1 Introduction
The Iranian Intelligence Community is a robust conglomerate of different organizations dedicated to internal security, stability, and external influence operations. Their capabilities range from traditional information collection through developed human sources to clandestine targeting programs against political dissidents. The Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) is, in theory, the main intelligence agency in the country, but the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) normally acts as a parallel and more powerful security apparatus, both in overt missions and covert action. Another dozen information services, counting the cybercrime division of the national police and the internal affairs units of the judiciary system, are also part of the intelligence community.
Images Sourced From: Islam Times, Washington Institute
2 History
2.1 Intelligence under the Imperial State of Iran
The Bureau for Intelligence and Security of the State (SAVAK) was the secret police of the Imperial State of Iran. The Pahlavi Dynasty established the service in Tehran to counter political and religious activism inside the Iranian Republic from 1957 to 1979. Prime Minister Shapour Bakhtiar dissolved the agency after the overthrow of the monarchy in the Islamic Revolution.
Iranian-American political scholar Gholam Reza Afkhami estimates that the agency had between 4,000 and 6,000 members at the peak of its power. Other sources backed the claim and estimated 5,000 agents, with 3000 in central staff and 2000 in supporting roles, including management of independent detention centers from political prisoners. [source]
The “Komiteh” as it was also known, attained a macabre reputation for widespread torture as an interrogation technique. Reports from Qezel Hesar and Gohar Dasht documented how senior officers were trained to apply sleep deprivation, nail extractions, mock executions, cigarette burns, electrical shocks and sexual abuse on civilian detainees. [source]

Prisoners were also humiliated by being urinated on and forced to stand naked. Despite these newer methods, the torture of choice continued to be the traditional physical beatdown. Out of the 368 suspected terrorists or guerrillas killed by Imperial State agents between 1971 and 1977, 45 died in captivity, presumed under torture.
Journalist Ryszard Kapuściński stated that the monarchy’s intelligence was not only responsible for the surveillance and detention of political opponents, but also for managing the censorship of books and films. By the end of 1975, 22 prominent poets, novelists, professors, theater directors, and filmmakers were in jail for criticizing the regime.
2.1.1 Shutdown of the SAVAK
The Bureau for Intelligence and Security of the State (SAVAK) was closed down in February 1979 following the Islamic Revolution and was replaced by the Ministry of Intelligence and National Security of Iran (SAVAMA). Ayatollah Khomeini and the Revolutionary tribunal punished some of the SAVAK agents, but the structure and personnel remained all the same under SAVAMA. [source]
2.2 Intelligence under the Islamic Republic of Iran
The Ministry of Intelligence and National Security of Iran (SAVAMA) retained the personnel and structure of the Bureau for Intelligence and Security of the State (SAVAK) as it became the secret service of the ayatollahs. Ali Tabatabai, former counselor at the Iranian embassy in Washington under the shah, declared that only the bureau chiefs were sacked in the transition.
An Amnesty International report on executions in Iran after the Khomeini takeover documented at least 83 deaths of former SAVAK members at the hands of revolutionary committees. These improvised tribunals convicted officers of serving as interrogators, torturers, and assassins before executing them by firing squad. [source]
Regarding internal administration, nine bureaus covered intelligence personnel management, collection of foreign intelligence, collection of domestic intelligence, and counterintelligence surveillance of its personnel. Additionally, it was in charge of the physical security of government buildings and the recruitment and training of future intelligence officers.

General Hossein Fardoust, who was deputy chief under the former shah, was named as the new head of the agency. Although the service maintained the same structure, the rest of the intelligence community did not. Other groups entered the national picture as the Iranian intelligence apparatus grew over the next four decades in number of agencies and operational capabilities. [source]
The Ministry of Intelligence and National Security of Iran (SAVAMA) was renamed the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and put under the command of the executive branch. Meanwhile, the defense conglomerate created the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Intelligence Organization (IRGC-IO) as an exterior service for military influence and covert operations.
These two services became the main reference in domestic and foreign intelligence among the sixteen-organizations national intelligence community. Eventually, their areas of responsibilities and influences started to overlap as a reflection of the power dynamics inside the regime. [source]
3 Organization

