1.0 Introduction
The history of war shows that conflict can be a catalyst for technological advancements. The situation in Ukraine is no exception. It highlights a new dimension of the importance of drones in modern large-scale combat operations (LSCO). Both sides are advancing their research and development of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) for battlefield applications, with production going into the millions of units per year. [source, source]
Many observers and analysts conclude that drones will be a decisive factor in the outcome of events in Ukraine. Kyiv’s recent development of the Sting drone coincides with Ukraine’s announcement to create a separate military branch for Unmanned Systems Forces. [source]
Sting is an “anti-drone drone.” Its main purpose is to take down other drones, specifically the Iranian-designed Shaded 136, which is locally produced in Russia under the name of Geran 2. Sting provides a cost-effective way to boost Ukraine’s air defence, which often is overwhelmed by the high number of drones and missiles deployed by Russia. [source, source]
2.0 Sting Specifications
The publicly known technical details of the Sting as of this writing include:
- Altitude: 3000 m (10000ft)
- Speed: 160 kph (100mph) or up to 320 kph (198 mph), according to varying sources
- Operation: Ground-based operation by a pilot with virtual reality (VR) goggles. Future modifications might include artificial intelligence (AI) for optimised targeting.
- Cost: No official price is published yet, however the drone is supposed to be much cheaper than the average USD $20,000 for a Shahed drone.
- Design: The sting features a quadcopter design with a dome on the top, which houses the camera system and warhead. [source, source, source]
2.1 Manufacturer
The Sting was developed by the Ukrainian volunteer-based non-profit charity Wild Hornets, which specialises in the production of first-person-view (FPV) drones. They rely largely on donations and crowdfunding but also collaborate with the Ukrainian military. According to Wild Hornets, they have approximately 45 engineers and manufacture circa 100 drones daily. About 70% of the components are local.
In addition to the Sting, which is designed to target larger UAVs, the organisation also produces:
- Standard Wild Hornets, a FPV “kamikaze” quadcopter drone with a payload of 1.5 – 3 kilograms (3.2-6.5 pounds) and speeds of up to 160 kph (100 mph);
- The Queen Hornet, a larger bomber drone with a payload of up to 5 kilogram (11-pound) bombs with a range of 30 kilometres (18.6 miles);
- Interceptors, drones specifically designed to intercept Russian reconnaissance drones in flight. They are equipped with improved cameras and batteries to enable air-to-air intercepts. [source, source]
3.0 Operational Purpose
Both sides of the conflict previously have used drones to attack other drones. What makes the Sting unique, however, is its tailored purpose: to engage and destroy the Shahed 136.
The Shahed 136 “kamikaze” drones are frequently used by Russia and are designed to attack ground targets and infrastructure. As a type of loitering munition, they hover above their targets before diving onto them and detonating their payload. The goal of the Sting is to be a fast and versatile counter-drone in order to respond to this significant threat. (According to President Zelensky, Russian forces have launched over 6100 drones against Ukrainian troops since the beginning of 2024.) [source, source]
4.0 The Cost Factor
In a war of attrition, such as in Ukraine, economic factors are crucial to military success. The ratio between the costs of the target and interceptor is important for sustained air defence. Additionally, Ukraine relies on Western countries to deliver much of its air defence capabilities. Currently, much of Ukraine’s defence against drones relies on surface-to-air capabilities, like the US-delivered Norwegian NASAMS or the German Iris-T SLS systems. Missiles for such systems can cost up to USD $1 million per unit and are in limited supply, making them an unsustainable choice for a large amount of low-altitude targets. By employing more cost-effective solutions like the Sting, Ukraine can preserve its missile systems for higher-value targets. [source, source]
5.0 Conclusion
The Sting represents a new line of advancement in the ever-evolving military research efforts of the Ukraine war. Its specific purpose of intercepting the Shahed-136 highlights the need for diverse means of defence against aerial threats. Given Ukraine’s limited advanced production capabilities and high reliance Western support, a self-developed counter-drone can contribute to a better integrated air defence. While its efficacy remains to be tested in more extensive combat and it is yet unclear whether enough units will be produced to meet the threat, the Sting promises to be a cost-effective interceptor.
One outstanding feature of this drone is its manufacturer. Wild Hornets demonstrates that innovative solutions can originate from local engineers volunteering for a cause. Similar efforts also exist in Russia. [source]
As the conflict continues, if current trends hold, we will likely see more advancements in drone technology from both local volunteer groups and government-contracted defence companies.
