First sighted under construction in January this year, the Shuiqiao ships are perhaps China’s clearest signal yet that an amphibious invasion of Taiwan may not be too far away. With an uncanny resemblance to the Mulberry artificial harbours used during the D-Day landings in 1944, these Shuiqiao vessels, meaning “water bridge”, are designed to land high volumes of military vehicles, equipment, and personnel directly onto beaches. [source, source]
Images Sourced From: news.com.au
1 Background
Also known as “mobile landing pier barges” or T-LPTs (“civilian-crewed auxiliary landing platform-transfer”), the Shuiqiao ships have been identified in three sizes: Shuiqiao-185, Shuiqiao-135, and Shuiqiao-110. Each vessel is named after the length in metres when the bridge is stowed. The shortest variant, with a shallow depth below the waterline, likely serves to bridge the gap between the larger barges and the beach. Unlike commercial ships or the multi-purpose military platforms on aircraft carriers, the Shuiqiaos lack civilian utility. Moreover, their advanced features render them overqualified for humanitarian aid or disaster relief. Indeed, the Shuiqiao ships appear built for one specific purpose: an amphibious invasion of Taiwan. [source, source]
According to a 2022 report by Kevin McCauley with the China Maritime Studies Institute, a cross-Strait invasion would involve significant logistical challenges including “transport, materiel and oil supply, medical care, search and rescue, logistics infrastructure protection, and maintenance of war materiel reserves”. For much of China’s military history, it has battled with these logistical issues. Operations involving shorelines that lack accessible or welcoming port infrastructure have posed particular difficulties. With these challenges in mind, the motivation behind the Shuiqiaos is clear. While not eliminating every obstacle in complex landing scenarios, the Shuiqiaos enable China access to a larger range of territory. In doing so, the Shuiqiaos hugely enhance China’s operational flexibility. [source, source]
2 Origins and Development
2.1 Historical Context
Many maritime observers note that the Shuiqiaos largely resemble the Mulberry artificial harbours used by the Allies during the amphibious Normandy landings on D-Day in World War II. Like the Shuiqiaos, the WWII Mulberry barges were purpose-built and portable. Moreover, both models were designed to serve as mobile pontoon causeway systems for unloading vehicles and personnel ashore. Crucially, the Mulberries helped the allies avoid the inefficiencies of relying solely on smaller amphibious vessels to ferry vehicles and supplies ashore. They also bypassed the need to capture intact ports capable of dealing with large boats. [source, source]
Historically speaking, militaries tend to build specialised landing vessels like the Mulberries only shortly before deployment. This strategy both reduces maintenance costs and ensures operational readiness. The Allies completed the Mulberry barges one year before use. With such striking parallels, experts are now questioning just how soon the Shuiqiaos may be deployed. [source]
2.2 The development of the Shuiqiaos
Satellite imagery and Chinese state media indicate active construction of the Shuiqiaos at Longxue Island shipyard in Guangzhou, Guangdong since January 2025. It is worth noting, however, that a 70-metre vessel of similar design was first sighted via satellite in 2022. Though reportedly lacking propulsion, experts believe this latter sighting likely represents the initial prototype. [source]
Between February and March 2025, a set of three Shuiqiao vessels were spotted near Zhanjiang, to the west of the province, conducting sea trials and practising their assembly as a causeway-to-shore. Footage of such exercises, and of alleged invasion rehearsals, were posted on Chinese social media. These were, however, swiftly removed by Beijing censors. According to Andrew S. Erickson, a professor of strategy in the US Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI), a second trio of barges is currently underway at the Guangzhou Shipyard International (GSI) in Guangdong. Experts expect many more to follow. [source, source, source]
As the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) bring the Shuiqiao ships into service and conduct increasingly complex exercises, experts note that this progress–combined with China’s growing coordination across military, paramilitary and civilian sectors–signals a rapid improvement in China’s ability to launch a large-scale, cross-strait operation. While the readiness of the PLA largely rests on Taiwan’s defence, deterrence, and support from allies such as the US and Japan, many believe such an operation could occur sooner than previously expected. [source]
Satellite Imagery of the Shuiqiao from Planet Labs [source]
3 The Shuiqiaos’ Capabilities
3.1 Shuiqiao Function and Design
The Shuiqiao vessels operate as self-propelled Landing Platform Utility (LPU) barges. These LPUs are capable of connecting together in lines of up three vessels, forming a causeway that can reach up to 820 metres long. Satellite imagery suggests that they may have their own propulsion mechanisms, including bow radars, pilothouses, and exhaust stacks. These features therefore differentiate the Shuiqiao’s from the WWII-era Mulberries used during the D-Day landings, allowing the vessels to self-navigate and steer. Thus, the Chinese vessels are far more adaptable and versatile than those used in 1944. [source, source]
China is known for learning from historical examples. Experts assess that the PLA likely observed and learnt from the US military’s failed Gaza pier operation in June 2024. Indeed, the Shuiqiaos’ advanced features include telescoping Bailey bridges, enabling them to link together, and retractable jack-up legs (also known as “pilings”). The latter can lower and anchor into seabeds as deep as 105 feet, raising the vessel on stilts out of the water. Lifting and supporting the hull, these legs provide enough stability to withstand currents and reduce damage from powerful waves. At the ‘foot’ of each leg, ballast tanks and conical devices called spudcans aid this process. [source, source, source, source, source]
3.2 Shuiqiaos in Action