3.1 Overlapping Responsibilities
The Iranian Regime is a complex structure defined by power struggles, and the intelligence conglomerate is no exception in a system where mandates clash and responsibilities overlap. Tensions in the Iranian Intelligence Community are both a reflection of the battles for control of the country’s economic and political spheres and a consequence of a system designed to prevent a monopoly on information.
The Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Intelligence Organization (IRGC-IO) are the main services in the security apparatus. Theoretically, the former sits at the top of the organizational structure and is regarded as a more traditional service with a heavy bureaucratic structure. The latter is perceived as a parallel militia for clandestine operations.
The MOI is a cabinet-level agency. The head, the Minister of Intelligence, is appointed by Iran’s president, the second-ranking official in the Iranian system. This gives the president a degree of authority over the MOI, which he lacks over IRGC intelligence. However, a special law dictates that the Minister of Intelligence must always be a cleric, giving the supreme leader, who sits atop Iran’s clerical hierarchy, additional influence over the ministry.
According to the US Congressional Research Service, the MOIS “is the most powerful and well-supported ministry among all ministries in terms of logistics and finances.” The IRGC, however, expanded its influence sphere and gained the upper hand in internal politics and overseas operations during the Mahmoud Ahmadinejad administration in 2005 and 2013. [source]
3.1.1 Counterintelligence
Iran possesses autonomous counterintelligence divisions in every service of its security apparatus. Said bureaus are not only tasked with protecting the homeland against foreign threats and infiltration by adversaries, but also with the internal surveillance of service members. Some of the most well known counterintelligence divisions in the intelligence community are:
- Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Counterintelligence Organization
- Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Artesh) Counterintelligence Organization
- Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Counterintelligence Organization
- Cyber Police (FATA) Counterintelligence
- Judiciary Counterintelligence Center
- Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) Counterintelligence Organization
The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) assesses the Iranian Counterintelligence Services as “capable of sophisticated operations worldwide to counter potential threats to the regime, its revolutionary ideology, and its interests.“ Their operations are nominally coordinated by the General Office of Counterintelligence, which reports to the supreme leader as commander-in-chief. [source]
3.2 Parallel Militaries
Iran’s Armed Forces are characterized by a dual military system consisting of two major components, similar to the parallel system seen in the intelligence community. The Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Artesh) is tasked with traditional territorial defense roles, while the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is charged with preserving internal stability and safeguarding national interest overseas.
The Islamic Revolution designed the parallel system to prevent domestic challenges to central authority, even at the cost of military effectiveness. Iran’s dual system has created a visible division between a classic military and a political formation. Artesh commanders have publicly criticized the Guards behavior regarding ideological showboating and political influence. [source]
Further examples of the divide between the services can be found in the budget. Teherán defense spending assigned $6.96 billion to the IRGC in 2020, while the larger conventional military only received $2.73 billion during the same year. Said difference in funding reflects the Guard’s importance as Iran’s most powerful security and military organization over the Artesh. [source]

