. These bombs are highly challenging for air defenses to intercept and are often deployed in large numbers simultaneously. Moving Ukraine’s best air defense systems closer to the front lines would improve accuracy but increase their vulnerability.

Despite this, President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to renew his appeal to Ukraine’s allies for additional U.S.-made Patriot air defence systems to strengthen the country’s defences against attacks. [source]

4.2 Supply Chain

Ukraine’s long-range drone strikes have successfully targeted Russian FAB bomb storage sites, with the latest attack occurring in early January. In fact, Ukraine has responded by developing its own glide bombs, adapting Western-supplied munitions for use on fighter jets to strike facilities inside Russia. However, their impact remains significantly smaller compared to Russia’s large-scale deployment. [source]

Despite efforts, Ukraine cannot eliminate glide bombs faster than Russia can produce or replenish its stockpiles. [source]

The aftermath of a Ukrainian strike on Russian industrial facilities in January 2025.

4.3 Fighter Jets

Russia’s rapid glide bomb production poses a significant challenge. Even with Western approval for Ukraine to strike inside Russia, interception mid-flight remains the most effective countermeasure.

Ultimately, Russian glide bombs are dependent on aircraft getting close enough to the frontline to drop their munitions. As a result, experts suggest that Ukraine’s allies should prioritise accelerating the delivery, support, and crew training for F-16s, which can effectively target and push back Russian jets deploying glide bombs.

Adding additional air defence fighters, such as France’s promised Mirage 2000 and Sweden’s potential Gripen, would strengthen Ukraine’s defences. However, introducing new aircraft types may overcomplicate this threat, putting additional strain on support infrastructure and supply chains. [source]

4.4 Electronic Warfare

Another strategy for defeating glide bombs is to use electronic warfare to interfere with their GPS or GNSS. Some systems are more susceptible to the effects of electronic warfare than others. Ukraine would require strong jammers to block satellite signals over a large area to safeguard vital infrastructure.

If satellite navigation fails, a glide bomb may use a backup inertial guidance system, though it’s less precise for targeting. The farther the bomb flies without satellite guidance, the more mistakes it makes. [source]

Two of Ukraine’s first F-16 fighter jets.

5 Summary

Since early 2023, Russia has ramped up the frequency of its use of glide bombs in Ukraine by modifying Soviet-era weapons with modular wings and guidance systems. By enabling standoff strikes from a safe distance, these inexpensive, high-impact weapons overwhelm Ukrainian defences and seriously harm both military and civilian infrastructure. 

Although sophisticated precision-guided munitions have advanced, Russia’s use of modular glide bomb systems, which are conceptually similar to JDAMs, highlights the continued value of flexible, affordable options in contemporary warfare. They are a sensible option in conflicts for which logistical limitations and attritional air threats are crucial, due to their demonstrated dependability, simplicity of integration, and operational flexibility. 

Ultimately, Ukraine’s ability to counter this threat will significantly influence the conflict’s trajectory. Doing so will likely require leveraging every available resource, as silver-bullet solutions are rare in the face of persistent and evolving challenges.

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