On the 24th of March 2023, Iranian-backed militias in Syria attacked a Coalition base with a suicide drone. This attack killed a contractor for the United States and injured six other American [source]. Estimates suggest that this was organised as retaliation for Israeli strikes against Iranian positions within Syria. However, the United States responded with precision strikes against Iranian-backed militia positions, avoiding Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) units [source]. While the US has entered into an escalatory cycle alongside Iran and Israel, these strikes and increasing tensions in the aftermath do not appear to have put nuclear deal negotiations off the table yet.
Key Judgement 1. The United States remains unlikely to directly target IRGC units anywhere in the Middle East within the next 3 months in order to safeguard diplomatic outreach and prevent higher-intensity retaliation.
Key Judgement 2. The United States and Iran are highly likely to continue talks at a short-term nuclear deal agreement within the next 3 months in order to prevent the production of an Iranian nuclear device within the year.
Key Judgement 3. Within the next 3 months, Iran is highly likely to launch strikes against Israeli positions through Iranian-backed militia proxies and continue its retaliation for Israeli strikes against Iranian forces.
Key Judgement 1. The United States remains unlikely to directly target IRGC units anywhere in the Middle East within the next 3 months in order to safeguard diplomatic outreach and prevent higher-intensity retaliation.
A.) The US views the cessation of Iran’s nuclear program as its highest priority objective in the region, through diplomatic, political and economic means and has not entertained military solutions yet [source].
B.) The US views the cessation of Iran’s nuclear program as its highest priority objective in the region, through diplomatic, political and economic means and has not entertained military solutions yet [source].
C.) The US has, in a rare manoeuvre, publicly acknowledged the deployment of a guided-missile submarine to the region, in order to deter escalation, rather than use it in retaliation strikes [source].
D.) US pressure on Iran’s directly owned assets has and is continuing to lean heavily on sanctions regimes, as it attempts to prevent Iran from continuing drone production [source].
KJ-2. The United States and Iran are highly likely to continue talks at a short-term nuclear deal agreement within the next 3 months.
A.) Despite continued strikes, the US has continued talks with Iranian officials over the possibility of an interim nuclear deal [source]
B.) Existing military tensions and the desire to stop Iranian drone supplies to Russia have also not prevented the US from proposing a “freeze-for-freeze scheme”, freezing sanctions in exchange for a nuclear program freeze [source].
C.) Secretary of State Anthony Blinken has stressed that the best possible option for the prevention of a nuclear capable Iran is in the formation of a deal [source].
KJ-3. Within the next 3 months, Iran is highly likely to launch strikes against Israeli positions through Iranian-backed militia proxies.
A.) Iran sees the recent Saudi-Iranian accords as a strategic victory in the region, allowing it to more directly focus on Israel [source].
B.) Hezbollah has claimed that it will use Iran’s help to turn its rocket stockpiles into precision weapons in order to better target Israel [source].
C.) Israel’s continued strikes against Iranian-backed militias and even Iranian units have sparked promises of response strikes [source].
D.) Iran is threatening to “flatten” Israel’s cities upon any further military provocation [source].
Analytical Summary: We are confident that the US will continue to attempt to pressure Iran into a new nuclear deal. We are also confident that the US will attempt to achieve this through primarily non-military means. We relied primarily on Arabic and English language sources. If provided access to data on US-Iranian communications with deeper specificity, accuracy could be improved. We assumed that Israel is unlikely to cease its attacks on Iranian units. Were this to change, we would expect to see a cessation or a slowdown in strikes. This would also be accompanied by Israel beginning to more directly support the US push for a deal.
Intelligence Cut-Off: 23 May 2023