3.2.1 Islamic Republic of Iran Army (Artesh)
The Artesh is the conventional military structure of Iran with four separate service branches: the Islamic Republic of Iran Army Ground Forces, the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force, the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy and the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Defense Force. Its annual budget is estimated to be around USD 18.4 billion for a manpower of 420,000 conscripts and soldiers. [source]
The Ground Forces have 130,000 soldiers and 220,000 conscripts divided into 32 territorial divisions. The Artesh’s Navy and Air Force are composed of at least 18,000 and 37,000 personnel in each branch. Beyond their mission to form the first line of defense against invading enemies, the Artesh does not have political influence and is considered underequipt in contrast with their parallel structure.
Iran’s current doctrine and strategy is primarily defensive. Ayatollah Khamenei does not seek military confrontation outside of proxy actions and clandestine operations. Because of this, Artesh has been at a disadvantage on assigned resources and recruiting numbers, as efforts are focused on unconventional capabilities to advance national interests in neighbouring countries.
3.2.2 Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is a parallel armed forces structure tasked with being the constitutionally mandated custodians of the Islamic Revolution, and it is trusted by the ruling clerical elite as the more reliable component of the Iranian Armed Forces. The IRGC focuses on internal security and external defense through irregular warfare and clandestine operations.
Ayatollah Khomeini created the organisation after the Iranian Revolution to enforce his mandate and safeguard the revolution. Since then, the Guards have played a unique role inside Iran as the most influential force within the security apparatus and the defense conglomerate, even going as far as gaining control over Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal and external intelligence operations. [source]
The IRGC operates with a high degree of autonomy from the rest of the intelligence community through a parallel independent ground force, as well as its own sea and air service branches. Additional capabilities of the Guards lie in its asymmetric warfare elite group, known as the Quds Force, and proxy militias such as Hezbollah in Lebanon or Popular Mobilization Units in Iraq.
3.3 Supreme National Security Council (SNSC)
The Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) is the homeland defense governing body. Among its responsibilities are “determining the defense and national security policies of the country within the framework of general policies determined by the leader” and “the coordination of political and intelligence general policies within the security and defense national community.” [source]
Furthermore, it formulates the country’s nuclear policy and usually has the last word on foreign policy decisions. This National Security Council is mandated by Article 176 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran to be presided over by the president of the country. Secretaries of the council are directly appointed by the executive branch and the religious leaders.
Akbar Ahmadian, a career paramilitary officer with studies in strategic management, is the current head of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). Ayatollah Seyyed Ebrahim Raisi brought Akbar Ahmadian from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) strategic centre and appointed him to the position to replace Admiral Shamkhani. [source]
3.4 Intelligence Coordination Council (ICC)
The Intelligence Coordination Council (ICC) is the official designation for the Iranian Intelligence Community. The Council is composed of at least 12 to 16 separate and competing active intelligence agencies, including the ones from the Judiciary Police, Minister of Defense, Cyber Police, Ground Forces, Criminal Investigations, and the Nuclear Program Counter Intelligence Unit.
Appointed officials like the Ministers of Intelligence, Interior, and Foreign Affairs and the country’s chief justice take part in the council, but it is Ayatollah Khamenei who chooses the majority of the senior staffers from the existing agencies, based on political influence and general performance. The Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) is the lead of the council by official decree.
Ayatollah Khamenei can also oversee any aspect of the council he deems appropriate for the defense of the homeland and the revolution. It is safe to assume that the Iranian Regime sees no need to centralize intelligence, and that keeping a strong hold over competing agencies in the intelligence community provides a safe system to manage power and prevent a monopoly on information.
4 Intelligence Agencies
According to a report by Teheran official media, the Iranian Intelligence Community is composed of between 12 and 16 active information and counterespionage services.
The Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS)
The Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) is, in theory, the primary civilian intelligence service. Iran’s congress created the institution in 1983 for “gathering, procurement, analysis, and classification of necessary information inside and outside the country.” Principal activities of the 30,000 strong ministry focus on surveillance of perceived domestic enemies, such as political dissidents or religious minorities. All other intelligence agencies are technically required to share information with the ministry, as it chairs the Intelligence Coordination Council.

The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Intelligence Organization (IRGC-IO)
The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Intelligence Organization (IRGC-IO) is a parallel intelligence service that exercises primary dominance over external clandestine operations and, to some extent, works to prevent internal political influence operations. Examples include the training of proxy groups as well as clandestine assassination programs. Originally it was known as the Revolutionary Guard Intelligence Directorate until Mahmoud Ahmadinejad changed the name during the Green Movement internal unrest. [source]

Artesh Directorate for Intelligence (J2)
Artesh Directorate for Intelligence (J2) is an old fashion traditional military service for the Islamic Republic of Iran Army, tasked with conducting tactical level intelligence operations to enhance the operational capabilities of the conventional military. J2 is composed of different members of the different services branches, it also has a sister counterintelligence component called the Artesh Counterintelligence Organization

Center for Investigating Organized Cybercrime Insignia (CDH)
Center for Investigating Organized Cybercrime Insignia (CDH) is a Republican Guard cyber unit tasked with the censorship and prosecution of online activism. Unlike the civilian police cyber unit that monitors possible online criminal activity, this parallel service only tracks threats related to politics. The IRGC launched the service in 2007 as Center for Investigating Organized Crime, but renamed it the Center for Investigating Organized Cybercrime in 2015. [source]

Law Enforcement Command (LEC)
Law Enforcement Command (LEC) was established in 1991 as a unified conglomerate of different civilian police departments dedicated to intelligence. The Law Enforcement Command (LEC) was preceded by the Public Security and Intelligence Police (PAVA) and the Law Enforcement Forces (LEF). Currently, it is under the Armed Forces General Staff along with two other civilian police intelligence services: The Cyber Police (FATA) and Police Counterintelligence (LEC-CI).