Once linked into a single extended ramp system, the Shuiqiaos’s five off-loading points allow civilian roll-on-roll-off (Ro-Ro) ferries as well as Type 072 Landing Ship Tanks (LSTs) to dock. The leading analysis on the Shuiqiao-Class landing barges published in March 2025 by J. Michael Dahm and Thomas Shugart note that the 6-metre-wide single-lane bridges can accommodate a range of vehicles, from “small tactical vehicles and trucks to 50-ton tanks and other oversized military equipment.” [source, source]
The report estimates that the Shuiqiao vessels could be capable of offloading a heavy arms battalion of around 150 vehicles from the Ro-Ro ferry, using the five off-load points, within 40 to 60 minutes. Each ship must clear the area before the next can move in, however, limiting the turnover rate. Overall, the advanced design and capabilities of the Shuiqiao barges significantly increase the potential for ship-to-shore throughput for heavy equipment, materiel, and military vehicles in rapid time. [source, source, source]
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4 Operational Utility and Limitations
While the Shuiqiao ships certainly give the PLA more flexibility in choosing landing sites along Taiwan’s coast, overcoming all challenges posed by adverse conditions remains difficult. One one hand, the jack-up legs greatly enhance stability and reduce risk of damage from adverse weather. Observers have only witnessed operational exercises in calm waters, however, that operational exercises, however, leaving their level of protection therefore unknown. We spoke to a source who raised additional concerns, notably the vessels’ weight and the composition of the sea floor. [source]
Moreover, whether or not the landing is successful, historic examples demonstrate that breaking out of the beachhead itself can be extremely difficult and costly. Note, for example, the perilous nature of the Normandy landings. With such slow velocity, a good weather window and solid oceanographical and meteorological predictions are therefore essential, our source notes. [source]
Furthermore, the Shuiqiao barges are vulnerable targets to defence assets from land, air, or sea. Not only are they large, highly visible, and difficult to manoeuvre at speed, their defence mechanisms are also limited. If one vessel were damaged, it is also uncertain whether the remaining ships could deliver the load to shore successfully. [source]
5 Political Context and Significance
It is no secret that China seeks “reunification” with the island of Taiwan, be it peacefully or by force. After recent military drills announced by Taipei in February 2025, China’s defence ministry warned Taiwan, “we will come and get you sooner or later”. The line drew particular attention in China for closely echoing a quote from Ne Zha 2, a popular children’s film. [source, source, source]
The development of the Shuiqiao vessels highlights China’s dedication under Xi Jinping to prepare for a large-scale invasion of Taiwan. Experts view their construction and testing as a clear indication that the PLA navy is becoming increasingly prepared. Indeed, many believe it is on track to field the capabilities necessary to launch an invasion by Xi’s 2027 target. Beijing has publicised no such evidence, however, to confirm or deny this claim. [source, source]
6 The Future
6.1 Purpose and Strategic Intent
It is unambiguously clear that the Shuiqiao barges are purpose-built for a likely cross-Strait invasion of Taiwan. Primarily designed to offload heavy armoured vehicles from large ships, these vessels are not intended for the initial assault phase. Instead, the Shuiqiaos serve as critical enablers for follow-on echelons, delivering large volumes of vehicles, personnel, and material to shore. [source, source, source]
According to a US Naval War College’s CMSI report, it is likely that Beijing is expanding its “amphibious sealift capacity”. This includes a wider range of viable landing points, facilitating access to previously unsuitable sites, such as damaged ports, seawalls, or blocked coastal roads. The Shuiqiaos’s advanced design therefore allows the ships to operate beyond well-defended areas and withstand adverse weather conditions. [source, source]
6.2 China’s Mission
According to Professor Erickson of the China Maritime Studies Institute, for the Shuiqiaos to be deployed, China’s military would need to gain effective control over the sea and air. This would require China to first disable Taiwan’s direct and indirect fire systems. Once achieved, the barges could then help address China’s historic challenge with “non-pier” operations by removing the need to seize functional ports before deploying heavy forces ashore. [source, source]
On their own, the Shuiqiaos do not pose a direct threat. They are, however, a clear indication of China’s broader, escalating preparations for a potential invasion of Taiwan. Indeed, experts note that the barges represent significant advances in technology and military capability. As such, the PLA may now be in a stronger position to accelerate its plans for a large-scale cross-strait operation, potentially aligning with Xi Jinping’s reported goal of military readiness by 2027. [source, source, source, source]
7 Conclusion
The new Shuiqiaos vessels therefore reflect China’s drive to expand capabilities and strategic options for a potential amphibious invasion. While in isolation, the Shuiqiao ships do not threaten Taiwan’s security, the ships significantly enhance China’s operational reach. Indeed, they fulfil a long-standing goal to efficiently deploy large numbers of troops, vehicles, and materiel during amphibious landings. Despite their inherent vulnerabilities–limited defensive capability, slow speed, and susceptibility to weather damage, the Shuiqiao ships represent a practical solution to the significant logistical challenges of delivering equipment and vehicles, and conducting joint over-the-shore logistics.
Their versatility, self-propulsion systems, and ability to transfer troops and vehicles without a port mark a substantial step forward in China’s over-the-shore logistics. In essence, the Shuiqiaos are more than just a technological advancement. They are tangible proof of China’s strategic focus and investment in overcoming operational challenges and underscore Xi Jinping’s ambition to prepare the PLA for potential action by 2027.