Nuclear Program Counter Intelligence Unit (OGHAB 2)
Nuclear Program Counter Intelligence Unit (OGHAB 2) is the security service in charge of the protection of the Iranian nuclear program, including its personnel and equipment. According to think tank research reports, the organisation has reported both to the MOIS and IRGC since its creation in 2005. The US Library of Congress estimates that at least 10,000 intelligence agents have served in the secret unit since 2012. [source]
Judiciary Counterintelligence Center
The Judiciary Counterintelligence Center is a security institution created in 2001 to consolidate different internal affairs departments within the local courts. Hojatoleslam Ali Abdallahi, a former judge in the religious courts, is the reported current head of the apparatus. Abdallahi said that Ayatollah Khamenei gave him orders to cleanse the judiciary of corruption through internal surveillance and counterintelligence operations. It also pinned last year’s protest on “unhealthy and ineffective people being placed” in the wrong government positions. [source]

The Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL)
The Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) is a military organisation with counterintelligence capabilities. Officially it is tasked with preventing the Ministry of Defense from infiltration attempts by foreign threats. Like the majority of the military services in the intelligence community, it is unofficially overseen and controlled by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Rahim Yaqoubi, a deputy head from the former militia, leads the agency.

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5 Key Figures
- Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Supreme Leader of Iran
- Masoud Pezeshkiani, President of Iran
- Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, Secretary of the Guardian Council
- Esmail Khatib, Minister of Intelligence
- Ahmad-Reza Radan, Commander of the Law Enforcement Command
- Brigadier General Esmail Qaani, Quds Force Commander
- Eskandar Momeni, Interior Minister
- Gholamhossein Mohseni-Ejei, Head of Iran’s Judiciary
- Mohammad-Reza Ashtiani, Minister of Defense
- Shahram Irani, Artesh Navy Commander
6 Allies and Proxies
6.1 Allied Foreign States and Intelligence Services
Iran usually relies on non-state armed actors, like criminal gangs or militant groups, for intelligence matters. However, cooperation with other foreign states and security services have improved and evolved significantly over the last decades. Russia and Venezuela, alongside Yemen and Sudan, are the principal allies of the security apparatus. Moscow has provided Teheran with military support, including advanced weaponry and training, while also offering diplomatic cover in international forums. In return, the Ayatollahs shared intelligence reports with the Kremlin, regarding regional threats, particularly concerning extremist terrorism. [source] [source]
Despite their cooperation with military advisors on Syria or suicide drones in Ukranie, there are underlying tensions. Iran’s aspirations for greater regional dominance sometimes clash with Russia’s interests, particularly in Central Asia. While both countries benefit from their partnership, they remain cautious of each other’s long-term intentions. Venezuela on the other hand, tends to support Iranian operations and proxies through logistics in exchange for economic relief and military support. Recently, a Venezuelan airframe was seized in Argentina while transporting Iranian operatives. [source]
6.2 Proxies Groups
Iranian proxy groups in the Middle East play a significant role in shaping the region’s geopolitical landscape. These groups, often armed and funded by Iran, serve as instruments of Tehran’s intelligence collection and direct action, allowing it to extend its influence and counter adversaries, particularly the United States and Saudi Arabia, as well as Israel and Iraq. Below is an overview of some of the most prominent Iranian proxy groups and their activities across the region.
- Hezbollah (Lebanon) is perhaps the most well-known Iranian proxy. Founded in the early 1980s, this Shiite militant group has received substantial military and financial support from Iran. Hezbollah operates as both a political party and a military organization, with significant political power in Lebanon, influencing government decisions and policies.

- Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) (Iraq) are an umbrella organization of various Shiite militias in Iraq, many of which have close ties to Iran. Formed in response to the rise of ISIS, the PMF has played a crucial role in combating the terrorist group. Many PMF groups have been integrated into the Iraqi military, giving Iran a foothold in Baghdad’s security apparatus, allowing Iran to exert influence.

- Houthis (Yemen), officially known as Ansar Allah, is a Shiite rebel group. The Houthis aim to govern all of Yemen and support external movements against the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. Because of the Houthis’ ideological background, the conflict in Yemen is widely seen as a front of the Iran–Saudi Arabia proxy war.

- Islamic Jihad Movement (Gaza). Iran supports the Islamic Jihad Movement, enabling it to carry out attacks against Israeli targets. While distinct from Hamas, Islamic Jihad often collaborates with the group, furthering Iran’s agenda in the Palestinian territories.

6.3 Use of Organised Crime Networks
Iranian covert action against perceived threats and dissidents in exile is well documented, with numerous accounts of targeted assassinations and successful kidnappings around the globe. The Revolutionary Guard Corps Intelligence Organization’s (IRGC) use of gangs in the European Union for paramilitary purposes have been confirmed by both Swedish Intelligence and the Israeli Mossad, for instance.
Foxtrot and Rumba, two major indigenous players in the Scandinavian underworld, executed three armed attacks in Stockholm and two in Copenhagen during this year on behalf of the Iranian Regime. Previous investigations from authorities established that Rawa “The Kurdish Fox” Majid was reportedly recruited by IRGC while fleeing from Swedish Police. [source]
Daniel Stenling, the head of counterintelligence of the Swedish Security Service (Säkerhetspolisen) declared Iran as one of the greatest security threats to Sweden after the connection between the Tehran agents and the Stockholm gangsters was made public. Sweden and Israel collaborated on the issue through information sharing and joint investigations. [source] [source]
7 Operations
7.1 Kinetic Operations
The Iranian Intelligence Community is one of the security conglomerates with significant reach in terms of international operations. Since the eighties, the different agencies that compose the apparatus have run overt and covert intelligence operations on six continents, ranging from individual assassinations to cyber warfare to terrorist attacks. Regardring the later, the Iranian Intelligence Community was linked to suicide bombings carried out by proxies in Lebanon and Kuwait during the eighties.
Iranian agents were also cited by the Argentinian police for the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy and the 1994 bombing of a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires. The United States Department of Justice cited the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) for aiding and abetting the 1996 al Qaeda bombings of Khobar Towers. Furthermore, the same agency was named during an investigation into the foiled murder of the Saudi ambassador to Washington, Adel al Jubeir. [source] [source]
President-elect Donald Trump was also a target for Iranian Intelligence. The Federal Bureau of Investigations uncovered a Revolutionary Guard Corps plot to assassinate him before the presidential election. Documents unsealed in November indicate that one of the suspects was briefed in Tehran by intelligence agents. [source] [source]
7.2 Counterintelligence
The Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Intelligence Organization (IRGC-IO) have robust counterintelligence capabilities; both services have targeted alleged Western and Israeli spy networks in Iran. Between 2009 and 2022, Iran reportedly identified and arrested dozens of United States human intelligence assets, although it rarely provided names of the alleged spies or proof of their operations. In 2011, 72 alleged informants of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were detained under espionage charges. [source] [source]
The New York Times reported in 2020 that the Iranian Intelligence Community busted the largest Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) informants network within the country. Among the detainees were former local intelligence officers from the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). “Those who deliberately betrayed the country were handed to the judiciary with some sentenced to death and some to long-term imprisonment,” according to a media source. Iran claimed that it was the largest spy bust in years.
7.3 Cyber Vigilance
Iranian intelligence collection also heavily focuses on suppressing internal dissent, especially through online domestic surveillance. State control of communications systems means that all domestic communication within Iran has the capability to be monitored, collected and finally prosecuted. This has resulted in the arrest of thousands of citizens under cyber crime laws. The IRGC’s cyber wing detained Roya Saberi Negad Nobakht, for “insulting Islamic sanctities.” through social media posting, for instance.
Dozens of other foreign citizens from France, Australia, Canada, Germany and Sweden have also been detained for allegedly “promoting unrest and instigating chaos” during protests. Mehran Raoof, a British-Iranian labor rights activist was detained under these charges, as well as Cecile Kohler and Jacques Paris, two French nationals. Cyber Vigilance against Western nationals is a longstanding practice of the Iranian Intelligence Community. [source] [source]
7.4 Target Packages
The Atolayah’s Revolution paved the way for an aggressive campaign by Iranian Intelligence to pursue, kidnap, prosecute or assassinate dissidents abroad. Ali Akbar Tabatabai, a diplomat who served for the monarchy was murdered in his Maryland home in 1980. Four Kurdish dissidents in Germany were also murdered by suspected Iranian intelligence agents in the mid-19990. Reza Mazlouman, Deputy Minister of Education under the monarchy, was also killed by the security apparatus while living in Paris.
The Ministry for Intelligence and Security (MOIS) forced a passenger plane transiting Iranian airspace to land in southern Bandar Abbas in 2010 as part of a bigger operation to detain Abdolmalek Rigi, the leader of a militant Sunni group based in Sistan and Baluchistan province. In 2018, Denmark accused Iranian intelligence of plotting to murder at least one dissident based near Copenhagen. The United States Justice Department in 2021 charged four Iranian assets for conspiring to kidnap dissident Masih Alinejad from her Brooklyn based home. [source] [source]
Massoud Molavi Verdanjani, an online opposition activist, was shot and killed on a street in Istanbul’s Şişli neighborhood on 14 November 2019. A Turkish security official later claimed Verdanjani’s suspected killer had confessed to acting under the orders of two Iranian intelligence officers at an Iranian consulate in Turkey. In 2023, Australia claimed to have uncovered a surveillance plot against an Australian-Iranian citizen who was critical of the Islamic Republic.
7.4 Military Support
Iran’s collaboration with Hamas and Hezbollah is a significant aspect of its foreign policy, particularly in the context of the Middle East’s complex geopolitical landscape. This partnership has evolved over the years, with both groups receiving various forms of support from Iran, including military, financial, and ideological backing. Alongside those proxies, there is also the presence of Iranian advisors both in Syria and Iraq.
The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) since 2014 has stationed around 3000 officers in Syria to train local troops loyal to Bashar al Assad. Additionally, Tehran assets–along with fellow Shi’ite forces from Hezbollah and members of Iran’s Basij militia–participated in the capture of Qusair from rebel forces in June that same year. By late 2015, 194 IRGC troops had been killed in Syria; almost all of these soldiers were officers, with several even reaching the rank of Brigadier.
Two battalions of Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) were reported to be operating in Iraq trying to combat the 2014 Northern Iraq offensive. The IRGC is considered to be a principle backer of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), a loose coalition of Shi’a militias allied with the Iraqi government in its fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Major General Qasem Soleimani was an instrumental force in the Iranian ground mission in Iraq against ISIS, purportedly planning the Second Battle of Tikrit.
Iranians military advisors also collaborated with the Houthis, enabling the use of long range land to sea cruiser missiles in the Red Sea during the recent shipping offensive. Commanders from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) were reported to be helping and directing the Houthi attacks against commercial vessels. Iran also provided the Houthis with state of the art armed drones, and advanced missile targeting systems. [source] [source]

8 Future
The Iranian Intelligence Community is expected to continue evolving in signals intelligence and human intelligence capabilities. As the geopolitical landscape in the Middle East continues to shift, Teheran will likely adapt its security apparatus to address emerging threats and maintain its influence in the region. It will do this first by shielding its institutions from perceived historical threats, particularly Israel and Washington and, second, by increasing its cooperation with both Russia and China on intelligence sharing.
Additionally, the rivalry with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states will continue to influence Iranian intelligence operations. As these nations enhance their own intelligence capabilities, Iran may seek to strengthen its intelligence networks and partnerships with regional allies, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, to counterbalance these threats. This collaboration will likely focus on intelligence sharing, military training, and joint operations, further entrenching Iran’s role as a key player in regional conflicts.
Furthermore, Iran’s relationships with non-state actors in the region will remain vital. By continuing to support groups like the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq, Iran can extend its influence and gather intelligence through these proxies. This strategy not only allows Iran to project power but also provides it with a network of informants and operatives that can be leveraged for intelligence purposes.
9 Conclusion
The Iranian Intelligence Community is a complicated mix of competing organizations that engage in surveillance and reconnaissance, both in terms of overt observation and clandestine collection by its intelligence services and proxy assets. The Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) is responsible for internal operations with traditional means, while the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is in charge of covert operations overseas and possesses a greater influence within the security apparatus. Dozens of agencies also compete for power within the Iranian Regime as their responsibilities constantly overlap each other.
Iran is able to effectively collect intelligence and surveillance in areas where it has a strong ground level presence–Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and, to a lesser extent, the United States and the European Union–where covert action is delegated to criminal organizations and diplomatic assets. Iran’s military footprint in the Middle East has also increased its ability to conduct overt and covert intelligence activities from fixed sites outside of Iran, which is likely enabled by the establishment of forward collection sites in areas where proxies groups have a heavy presence. These sites not only act as an operating base for human assets, but also a steady platform for the monitoring of telecommunications systems.